The power of Wittgenstein's N operator described in the Tractatus is that every proposition which can be expressed in the Russellian variant of the predicate calculus familiar to him has an equivalent proposition in an extended variant of his N operator notation. This remains true if the bound variables are understood in the usual inclusive sense or in Wittgenstein's restrictive exclusive sense. The problematic limit of Wittgenstein's N operator comes from his claim that symbols alone reveal the logical status of (...) propositions. This would require knowledge of the size of the Tractarian domain of unchangeable, simple objects, and this, Wittgenstein maintained, cannot be known. (shrink)

The essential core of the argument from analogy is that just as it is rational from the perspective of individual persons to maximize their net level of satisfaction, So also it is rational from the perspective of everyone to maximize over the entire set of satisfactions. I argue that the objections of rawls, Gauthier, And nozick to this argument can be answered, And that this argument provides a foundation for classical utilitarianism.

This paper is a critique of R.M. Hare’s argument that rational universal prescriptions are equivalent to utilitarian judgments. The problem with Hare’s argument is his restrictive model of rationality. He succeeds in proving that awareness of certain facts is essential to making a fully rational universal prescription. But he fails to prove that other facts, such as the ultimate separateness of persons, are irrelevant. Once such facts are taken seriously, the utilitarian implication is invalidated.

This paper is a critique of R.M. Hare’s argument that rational universal prescriptions are equivalent to utilitarian judgments. The problem with Hare’s argument is his restrictive model of rationality. He succeeds in proving that awareness of certain facts is essential to making a fully rational universal prescription. But he fails to prove that other facts, such as the ultimate separateness of persons, are irrelevant. Once such facts are taken seriously, the utilitarian implication is invalidated.

Silent reading is markedly different from loud reading. For loud reading it is necessary that the spoken words match the printed or written words in accord with rules of pronunciation and grammar. Ordinarily, a loud reader can repeat or describe what he has read, but the acquisition of this ability is not necessary for loud reading. However, for silent reading it is necessary that the reader can repeat or describe the printed or written words that he has read. Inner voicing (...) may be part of the experience of silent reading, but it isn’t necessary. (shrink)

Silent reading is markedly different from loud reading. For loud reading it is necessary that the spoken words match the printed or written words in accord with rules of pronunciation and grammar. Ordinarily, a loud reader can repeat or describe what he has read, but the acquisition of this ability is not necessary for loud reading. However, for silent reading it is necessary that the reader can repeat or describe the printed or written words that he has read. Inner voicing (...) may be part of the experience of silent reading, but it isn’t necessary. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to defend the morality of the Golden Rule from the objection that it will lead to intolerable paternalism. Once religious paternalism is allowed, Inquisitors come forward to care for the weak-willed and obtuse masses. Eventually, the Inquisitors lose their faith, and focus their concern upon harmony, health, and happiness in this life. The outcome is either a constrained distopia that is abhorrent (Huxley), or a cruel distopia which is the antithesis of what the Golden (...) Rule is supposed to prescribe (Orwell), Paternalism presupposes knowledge that an agent is acting against his own best interests. Such epistemic justification is not available in matters of ethics or faith. (shrink)