In this essay, I want to explore one of the most ironic episodes in the history of propaganda, the attempt by various federal agencies to moderate American WWII anti-Japanese propaganda films. My texts will be four films, two produced by the military, and two by Hollywood: December 7th (1943), directed by Gregg Toland and revised by John Ford; Air Force (1943), directed Howard Hawks; Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945), directed by Frank Capra; and Betrayal for the East (1945), directed by (...) William Berke. As all of these films are readily available on YouTube, I will be brief in my description of them. Instead, I will focus on how they served to intensify racial hatred of Japanese in general and Japanese-Americans in particular, and how the federal government tried to control that propaganda—but was limited by its own policies regarding Japanese-Americans. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 211-222 [Access article in PDF] Criticism and the Terror of Nothingness C. Jason Lee DESTINY IS OFTEN ANOTHER NAME for narrative, it being the order we retrospectively find in scattered events. It is traditionally the role of the storyteller to create a believable narrative, with the reader investing attention into believing the story while the critic dissects the results to ascertain whether the (...) magic works. As Wallace Stevens put it, "we orchestrate a whole history and then imprison ourselves in the score, as if someone else had written it." 1 In the author's note to the second edition (1962) of Wise Blood (1949) Flannery O'Connor makes the point that her novel is a comic novel, yet its comedy does not lessen the depth of understanding it offers concerning the complexity of freedom. 2 The obsession with fate and destiny that swamps her characters, leads the reader into a gothic nightmare where humans in their attempt to re-create themselves dig themselves further into the graves of their dead relatives. For O'Connor free will does not mean one will but many wills conflicting in one man, and she explains the integrity of the central character of Wise Blood, Hazel Motes, as stemming from his vigorous attempts to rid himself of the "ragged figure who moves from tree to tree in the back of his mind."This figure is the Jesus of his grandfather, and it is also the religious preoccupation of the Deep South. Destiny has shaped his features and his character in the mold of his grandfather, and whomever he meets believes he too is a preacher. After establishing the Church Without Christ, like many sons attempting to shake off their origin, Hazel Motes realizes that his new way of behaving is in some sense being controlled [End Page 211] by his past and that he must shake off all vestiges to possess freedom. One might argue that, by eventually blinding himself, Hazel Motes is behaving as a soul who has given into the temptation of purgation, as if this is destiny. But it can be argued that this act is going against destiny, as it is an act that is perhaps trying to persuade God of something, despite the Oedipal connotations.Questioned by his landlady why he blinded himself he says to pay, and when asked to pay for what, he replies it does not matter what. Mrs. Flood is frightened of death, particularly death being one long blind existence, and Hazel Motes is a reminder to her of her destiny. This can be read as a judgment on life also. Yet she eventually decides to take care of him, for both altruistic and materialistic reasons, believing that his widow would inherit his war pension. Mrs. Flood, her name evocative of apocalyptic occurrences and Old Testament punishment, is a critic of the text; the text in this instance is nothing written but rather Motes himself. It seems that Hazel Motes, his name a reference to taking the mote out of one's own eye before you try and take the splinter out of another's, is punishing himself for his previous denial of Christ and for his sins, such as fornication, as with Mrs. Watts the prostitute and Sabbath Hawks, and murder, but also something more primal.After trying desperately to break the curse of his biological inheritance, his wise blood, just like the character Enoch Emery, it forces him to once again take on roles that deny him freedom. Hazel Motes may seem to a contemporary reader as a caricature, the mad preacher/antipreacher of the American South, but as V. S. Pritchett puts it, Hazel Motes is "entirely real" (p. viii). His self-blinding is part of his further alienation from the world, the world he has come back to after the "Great War." O'Connor shows how this watershed in human history was so devastating, Motes's new theology entirely rational. After having an insight into the world in reality through war, Hazel Motes is now "going to do some things... (shrink)

When one thinks—knows, believes, imagines—that something is the case, one’s thought has a topic: it is about something, towards which one’s mind is directed. What is the logic of thought, so understood? This book begins to explore the idea that, to answer the question, we should take topics seriously. It proposes a hyperintensional account of the propositional contents of thought, arguing that these are individuated not only by the set of possible worlds at which they are true, but also by (...) their topic: what they are about. The book then builds epistemic, doxastic, probabilistic, and conditional logics based on this view. It applies them to issues ranging from dogmatism, scepticism, and epistemic fallibilism, to imagination and suppositional reasoning, belief revision, framing effects, and the acceptability of indicative conditionals. (shrink)

Suppose all of the particles in the universe should happen to come to rest at the same time, in positions so arranged that all of the forces on every particle balance to zero at that time. What would happen next? Or rather, what does Newtonian mechanics say will happen next? Preface Inertia and Stasis 2.1 Stating the Law of Inertia more precisely 2.2 The stasis scenario Indeterministic Examples 3.1 Abstract example 3.2 Second example Non-Lipschitz Forces and Determinism Beyond the Stasis (...) Scenario CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In talking about the compatibility of quantum observables, discussions often center on the question of whether the corresponding operators commute—even though commutativity is a coarse-grained notion that largely fails to capture the salient “nonclassical” features of quantum theory. Often, too, such discussions involve the issue of whether the operators in question satisfy a Heisenberg-like inequality, of the form ΔA·ΔB≥r>0—even though such inequalities are specific to unbounded operators and (for this and other reasons) are typically not a useful way to discuss (...) joint uncertainty in quantum mechanics. In the present paper we emphasize a simpler dichotomy, in which operator pairs (A, B) are classified according to whether or not states can be found with arbitrarily small dispersions in both A and B. If A and B cannot be made arbitrarily dispersionless simultaneously, then we call A and B an uncertainty pair. Otherwise, we call A and B a certainty pair. An interesting feature of uncertainty pairs in particular is that they are stable, in the sense that if A and B form an uncertainty pair, then slight enough perturbations of A and B must also form an uncertainty pair. This stability, obvious in the finite-dimensional case, follows in general from an operator inequality derived herein. A consequence of this inequality is that perturbed position and momentum operators X+δX and P+δP cannot share an eigenvector unless |δX|·|δP|≥ℏ/2. (Here vertical bars denote the operator norm.) This, despite the fact that (as we show) arbitrarily slight perturbations of X and P can fail to satisfy a Heisenberg inequality—a fact which raises interesting measurement issues in its own right. (shrink)

A general feature of our moral psychology is that we feel that some moral demands are motivated externally. Stanford explains this feature with an evolutionary account, such that moral externalism was selected for its ability to facilitate prosocial interactions. Alternatively, I argue that a cognitive, non-selectionist account of moral externalism is a more parsimonious explanation.

Subjectivists about practical normativity hold that an agent’s favoring and disfavoring attitudes give rise to practical reasons. On this view, an agent’s normative reason to choose vanilla over chocolate ice cream ultimately turns on facts about what appeals to her rather than facts about what her options are like attitude-independently. Objectivists—who ground reasons in the attitude-independent features of the things we aim at—owe us an explanation of why it is rational to choose what we favor, if not because favoring is (...) a source of reasons. My aim in this paper is to supply such a story. The proposal is roughly that when an agent cannot base her choices on her judgments about what she has most reason to do, structural rationality extends to her a license to choose something just because she favors it, without imbuing favoring with the authority of a normative reason. (shrink)

Eudaimonistic theorists of welfare have recently attacked conative accounts of welfare. Such accounts, it is claimed, are unable to classify states normally associated with physical and emotional health as non-instrumentally good and states associated with physical and psychological damage as non-instrumentally bad. However, leading eudaimonistic theories such as the self-fulfillment theory and developmentalism have problems of their own. Furthermore, conative theorists can respond to this challenge by dispositionalizing their theories, i.e., by saying that it is not merely the realization of (...) one’s values that is non-instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one’s values is also non-instrumentally good for one. This approach, properly elaborated, can accommodate the idea that, in many cases, states normally associated with physical and psychological health (or unhealth) are non-instrumentally good (or bad). It also preserves the many well-known advantages of conative theories. (shrink)

In Our Best Interest argues that it is permissible to intervene in a person's affairs whenever doing so serves her best interest without wronging others. Jason Hanna makes the case for paternalism, responding to common objections that paternalism is disrespectful or that it violates rights, and arguing that popular anti-paternalist views confront serious problems.

Antiquated Classical pictures of the universe have been formative in shaping the modern idea that, to the extent change is caused, it is fixed in advance. This idea has played a role in making it seem to many that what we are discovering through science supports the exclusion of free will from models for the relevant neural and bodily changes. I argue that giving up this unwarranted notion about causation opens us to the likelihood that how a person expresses free (...) will offers unique explanatory value. I then briefly discuss some further issues with either including or excluding expressions of free will from our explanations, as well as some implications for AI and everyday life. (shrink)

“Libertarian paternalism” aims to harness cognitive biases in order to improve prudential decision-making. Some critics have objected that libertarian paternalism is wrongly manipulative. I argue that this objection is mostly unsuccessful. First, I point out that some strategies endorsed by libertarian paternalists can help people to better appreciate reasons. Second, I develop an account of manipulation according to which an agent manipulates her target by worsening the target’s deliberative position. The means of influence defended by libertarian paternalists—for instance, the judicious (...) use of default rules—are not manipulative in this way. (shrink)

In De interpretatione 9, Aristotle argues against the fatalist view that if statements about future contingent singular events (e.g. ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ ‘There will not be a sea battle tomorrow’) are already true or false, then the events to which those statements refer will necessarily occur or necessarily not occur. Scholars have generally held that, to refute this argument, Aristotle allows that future contingent statements are exempt from either the principle of bivalence, or the law of (...) excluded middle. This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s refutation of fatalism. According to this interpretation, each member of a pair of contradictory future contingent statements, in virtue of expressing modal necessity, is simply false. (shrink)

Two-tiered mixed theories of punishment hold that legislatures should act according to consequentialism, but the judiciary should act according to retributivism. A major motivation for these theories is wanting to preserve the idea that punishment is ultimately justified on consequentialist grounds, without falling prey to the Punishing the Innocent objection. Yet this benefit is illusory. While two-tiered mixed theories successfully avoid the Punishing the Innocent objection narrowly construed, they do not successfully escape the point behind it. This is because cases (...) can be constructed with the same problems as those used to describe the classic Punishing the Innocent objection, just bumped up to the legislature. (shrink)

I present an account of epistemic autonomy as a distinctively wide-ranging epistemic virtue, one that helps us to understand a range of phenomena that might otherwise seem quite disparate – from the appropriate selection of epistemic methods, stances and topics of inquiry, to the harms of epistemic oppression, gaslighting and related phenomena. The account draws on four elements commonly incorporated into accounts of personal autonomy: (i) self-governance, (ii) authenticity, (iii) self-creation and (iv) independence. I further argue that for a distinctively (...) epistemic virtue of autonomy; the above elements must ultimately reliably lead to valuable epistemic goods (for the agent herself and others). I then turn to the domains or ways in which epistemic autonomy so understood, can be made manifest. I suggest that epistemic autonomy is a virtue that allows us to appropriately choose (i) subject matters and areas of inquiry, (ii) methods, sources, and processes of belief formation, (iii) epistemic goals and (iv) epistemic stances or frameworks. So understood, epistemic autonomy has a role to play in shaping most every aspect of our epistemic lives. (shrink)

This chapter surveys libertarian thought on the question of “historic injustice,” which is when serious injustice goes unresolved for many years. After some historical discussion of early libertarian writing on the subject, I turn to the contemporary debate surrounding reparations for slavery. After outlining three arguments common among libertarians for reparations, common reasons for skepticism are also discussed. Then, special focus is given to the topic of land theft. In particular, I hone in on what I call the “Poisoning Problem,” (...) or the idea that natural rights approaches to property fail because so much of actually-existing property is founded in conquest. In the conclusion, I highlight two areas where libertarian writing on historic injustice is relatively quiet compared with broader writing on these topics: reparations of a less material sort and transitional injustice. Throughout this chapter, I typically refer to American slavery and land theft, but the discussion is meant to apply much further than those two cases. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the emerging field of comparative metaethics by offering a reconstruction of the metaethical views implicit to the Daoist classic, the Laozi 老子 or Daodejing 道德經. It offers two novel views developed out of the Laozi: one-all value monism and moral trivialism. The paper proceeds by discussing Brook Ziporyn’s reading of the Laozi in terms of omnipresence and irony, and then applies his reading to moral properties like values and names (ming 名). The paper emboldens Ziporyn’s monistic (...) tendencies in order to claim that the Laozi not only treats the Dao as an omnipresent value, but also as the one value that is all values. I call this view one-all value monism. I then argue that, in terms of moral epistemology, one-all value monism entails moral trivialism, the view that all moral judgments are true. I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for holding such apparently outrageous metaethical views. The paper thus defends the basic claim that there is a point at which Ziporyn’s omnipresence and irony become monism and true contradiction, and that further exploring the consequences of these inevitable transitions leads to the discovery of novel metaethical views. (shrink)

Responsibility for Human Rights provides an original theoretical analysis of which global actors are responsible for human rights, and why. It does this through an evaluation of the different reasons according to which such responsibilities might be assigned: legalism, universalism, capacity and publicness. The book marshals various arguments that speak in favour of and against assigning 'responsibility for human rights' to any state or non-state actor. At the same time, it remains grounded in an incisive interpretation of the world we (...) actually live in today, including: the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, recent events in 'business and human rights' practice, and key empirical examples of human rights violations by companies. David Karp argues that relevantly public actors have specific human rights responsibility. However, states can be less public, and non-state actors can be more public, than might seem apparent at first glance. (shrink)

Despite increased philosophical and psychological work on practical wisdom, contemporary interdisciplinary wisdom research provides few specifics about how to develop wisdom (Kristjánsson 2022). This lack of practically useful guidance is due in part to the difficulty of determining how to combine the tools of philosophy and psychology to develop a plausible account of wisdom as a prescriptive ideal. Modeling wisdom on more ordinary forms of expertise is promising, but skill models of wisdom (Annas 2011; De Caro et al. 2018; Swartwood (...) 2013b; Tsai 2023) have been challenged on the grounds that there are important differences between wisdom and expert skills (Hacker-Wright 2015, p. 986; Kristjánsson 2015, pp. 98, 101; Stichter 2015, 2016, 2018). I’ll argue that we can both vindicate the promise of skill models of wisdom and begin to specify practically useful strategies for wisdom development by attending to a reflective process that I call Case-Based Critical Reflection. I begin by demonstrating the process as it arose in a notable example from everyday life, illustrating how the process can be usefully applied to a case study of interest to wisdom scientists, and explaining its philosophical pedigree. After isolating the key features that make it relevant to wisdom development, I argue that attending to the importance of Critical Reflection can defuse prominent objections to skill models of wisdom. (shrink)

Despite their purported demographic and institutional decline, White evangelical voters were instrumental in the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and even more so in his 2020 loss. The story of Trump’s electoral successes among Christian voters in the last two elections is in large part the story of religious nationalism—and White Christian nationalism in particular—because Trump personifies the convergence of nationalism-infused forms of messianism and apocalypticism intrinsic to White evangelicalism, which culminate in QAnon cultic ideology. However, these same ethnoreligious/nationalist (...) patterns and logics extend much further back than Trump’s insurgent candidacy. This chapter traces the recurring, resurgent patterns of “zombie nationalism” among White evangelical Christians in the United States over the last half century that emerged in response to periods of significant societal change and certain recurring sociopolitical issues. In particular, alongside established elective affinities around ethnicity (whiteness) and religion (Christianity), this chapter makes the case for incorporating gender and sexual politics as key factors in the articulation and legitimation of religious nationalism in the United States. White Christian nationalism tends to reemerge as a salient political force during periods of rapid social change and diversification, driven by racialized religious grievances symptomatic of Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment, or the paradoxical internalization and reprojection of a person’s or group’s perceived endangerment, victimhood, and/or suffering, in order to gain power. Drawing on examples of marriage equality and reproductive rights, this chapter demonstrates how an understanding of sexual politics is key to both apprehending and breaking the cyclical reanimation of White Christian nationalism. Escaping the nihilistic impulses driving these cycles will require White evangelicals to develop new hermeneutical tools capable of transforming the exclusionary patterns of racism, ethnocentrism, heteronormativity, and patriarchy that fuel the engine of ressentiment animating zombie nationalism. (shrink)

Two recent films by Pulitzer Prize-winning playwright, David Mamet, can provide opportunities for observing student reactions to ethically troublesome situations and for discussing business-communication ethics in the classroom. The key question addressed in this article is whether business-communication courses, for example, those in public relations, can encourage students to make the "metaphoric leap" and apply Mamet's messages to class readings and discussions on ethical problems or challenges. Through showing two films in their entirety and conducting focus groups among upper-level undergraduates, (...) the authors find that there is instructional value in using Mamet's films to discuss ethics in business-related settings. (shrink)

The process of engaging in historical empathy holds the potential for significant curricular and dispositional benefits for students in history classrooms. In order to realize these benefits, classroom teachers must be able to integrate historical empathy into their existing planning and teaching; a process that would benefit from empirical examination. This single subject case study examined the pedagogical reasoning process of an experienced classroom teacher who integrated historical empathy into an existing instructional unit designed to foster student knowledge of social (...) control as an enduring historical understanding. The findings of this study suggest that experienced teachers may only be able to partially anticipate the unique pedagogical needs integrating historical empathy requires, and that a holistic examination of pedagogical reasoning during all phases of planning and teaching may be most suitable for the task. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Ayn Rand's characteristic approach to metaphysical concepts and principles. It first concerns the axioms of existence and identity, their respective concepts, and then their validation and cognitive roles. The chapter also considers Rand's view of entities and causation. Next, it describes consciousness, and its dependence on existence (i.e., the primacy of existence). The chapter then discusses Rand's view of free will (a fundamental feature of human consciousness) and the related distinction Rand draws between metaphysically given and (...) man‐made facts. Just as free will is a case of causality, so too is it a case of identity. Rand's endorsement of self‐created character and free will is not an endorsement of the existentialist positions that human nature or identity is contrary to or negated by choice. The chapter concludes by describing the relationship between the primacy of existence and Rand's conception of objectivity. (shrink)

Philosophical tradition holds that sounds, like colors, are sensible properties. Recently, however, there is a growing consensus in favor of the view that sounds are particulars, not properties. This article bucks the trend: it argues for the Event-Property View of Sounds – a widely overlooked and intuitively plausible version of the traditional view that not only avoids the difficulties that have led philosophers to opt for particularist alternatives, but does justice to the best insights of recent philosophical and empirical work (...) on audition. In other words, it saves the truth in tradition by transforming it in light of new insight. (shrink)

Do extraordinary crisis situations requiring life-and-death decisions create a “state of exception” in which ordinary social, political, and ethical norms must be altered or suspended altogether? Daniel Sulmasy contends that the extraordinary circumstances of a pandemic do not require abandoning or altering ethical values and principles. Rather, “ethics as usual” ought to guide policy formation and clinical decision-making. One critical question raised by the current pandemic, and which stresses ordinary ethical standards, is whether ventilators or other scarce life-sustaining resources may (...) be unilaterally withdrawn from a patient in order to be reallocated to another who is estimated to have a superior chance of survival or better satisfies other triage criteria. In this type of situation, it is unclear what constitutes “ethics as usual.”. (shrink)

In the Bayesian framework, a language learner should seek a grammar that explains observed data well and is also a priori probable. This paper proposes such a measure of prior probability. Indeed it develops a full statistical framework for lexicalized syntax. The learner's job is to discover the system of probabilistic transformations (often called lexical redundancy rules) that underlies the patterns of regular and irregular syntactic constructions listed in the lexicon. Specifically, the learner discovers what transformations apply in the language, (...) how often they apply, and in what contexts. It considers simpler systems of transformations to be more probable a priori. Experiments show that the learned transformations are more effective than previous statistical models at predicting the probabilities of lexical entries, especially those for which the learner had no direct evidence. (shrink)

Most deontologists claim that it is more objectionable to do harm than it is to allow harm of comparable magnitude. I argue that this view faces a largely neglected puzzle regarding the moral relevance of an agent's past behavior. Consider an agent who chooses to save five people rather than one, where the one person's life is in jeopardy because of something the agent did earlier. How are the agent's obligations affected by the fact that his now letting the one (...) die would retroactively make it the case that he has killed? I argue that the most promising deontological responses to this question are difficult to defend. Further, it is unclear how the deontologist can resolve a further set of cases, in which commonsense intuition indicates that an agent is required to terminate a threat she initiated more recently in preference to a threat she initiated less recently. (shrink)

This chapter considers various arguments purporting to show that respect for animal rights is consistent with "therapeutic hunting"--that is, hunting undertaken as part of a plan to control wild animal populations. It concludes that these arguments fail. It also suggests that the implications of Regan's rights view may be more sweeping than are generally recognizes: the rights view seems to rule out not only therapeutic hunting, but also subsistence hunting.

The relationship between Goethe and Salomon Maimon has only been touched on once in the literature, and further clarification of the link between them remains a desideratum. Below I propose that the way to grasp their seeing eye to eye is through Spinoza, and specifically Spinoza's notion of scientia intuitiva. Initially I provide some context in order to illustrate what makes Maimon's role here rather unique. Then I sketch the relationship Maimon and Goethe had both to Spinoza and each other (...) while emphasizing what is at stake. I conclude with various new findings. (shrink)

Many critics of commercial surrogate motherhood argue that it violates the rights of children. In this paper, I respond to several versions of this objection. The most common version claims that surrogacy involves child‐selling. I argue that while proponents of surrogacy have generally failed to provide an adequate response to this objection, it can be overcome. After showing that the two most prominent arguments for the child‐selling objection fail, I explain how the commissioning couple can acquire parental rights by paying (...) the surrogate only for her reproductive labor. My explanation appeals to the idea that parental rights are acquired by those who have claims over the reproductive labor that produces the child, not necessarily by those who actually perform the labor. This account clarifies how commercial surrogacy differs from commercial adoption. In the final section of the paper, I consider and reject three further child‐based objections to commercial surrogacy: that it establishes a market in children's attributes, that it requires courts to stray from the best interests standard in determining custodial rights, and that it requires the surrogate to neglect her parental responsibilities. Since each of these objections fails, children's rights probably do not pose an obstacle to the acceptability of commercial surrogacy arrangements. (shrink)

I begin by examining how genetics drivesschizophrenia research, and raise both familiar andrelatively novel criticisms of the evidence putativelysupporting the genetic basis of schizophrenia. Inparticular, I call attention to a set of concernsabout the effects of placentation on concordance ratesof schizophrenia in monozygotic twins, which furtherweakens the case for schizophrenia''s so-called stronggenetic component. I then underscore two criticalpoints. First, I emphasize the importance of takingseriously considerations about the complexity of bothontogenesis and the development of hereditarydiseases. The recognition of developmentalconstraints and (...) supports is crucial, for attention todevelopment exposes the naivete of too many models ofgene action in the aetiology of disease. Secondly, Iattend to those schizophreniologists who ignoremethodological criticisms and thus presume a geneticbasis for schizophrenia, and then seek the schizophrenic genotype lacking an adequatephenotype. In response I attempt to demonstrate thenecessity of a sustained effort at characterizing thephenotype of schizophrenia as an enabling conditionfor the whole enterprise of psychiatric genetics – andfor psychiatry itself. Without the organism-levelphenotype, research at the level of genes will remainunproductive – assuming of course that research at thegenetic level is appropriate at all. (shrink)

We show that the exterior algebra bundle over a curved spacetime can be used as framework in which both the Dirac and the Einstein equations can be obtained. These equations and their coupling follow from the variational principle applied to a Lagrangian constructed from natural geometric invariants. We also briefly indicate how other forces can potentially be incorporated within this geometric framework.

In the Theological-Political Treatise, published in 1670, Spinoza asked why people “fight for their servitude as if for salvation.” In doing so, he foregrounded the affective dimension of despotism, putting forward the idea that servitude is not just passively endured but passionately strived for—something people want and will. Three hundred years later, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari repeated this formula in Anti-Oedipus, arguing that it was the central question of political philosophy. They read Spinoza through Wilhelm Reich, stating that the (...) astonishing thing is that “those who are exploited are not continually out on strike.” In doing so they shifted the political question from domination to exploitation. Following Deleuze and Guattari, I argue for an updated version of the question, asking why people fight for exploitation as if it were rebellion. Asking this question involves reexamining the way in which the critique of religion is the antechamber of the critique of political economy in Marx, and is the thread connecting Spinoza to Marx. Finally, I argue that reframing the question in terms of rebellion and exploitation is useful in making sense of contemporary forms of right populism that present themselves as rebellion, but actually deepen the domination of capitalism over our lives. (shrink)

There is a basic methodological difference in the way anarchists and non-anarchists think about politics, often more implicit than explicit. Anarchists see politics and justice as being concerns of social institutions, norms, and relations generally – both inside and outside the state. Much of academic political philosophy talks of politics and justice as if they are definitionally concerns about what states should do, or our relationships with each other through the state. In this chapter, we argue that the anarchists are (...) on the right side of this difference. We call the insight that undergirds the anarchists’ understanding of politics and justice “methodological anarchism.” We seek to exorcise the policy framework in favor of methodological anarchism. Indeed, we believe it should be embraced by all political philosophers, not only the anarchists among their ranks. Political philosophers ought to abstain from the policy framework for two reasons. Firstly, it is analytically impoverished inasmuch as, when followed to its logical conclusion, it is unable to engage with enormous areas of analysis that are relevant to what makes a society just or unjust. Secondly, it instills subtle prejudice against other important approaches to mitigating injustice that are unconcerned with public policy. This also carries the danger of lending ideological support for existing injustices and thereby entrenching them. Accepting our critique of the policy framework and adopting methodological anarchism does not necessarily require the acceptance of any kind of substantive political anarchism. But it does mean thinking a bit more like an anarchist about how to make society more just – thus our characterization of it as “methodological.”. (shrink)

Through cutting-edge accounts and interdisciplinary critiques of shame, this collection responds to the epidemic of gendered violence that the world witnesses daily. Contributors expose and challenge how oppression and violence connect to regimes of injustice that have dominated modern times.

The current trajectory of artificial intelligence development suffers from fundamental epistemological shortcomings, resulting in the systematic operationalization of bias against non-white, non-male, and non-Western peoples. We argue that these failings are, in part, the result of certain Western rationalist epistemologies that exclude many ways of knowing about the world, and therefore they cannot provide a sufficient foundation on which to adequately, robustly, and humanely conceptualize intelligence. We present a new research agenda, Abundant Intelligences, an Indigenous-led, Indigenous-majority international, interdisciplinary research program (...) that imagines anew how to conceptualize and design artificial intelligence (AI) based on Indigenous knowledge (IK) systems. Abundant Intelligences draws on the rich plurality of Indigenous knowledge systems, bringing together diverse sets of thought, culture, and protocol together. We show IK systems provide one way to rebuild AI’s epistemological foundations and transform these tools’ current role in reinforcing colonial practices of exclusion, extraction, manipulation, and eradication into engines of abundance that enable us to care better for ourselves, our communities, and our world. Our proposition is to fully engage with AI to explore how different conceptions of intelligence could be embodied in these technologies. In this paper, we present the tenets of the research program in detail, account for our methodological approach, describe the impact and limitations, and conclude on a discussion of the implications of the program. (shrink)

We do two things in this article: develop a novel conception of domination and show how the Kurdish people are dominated in this novel sense. Conceptions of domination are usually distinguished in terms of paradigm cases and whether they are moralised and/or norm- dependent accounts, or neither. By contrast, we argue there is a way of understanding domination in terms of distinct social kinds. Among kinds of domination, like economic or racial or sexual domination, there must be a specifically political (...) kind of domination. Borrowing from Carl Schmitt’s framework of differing degrees of political enmity, we argue political domination is best understood as an existential form of domination whereby one people aim to prevent the independent exis- tence of another people mainly through the uncontrolled power and extreme violence involved in absolute enmity. This conception of exis- tential domination is offered as an example of a non-moralised, norm- independent account of domination. We then argue that the Kurdish people, who are the largest stateless people in the world, suffer existen- tial domination from the absolute enmity expressed towards them by the four nation-states they find themselves dominated within: Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. (shrink)

This essay argues that an account of vocation that ties one’s work with divine calling stands counter to the biblical witness of calling in the New Testament. Rather than calling to a particular profession, the biblical account of calling is to a unique way of living that is to exemplify the followers of Christ. Therefore, the re-enchantment of medicine is not accomplished when one makes the practice itself sacred simply by imagining it as one’s divine calling. Rather, the sacredness of (...) medicine is rooted in the character of the physician whose daily decisions and patient interactions are the outcomes of virtues inculcated in worship, prayer, Bible study, and all other practices that mark the life of faith. Thus, the practitioner avoiding burnout asks not “Am I called to be a physician?” but “How as a physician in the daily practice of medicine might I exemplify my calling to Christ-likeness?”. (shrink)

Calls for the “translation” of research from bench to bedside are increasingly demanding. What is translation, and why does it matter? We sketch the recent history of outcome-oriented translational research in the United States, with a particular focus on the Roadmap Initiative of the National Institutes of Health. Our main example of contemporary translational research is stem cell research, which has superseded genomics as the translational object of choice. We explore the nature of and obstacles to translational research and assess (...) the ethical and biomedical challenges of embracing a translational ethos. (shrink)

The current issue of the American Journal of Bioethics illustrates the scope of disagreement among professionals about normothermic regional perfusion (NRP). A similar range of opinions has been de...

Blindsight is a hot topic in philosophy, especially in discussions of consciousness. Here I critically examine various attempts to bring blindsight to bear on debates about qualia -- the raw constituents of consciousness. I argue that blindsight does not unequivocally support any particular theory of qualia. It does, however, vindicate the view that there are qualia, despite arguments -- most notably by Daniel Dennett -- to the contrary.

Thomas Aquinas was concerned with developing a metaphysical account of the article of Christian faith which asserts that a human person will experience a bodily resurrection at some point after death. This article of faith is prima facie in line with Aquinas’ Aristotelian assertions that a human soul is incorruptible per se and that it is in its natural state only when it is united to a material body of which it is the informing principle. But how is personal identity (...) maintained between the pre-mortem union of body and soul, the soul in its separated state, and the post-resurrection union of body and soul? In this paper, I will address and attempt to show Aquinas’ answer to this question and its dependence on his metaphysics. (shrink)