Originally published in 1938. This compact treatise is a complete treatment of Aristotle’s logic as containing negative terms. It begins with defining Aristotelian logic as a subject-predicate logic confining itself to the four forms of categorical proposition known as the A, E, I and O forms. It assigns conventional meanings to these categorical forms such that subalternation holds. It continues to discuss the development of the logic since the time of its founder and address traditional logic as it existed in (...) the twentieth century. The primary consideration of the book is the inclusion of negative terms - obversion, contraposition etc. – within traditional logic by addressing three questions, of systematization, the rules, and the interpretation. (shrink)

Originally published in 1938. This compact treatise is a complete treatment of Aristotle’s logic as containing negative terms. It begins with defining Aristotelian logic as a subject-predicate logic confining itself to the four forms of categorical proposition known as the _A, E, I _and_ O_ forms. It assigns conventional meanings to these categorical forms such that subalternation holds. It continues to discuss the development of the logic since the time of its founder and address traditional logic as it existed in (...) the twentieth century. The primary consideration of the book is the inclusion of negative terms - obversion, contraposition etc. – within traditional logic by addressing three questions, of systematization, the rules, and the interpretation. (shrink)

Reissuing works originally published between 1938 and 1993, this set offers a range of scholarship covering Aristotle’s logic, virtues and mathematics as well as a consideration of De Anima and of his work on physics, specifically light. The first two books are in themselves a pair, which investigate the philosopher’s life and his lost works and development of his thought.

In the case of the Parmenides, I thought that I had sufficiently protected myself by saying that the details were not to be pressed. But, if I am required to take Plato's version of Parmenides au pied de la lettre, I can still reply that quite possibly it is historically accurate, that scholars know far less about Parmenides than they could wish, that perhaps they have erred in not taking Plato's testimony into serious account in their reconstruction of the philosophy (...) of Parmenides, and that perhaps Plato's dialogue--in which Parmenides is old--represents a late stage in the development of Parmenides' philosophy whereas the fragments of the poem come from an earlier period. (shrink)

In this paper I shall try to do three things: first, to present Descartes's theory of universals; second, to argue that it creates insoluble difficulties for his system; and third, to explain why Descartes, who was not unaware of these difficulties, nevertheless persisted in holding it.

By Burnet's principle I mean the theory that, contrary to the usual belief of scholars in the nineteenth century, the character "Socrates" in the dialogues of Plato is to be regarded not as an idealized figure, not as the mouthpiece for Plato's original philosophical doctrines, but as Plato's accurate representation of the historical Socrates whom he had known.