Theorising about politics and society has never had firm and settled boundaries. In the past, political theorists have sometimes been moralists, sometimes moral philosophers; now apologists for the existing order, now social engineers; they have tried both to explain society and to discuss social values; and their explanations have been variously based on empirical generalisations, a priori assumptions about human nature or general metaphysical theories. Very few aspects of knowledge have been thought irrelevant to social enquiry, and no problem has (...) been isolated as its central and necessary concern. (shrink)

What I wish to do in this paper is to look at a part of John Stuart Mill's ‘one very simple principle’ for determining the limits of state intervention. This principle is, you will remember, that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’.

Scholarly analysis of the political philosophy of the eminent 19th century Frenchman.

John Stuart Mill has often been charged with inconsistency in his social thinking. The reason given is usually that he tries to combine too many different traditions of thought into an ideological whole. Too deeply affected by his father and his severely purposeful early education ever to repudiate utilitarianism, he was yet too sensitive to disregard criticism of his inherited creed, and too open-minded to ignore areas of thought and experience generally allen to the utilitarian mind. Professor Robson, whose editing (...) of Mill’s works has already put social theorists and historians of ideas in his debt, disputes this view. He argues that, beneath Mill’s eclecticism, beneath his perhaps over-generous acknow-ledgements of his obligations to others, there is a basic unity of ideas. His discussion of the influences on Mill’s thought covers some fairly well-trodden ground but he brings a good deal of common sense to bear on an area where the excitement of the academic chase for sources has sometimes obscured the obvious. On the whole, he claims, the influence of Coleridge, the Suint-Simonians, Carlyle and Comte was limited; some of their specific ideas Mill accepted and used, but he was clearly aware of the differences of emphasis and context that did exist. Harriet Taylor and Tocqueville contributed more, the first by extending Mill’s vision of desirable social ends and by emphasising the difficulties of applying social theory in the world of practice, the second by his insights into democratic society and his demonstration of a proper sociological method. The deepest influence was, however, his early Benthamite upbringing and it is this life-long commitment to a utilitarian ethic that constitutes, for Professor Robson, the still, calm centre of his mind. There are other unifying ideas—his bias towards practicality and his constant concern with evolving a satisfactory methodology for the social sciences—but even these centred on a continual examination of the adequacies and inadequacies of his father’s doctrine. (shrink)

‘We have the strong ground of common hatreds, though perhaps we hate on different or even opposite grounds’. Thus wrote Tocqueville the liberal of Montalembert the liberal Catholic. What lay in common was a desire for an extension of personal liberties, freedom of association, decentralisation, separation of Church and state; but, in recognizing the differences, Tocqueville tacitly acknowledges the areligious nature of his own plea for religion in modern society and asserts the aliberal nature of Montalembert’s dedication to liberal programmes. (...) Both claimed to unite what the French had set asunder, religion and liberalism; both in fact degraded one end by using it as a tool of the other. (shrink)