Think of some environmentally unfriendly choices – taking the car instead of public transport or driving an SUV, just binning something recyclable, using lots of plastic bags, buying an enormous television, washing clothes in hot water, replacing something when you could make do with last year's model, heating rooms you don't use or leaving the heating high when you could put on another layer of clothing, flying for holidays, wasting food and water, eating a lot of beef, installing a patio (...) heater, maybe even, as some have said lately, owning a dog. Think about your own choices, instances in which you take an action which enlarges your carbon footprint when you might have done otherwise without much trouble. Is there consolation in the thought that it makes no difference what you do? (shrink)

Acknowledgements ix Contributors xi How to Use This Book xv Introduction xix 1 Problems, Questions and Concepts in the Philosophy of Mind 1 Ian Ravenscroft 2 Consciousness 35 Daniel D. Hutto 3 The Mark of the Mental 54 Fred Adams and Steve Beighley 4 Substance Dualism 73 T. J. Mawson 5 Physicalism 92 Barbara Montero 6 Folk Psychology and Scientific Psychology 102 Barry C. Smith 7 Internalism and Externalism in Mind 133 Sarah Sawyer 8 The Philosophies of Cognitive Science 151 (...) Margaret A. Boden 9 Representation 171 Georges Rey 10 Mental Causation 190 Neil Campbell 11 Personal Identity 203 E. J. Lowe 12 Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind 220 Michael Wheeler 13 Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind 239 Paul Noordhof Glossary 280 Chronology 319 Research Resources 327 Notes 330 Bibliography 341 Index 375. (shrink)

Exactly what is McGinn saying when he claims that we cannot solve the mind-body problem? Just what is cognitively closed to us? The text suggests at least four possibilities. I work through each them in some detail, and I come to two principal conclusions. First, by McGinn's own understanding of the mind-body problem, he needs to show that we are cognitively closed to how brains generate consciousness, but he argues for something else, that we are cognitively closed to the brain (...) property in virtue of which the brain is the basis of consciousness. Second, it turns out that McGinn is not entitled to any of the four closure possibilities. (shrink)

“Philosophy is constitutive of good citizenship. It becomes part of what you are when you are a good citizen – a thoughtful person. Philosophy has manyroles. It can be just fun, a game that you play. It can be a way you try to approach your own death or illness, or that of a family member. I’m just focusing on the place where I think I can win over people, and say ‘Look here, you do care about democracy don’t you? (...) Then you’d better see that philosophy has a place.’”. (shrink)

If it’s correct to think that the West does wrong by doing nothing despite having the room to reduce emissions and the capacity to do so, then it’s correct to think that we’re doing wrong too, in our everyday lives. Your emissions might be as much as 20 times more than others in the world; you might be doing as much as 20 times the damage to the planet compared to other people. The bulbs are not enough.

State governments have done little or nothing about climate change, and individuals have done little or nothing about their own carbon footprints. Perhaps both parties would do something if the moral demand for action were clear. This paper presents two arguments for the necessity of meaningful state action on climate change. The arguments depend on certain clear facts about emissions as well as two uncontroversial moral principles — one owed to Peter Singer and the other connecting capacities with the demand (...) for action. Arguments are presented for individual action based on a similar set of facts and the consistent application of principles which apply in state cases. The arguments put consistency, not consequences, at the heart of the call for individual action. This is a strategy which might help individuals recognize their obligations to the environment. (shrink)

In issue 15, John Shand addressed the moral issue of climate change and suggested that what might happen in 1,000 years time is not as important, morally speaking, as many of us think. Here, James Garvey responds.

“Philosophy is constitutive of good citizenship. It becomes part of what you are when you are a good citizen – a thoughtful person. Philosophy has manyroles. It can be just fun, a game that you play. It can be a way you try to approach your own death or illness, or that of a family member. I’m just focusing on the place where I think I can win over people, and say ‘Look here, you do care about democracy don’t you? (...) Then you’d better see that philosophy has a place.’”. (shrink)

Is technology neutral, a neutral means to whatever ends we have in mind, or is it, instead, somehow imbued with moral and political value, a kind of autonomous force which brings about its own ends? How should we think about the moral dimension of mundane technology, in particular, what is the right way to use it?

The Story of Philosophy sees philosophy for what it is: a passionate, exhilarating quest for human understanding that cannot be reduced to dry categories or simple definitions. It's a story with plot twists, a murder, accidental discoveries, disastrous love affairs, geniuses, idiots, monks, and vagabonds. At the heart of it all are the ideas and obsessions that have captured great thinkers from the very beginning. Packed with intriguing anecdotes and fascinating detail, James Garvey and Jeremy Stangroom bring us face to (...) face with the most important philosophers in western history. Rigorous, refreshingly free of academic jargon, and highly accessible, this is the ideal introduction for anyone who wants to gain a new perspective on philosophy's biggest thoughts. (shrink)

If it’s correct to think that the West does wrong by doing nothing despite having the room to reduce emissions and the capacity to do so, then it’s correct to think that we’re doing wrong too, in our everyday lives. Your emissions might be as much as 20 times more than others in the world; you might be doing as much as 20 times the damage to the planet compared to other people. The bulbs are not enough.

If it’s correct to think that the West does wrong by doing nothing despite having the room to reduce emissions and the capacity to do so, then it’s correct to think that we’re doing wrong too, in our everyday lives. Your emissions might be as much as 20 times more than others in the world; you might be doing as much as 20 times the damage to the planet compared to other people. The bulbs are not enough.