Professor Jack Goody builds on his own previous work to extend further his highly influential critique of what he sees as the pervasive eurocentric or occidentalist biases of so much western historical writing. Goody also examines the consequent 'theft' by the West of the achievements of other cultures in the invention of (notably) democracy, capitalism, individualism, and love. The Theft of History discusses a number of theorists in detail, including Marx, Weber and Norbert Elias, and engages with critical admiration western (...) historians like Fernand Braudel, Moses Finlay and Perry Anderson. Major questions of method are raised, and Goody proposes a new comparative methodology for cross-cultural analysis, one that gives a much more sophisticated basis for assessing divergent historical outcomes, and replaces outmoded simple differences between East and West. The Theft of History will be read by an unusually wide audience of historians, anthropologists and social theorists. (shrink)

The importance of writing as a means of communication in a society formerly without it, or where writing has been confined to particular groups, is enormous. It objectifies speech, provides language with a material correlative, and in this material form speech can be transmitted over space and preserved over time. In this book the contributors discuss cultures at different levels of sophistication and literacy and examine the importance of writing on the development of these societies. All the articles except the (...) first were specially written for this book and the extensive introduction unites and synthesizes the material. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article considère que l’émergence de valeurs humanistes n’est pas un phénomène purement moderne. Si par humanisme nous entendons l’essor des savoirs laïques et scientifiques, nous pouvons constater sa présence à certaines époques de l’histoire de l’Islam. L’Humanisme dans le sens du respect des « valeurs humaines » comme la démocratie est tout aussi étendu dans le temps et dans l’espace. Donc l’idée que l’Occident, en tant qu’héritier de la Grèce antique, en possède le monopole est assez intenable. Des (...) sociétés tribales pratiquent bien souvent des versions de la démocratie directe, la représentation étant un aspect des régimes beaucoup plus complexes. En outre, même parmi les États monarchiques, rares sont ceux qui peuvent à long terme se permettre d’ignorer l’opinion publique. Les démocraties représentatives modernes en revanche se dispensent souvent de consulter leurs électorats pour des décisions telles que la déclaration des guerres. En tout cas, elles ne constituent qu’un mode de représentation parmi d’autres et n’ont pas le monopole de la vertu, surtout dans les communautés divisées sur le plan religieux. Ailleurs elles peuvent servir de dispositif de légitimation, comme dans le cas d’Israël. (shrink)

The notion that there was a profound cultural boundary between Europe (defined as Christian) and Asia (defined as other, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism …) was dear to the hearts of the Europeans at least from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. But it is as much a figment of European creation as the notion of a physical boundary. Of course there were cultural differences of a graduated kind and important political-military ones with the western developments of ships and guns (using (...) the Islamic compass and Chinese gunpowder), but especially with the development of industrial production. Pomerantz has recently argued that western economic supremacy was not in evidence until after that time, a thesis that obviously cuts at the roots of those many writers who claim a cultural advantage in the West going back perhaps to classical times, to Christianity, to the German heritage, or even to the Renaissance and Reformation. Some important changes did occur in the West following developments in the sphere of printing, mainly in the sphere of education and the modes of communication. That earlier levels of cultural attainment were not so very different is clear from the early Jesuit reports of their work in the East. (shrink)

This paper argues that the emergence of humanistic values is not a purely modern phenomenon. If by humanism we refer to secular learning and the development of science, there were periods in the history of Islam when this was encouraged. Humanism in the sense of the respect for ‘human values’ such as democracy is equally widely distributed in time and space, so that the idea that the West, as heirs of Ancient Greece, has a monopoly is quite untenable. Tribal societies (...) often practise versions of direct democracy; representation is an aspect of many more complex regimes. Even with monarchical states, few can afford to neglect public opinion over the longer term. Modern representative democracies moreover often fail to consult their people on major issues such as declaring war. In any case that is only one mode of representation among others and does not have the monopoly of virtue, especially in religiously divided communities. Elsewhere it may be adopted as a legitimating device in a specific context, as I suggested had been the case with Israel. (shrink)