How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson (...) needs to be in a position to make the determination herself. This view I will call individualism. Individualism maintains the burden of epistemic assessment is on the layperson, not on the expert. One such version of individualism is Jason Borenstein’s proposal as to what is needed for laypersons to make such an assessment. Borenstein’s proposal turns on the laypersons’ ability to understand the domain of expertise as well as the putative expert’s ability to satisfy a proficiency test. What I hope to show is that this proposal fails for two reasons. I argue that the nlove to proficiency tests does not warrant any layperson’s determination of truth or reliability and that given the limited epistemic abilities of laypersons they are not able to satisfy Borenstein’s proposed conditions for determination. (shrink)

How do laypeople sitting on a jury make determinations of expertise? How, if at all, can laypersons epistemically assess the expertise of an expert or rival experts? Given that the domains of expertise are quite technical, if laypersons are to adjudicate the various proposed and often conflicting claims of experts, they must be able to determine the reliability of the experts as well as the truth of their claims. One way to address these concems is to say that the layperson (...) needs to be in a position to make the determination herself. This view I will call individualism. Individualism maintains the burden of epistemic assessment is on the layperson, not on the expert. One such version of individualism is Jason Borenstein’s proposal as to what is needed for laypersons to make such an assessment. Borenstein’s proposal turns on the laypersons’ ability to understand the domain of expertise as well as the putative expert’s ability to satisfy a proficiency test. What I hope to show is that this proposal fails for two reasons. I argue that the nlove to proficiency tests does not warrant any layperson’s determination of truth or reliability and that given the limited epistemic abilities of laypersons they are not able to satisfy Borenstein’s proposed conditions for determination. (shrink)

Introduction to a volume on Philosophical Methodology. Edited by James McBain.

The dialogue between internalists who maintain a belief is a case of knowledge when that which justifies the belief is within the agent's first-person perspective and externalists who maintain epistemic justification can be in part, or entirely, outside the agent's first-person perspective has been part of the epistemological literature for some time with one side usually attempting to show how the other side is mistaken. Edward Craig argues the internalist/externalist debate is flawed from the outset. Specifically, both internalism and externalism (...) should be incorporated into the correct analysis of knowledge once we revamp that project. The epistemological project, according to Craig, is a practical explication of what both our epistemological practices and the concept of knowledge do for us. My purpose here is to evaluate this proposal, as well as Ram Neta's attempt to generalize this proposal to cover all epistemic appraisals, in light of the internalism/externalism debate. I argue the Craig/Neta proposal does not actually 'solve' the internalism/externalism debate, but rather pushes it back a level or assumes that one side is correct; hence, the Craig/Neta proposal is not an adequate 'solution' to the internalism/externalism debate. (shrink)

While there are numerous questions that the having of children raise, there is one that philosophers should be particularly concerned with – “What is the good reason for the having of children?” Recently, Jeff Mitchell has given a deontological answer to this question (Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. XXIV, NO. 5 & 6, Sept/Oct & Nov/Dec 2002, pp. 42-46). His answer is based on the moral function of the having of children. He claims that parenthood is a “moral calling” and that one (...) should heed the call out of a sense of duty and responsibility for the good of society (Mitchell, 44). In this paper, I argue that such a “moral calling” account is mistaken. I maintain that Mitchell’s account is mistaken on two grounds. First, I maintain Mitchell has assumed a problematic stance at the outset and it infects his position in general. That assumption is that we can and should consider the interests of non-existent people when considering the utility of an outcome. By looking at this assumption, we see that the warrant for such a moral reason to have children is lacking, hence, we ought not to appeal to such a reason when deciding whether to have children. The second problem is the failure to provide the epistemic conditions for a central consideration – the warranted belief that one would probably make a good parent. Furthermore, even if we attempt to construct what such conditions might be given other aspects of Mitchell’s account, the conditions fail to provide an adequate justification for the central consideration. Thus, I intend to show that such a moral calling rationale for the having of children is not superior to rationales that focus on the individual’s self-interest. (shrink)

Intuitions are funny things. Intuitions would seem to be these fluid, temporary mental states that we form minute by minute. On the face of it, they would seem to have no real value. But, when we ask whether a particular theory is true, we usually turn to our intuitions. This is nowhere more prevalent than in moral theorizing. When we attempt to show that a particular moral theory is mistaken, we usually present cases that yield counterintuitive results for the theory. (...) For example, take the famous Trolley Car example. Suppose a trolley car is traveling down a steep street and is heading straight for a child. Suppose further that you have the means to push a button that will divert the trolley car to a different track thereby missing the child. But, if you push the button to save the one child, you will kill five other children standing on the other track to which the trolley car will be diverted. So the choice is do not push the button and let one child die, or push the button, saving, the one child, but killing five other children. What do you do? Such cases are common in moral theorizing and our intuitions concerning what we would do in such cases are usually taken as evidence for or against a moral theory. In the trolley car case, a utilitarian would say, ceteris paribus, you should not push the button diverting the trolley car. Since an action is morally right if and only if it produces more net good (say, pleasure), diverting the trolley car would result in more pain in the world and hence be the wrong action. But how do our intuitions evidentially fit into the case? Since our goal is to have a moral theory that coincides with our intuitions about cases, if our intuitions fit with the theory, then we have prima facie evidence for the theory. If our intuitions do not fit, then we have prima facie evidence against the theory. Concerning the trolley car case, if our intuitions are that we should not push the button, thus letting the single child die, then our intuitions count as evidence for the correctness of utilitarian moral theory. If we do not share the intuitions of the utilitarians, then it is said to count as evidence against the correctness of utilitarian moral theory. Thus, it is our intuitions that carry the evidential burden. Since most agents take their intuitions to have significant evidential weight, cases (such as the Trolley Car case) usually indicate something problematic with the theory in question. Yet, there has been considerable interest lately in the status of such a practice. This interest has in part surrounded the issue of whether the cases themselves pose a problem for moral theorizing. Such cases are sometimes called intuition pumps. These thought experiment-style cases are usually taken to elicit intuitions that count for or against a moral theory. But many have claimed that the reliance upon such intuition pumps in moral theorizing is unjustified. In this paper I will investigate this claim. First, I lay out what I take to be the problem of intuition pumps. In particular, the problem will surround (1) there always being the possibility of constructing new cases that “pump” people’s intuitions to the other side of a moral debate and (2) there being systematic and patterned disagreement as to what the “correct” intuitive response for a given case is. Next, I give an account of the structure and evidence-conferring status of intuitions. Then, given this account, I illustrate how we can and why we should appeal to the intuitions of experts to solve the problem of intuition pumps. Thus, I hope to show that the problem of intuition pumps is not a problem for moral theorizing. That is, the use of intuition pump-style cases in moral theorizing is prima facie justified. (shrink)

Debates on procreative liberty usually surround the issue of whether it is permissible to not bring a child into existence. However, some argue that, under certain conditions, there is an obligation to bring a child (or even as many children as possible) into existence. This position, I will call the procreative duty stance, is argued for in two general ways—obligations arising from the extinction of the human species and obligations arising from personal reasons which override the reluctance of a potential (...) parent. It is argued that no version of either of these arguments works to establish a duty to procreate. So, the procreative duty stance is mistaken. (shrink)

Bluffing is essentially nothing more than a type of deception. But, despite its morally questionable foundation, it is not only permissible in certain contexts, but sometimes encouraged and/or required (e.g., playing poker). Yet, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to bluff in other contexts – particularly everyday situations. In this paper, I look at László Mérő’s argument – one based in game theory and Kantian ethics – to the end that bluffing is morally permissible in everyday contexts. (...) I argue that Mérő’s argument is mistaken on two grounds. First, it includes an epistemic feature (i.e., knowledge that bluffing is part of the game) that is lacking in everyday contexts. Second, even if we add a proviso to solve this epistemic problem, the resulting strategies fail to guarantee an equilibrium state. Thus, I hope to show that Mérő’s attempt to justify the use of bluffing in everyday contexts fails. (shrink)

It is all too common in philosophy to claim that a particular philosophical theory is mistaken because it fails to coincide with most philosophers' or normal inquirers' intuitions as represented in a particular case or counterexample. This suggests, as Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust point out, that our intuitions provide a sort of evidential basis for particular theories. Yet, the question remains as to whether this assessment is correct, and, if it is, whose intuitions (either those trained within the area (...) in question or normal inquirers) are more evidence conferring? Goldman and Pust provide a positive response to the former question and go on to argue that it is normal inquirers' intuitions that will be the most evidence-conferring. In this paper I first explain Goldman and Pust's view of the nature of intuitions and why, on their account, they are to count as evidence. Next, I argue that the evidence-conferring status of intuitions, as Goldman and Pust hold, is inherently flawed due to the inevitability of theory contamination. Also, I argue that intuitions (though theory contaminated) can be evidence-conferring by making an appeal to the intuitions of experts. Thus, intuitions can be counted as evidence, but not in the manner that Goldman and Pust maintain. (shrink)

At the end of BioShock Infinite, Booker is faced with the challenge of not allowing the tragedy to befall Columbia. There has to be a way, he believes, to prevent the rise of Father Comstock, the imprisonment and abuse of Elizabeth, and the creation of a Columbia that persecutes people for both religious and racial reasons. Booker's action is predicated on the necessity of Booker becoming Comstock. Elizabeth takes Booker back to Father Comstock's creation and it is revealed that Comstock's (...) coming to power took place when DeWitt accepted Christian baptism after his participation in the Wounded Knee massacre. The notion that Booker DeWitt had to become Father Comstock because of his baptism portrays a God that is overly deterministic, however. In reality, God may be omnipotent and omniscient, and yet humans may be free. (shrink)

Book review of Nicholas Agar's Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits.