The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. If the (...) premise is understood in the sense required for the argument to go through then it should be rejected by a deflationist. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present and evaluate one version of the deflationary attitude to truth, namely the Modest Account, propounded by Wolfgang Künne in his Conceptions of Truth (2003). I introduce the deflationary theories of truth in the first part of my paper and present briefly the views of a more familiar deflationist, Paul Horwich, as a "stepping-stone" to Künne's account. In the second part of the paper I give an overview of Künne's theory and in the (...) final part I present a dilemma that his account faces: either it is not modest after all or it is incomprehensible. (shrink)