An account of an experience with contracting an illness that may well have been Covid‐19 gives rise to reflections on doubt and on the art of dying well. The upshot: our mortality remains a fundamentally disorienting condition of our existence. If there's any wisdom to be had concerning our deaths, it likely lies in the direction of accepting their deranging character, rather than in searching for the philosophical insight that will reconcile us to our fate.

As practiced, medicine bumps along with the rest of us, doing its level best to cope with the contingencies of this often heartbreaking world. Yet it's a commonplace that much of medicine's self‐image, and a good deal of its cultural heft, come from its connection with the natural sciences and, what's more, from a picture of science that has a touch of the transcendental, highlighting the unmatched rigor of its procedures, its exacting rationality, and the reliability of its results.In contrast, (...) the very idea of “queer” carries with it a little taste of the uncanny. What we're inclined to label queer resists understanding, not so much because it's too complicated, but because it tends to be too slippery to capture neatly in our conceptual nets—that queer ache in your side, for instance, or your partner's queer notion of doing laundry. The outmoded use of “queer,” as a way to refer disparagingly to gay people, carried similar uncanny connotations: the unnatural, the perverse.One might think, then, that the reclamation of “queer” as an umbrella term referring to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender spectrum has a pleasing depth to its irony—not only does it wrench the customary direction of evaluation conveyed by the word from condemnation to celebration, but it also hints that what you find comprehensible depends a good deal on who you are and where you're standing. What from the perspective of many heterosexual and cisgendered people may seem opaque, exotic, threatening—erotic love directed toward someone with the same kind of body you have, lives lived in ways that challenge the immutability of birth‐assigned gender—are to LGBT folk not uncanny at all, but as familiar as breathing.I like this conceit, but alas, it is too simple. It slights the variety of difficulties associated with making sense of queerness that can vex deeply thoughtful people of undoubted good will—as I found out some years ago when I first talked about my efforts to understand my own transgender identity with a ferociously intelligent, highly sophisticated friend. (shrink)

I have sometimes mused about writing an essay on what insights for understanding the doctor-patient relationship might be gleaned from P. F. Strawson's magisterial British Academy address, "Freedom and Resentment". This might seem an odd thought. The preoccupations of "Freedom and Resentment" are highly abstract, meta-ethical, and perhaps even meta-philosophical. Its aim is to turn philosophical discussion of moral responsibility away from two seductive yet unprofitable temptations.One temptation is the insistence that, if morality is to be all it seems, human (...) beings must in some respects not be fully subject to natural law. If we are morally responsible for what we do and omit to do, we must be able to... (shrink)

Kate Robins-Browne and her colleagues have written a conceptually daring, empirically grounded article that is rich in scholarship and just conceivably might have a salutary effect on the theory and practice of advance care planning. It is, alas, just as easy to believe that its appreciation will be restricted to like-minded theorists. Writing from a posture of great admiration for this article’s agenda and achievements, I will consider why non-relationallybased understanding of deciding for others are so enduring, and what might (...) be done about that. (shrink)

Cutting people’s genitals—at least, when thought of as an exotic practice—seems to interest philosophers chiefly as a source of problem cases for moral relativism. A ready-to-hand example is supplied by Simon Blackburn, in the relativism chapter of his charming little introduction to ethics text, Being Good: “If, as in some North African countries, young girls are terrifyingly and painfully mutilated so that thereafter they cannot enjoy natural and pleasurable human sexuality, that is not OK, anywhere or anytime”. Now, it’s worth (...) considering how vulnerable moral relativism actually is to intuitive counterexamples. Surely, there’s a powerful tendency to say that any metaethics... (shrink)