The purpose of this volume is to remedy this neglect, to explain Thoreau's philosophical significance, and to argue that we can still learn from his polemical conception of philosophy.

… an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible is possible, just as if they were two different worlds.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

James D. Reid - The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.4 673-674 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by James D. Reid Metropolitan State College of Denver S. J. McGrath. The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006. Pp. xx + 268. Cloth, $69.95. Taking its clues from the scholarly work (...) of Kisiel, van Buren, and others on the religious origins of early Heidegger's phenomenology, blending philosophical interpretation and biographical insight, and drawing fruitfully from a wide range of historical and philosophical sources, McGrath's The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy offers a wide-ranging account of Heidegger's.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 407-436 [Access article in PDF] Dilthey's Epistemology of the Geisteswissenschaften: Between Lebensphilosophie and Wissenschaftstheorie James Reid A great part of my life's work has been devoted to formulating a universally valid science which should provide the human sciences with a firm foundation and a unified internal coherency.... I am neither an intuitionist, nor a historicist, nor a skeptic. Dilthey to Husserl, (...) 29 June 1911 To show life as it is, that is what we strive for. To describe life: that is our goal.... We want to make life visible in its unfathomable depths, and in its unfathomable nexus. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften 19: 330 In the dedication of the first volume of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften to his friend and philosophical interlocutor Count Yorck, Dilthey famously named what would become his lifelong philosophical preoccupation a Kritik der historischen Vernunft, the overarching aim of which is to provide "an epistemological foundation for the human sciences" that would "determine the interconnections among the particular human sciences, the limits within which knowledge is possible in these sciences, and the relation of their truths to one another." 1 For Dilthey, the liberation of historical consciousness from the "grey cobweb of abstract essences" spun by traditional metaphysics constituted one of the [End Page 407] major intellectual achievements of the nineteenth century. 2 However, as important as the concrete historical investigations of Ranke, Droysen, and Mommsen undoubtedly are, the Historical School nevertheless failed in Dilthey's eyes to grasp the essence of historical consciousness—its scope, limits and objective validity: Its study and evaluation of historical phenomena remain unconnected with the analysis of facts of consciousness; consequently, it has no grounding in the only knowledge which is ultimately secure; it has in short no philosophical foundation. 3A critique of historical reason, grasped as an epistemological analysis of "the capacity of man to know himself and the society and history which he has produced," is needed in order to provide for the Geisteswissenschaften a foundation equivalent to the one furnished by Kant for mathematical natural science in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 4The epistemological dimension of Dilthey's project took shape as the elaboration of a basic science (Grundwissenschaft) identified, in the Einleitung at least, with descriptive psychology. 5 In an effort to delimit the province of the Geisteswissenschaften, Dilthey came to distinguish between outer experience and its objects and various levels of inner experience. Although Dilthey's thought developed considerably in the years after 1900, most notably in the direction [End Page 408] of a refinement of the relation between inner and outer experience, the distinction between these two fundamental modes of givenness remained central to his conception of the structure and methodology of the human sciences. 6 In a number of manuscripts, some published in Dilthey's lifetime, others (by far the majority) published after his death by former students, Dilthey envisages a comprehensive theory of consciousness and its objectifications that would shed light on the origins and ultimate validity of our knowledge of the historical world.As several commentators have pointed out, however, the epistemological dimension of Dilthey's project fails to capture the entire breadth of his achievement. 7 Dilthey's interest in the objective validity of historical investigation was subservient to broader concerns about the nature of human existence and its historicity, what Dilthey often referred to simply as Leben. 8 Life as it is revealed in the human sciences is the medium in which self-consciousness and self-knowledge, scientific and practical activity originate, and remains the abiding concern of the human sciences. At the most fundamental level of epistemological reflection, we encounter life as it is lived in pre-scientific and pre-reflective experience (Erlebnis). 9 Life, Dilthey consistently maintained, is the "prius" of thought: Knowledge (Erkenntnis) cannot go behind life, of which it is a function. Life always remains the presupposition of knowledge, i.e., of the consciousness or knowledge (Wissen) contained in life. As a presupposition of knowledge (des Erkennens) itself, life is [End... (shrink)

Excerpt from M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum Libri Quinque Duo sunt, opinor, quae lectures a me hoc loco requi rent aut, si non requirent ipsi, rogandi mihi sunt, ut beneuolo animo et adtento accipiaut. Nam primum di ccudam st de horum librorum, quos Cicero de finibus honorum et maiorum scripsit, emendatiolle et enarratione et nninersae opera a me in iis positm ratio sic expli canda, ut, qua in commentariis disperse posita sunt, ea ad suas canssas generation reuocata (...) et intellegi plenius et indicari rectius possint. Quo loco etiam illud ecli cere conabor, ut libertas quaedam et simplicitas indici et orationis, a qua ne hic quidem discedam, merito et necessario adhibita esse uideatur. Deiude, qum de Cice roniani operis forma atque descriptione ncitu digna ui debuntur neque in commentariis aut per excursus carpo sita, conprehendam et ab iis ad ipsos libros lectores nittam. Sed prior illa disputatio, cuius magna pars ad paratns critici ex;>licatione continebitur, quem sua na tura maiorem necessitatem habent quam delectationem in rebus minutis per ambages persequendis, tum molestior fit, quod plus uerhorum consumendum et in eorum co dicum conmemoratione, quos parum nouimus, quam in eorum, quorum plenus asus concessus est. Itaque de precor, ne mea existumetur culpa, qua superiorum st. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Agency and Imagination in the Films of David Lynch: Philosophical Perspectives offers a sustained philosophical interpretation of the filmmaker’s work in light of classic and contemporary discussions of human agency and the complex relations between our capacity to act and our ability to imagine.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 407-436 [Access article in PDF] Dilthey's Epistemology of the Geisteswissenschaften: Between Lebensphilosophie and Wissenschaftstheorie James Reid A great part of my life's work has been devoted to formulating a universally valid science which should provide the human sciences with a firm foundation and a unified internal coherency.... I am neither an intuitionist, nor a historicist, nor a skeptic. Dilthey to Husserl, (...) 29 June 1911 To show life as it is, that is what we strive for. To describe life: that is our goal.... We want to make life visible in its unfathomable depths, and in its unfathomable nexus. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften 19: 330 In the dedication of the first volume of the Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften to his friend and philosophical interlocutor Count Yorck, Dilthey famously named what would become his lifelong philosophical preoccupation a Kritik der historischen Vernunft, the overarching aim of which is to provide "an epistemological foundation for the human sciences" that would "determine the interconnections among the particular human sciences, the limits within which knowledge is possible in these sciences, and the relation of their truths to one another." 1 For Dilthey, the liberation of historical consciousness from the "grey cobweb of abstract essences" spun by traditional metaphysics constituted one of the [End Page 407] major intellectual achievements of the nineteenth century. 2 However, as important as the concrete historical investigations of Ranke, Droysen, and Mommsen undoubtedly are, the Historical School nevertheless failed in Dilthey's eyes to grasp the essence of historical consciousness—its scope, limits and objective validity: Its study and evaluation of historical phenomena remain unconnected with the analysis of facts of consciousness; consequently, it has no grounding in the only knowledge which is ultimately secure; it has in short no philosophical foundation. 3A critique of historical reason, grasped as an epistemological analysis of "the capacity of man to know himself and the society and history which he has produced," is needed in order to provide for the Geisteswissenschaften a foundation equivalent to the one furnished by Kant for mathematical natural science in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 4The epistemological dimension of Dilthey's project took shape as the elaboration of a basic science (Grundwissenschaft) identified, in the Einleitung at least, with descriptive psychology. 5 In an effort to delimit the province of the Geisteswissenschaften, Dilthey came to distinguish between outer experience and its objects and various levels of inner experience. Although Dilthey's thought developed considerably in the years after 1900, most notably in the direction [End Page 408] of a refinement of the relation between inner and outer experience, the distinction between these two fundamental modes of givenness remained central to his conception of the structure and methodology of the human sciences. 6 In a number of manuscripts, some published in Dilthey's lifetime, others (by far the majority) published after his death by former students, Dilthey envisages a comprehensive theory of consciousness and its objectifications that would shed light on the origins and ultimate validity of our knowledge of the historical world.As several commentators have pointed out, however, the epistemological dimension of Dilthey's project fails to capture the entire breadth of his achievement. 7 Dilthey's interest in the objective validity of historical investigation was subservient to broader concerns about the nature of human existence and its historicity, what Dilthey often referred to simply as Leben. 8 Life as it is revealed in the human sciences is the medium in which self-consciousness and self-knowledge, scientific and practical activity originate, and remains the abiding concern of the human sciences. At the most fundamental level of epistemological reflection, we encounter life as it is lived in pre-scientific and pre-reflective experience (Erlebnis). 9 Life, Dilthey consistently maintained, is the "prius" of thought: Knowledge (Erkenntnis) cannot go behind life, of which it is a function. Life always remains the presupposition of knowledge, i.e., of the consciousness or knowledge (Wissen) contained in life. As a presupposition of knowledge (des Erkennens) itself, life is [End... (shrink)

HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, CRITICISM. Philosophy has a history because human life is historical. This truism assumes a deeper, more puzzling, and unsettling significance in the programmatic section 6 of Sein und Zeit, which promises nothing less than a Destruktion of the history of philosophy centered on a few pivotal figures and guided by the problem of temporality as the horizon and transcendental condition of any understanding and explicit interpretation of the sense of being. If the Seinsfrage cannot be formulated, let alone (...) answered, without this detour through the history of ontology, it is precisely because the philosophizing human being is its past, because the philosopher's past does not merely trail behind the present as a foregone conclusion but "always already advances ahead of it." Every effort to free ourselves from tradition and to begin with a tabula rasa "is pervaded by traditional concepts and...horizons and traditional angles of approach." An understanding shaped and governed by the past plays its enabling role whether the individual recognizes and welcomes it or not, whether he makes the past an object of study and cultivates an interest in tradition or abandons history to the historian or philosopher. An individual or a people or an entire era can lack historical consciousness, philosophy of history, and historiography, and can remain indifferent to tradition only because the human being is historical "in the ground of its being.". (shrink)

Heidegger's Moral Ontology offers the first comprehensive account of the ethical issues that underwrite Heidegger's efforts to develop a novel account of human existence. Drawing from a wide array of source materials from the period leading up to the publication of Being and Time, and in conversation with ancient, modern, and contemporary contributions to moral philosophy, James D. Reid brings Heidegger's early philosophy into fruitful dialogue with the history of ethics, and sheds fresh light on such familiar topics as Heidegger's (...) critique of Husserl, his engagement with Aristotle, his account of mortality, the role played by Kant in the genesis of Being and Time, and Heidegger's early reflections on philosophical language and concepts. This lively book will appeal to all who are interested in Heidegger's early phenomenology and in his thought more generally, as well as to those interested in the nature, scope, and foundations of ethical life. (shrink)

This book demonstrates instead the writers' use of irony and allegory in struggling against the deceitfulness of their own texts.

Fichte’s Jena Wissenschaftslehre is among the most significant products of that immensely fertile period spanning the publication of Kant’s first Critique and Hegel’s Phenomenology. Like many of Kant’s earliest disciples and critics, Fichte was preoccupied with puzzles that arose in connection with certain distinctions presupposed or drawn by Kant throughout the writings of the Critical period. Among the many distinctions developed with great care in the three Critiques, the most important for Fichte were those drawn between the various powers or (...) faculties of the human mind. Fichte came to recognize that a well-grounded philosophical science would have to account for the complex structure of human subjectivity without dividing the mind into a mere aggregate of lifeless mental faculties. As Fichte famously put it in the Grundlage, the aim of the Wissenschaftslehre is to introduce into “the whole human being that unity and connection that so many systems lack.” Despite obvious Romantic overtones, this quest for a single, unified account of the human mind amounted to the demand for a strictly scientific reconstruction of the Critical philosophy. On Fichte’s view, philosophy would be able to come forward as a rigorous science of living subjectivity, with the force and evidence of geometry, only as a closed system of propositions derived from a self-evident first principle. (shrink)

Higher education institutions in the United Kingdom are increasingly demanding that social work lecturers are ?registered? with the UK regulatory body, the General Social Care Council (GSCC) as a requirement of appointment for the post of social work lecturer. There are many compelling reasons for such an expectation but this paper argues that such action should not be undertaken uncritically. Using Colnerud's five categories of norms a number of tensions for the lecturer are explored that indicate that the current GSCC (...) codes of practice do not fully recognize the role of the social work lecturer. (shrink)