Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.

This book offers solutions to two persistent and I believe closely related problems in epistemology. The first problem is that of drawing a principled distinction between perception and inference: what is the difference between seeing that something is the case and merely believing it on the basis of what we do see? The second problem is that of specifying which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., directly, or noninferentially, justified) and which are not. I argue that what makes a belief a (...) perceptual belief, or a basic belief, is not any introspectible feature of the belief but rather the nature of the cognitive system, or "module", that is causally responsible for the belief. Thus, even zombies, who in the philosophical literature lack conscious experiences altogether, can have basic, justified, perceptual beliefs. -/- The theories of perceptual and basic beliefs developed in the monograph are embedded in a larger reliabilist epistemology. I use this theory of basic beliefs to develop a detailed reliabilist theory: Inferentialist Reliabilism, which offers a reliabilist theory of inferential justification and which solves some longstanding problems for other reliabilist views by demanding inferential support for some—but not all—beliefs. The book is an instance of a thoroughgoingly naturalistic approach to epistemology. Many of my arguments have an empirical basis, and the view that I endorse reserves a central role for the cognitive sciences—in particular, cognitive neuroscience—in filling in the details of an applied epistemological theory. (shrink)

Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...

Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular (...) proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition. For instance, Sophia’s degree of belief that it will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief. These theories offer a formal tool to measure degrees of belief, to investigate the relations between various degrees of belief in different propositions, and to normatively evaluate degrees of belief. (shrink)

This paper develops the account of our experience and knowledge of time put forward by Russell in his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. While Russell ultimately abandons the project after it receives severe criticism from Wittgenstein (though several chapters derived from it appear as articles in The Monist), in producing this manuscript time, and particularly the notion of the present time, play a central role in Russell’s account of experience. In the present discussion, I propose to focus largely on Russell’s writing (...) in 1912–3, comparing this with some of the remarks made about memory by Moore in 1910–11. My motivation is twofold. First as a matter of scholarship, to reveal an original interpretation of Russell’s notion of immediate memory and of his view of our experience and knowledge of time over this period. Second as a matter of philosophical curiosity. There has been an increase in interest in temporal experience in contemporary discussions of the philosophy of mind, from memory and the imagination to the temporal aspects of perceptual experience. Russell’s writing in 1912–3 provides us with a philosophically interesting account of temporal experience which has points of contact with contemporary debates. (shrink)

The “looks” of things are frequently invoked (a) to account for the epistemic status of perceptual beliefs and (b) to distinguish perceptual from inferential beliefs. ‘Looks’ for these purposes is normally understood in terms of a perceptual experience and its phenomenal character. Here I argue that there is also a nonexperiential sense of ‘looks’—one that relates to cognitive architecture, rather than phenomenology—and that this nonexperiential sense can do the work of (a) and (b).

This is an opinionated overview of the Frege-Geach problem, in both its historical and contemporary guises. Covers Higher-order Attitude approaches, Tree-tying, Gibbard-style solutions, and Schroeder's recent A-type expressivist solution.

Traditionally, the investigation of truth has been anchored in a priori reasoning. Cognitive science deviates from this tradition by adding empirical data on how people understand and use concepts. Building on psychophysics and machine learning methods, we introduce conceptual scaling, an approach to map people's understanding of abstract concepts. This approach, allows computing participant-specific conceptual maps from obtained ordinal comparison data, thereby quantifying perceived similarities among abstract concepts. Using this approach, we investigated individual's alignment with philosophical theories on truth and (...) the predictive capacity of conceptual maps. The obtained results indicated that, while people's understanding of truth is multifaceted and encapsulates notions of coherence and authenticity, alignment is best for the correspondence theory of truth. Furthermore, conceptual maps allowed predicting individual outcomes with an accuracy of roughly 70%. This research demonstrates that conceptual scaling offers accurate descriptions of individual's understanding of abstract concepts, behavioral predictions, and quantification of alignment with theoretical perspectives. (shrink)

Seminal work in moral neuroscience by Joshua Greene and colleagues employed variants of the well-known trolley problems to identify two brain networks which compete with each other to determine moral judgments. Greene interprets the tension between these brain networks using a dual process account which pits deliberative reason against automatic emotion-driven intuitions: reason versus passion. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests, however, that the critical tension that Greene identifies as playing a role in moral judgment is not so much a tension between (...) reason and passion, but a tension between distinct forms of deliberative reasoning: analytic versus empathetic. In this paper we present results from several new studies supporting this alternative hypothesis. (shrink)

Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of (...) introspection but which generalizes to theories of perceptual justification as well. (shrink)

To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are messier than (...) is sometimes thought. (shrink)

The history of the Frankfurt School cannot be fully told without examining the relationships of Critical Theorists to their Jewish family backgrounds. Jewish matters had significant effects on key figures in the Frankfurt School, including Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal and Herbert Marcuse. At some points, their Jewish family backgrounds clarify their life paths; at others, these backgrounds help to explain why the leaders of the School stressed the significance of antisemitism. In the post-Second World War (...) era, the differing relationships of Critical Theorists to their Jewish origins illuminate their distinctive stances toward Israel. This book investigates how the Jewish backgrounds of major Critical Theorists, and the ways in which they related to their origins, impacted upon their work, the history of the Frankfurt School, and differences that emerged among them over time. (shrink)

Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of epistemologists endorse a particular two-part view about how this happens. The view is that perceptual beliefs get their justification from perceptual experiences, and that they do so by being based on them. Despite the ubiquity of these two views, I think that neither has very much going for it; on the contrary, there’s good reason not to believe either one of them.

The public role of religion continues to be a complex and controversial topic. In a career spanning nearly five decades, Wolfgang Huber has written extensively on the role of Christian ethics in societies across the globe. This collection provides an introduction to his thought and access to some of his most important and thought-provoking essays. Huber continues to engage issues of both local and global importance at institutions in a number of countries. (Series: Theology in the Public Square (...) / Theologie in der Offentlichkeit - Vol. 5). (shrink)

Phenomenology has been described as a “non-argumentocentric” way of doing philosophy, reflecting that the philosophical focus is on generating adequate descriptions of experience. But it should not be described as an argument-free zone, regardless of whether this is intended as a descriptive claim about the work of the “usual suspects” or a normative claim about how phenomenology ought to be properly practiced. If phenomenology is always at least partly in the business of arguments, then it is worth giving further attention (...) to the role and form of phenomenological argumentation, how it interacts with its more strictly descriptive component, and the status of phenomenological claims regarding conditions for various kinds of experience. I contend that different versions of phenomenological reasoning encroach upon argument forms that are commonly thought to be antithetical to phenomenology, notably abductive reasoning, understood in terms of its role in both hypothesis generation and in terms of justification. This paper identifies two main steps to making this case. The first step takes seriously the consequences of the intrinsically dialectical aspect of phenomenology in intersection with other modes of philosophy, the natural attitude, and non-philosophy. The second step focuses on transcendental reflection and arguments about the conditions/structures they contain. Together, these two steps aim to rescue phenomenology from the objection that it has an “ostrich epistemology” with regard to the ostensible purity of description, the intuition of essences, or the “conditions” ascertained through transcendental reflection. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider a challenge that naturalism poses for embodied cognition and enactivism, as well as for work on phenomenology of the body that has an argumentative or explanatory dimension. It concerns the connection between embodiment and emergence. In the commitment to explanatory holism, and the irreducibility of embodiment to any mechanistic and/or neurocentric construal of the interactions of the component parts, I argue there is (often, if not always) an unavowed dependence on an epistemic and metaphysical role (...) for emergence, especially concerning certain embodied capacities (motor-intentionality, know-how, skilful habits, affordances, etc.). While the problem of emergence is standardly dismissed as a problem for phenomenology, which brackets away the kind of materialist (and scientific) picture from which reflection on emergence derives, I argue that once a phenomenologist takes a fully-fledged embodied turn, they also have a genuine dilemma of emergence to confront, and I evaluate the relevant options. (shrink)

There are several reasons which suggest that the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe is gradually diminishing. Thus, Europeans are confronted with the question whether and under what conditions strategic stability can be obtained in a post-nuclear world. From the analysis of a simple conceptual model of military conflict the conclusion is reached that, in order to preserve crisis stability in a non-nuclear world and to dampen the arms race, the antagonistic land forces in Europe need to be (...) gradually restructured in a manner so that neither side may perceive the other as a potential threat to its territorial integrity. The requisite structural changes ought to be brought about before nuclear weapons become altogether invailable for deterrence in Europe, otherwise the War saw Pact’s conventional superiority would, in a serious crisis, leave Western Europe only the choice between military defeat and a priori capitulation. There should be military as well as economic incentives for the implementation of structural changes toward a reduction of the offensive capabilities of conventional forces, if the so-called ‘defense efficiency hypothesis’ were to be validated. Otherwise, a deterioration of crisis stability must be expected during the transition period. (shrink)

Das Werk des vorsokratischen Philosophen Parmenides, das nur fragmentarisch erhalten ist, kann als Lehrgedicht beschrieben werden. In diesem Buch werden zum ersten Mal die pädagogischen Aspekte des Gedichtes aufgrund einer detaillierten Diskussion von ausgewählten Fragmenten systematisch untersucht. Es werden u. a. folgende Fragen behandelt: Wie kommt der Suchende oder Lernende zur philosophischen Erkenntnis? Welche 'Wege' oder Methoden führen dorthin? Was für Lernstufen gibt es? Wie verhält sich der Lernende (der Kuros) zur Belehrenden (der Göttin)? Welcher geistige Zustand soll den Erkennenden (...) kennzeichnen? Parmenides' Ontologie wird hier als Beschreibung des Erkennenden in Betracht gezogen, insofern das erkennende Subjekt seinem Objekt entsprechen soll. Parmenides' philosophische Pädagogik wird im Rahmen der Erziehungstheorie und Praxis der antiken Philosophie dargestellt und mit dem Thema der Philosophie als Lebenskunst verglichen. (shrink)

The Psychosis of Race offers a unique and detailed account of the psychoanalytic significance of race, and the ongoing impact of racism in contemporary society. Moving beyond the well-trodden assertion that race is a social construction, and working against demands that simply call for more representational equality, The Psychosis of Race explores how the delusions, anxieties, and paranoia that frame our race relations can afford new insights into how we see, think, and understand race's pervasive appeal. With examples drawn from (...) politics and popular culture--such as Candyman, Get Out, and the music of Kendrick Lamar--critical attention is given to introducing as well as explicating on several key concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis and the study of psychosis, including foreclosure, phallus, the Name-of-the-Father, sinthome, and the objet petit a. By elaborating a cultural mode to psychosis and its understanding, an original and critical exposition of the effects of racialization, as well as our ability to discern the very limits of our capacity to think through, or even beyond, the idea of race, is provided. The Psychosis of Race speaks to an emerging area in the study of psychoanalysis and race, and will appeal to scholars and academics across the fields of psychology, sociology, cultural studies, media studies, and the arts and humanities. (shrink)

In Subconscious Journeys, Jack Mitchell explores the human mind and its connection to life, death, disease, and the probability of extended life. He addresses how the four parts of the mind function and adapt as we deal with the inherent changes in life.

In this paper, I argue that the negative injunctions against certain ways of conceiving of the ethico-political that we can draw explicitly from the methodological strictures of phenomenology are also consistent with some of the core more positive dimensions of contemporary virtue ethics (especially at the more anti-theoretical end of the virtue ethical spectrum), and that central aspects of virtue ethics are consistent with most of the explicit reflections on ethical matters proffered by canonical phenomenologists.

Methods have been a controversial element in theories of knowledge for the last 40 years. Recent developments in theories of justification, concerning the identification and individuation of belief-forming processes, can shed new light on methods, solving some longstanding problems in the theory of knowledge. We needn’t and shouldn’t shy away from methods; rather, methods, construed as psychological processes of belief-formation, need to play a central role in any credible theory of knowledge.

The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology presents a comprehensive exploration of the wide range of methodological approaches utilized in the contemporary field of theoretical and philosophical psychology. The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology presents a comprehensive exploration of the wide range of methodological approaches utilized in the contemporary field of theoretical and philosophical psychology. Gathers together for the first time all the approaches and methods that define scholarly practice in theoretical and philosophical psychology Chapters explore various (...) philosophical and conceptual approaches, historical approaches, narrative approaches to the nature of human conduct, mixed-method studies of psychology and psychological inquiry, and various theoretical bases of contemporary psychotherapeutic practices Features contributions from ten Past Presidents of the Society of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, along with several Past Presidents of other relevant societies. (shrink)

This book aims to elevate the education of future mental health professionals to a higher professional level and serve as a "vade mecum" of ethical and psychological reflection for practicing professionals. This book goes beyond merely offering a set of instructions; it encourages readers to actively engage in ethical reflection and cultivate ethical attitudes grounded in factual understanding.

This chapter examines the nature of legislative deliberation and the political sources of legislative majorities as dominant themes of American constitutional thinking. Drawing on James Madison's insights based on his memorandum ‘Vices of the Political System of the U. States’, it considers how the American conception of the rule of law developed amid the republican innovations of the late eighteenth century. It looks at the constitutional crisis of the late 1780s and the underlying aspects of governance in the colonies-becoming-commonwealths of (...) Anglophone North America, with reference to Madison's arguments regarding the ‘impotence of the laws of the states’ and ‘perspicuity’ in the realms of law and politics. It also discusses Madison's innovative approach to republican constitutionalism as well as his conception of the effect of popular opinion and interest on the pursuit of public good and private rights. (shrink)

This book explores a value-based research methodology, Living Educational Theory Research (LETR), which aligns a values-based approach with key tenets of professional development to inform and inspire future educators' practice. Written by the world-leading scholars in the field of LETR, chapters are global in reach and promote the evolving and dynamic nature of the methodology and its application with real-world professional training within higher education. Through discussion and dialogue on the evolution of Living Educational Theory Research, chapters explore topics such (...) as professional development and community-based contexts, supporting academics wishing to improve their practice by placing the theory within a scholarly paradigm to legitimise its use for scholarly learning. Demonstrating how insights from disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, and psychology are integrated within the generation of living-educational-theories, this outwardly looking volume will appeal to postgraduate students, scholars, and researchers involved with educational theory, action research and other forms of practitioner research, and education research methods more broadly. (shrink)

While most other works focus on conspiracy theories, this book examines conspiracy panics, or the anxiety over the phenomenon of conspiracy theories. Jack Z. Bratich argues that conspiracy theories are portals into the major social issues defining U.S. and global political culture. These issues include the rise of new technologies, the social function of journalism, U.S. race relations, citizenship and dissent, globalization, biowarfare and biomedicine, and the shifting positions within the Left. Using a Foucauldian governmentality analysis, Bratich maintains that (...) conspiracy panics contribute to a broader political rationality, a (neo)liberal strategy of governing at a distance through the use of reason. He also explores the growing popularity of 9/11 conspiracy research in terms of what he calls the "sphere of legitimate dissensus." Conspiracy Panics concludes that we are witnessing a new fusion of culture and rationality, one that is increasingly shared across the political spectrum. (shrink)

Was ist Wurde? Konnen auch nichtmenschliche Tiere Wurde haben? Bettina Huber geht diesen Fragen nach, indem sie sich mit verschiedenen Auffassungen von Wurde befasst und davon ausgehend genauer auf das Verstandnis von Wurde als einer Haltung eingeht: Uber Wurde als Haltung zu verfugen bedeutet, mit dem eigenen Selbstbild in Ubereinstimmung zu leben. Die Autorin zeigt, inwiefern bestimmte nichtmenschliche Tiere die notwendigen Fahigkeiten besitzen, um ein Selbstbild zu entwickeln und damit ubereinzustimmen. Anschliessend beschaftigt sie sich mit den Bedingungen, die fur (...) ein Leben in Wurde erfullt sein mussen. Am Ende geht es um ein konkretes Beispiel, namlich warum Grossaquarien Delfinen ein Leben in Wurde nicht ermoglichen konnen - und in bestimmten Fallen eine Wurdeverletzung oder gar eine Demutigung vorliegt. (shrink)

Als geistiger Vater der "offenen Gesellschaft" wurde Karl Popper zum Hofphilosophen der westlichen Demokratie. Seine Staatstheorie steht vor dem Hintergrund seiner bahnbrechenden Wissenschaftstheorie, da er von einer Einheit der Methode ausgeht.Allerdings hat Popper selbst auf eine zusammenhangende Darstellung seiner politischen Philosophie verzichtet. Jack Nasher gibt die Staatstheorie Poppers aus seinem gesamten Opus mosaikartig wieder.Poppers offene Gesellschaft ist gekennzeichnet von einer Politik der kleinen Schritte, die stets an ihrer Wirkung zur Verbesserung von Lebensumstanden gemessen werden. Das Stammesleben ist aufgegeben, zugunsten (...) eines freien Individuums - die immer wiederkehrende Stammessehnsucht dagegen ist brandgefahrlich. Kern der Demokratie ist es, Herrscher ohne Blutvergiessen loswerden zu konnen - mit "Volksherrschaft" hat sie hingegen wenig zu tun, was immer wieder zu unheilbringenden Enttauschungen fuhrt. (shrink)

In the late 1980s, the American economist Jeremy Rifkin claimed that “a battle is brewing over the politics of time” because he felt that the pivotal issue of the twenty first century would be the question of time and who controlled it. I argue in this chapter that a battle over the politics of time (and the metaphysics of time) is also a major part of what is at stake in the differences between analytic and continental philosophy. Very different philosophies (...) of time, and associated methodological techniques, serve to define representatives of each of these groups and also to guard against their potential interlocutors. To begin to illustrate this, I offer a patchy history of philosophy of time in the early twentieth century, the period in which the idea of a ‘divide’ between two ways of doing philosophy began to be entrenched. (shrink)

Everybody involved in sport, from the bleachers to the boardroom, should develop an understanding of ethics. Sport ethics prompt discussion of the central principles and ideals by which we all live our lives, and effective leadership in sport is invariably ethical leadership. This fascinating new introduction to sport ethics outlines key ethical theories in the context of sport as well as the fundamentals of moral reasoning. It explores all the central ethical issues in contemporary sport: from violence, hazing, and gambling (...) to performance enhancement, doping, and discrimination. This book not only investigates the ethical, social, and legal underpinnings of the most important issues in sport today, but also introduces the reader to the foundations of ethical leadership in sport and discusses which leadership strategies are most effective. Each chapter includes original real-world case studies, learning exercises, and questions to encourage students to reflect on the ethical problems presented. Sport, Ethics and Leadership is an essential resource for any course on sport and leisure studies, the ethics and philosophy of sport, or sport and leisure management. (shrink)

Recent work on complex adaptive systems in the natural sciences, and the growing relational turn in the social sciences both reject the "systems theories" of earlier generations. This book builds on these entities to advance a relational processual approach to the comparative study of historical and contemporary international systems.

This anthology discusses important issues surrounding environmental law and economics and provides an in-depth analysis of its use in legislation, regulation and legal adjudication from a neoclassical and behavioural law and economics perspective. Environmental issues raise a vast range of legal questions: to what extent is it justifiable to rely on markets and continued technological innovation, especially as it relates to present exploitation of scarce resources? Or is it necessary for the state to intervene? Regulatory instruments are available to create (...) and maintain a more sustainable society: command and control regulations, restraints, Pigovian taxes, emission certificates, nudging policies, et cetera If regulation in a certain legal field is necessary, which policies and methods will most effectively spur sustainable consumption and production in order to protect the environment while mitigating any potential negative impact on economic development? Since the related problems are often caused by scarcity of resources, economic analysis of law can offer remarkable insights for their resolution. Part I underlines the foundations of environmental law and economics. Part II analyses the effectiveness of economic instruments and regulations in environmental law. Part III is dedicated to the problems of climate change. Finally, Part IV focuses on tort and criminal law. The twenty-one chapters in this volume deliver insights into the multifaceted debate surrounding the use of economic instruments in environmental regulation in Europe. (shrink)

Two kinds of cosmopolitan vision are typically associated with Kant's practical philosophy: on the one hand, the ideal of a universal moral community of rational agents who constitute a 'kingdom of ends' qua shared humanity. On the other hand, the ideal of a distinctly political community of'world citizens' who share membership in some kind of global polity. Kant's Grounded Cosmopolitanism introduces a novel account of Kant's global thinking, one that has hitherto been largely overlooked: a grounded cosmopolitanism concerned with spelling (...) out the normative implications of the fact thata plurality of corporeal agents concurrently inhabit the earth's spherical surface. It is neither concerned with a community of shared humanity in the abstract, nor of shared citizenship, but with a 'disjunctive' community of earth dwellers, that is, embodied agents in direct physical confrontationwith each other. Kant's grounded cosmopolitanism as laid out in the Doctrine of Right frames the question how individuals relate to one another globally by virtue of concurrent existence and derives from this a specific set of constraints on cross-border interactions. (shrink)