This paper criticizes Kent Wilson's (`Circular Arguments', 1988) arguments against the analysis of the fallacy of begging the question in epistemic terms and against the division of the fallacy into equivalence and dependency types. It is argued that Wilson does not succeed in showing that the epistemic attitude to the fallacy analysis should be given up. Further, it is argued that Wilson's arguments against the division of the fallacy into two types can be overcome by altering the accounts he criticizes (...) (David Sanford (1971, 1984, 1988) and John Biro (1977, 1984)): fallacy analysis should concentrate on externalized arguments, but this does not mean that either the epistemic attitude or the dependency conception should be given up. (shrink)

Michael Huemer () argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.

In this essay, I first discuss the conditions set by theorists of democratic deliberation on proper deliberation. These conditions call for reasoned decisions from mutually acceptable premises. Next, I present the ideal of critical thinking that should guide the citizen in this deliberation. I then examine the empirical literature on human reasoning. Some research results in the empirical literature paint a bleak picture of human rationality: we fall victim to heuristics and biases, persevere in our beliefs in the face of (...) contrary evidence, and justify our moral judgments by post hoc-reasoning. In addition, the deliberating groups have problems of their own. The groups may, for example, amplify errors or fall victim to information cascades. Though these epistemically detrimental processes can be overcome, they do present a challenge to our rationality. The essay concludes by arguing that the empirical evidence in fact supports an internalistic approach to group deliberation, a claim challenged by Solomon. (shrink)

This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.

In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation 18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis 31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis 56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis 57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree (...) with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument. (shrink)

Epistemic circularity is a problem of arguments purporting to establish the reliability of our different sources of belief‐acquisition. For example:(TRA)At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p.At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q.At t3, …Therefore, sense perception is reliable source of beliefs.The problem is that any arguer putting forth this argument is ompelled to rely on the thing to be proven in establishing the second conjuncts of each premise. But relying on the thing (...) to be proven is begging the question; therefore, the argument is fallacious. This has been argued to have serious skeptical implications: if there is no other way to establish the conclusion, we have no way of showing the reliability of, e.g., sense perception. Different authors have tried to resist this result. Frederick F. Schmitt (2004) argues that sense perception skepticism only follows from epistemic circularity if certain questionable assumptions are granted. He also argues that epistemic circularity is a specific type of circularity that is not vicious in the way logically circular arguments are. I argue thatSchmitt’s dismissal of the discussed assumptions is questionable and that the argument (TRA) is viciously circular under very minimal assumptions about inferential justification. Therefore, Schmitt fails to dissolve the problematic nature of (TRA). (shrink)

I will first look at some of the existing literature on irresolvable conflicts, shortly discuss the fallacy of begging the question, and then examine some questions that irresolvable conflicts bring to surface with respect to this fallacy. In particular, I will argue that even though such conflicts invite an analysis of the fallacy based on the doubt of the opponent, an analysis in terms of justified belief of the arguer is preferable.

IntroductionThis title is an important collection of articles on the principles, methods, and facts of human reasoning. It is of interest to argumentation theorists, philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and researchers in related fields. Out of the 53 articles, 16 were written specifically for this volume by prominent representatives of their fields, and it makes an important contribution to the research on reasoning. The size of the collection enables it to include papers from classic philosophical articles to important new theorizing on (...) the psychology of reasoning, so it can be used as material for a variety of courses with different emphases and levels of expertise. The “comingling” of the empirical and the philosophical keeps the reading experience refreshing for readers of different academic denominations. Both the philosophical and the empirical develop their mutual and distinct debates, though the selection of philosophical texts naturally favors those that link wi .. (shrink)

In this essay Juho Ritola develops a justificationist approach to social epistemology, which holds that normatively satisfactory social processes pertaining to the acquisition, storage, dissemination, and use of knowledge must be evidence-based processes that include appropriate reflective attitudes by the relevant agents and, consequently, the relevant institutions. This implies that the teaching of critical thinking and reasoning in general should strive to bring about such attitudes in students. Ritola begins by sketching a justificationist approach and defending it on a general (...) level against the criticism posed by Alvin Goldman. He then defends it on the level of individual reasoners against the argument set out by Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout. Based on empirical evidence, Bishop and Trout argue that the kind of reflection advocated by a justificationist approach to reasoning leads to worse outcomes than the use of various statistical prediction rules. Ritola, in contrast, maintains that one cannot and should not replace critical reflection on evidence by a mechanical application of rules. Instead, he asserts, statistical prediction rules and empirical evidence regarding our reasoning performance are part of the total evidence that we should reflect on in our critical reasoning. (shrink)

This essay discusses epistemic analysis of the fallacy of begging the question. In the literature, there are two prominent epistemic explanations of the fallacy, the objective and the subjective. The objective account bases the analysis of the fallacy on the epistemic relations of the propositions used in the argument. The subjective account bases the analysis on the way the arguers acquire their beliefs in the propositions used in the argument. Arguments that aim to show that a propositional analysis is not (...) flexible enough for fallacy analysis have been taken to be a decisive argument for the subjective approach. Yet, the propositional sense seems to address a central intuition about this fallacy. In this essay, it is argued that both analyses need to be retained. (shrink)

The essay starts by presenting two accounts of begging the question, John Biro's epistemic account and David Sanford's doxastic account. After briefly comparing these accounts, the essay will study an argument suspected of begging the question and subsequently apply the epistemic and doxastic accounts to this test case. It is found that the accounts of Biro and Sanford do not analyse the test case adequately, therefore a new account is developed using the idea of a knowledge-base.