In this article we investigate whether long-term radioactive waste management by means of geological disposal can be understood as a social experiment. Geological disposal is a rather particular technology in the way it deals with the analytical and ethical complexities implied by the idea of technological innovation as social experimentation, because it is presented as a technology that ultimately functions without human involvement. We argue that, even when the long term function of the ‘social’ is foreseen to be restricted to (...) safeguarding the functioning of the ‘technical’, geological disposal is still a social experiment. In order to better understand this argument and explore how it could be addressed, we elaborate the idea of social experimentation with the notion of co-production and the analytical tools of delegation, prescription and network as developed by actor-network theory. In doing so we emphasize that geological disposal inherently involves relations between surface and subsurface, between humans and nonhumans, between the social, material and natural realm, and that these relations require recognition and further elaboration. In other words, we argue that geological disposal concurrently is a social and a technical experiment, or better, a long-term socio-technical experiment. We end with proposing the idea of ‘actor-networking’ as a sensitizing concept for future research into what geological disposal as a socio-technical experiment could look like. (shrink)

Two developments have been of crucial significance to create the today's relation of theoretical (scientific) jurisprudence and the practical pursuit of law:1. The process of forming a jurisprudence basing on scientific methods around 1800. This process is particularly based on the following epistemological changes:(a) The late 18th century gave birth to the idea of a system of science as an unchangeable context of science in abstracto. Therefore the practical application of parts of this system appeared no longer as an independent (...) science. (b) Besides the late 18th century gave birth to the distinction between scientific ability (reason/“Verstand”) and practical ability (judgement/“Urteilskraft”). (c) Finally the late 18th century established criteria of a scientific method — necessity, reasoning, systematics —, which the practical application could not satisfy. Jurisprudence (now: legal science/“Rechtswissenschaft”) absorbed these epistemological changes in the late 18th century and regarded itself as a science. Therefore the legal science dismissed the “applied jurisprudence” that is to say the practical pursuit of law (that had been recognized as a part of legal scholarship in former times). 2. The change in the relation of academic and practical education of lawyers around and after 1800: The practical education was dislodged from the universities and found its place in the practical judicial training after the first state examination (“Referendarzeit”). This “two‐step‐education” was established first in Prussia and since 1879 everywhere in Germany. (shrink)

Die Interpretation (seit dem 17. Jahrhundert auch aHermeneutiko) ist das wichtigste methodische Hilfsmittel der Geisteswissenschaften. Die Erforschung ihrer fruehneuzeitlichen Urspruenge ist zwar im letzten Jahrzehnt ein Stueck vorangekommen, aber nach wie vor gibt es keine zusammenfassende Geschichte der juristischen, der theologischen oder der allgemeinen Hermeneutik und schon gar keinen facheruebergreifenden Vergleich. Der vorliegende Band faat die Ertrage der bisherigen Forschung zusammen und liefert darueber hinaus wichtige Bausteine zu einer vergleichenden Geschichte der Hermeneutik. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die bisher vernachlassigte Geschichte (...) der juristischen Interpretation. "Ohne Zweifel stellt der Band einen wichtigen Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer vergleichenden Geschichte der Hermeneutik dar." Das Historisch-Politische Buch "a wird fuer kuenftige Arbeiten zur Geschichte der Methodenlehre unverzichtbar sein." Zeitschrift fuer Neuere Rechtsgeschichte Aus dem Inhalt: Reformation und Humanismus: Beitrage von Ulrich Kopf zu Luther, Ian Maclean und Maximiliane Kriechbaum zur medizinischen und juristischen Hermeneutik 17. Jahrhundert und Aufklarung: Beitrage von Lutz Danneberg zur allgemeinen Hermeneutik, Klaus Luig zur Vertragsauslegung, Clausdieter Schott, Gerhard Otte und Joachim Hruschka zur Gesetzesauslegung Romantische Hermeneutik: Beitrage von Hermann Beisler zu Friedrich Schlegel, Guenter Meckenstock und Oliver R. Scholz zu Schleiermacher, Joachim Rueckert und Axel Buehler zu Savigny. (shrink)