Today, it is widely held that while authorization may be helpful in assuring that the other jus ad bellum criteria are met, legitimate authority is not itself a condition for just recourse to war....

The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya has been hailed as a successful humanitarian intervention, beginning the implementation of the United Nations' Responsibility to Protect. Yet when the intervention pursued a mission of regime change which was not necessary to halt an imminent catastrophe, it became dubious on the strict reading of just cause that has been influential in just war theory. However, a recent trend suggests that minor uses of force with small cost to benefit ratios can be justified by (...) a lower threshold of harm, so long as the cause is prima facie just or force is directed at an illegitimate illiberal state. This paper rejects these arguments by arguing that both deontological principle and utilitarian considerations support maintaining a strict catastrophic harm threshold for intervention. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has outlined a critical social theory in terms of recognition. He has recently argued that his theory is superior to the communications framework ofHabermas in that it better achieves the goals of providing normative criticism of society's ability to foster genuine and full sell-realization and explaining how emancipatory social movements can emerge within existing society. After exploring these arguments and their implications for critical theory, this paper concludes that Honneth's criticisms of Habermas fail and that the former's recognition (...) theory cannot provide an adequate free-standing alternative critical framework. lnstead, it is argued that recognition theory is best seen as a complement of a critical theory for which the normative basis remains Habermasian discourse ethics. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has outlined a critical social theory in terms of recognition. He has recently argued that his theory is superior to the communications framework ofHabermas in that it better achieves the goals of providing normative criticism of society's ability to foster genuine and full sell-realization and explaining how emancipatory social movements can emerge within existing society. After exploring these arguments and their implications for critical theory, this paper concludes that Honneth's criticisms of Habermas fail and that the former's recognition (...) theory cannot provide an adequate free-standing alternative critical framework. lnstead, it is argued that recognition theory is best seen as a complement of a critical theory for which the normative basis remains Habermasian discourse ethics. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally presupposed what Michael Walzer calls the moral equality of soldiers: that combatants on all sides have an equal right to kill, such that the soldier is not blameworthy for fighting for an unjust cause. The theory of moral equality has come under increasing attack by Jeff McMahan and others who argue that soldiers are responsible for killing for an unjust cause. I agree with McMahan that soldiers cannot be justified in serving injustice, such that there (...) is no full moral equality. Moreover, the common excuses of ignorance and duress cannot exculpate many soldiers. However, I argue that when one considers the force of legal authority and the bonds of patriotism, combined with ignorance and duress, most soldiers are excused. Because of the rarity of exceptions and the consequences of holding soldiers accountable, I conclude that we should presuppose the equal blamelessness of combatants. (shrink)

Though the concept of ideology appears central to the explanation of the perseverance of systematic domination, the coherence and viability of the concepthave been repeatedly questioned. The status of the concept of ideology in critical theory has become one of simultaneous dependence and suspicion. While Habermas has been reluctant to develop the concept in his communications theory, this paper argues that ideology can be usefully and coherently defined in terms of distorted communication. It is shown that this discourse theoretical concept (...) of ideology can meet the central normative and explanatory challenges facing the concept. (shrink)

Though the goals of democracy and ecological soundness are largely believed to be necessarily linked, there is sometimes a lack of adequate argument demonstrating this connection. Defining ecological soundness and democracy and showing weaknesses in some typical attempts to link them, I argue that democracy is in fact necessary for ecological improvement. The undemocratic practices of capitalism, ecological discrimination, and global inequality all play key roles in environmental degradation. Drawing on David Schweickart's (1996) recent argument for "Economic Democracy," I defend (...) such a model of democratic socialism as the most ecologically sound political and economic form currently possible. © 7999 Elsevier Science Inc. (shrink)

Just war theory has traditionally accepted revolutionary overthrow of an undemocratic government as a just cause but not foreign intervention for the same purpose. For many contemporary cosmopolitan theorists this asymmetry involves an indefensible inconsistency. For example, Ned Dobos argues that it is only a potential foreign intervener’s duty to its own citizens and soldiers, not any additional duty of non-intervention, that places additional restrictions upon the use of force across borders. I defend insurrection/intervention asymmetry, arguing that due to several (...) intersecting practical difficulties, intervention has a higher threshold of just cause. I argue that interven­tion’s high costs and low likelihood of success, intervener’s limited ability to evaluate the validity of democratic intervention, and the effects of intervention on the international system, lead to a stronger presumption against intervention than revolution. In particular, democratization is a just cause for revolution but not humanitarian intervention. (shrink)

There is a little explored tension between the regulations called for by environmentalists and the predominant liberal political theory. The latter says that laws are only legitimate when publicly defensible to all who must follow them and thus does not support the state adoption of particular values. Environmental concerns frequently fall under the category of particular values. I explore ways that liberalism does in fact support environmental regulations as furthering universal rights and justice within and between generations. However, some forms (...) of environmental preservation are clearly government pursuits of particular values. I explore possible liberal justifications of publicly fostering environmental values and conclude by arguing for a deliberative democratic approach. (shrink)

There is a little explored tension between the regulations called for by environmentalists and the predominant liberal political theory. The latter says that laws are only legitimate when publicly defensible to all who must follow them and thus does not support the state adoption of particular values. Environmental concerns frequently fall under the category of particular values. I explore ways that liberalism does in fact support environmental regulations as furthering universal rights and justice within and between generations. However, some forms (...) of environmental preservation are clearly government pursuits of particular values. I explore possible liberal justifications of publicly fostering environmental values and conclude by arguing for a deliberative democratic approach. (shrink)

The traditional view that legitimate international law is founded on the consent of the states subject to it has come under increasing attack by liberals, such as Allen Buchanan, who argue for a cosmopolitan order in which the protection of human rights norms is legally foundational. The cosmopolitan argument presupposes that human rights would be better preserved by doing away with the requirement of state consent. However, state consent is seen to be necessary for protecting the rights of individuals in (...) weaker states and preserving global stability. The requirement of state consent preserves individual rights better than attempts to assert non-consensual liberal norms as international law, such that the internationalist system is more legitimate than the cosmopolitan on the latter’s own terms. (shrink)

The traditional view that legitimate international law is founded on the consent of the states subject to it has come under increasing attack by liberals, such as Allen Buchanan, who argue for a cosmopolitan order in which the protection of human rights norms is legally foundational. The cosmopolitan argument presupposes that human rights would be better preserved by doing away with the requirement of state consent. However, state consent is seen to be necessary for protecting the rights of individuals in (...) weaker states and preserving global stability. The requirement of state consent preserves individual rights better than attempts to assert non-consensual liberal norms as international law, such that the internationalist system is more legitimate than the cosmopolitan on the latter’s own terms. (shrink)

The traditional view that legitimate international law is founded on the consent of the states subject to it has come under increasing attack by liberals, such as Allen Buchanan, who argue for a cosmopolitan order in which the protection of human rights norms is legally foundational. The cosmopolitan argument presupposes that human rights would be better preserved by doing away with the requirement of state consent. However, state consent is seen to be necessary for protecting the rights of individuals in (...) weaker states and preserving global stability. The requirement of state consent preserves individual rights better than attempts to assert non-consensual liberal norms as international law, such that the internationalist system is more legitimate than the cosmopolitan on the latter’s own terms. (shrink)