This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and ...
Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the 1950s. An issue (...) of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)
We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral over gains and (...) are mildly ambiguity seeking over losses. Further analysis shows that on an individual level, and with respect to both risky and ambiguous prospects, there is limited incidence of a reflection effect where subjects are risk/ambiguity averse (seeking) in gains and seeking (averse) in losses, though this incidence is higher for ambiguous prospects. A very high proportion of such cases of reflection exhibit risk (ambiguity) aversion in gains and risk (ambiguity) seeking in losses, with the reverse effect being significantly present in the case of risk but almost absent in case of ambiguity. Our results suggest that reflection across gains and losses is not a stable individual characteristic, but depends upon whether the form of uncertainty is precise or ambiguous, since we rarely find an individual who exhibits reflection in both risky and ambiguous prospects. We also find that correlations between attitudes towards risk and ambiguity were domain dependent. (shrink)
Understanding the individual-level factors associated with sustainable behaviour in the workplace is important to advance corporate ethics and sustainability efforts. In two studies, we simultaneously assess the role of core values and personality traits in relation to a broad set of sustainability actions, both beneficial and harmful. Results from a student sample and then a national sample confirm that values and personality are distinct constructs that incrementally and differentially predict economic, social, and environmental outcomes. We successfully replicate previous findings pertaining (...) to values and find that, controlling for values, the personality dimension of Honesty–Humility is the strongest negative predictor of harmful actions. Our analyses highlight the unique characteristics of values and personality and their distinct implications for ethical and sustainable management practice. By assessing values and personality together, we also contribute to more general efforts within psychology to develop an integrative view of the person. (shrink)
The lateralized ERP N2pc component has been shown to be an effective marker of attentional object selection when elicited in a visual search task, specifically reflecting the selection of a target item among distractors. Moreover, when targets are known in advance, the visual search process is guided by representations of target features held in working memory at the time of search, thus guiding attention to objects with target-matching features. Previous studies have shown that manipulating working memory availability via concurrent tasks (...) or within task manipulations influences visual search performance and the N2pc. Other studies have indicated that visual vs. spatial working memory manipulations have differential contributions to visual search. To investigate this the current study assesses participants' visual and spatial working memory ability independent of the visual search task to determine whether such individual differences in working memory affect task performance and the N2pc. Participants completed a visual search task to elicit the N2pc and separate visual working memory and spatial working memory assessments. Greater SPWM, but not VWM, ability is correlated with and predicts higher visual search accuracy and greater N2pc amplitudes. Neither VWM nor SPWM was related to N2pc latency. These results provide additional support to prior behavioral and neural visual search findings that spatial WM availability, whether as an ability of the participant's processing system or based on task demands, plays an important role in efficient visual search. (shrink)
Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism (Hall and Dreyfus 1982), to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations (cf., for instance, Villela-Petit 1999). (shrink)
This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl (...) is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology. (shrink)
Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...) relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism, to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations. (shrink)
Ce texte est le fruit d’une collaboration entre un astrophysicien, Jean-René Roy, et un philosophe de l’éducation, Normand Baillargeon. Ils ont en commun d’avoir été marqués par la fréquentation des oeuvres de Mario Bunge, auxquelles ils attachent un grand prix, sur un plan personnel, d’abord, mais aussi, et c’est ce qu’ils veulent rappeler dans ces pages : parce qu’ils estiment que les oeuvres de Bunge contribuent de manière extrêmement forte et positive à rendre plus salubre la vie de l’esprit, en (...) enrichissant notre intellect et en luttant contre diverses formes troublantes d’obscurantisme qui y sévissent parfois, notamment dans les domaines familiers aux deux auteurs. (shrink)
Jean-Olivier Roy | : L’étude des nations et du nationalisme autochtones contemporains présente des défis en raison des divergences, chez les penseurs et les acteurs politiques, quant à leur nature et leur interprétation. Nous constatons que le nationalisme autochtone, à la base principalement ethnique ou culturel, accorde de plus en plus d’importance aux revendications politiques, dépassant ainsi les simples protections culturelles. Cet article pose l’hypothèse que les nations et le nationalisme autochtones, malgré les références aux traditions et à leur origine (...) immémoriale, sont des construits en perpétuelle mutation, notamment sous l’influence des nationalismes environnants et de la modernité politique. Pour développer cette hypothèse, nous examinons les propos des acteurs et des penseurs au moyen des différentes théories de la nation. | : The study of indigenous nations and nationalism poses several challenges based on the disagreements that their interpretation poses for the theorists and political actors alike. We note that indigenous nationalism, based on ethnic or cultural grounds, attributes increasing importance to political demands, thereby leaving behind claims for cultural protections. This article argues that despite references to tradition and culture, indigenous nations and nationalisms are in constant flux, subject to the influences of nationalisms around them and the demands of political modernity. To support this claim, we examine the proposals by several theorists and political actors across theories of the nation. (shrink)
The history of contemporary metaphysics shows there are two schools of thought. One for whom the analysis of categories assumes primarily an epistemological character and on the other hand some believe that the field to be investigated is rather to be approached in primarily ontological terms. Strawson's conception of descriptive metaphysics is a clear example of this approach.
L'idee domine largement encore que, des dernieres annees du XIXe siecle a nos jours, le developpement de la philosophie est parcouru par une opposition a la fois centrale et radicale entre un courant analytique surgi avec Frege et Russell, et un courant phenomenologique initie par Husserl. L'investigation rigoureuse du passe a neanmoins commence de mettre a nu une realite historique bien plus complexe, soulevant par la des interrogations aussi vastes qu'essentielles a la pleine comprehension de notre modernite philosophique. Jusqu'a quel (...) point un schisme analytico-phenomenologique s'est-il effectivement produit au sein de la philosophie? A quel moment au juste et selon quelles modalites precises? Comment ce schisme s'est-il remodele au fil du temps? Quel en est, a travers ses differentes figures, l'objet le plus essentiel? Autant de questions qui, malgre l'interet croissant qu'elles suscitent, demeurent objet de controverse. Rhin et Danube apporte une nouvelle contribution a ce debat, degageant les fondements d'une interpretation originale qu'il confronte de facon prioritaire avec celle proposee par le philosophe Michael Dummett, dont il salue la profondeur souvent meconnue en meme temps qu'il en denonce les erreurs et les insuffisances. (shrink)
Open peer commentary on the article “Modeling Subjects’ Experience While Modeling the Experimental Design: A Mild-Neurophenomenology-Inspired Approach in the Piloting Phase” by Constanza Baquedano & Catalina Fabar. Upshot: Demonstrating the relevance of collecting first-person data and of establishing reciprocal constraints between this these data and behavioral data to overcome the issue of behavioral data replication is an interesting result. However, this result, as such, falls short of offering any theoretical reorientation of the neurophenomenological project, strictly understood.
Gallagher provides a suggestive solution to the problem of articulating the neurophenomenological and the enactivist components of Varela’s approach to cognition, although one that perpetuates a problematic understanding of the naturalist dimension of the idea of neurophenomenology.