In this rich and detailed study of early modern women's thought, Jacqueline Broad explores the complexity of women's responses to Cartesian philosophy and its intellectual legacy in England and Europe. She examines the work of thinkers such as Mary Astell, Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway and Damaris Masham, who were active participants in the intellectual life of their time and were also the respected colleagues of philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Locke. She also illuminates the continuities (...) between early modern women's thought and the anti-dualism of more recent feminist thinkers. The result is a more gender-balanced account of early modern thought than has hitherto been available. Broad's clear and accessible exploration of this still-unfamiliar area will have a strong appeal to both students and scholars in the history of philosophy, women's studies and the history of ideas. (shrink)

A discussion of epistemic reasons, theoretical rationality, and the relationship between them. Discusses the ontology of reasons and evidence, the relationship between reasons (motivating, normative, possessed, apparent, genuine, etc.) and rationality, the relationship between epistemic reasons and evidence, the relationship between rationality, justification, and knowledge, and many other related topics.

American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG) recently provided two recommendations about predictive genetic testing of children. The Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research Consortium's Pediatrics Working Group compared these recommendations, focusing on operational and ethical issues specific to decision making for children. Content analysis of the statements addresses two issues: (1) how these recommendations characterize and analyze locus of decision making, as well as the risks and benefits of testing, and (2) whether the guidelines conflict or (...) come to different but compatible conclusions because they consider different testing scenarios. These statements differ in ethically significant ways. AAP/ACMG analyzes risks and benefits using best interests of the child and recommends that, absent ameliorative interventions available during childhood, clinicians should generally decline to order testing. Parents authorize focused tests. ACMG analyzes risks and benefits using the interests of the child and other family members and recommends that sequencing results be examined for additional variants that can lead to ameliorative interventions, regardless of age, which laboratories should report to clinicians who should contextualize the results. Parents must accept additional analysis. The ethical arguments in these statements appear to be in tension with each other. (shrink)

This is a defence of externalism about knowledge and also about justification. In this paper, I argue that an important virtue of externalism about these notions is that externalism about justification helps to explain the value of (i.e., importance of) knowledge. I also develop and expand upon some of my earlier arguments for externalism that drew upon what's now known as 'morally loaded cases'. The virtue of externalism is that it's the only view that can both allow for certain kinds (...) of categorical normative requirements while also vindicating the idea that we ought to be guided by the beliefs that we ought to have. (Internalists either have to deny that we ought to be guided by the beliefs that we ought to have (which isn't very internalist!) or, failing that, revise our views about the existence of certain kinds of categorical requirements and tell us that we ought to be guided by our beliefs to do evil things (which isn't very nice!).). (shrink)

This paper explores the reception of Kant's understanding of consciousness by both Romantics and Idealists from 1785 to 1799, and traces its impact on the theory of religion. I first look at Kant's understanding of consciousness as developed in the first Critique, and then looks at how figures such as Fichte, Jacobi, Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schleiermacher received this theory of consciousness and its implications for their understanding of religion.

This is the second of two collections of correspondence written by early modern English women philosophers. In this volume, Jacqueline Broad presents letters from three influential thinkers of the eighteenth century: Mary Astell, Elizabeth Thomas, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn. Broad provides introductory essays for each figure and explanatory annotations to clarify unfamiliar language, content, and historical context for the modern reader. Her selections make available many letters that have never been published before or that live scattered in various archives, (...) obscure manuscripts, and rare books. The discussions range in subject from moral theology and ethics to epistemology and metaphysics; they involve some well-known thinkers of the period, such as John Norris, George Hickes, Mary Chudleigh, John Locke, and Edmund Law. By centering epistolary correspondence, Broad's anthology works to reframe early modern philosophy, the foundation for so much of twentieth-century philosophy, as consisting of collaborative debates that women actively participated in and shaped. Together with its companion volume, Women Philosophers of Eighteenth-Century England: Selected Correspondence is an invaluable primary resource for students, scholars, and those undertaking further research in the history of women's contributions to the formation and development of early modern thought. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I In What Sense is Dworkin's Liberalism Neutral? II Two Parameters III Liberal Neutrality and the Sacred Acknowledgement.

If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical (...) that statements that can express true propositions or contingently false propositions should nevertheless seem absurd like this. If we can account for the absurdity, we shall solve Moore’s Paradox. In this chapter, we shall look at Moore’s proposals and more recent discussions of Moorean absurd thought and speech. (shrink)

Descriptive accounts of the nature of explanation in neuroscience and the global goals of such explanation have recently proliferated in the philosophy of neuroscience and with them new understandings of the experimental practices of neuroscientists have emerged. In this paper, I consider two models of such practices; one that takes them to be reductive; another that takes them to be integrative. I investigate those areas of the neuroscience of learning and memory from which the examples used to substantiate these models (...) are culled, and argue that the multiplicity of experimental protocols used in these research areas presents specific challenges for both models. In my view, these challenges have been overlooked largely because philosophers have hitherto failed to pay sufficient attention to fundamental features of experimental practice. I demonstrate that when we do pay attention to such features, evidence for reduction and integrative unity in neuroscience is simply not borne out. I end by suggesting some new directions for the philosophy of neuroscience that pertain to taking a closer look at the nature of neuroscientific experiments. (shrink)

I argue that justification isn't just in the head. The argument is simple. We should be guided by our beliefs. We shouldn't be guided by anything to do what we shouldn't do. So, we shouldn't believe in ways that would guide us to do the things that we shouldn't. Among the various things we should do is discharge our duties (e.g., to fulfil our promissory obligations) and respect the rights of others (e.g., rights not to be harmed or killed by (...) agents acting on bad information). The grounds of our duties and obligations aren't just in the head. Thus, the conditions that bear on the justification of our beliefs cannot be contained wholly in our heads. The internalist might be right about aspects of normativity, but their theories tell us important normative truths without telling us the whole truth. In addition to norms that tell us how to process information, there are norms that tell us how we ought to live together. In information-asymmetry cases, these norms clearly come apart. Important normative questions about what we should do when agents (who, we might suppose, do what they subjectively ought to do) have interests that come into conflict can only be answered by externalist theories that recognise information-transcendent norms and normatively significant relations that don't supervene upon the information of any agent in particular. The internalist picture turns out to be disturbing precisely because it falls silent when we're faced with questions about how to resolve these conflicts. Resolving these conflicts should be a pressing concern for every normative theory. (shrink)

Dans ce monde ultrarapide, qui honnit le silence et l'absence, l'éloge de l'attente... qu'on n'attendait plus! Un ouvrage éclairé, étayé par de magnifiques références littéraires, d'Homère à Buzatti. Une suspension vitale par l'une des grandes auteures spirituelles d'aujourd'hui. " Heureux ceux qui connaissent encore la joie d'attendre - une lettre, une rencontre, une éclaircie, voire la vie éternelle.0" Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre le peuple hébreu marchant dans le désert pendant quarante ans, la reine Pénélope dont l'époux, Ulysse, est absent (...) depuis si longtemps, la Belle au bois dormant, l'arpenteur de Kafka, la sentinelle de Buzzati? ou encore l'amour lointain chanté par les troubadours et le long désir qui brûle les mystiques? Ici et là se manifeste une manière d'attendre - dans la paix, la détermination ou le doute, dans la confiance et la ferveur, avec parfois une joie intense.0Immense et mystérieuse, l'attente tisse toute une existence et elle élève l'être humain jusqu'à l'infini. Un livre empli d'espérance. Ecrivain, Jacqueline Kelen a publié de nombreux livres qui étudient les grands mythes de l'Occident, les figures de la mystique et les richesses de la vie intérieure. Aux Editions du Cerf ont paru Le diable préfère les saints, Les compagnons de sainteté, et Histoire de celui qui dépensa tout et ne perdit rien (prix de la liberté intérieure 2020). (shrink)

People with mental illness are treated, in research, as a ‘class’ or category who are vulnerable, without always being clear why they should be treated as such, not why an individual, rather than the class, is vulnerable. The two main reasons given are lack of competence and power imbalance. Competence issues include incapacity and legislation, assessment and the impact of the illness in decisions. Power issues cover the role of mental health legislation, coercion, protectiveness and paternalism, stigma and discrimination and (...) the ‘well’ and ‘ill’ self. These are examined within a framework of risk assessment, both to the patient and to others. Over-concern to protect the vulnerable can lead to gate-keepers preventing their inclusion in studies at various stages of the research. This denies such groups a voice in the research process.It is suggested that ethical scrutiny of research is not only to prevent harm to the vulnerable, but also to provide a framework to empower such people to take part in research. To do otherwise is to further stigmatize and marginalize them. One way forward is to look at the risk presented by different types of research, from clinical intervention trials to non-therapeutic, qualitative studies and to modify capacity and access requirements in the light of the risks presented. (shrink)

In this chapter I investigate the kinds of changes that psychiatric kinds undergo when they become explanatory targets of areas of sciences that are not “mature” and are in the early stages of discovering mechanisms. The two areas of science that are the targets of my analysis are cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology.

This paper explores three important criticisms of Kant's ethics by Friedrich Schleiermacher, all having to do with Kant's alleged failure to account for the value of the individual. These are: (1) Kant's formalism precludes him from specifying ends for the will, and without such ends, the moral perfection of the individual, and the genuine appreciation of the other in his or her individuality cannot become my end; (2) Kant cannot provide an adequate metaphysical grounding of the value of the individuals (...) comprising a community; (3) Kant cannot give an account of why members of a community should value the individual qua individual in relation to the community. In this paper I discuss these criticisms and their validity in detail. I show that understood properly, Kant has the resources to answer Schleiermacher's first criticism, and I show how Schleiermacher's own system sought to avoid the second and third problems. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such stability is (...) put forward and its implications for explanatory integration are briefly considered. (shrink)

What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be (...) open to the idea that justified beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs. (shrink)

The internalism-externalism debate is one of the oldest debates in epistemology. Internalists assert that the justification of our beliefs can only depend on facts internal to us, while externalists insist that justification can depend on additional, for example environmental, factors. Clayton Littlejohn proposes and defends a new strategy for resolving this debate. Focussing on the connections between practical and theoretical reason, he explores the question of whether the priority of the good to the right might be used to defend (...) an epistemological version of consequentialism, and proceeds to formulate a new 'deontological externalist' view. On this view, the justificatory status of a belief depends upon whether it is fit for the purposes of practical reasoning. Only beliefs that meet externalist standards are fit for such a purpose. If we want to understand how a wide range of norms (e.g., moral norms) apply to rational agents regardless of what their evidence or outlook is like, we have to embrace an externalist account of the justification. (shrink)

It seems that different epistemic norms can come into conflict and so we might wonder what happens when they do impose incompatible requirements upon us. According to the dilemmic view, they might sometimes generate sets of requirements that cannot be satisfied, ensuring that there is no rationally acceptable way for a thinker to deal with the predicament she’s in. After reviewing the case for the dilemmic view, I introduce an alternative framework that accounts for the appearance of dilemma-like conflicts without (...) committing us to the possibility of genuine dilemmas. I argue that this alternative view has some important explanatory virtues that the dilemmic view lacks and can account for the problematic intuitions that seem to support the dilemmic view. (shrink)

This volume is the first to undertake a large-scale, longue durée study of pain in antiquity across multiple contexts, cultures and genres, providing a close analysis of the articulation of pain experiences, both mental and physical.

Volontiers pluridisciplinaire, le présent ouvrage multiplie les regards susceptibles d’éclairer l’insidieux changement de paradigme en cours qui affecte le mouvement Droit & Littérature et il prépare ainsi une espérée « théorie narrative du Droit ». L’être social fut naguère un être de Droit. Le voici aujourd’hui cerné de toutes parts - étouffé même - par les normes, les règles et les nudges qui déferlent sur lui en flux continus, issus de mille sources et transportés de mille manières. Pareille avalanche entraîne (...) de nouvelles modalités narratives qui se bousculent les unes les autres, dans un tourbillon où se dissout le Droit tel qu’il nous a longtemps été familier. (shrink)

Part of the nonfiction Orca Think series, this book gives young readers the tools to think about the physical, social and emotional needs of pets, farm animals and wild animals using the Five Freedoms.

Business ethics can be taught as a stand-alone course or be woven throughout a curriculum. There is a debate over whether to teach ethics in the form of theory or real-world connectedness or both. A moral-judgment gap exists, and many believe Business education should promote knowledge and skills that enable ethical intentions to be followed with ethical behaviors. This conceptual paper diagrams where the gap exists in Business Ethics education and theorizes how multi-modal, learning-centered ethics teaching can bridge this shortfall. (...) Literature from the field of Education is drawn upon for pedagogies that promote learning and application. Case studies, constructed narratives, and simulations function as several key components useful for developing complex skills needed for applying ethical reasoning. Additional components and strategies that undergird and reinforce the case studies and other active learning components are laid out in pyramid form toward an overall best-practices approach to developing principled moral reasoning in Business Ethics. (shrink)

According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support (...) grounds propositional justification. -/- The principle is mistaken. There are permissible steps you may take that others may not even if you have the very same evidence. There are permissible steps that you cannot take that others can even if your beliefs receive the same type of evidential support. Because we have to assume almost nothing about the nature of evidential support to establish these results, we should reject evidentialism. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to the (infamous) causal impotence objection to the standard arguments for ethical vegetarianism. The paper defends a non-consequentialist response to this objection, one that draws on an account of the principle of non-maleficence inspired by Ross.

Neuroscience is a laboratory-based science that spans multiple levels of analysis from molecular genetics to behavior. At every level of analysis experiments are designed in order to answer empirical questions about phenomena of interest. Understanding the nature and structure of experimentation in neuroscience is fundamental for assessing the quality of the evidence produced by such experiments and the kinds of claims that are warranted by the data. This article provides a general conceptual framework for thinking about evidence and experimentation in (...) neuroscience with a particular focus on two research areas: cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology. (shrink)

This book explores how the immediate experience of musical sound relates to processes of meaning construction and discursive mediation. A unique multi-authored work that both draws on and contributes to current debates in ethnomusicology, musicology, psychology, and cognitive science, it presents a novel and productive view of how cultural practice relates to the experience and meaning of musical performance.

This work arises out of the efforts of two college teachers to explain to their beginning students how believing and reasoning are two human activities that may be integrated to form a complete Christian view of human existence. Two Wings takes its title from the opening of John Paul II's encyclical Fides et Ratio, which speaks of how the human spirit rises on the two wings of faith and reason to stretch toward truth. The book offers a basic yet engaging (...) encounter with traditional arguments for and against God's existence, including such troubling topics as the question of evil and Christian belief. It also grapples in non-technical language with arguments arising from the encounter between contemporary natural science and traditional Christian theology. These chapters include accessible discussions of the implications of Big Bang cosmology, arguments from design, and Darwinian evolution. The final chapters of the book take up questions from ethics and politics that impact decisions on how we should structure our lives in light of the engagement between faith and reason. This book is non-dogmatic; it seeks to probe and question the contours of the problems involved in the debate. It addresses arguments supporting and opposing its own viewpoint, and abounds in analogies designed to speak to non-specialists. Today even Christians who do not work in academic environments need to be familiar with such philosophical and theological arguments. Two Wings provides the best available starting point for their efforts to engage with confidence the contemporary situation of Christian believers because it arises directly from the questions of the inquisitive. (shrink)

Are humans free, or are we determined by our genes and the world around us? The question of freedom is not only one of philosophy’s greatest conundrums, but also one of the most fundamental questions of human existence. It’s particularly pressing in societies like ours, where our core institutions of law, ethics, and religion are built around the belief in individual freedom. Can one still affirm human freedom in an age of science? And if free will doesn’t exist, does it (...) make sense to act as though it does? These are the issues that are presented, probed, and debated in the following chapters. A dozen experts―specialists in medicine, psychology, ethics, theology, and philosophy—grapple with the multiple and often profound challenges presented by today’s brain science. After examining the arguments against traditional notions of free will, several of the authors champion the idea of a chastened but robust free will for today, one that allows us still to affirm the value of first-person experience. (shrink)

Derrida and the new materialism -- Reading Derrida reading religion -- Surviving Christianity -- Political theology without sovereignty -- Interrupting Heidegger with a ram: Derrida's reading of Celan -- Derrida, Lacan, and object-oriented ontology: philosophy of religion at the end of the world -- Radical theology and the event: Caputo's Derridean gospel -- Deconstructive plasticity: Malabou's biological materialism -- Quantum Derrida: Barad's hauntological materialism -- The sins of the fathers, a love letter.

Transitive proxy voting (or "liquid democracy") is a novel form of collective decision making, often framed as an attractive hybrid of direct and representative democracy. Although the ideas behind liquid democracy have garnered widespread support, there have been relatively few attempts to model it formally. This paper makes three main contributions. First, it proposes a new social choice-theoretic model of liquid democracy, which is distinguished by taking a richer formal perspective on the process by which a voter chooses a proxy. (...) Second, it examines the model from an axiomatic perspective, proving (a) a proxy vote analogue of May's Theorem and (b) an impossibility result concerning monotonicity properties in a proxy vote setting. Third, it explores the topic of manipulation in transitive proxy votes. Two forms of manipulation specific to the proxy vote setting are defined, and it is shown that manipulation occurs in strictly more cases in proxy votes than in classical votes. (shrink)