Understanding the nature of pain at least partly depends on recognizing its inherent first person epistemology and on using a first person experiential and third person experimental approach to study it. This approach may help to understand some of the neural mechanisms of pain and consciousness by integrating experiential–phenomenological methods with those of neuroscience. Examples that approximate this strategy include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities and brain imaging-psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of (...) pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. The experiential paradigm of Price and Barrell offers the possibility of improved designs and methods for investigating neural mechanisms underlying pain and consciousness. (shrink)

This article studies a series of provocative references to Spinoza by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. For both contemporary philosophers, the context is discussions of eating, a subject matter that turns out to involve such central issues as subjectivity, nature, ethics, and teleology. Each situates Spinoza in a counter-history of philosophy and suggests that Spinoza constitutes an important resource for contemporary reflections. Through an analysis of the three philosophers' texts about eating, nutrition, and being metabolized, I argue that Spinoza's nonteleological, (...) nonhumanistic conception of nature remains a radical possibility, even in the face of contemporary attempts to think outside the canonical discourses of transcendental subjectivity, technological reason, and teleological ethics. Spinoza's position is, in the end, more uncompromising than that of Derrida or Agamben. (shrink)

On April 26, 1995, the United States Supreme Court limited the reach of the preemption provision of ERISA in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Tavelers Insurance Co. ). In Travelers, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers and requiring health maintenance organizations to pay a surcharge to the state's general fund that varies depending on the number of Medicaid-eligible (...) HMO members enrolled. Neither patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans nor the plans themselves are similarly charged under the statute. Several commercial insurers and HMOs claimed the surcharges should be preempted under ERISA because they are levied on patients whose insurance or HMO membership premiums are purchased by an ERISA plan.The ERISA preemption clause means that federal regulation, or lack thereof, supersedes state regulation that is related to employee pension and benefit plans. This preemption clause prevents states from changing health care and benefit law for a significant portion of state residents. (shrink)

This paper examines the life and work of T. C. Chamberlin, a prominent glacial geologist who developed an interest in interdisciplinary earth science. His work on the geological agency of the atmosphere informed his understanding of climate change and other terrestrial phenomena and led him to propose a new theory of the formation of the Earth and the solar system.Chamberlin's graduate seminar at the University of Chicago in 1896 contained all the themes that informed his research programme over the next (...) three decades. These included the carbon dioxide theory of climate change in its relationship to diastrophism and oceanic circulation, the role of water vapour feedbacks in the climate system, and the relationship between multiple glaciations, the climate system, and the formation of the planet. (shrink)

This collection of eight articles of uneven quality examines ethical and moral considerations surrounding "euthanasia." They all concentrate more on philosophic issues such as decision-making, principles and theories of action and accountability, and definitions than on medical dilemmas which bring such questions to prominence. Except for Ladd’s they seem unfamiliar with current law on the issues, and most, we suspect, took shape before Saikewicz, if not before the appellate decision on Quinlan. There are four principal themes. The alleged distinction, rejected (...) by all but P. Foot, between active and passive euthanasia. The nature and origin of certain concepts such as "right", "death," and "person." The problem of whether rights can be located elsewhere than in persons. Special problems such as Down’s Syndrome infants and infanticide in general. (shrink)

Day argues that the meaning of "probable" is partly evaluative and partly descriptive--to say that a proposition is probable is both to recommend its assertion and to say that a certain procedure shows it to be so. The paradigm of an inductive probability judgment, which is the major concern of the book, is "The fact that all observed A's are B's makes it probable that all A's are B's." Several more complex kinds of probability judgments are distinguished and discussed in (...) detail, the author's own theory being illuminated by extensive criticism of the views of other philosophers, including Aristotle, Hume, Whewell, Mill, Peirce, Russell, Braithwaite, Carnap, and Von Wright. Philosophic problems related to induction, such as the existence of other minds and the reliability of memory, are briefly discussed. Ambitious in scope and carefully executed, the book demands, and rewards, close study.--J. R. W. (shrink)

The system of combinatory logic presented in this essay differs from usual systems of combinatory logic by its addition of Boolean operators and a theory of quantification. It differs from Fitch's previous systems in containing a strong extensionality principle. The system is claimed to provide adequate foundations for a major part of mathematical analysis. In this Report the elementary theory of natural numbers is developed in detail. An excellent introduction to Fitch's work; the exposition is clear and well developed.--J. R. (...) W. (shrink)

This revised version of Price's 1960 Gifford Lectures in two series at Aberdeen University presents an extensive analysis of the concept of belief and related problems. The author begins by exploring different senses of knowledge. He continues to examine some logical peculiarities of expressions about believing and knowing, of relationships between the two types of expressions, and remarks on the performatory aspects of the relevant expressions. Connections between believing, and the bearing on beliefs of perceptual evidence, self-consciousness, memory and testimony (...) are examined. The results of this examination are applied to introduce systematic distinctions and concepts, which are made constitutive of the concept of belief. The notion of degrees of belief is introduced. The problem of degrees of assent is examined in the context of Newman's criticisms of Locke's view. Specific theories of belief are surveyed, beginning with Hume's theory, and two traditional occurrence analyses of belief are touched upon. The first series is concluded with a brief examination of Descartes' and Hume's views on freedom of assent. The second series examines various dispositional analyses of belief; the notions of believing and "acting as if" are compared, and the connection between inference and assent examined. The notion of half-belief is reviewed, along with Newman's distinction between real and notional assent, and James' self-verifying beliefs. The second series concludes with a discussion of moral beliefs and feelings; belief "in" and belief "that" are compared, and the possibility of a rapprochement between religious belief and empiricist philosophy is examined. While the author offers no full-blown theory of belief--and does not purport to do so--he provides a most informative discussion of the matrix of epistemological and psychological problems called belief, offers new criticisms of both older and present-day views on persisting problems for belief-analysis, and refines these views with new distinctions and concepts.--J. R. H. (shrink)

Professor Sallis has read the Apology, Meno, Phaedrus, Cratylus, Republic, and Sophist with the intention of elucidating Platonic responses to three questions: what is philosophy? what is logos? and what is being? His task, as he states it, is not to collect Plato’s opinions on these matters, as though such were either possible or interesting, but rather to elicit "an understanding of the manifold way in which a Platonic dialogue, by virtue of its character as a dialogue, lets whatever is (...) at issue in it become manifest." The actions described in the dialogues embody the results of the discourses recounted therein. The first part of the book, "Socratic Logos," attempts to clarify Plato’s answer to the first question by answering the far from obvious question "who was Socrates." The answer involves three points. First, the philosopher Socrates was aware of his own ignorance as well as the implicit limits of human wisdom; this "innate distance from a total and immediate revelation of beings" is, though, what motivates and makes possible the "second sailing" in logos described in the Phaedo. Athens’ obliviousness to the Apollonian origin of Socrates’ elenchtic [[sic]] activities led to its condemnation of him as a sophist. Second, the Meno’s myth of recollection "is founded on the capacity of man, with his peculiar mixture of knowledge and ignorance, to apprehend an image as an image, i.e., to apprehend the original that shows through it." The original, though, is the whole, of which the "manys" are images; the activity proper to the philosopher is recollection of the whole and mediation between whole and part. Third, Sallis’ work on the Phaedrus links Socrates’ divine mania and philosophic eros for the beautiful to his apprehension of eide. Sallis claims that the eidos of beauty is the most proper beginning for philosophic recollection of the eide because "the beautiful is that eidos which is most manifest to man in his embodied condition." The second half of the work poses the problem of the relation of being and logos. His excellently wrought study of the Republic accomplishes what several others in his exegetic tradition have failed to deliver: Sallis shows the actual engagement in what he calls "upward-moving dianoia" which Socrates compels Glaucon to undertake. Following Klein, Sallis stresses the unity of the "divided" line, though with this novel thesis: the distinction between "opinable" and "knowable" "is not fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of things, between which some relation would subsist, but rather between two ways in which an eidos can show itself... in both cases what shows itself is the same thing." He arrives at this by not wholly satisfying analyses of the mixture of beauty and ugliness in sensible things, and by reflection on the finger-example Socrates offers, at Rep. 523, ff. Concerning the good, Sallis’ judgment is that Socrates’ inexact analogy of it to the light of the sun means that it "makes possible that sort of showing in which something can show itself as one." The course of his exegesis and argument must be studied in detail, but whatever its lacunae, it does allow a good explanation of the unity of logoi and erga in this long dialogue, of its apparent abstraction from eros, and of its central images of sun, line, and cave. Sallis’ section on the Sophist lacks the precision and sureness of his work on the Republic. He continues, though, with his emphasis on the central importance of the study of the structure of images. Image-making raises the problem of non-being, which raises the problem of being, which is resolved into a dyadic structure unsusceptible of a dianoetic or arithmetical account. This problem leads beyond counting to dialectic as the required means of showing that both true and false logos, and hence non-being itself, are within being. (shrink)

This small book has one principal theme that explains most of its parts: Seligman claims that the "central sections" of the Sophist cannot be explained by linguistic or syntactic analyses, but rather require attention to Plato’s ontological commitments. This assumption, unfortunately an unusual one in the light of many recent works on Plato’s Sophist, conditions his further claim that the principal aim of the Sophist is to dismantle the Parmenidean canon of non-being as to medamos on. He diagnoses the main (...) work of the Stranger as showing the interweaving of being with non-being, and that in this, "Plato’s key move is his discovery that the true nature of non-being is ‘difference'." Taking the notion of the koinonia at the level of the "greatest kinds," Seligman shows that the copular- and identity-senses of "is" must be replaced by the consequences of the auto kath’ hauto and pros allo senses of being, or by "participating in being" and "participating in otherness.". (shrink)

This small book explores the political thought of Lucretius, by analysing De rerum natura. Nichols does not move immediately to the last section of Book V, which discusses clearly political phenomena; rather he locates that section within the place it has in the entire poem. Writing in the Straussian tradition, Nichols analyses not only the sections of the poem relevant to the political enterprise, but discusses the form and movement of the poem as a whole. Chapter 1 asks how we (...) can take such an apparently antipolitical and antireligious tradition—the Epicurean—as serious political philosophy, answering that the Epicurean-Lucretian materialist atomism, and its consequences for our understanding of the whole of things, represents a fundamental philosophic alternative to the Socratic-idealist political tradition. The traditions agree, though, on the primacy of philosophy for genuine human fulfillment. Chapter 2 elucidates Lucretius’ non-Epicurean choice of a poetic medium for his philosophy. Nichols ties it both to the need for beauty to conceal Lucretius’ bitter doctrine of the whole of things until Epicurean philosophy can replace politics and religion, and also to poetry’s "psychagogic utility." These claims are often made of Plato’s use of poetry. It is thus unfortunate that Nichols does not discuss the differences and similarities between Plato’s and Lucretius’ use of poetry, because Plato’s political project, and hence his dramatic philosophical presentations, seems essential to his philosophy, whereas "The element of poetry does not arise naturally or automatically from the Epicurean doctrine." Chapter 3 describes the character of the poem as a whole. Nichols works through the development from the first two Epicurean metaphysical principles to the Lucretian teaching which opposes the fear of death and the chains of love. This teaching does not rest on the overcoming of false religious fears but rather on not attributing "something more than belongs to our mortal condition to oneself or to another." It is this thesis in its metaphysical, theological, and political dimensions that is the core of Nichols’ reading of Lucretius. Chapter 4 deals specifically with Lucretius’ political concerns. Its two themes are Lucretius’ evaluation of the development of current political society, and his response to the bitter truth about man’s relationship to a thoroughly nonteleological universe. Both themes are, to say the least, bleak. traces the "natural" development of political society out of primitive association and through pre-political life. While this development is "natural," and in a way mandated by human desires, Nichols is clear that "... the most striking aspect of Lucretius’ treatment of political society is his depreciation of political life... There is no indication that Lucretius thinks the city achieves any other good purpose". describes the tension between religion and politics, and philosophy. The former try to replace or control fears and excess desires by other fears and desires. "Only philosophy" "can purge a man’s heart of unnecessary desires and thus enable him to live well without fear...." Chapter 5 compares Lucretius with Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau: "... all three share a hopefulness for fundamental improvements in man’s lot that sets them apart from Lucretius...." Nichols’ book presents a consistent picture of Lucretius’ work as a whole, and of the interrelationship of themes in it which lie beyond the domain of politics.—J.R. (shrink)

This difficult and intensely sophisticated work is probably the most comprehensive and profound introduction to Hegel available in English. It has several aspects. Polemically, Rosen argues that Hegel must be read primarily as a logician, "... not as a philosopher of history, a political thinker, a theologian, or a Lebensphilosoph." He definitely does not mean that Hegel was interested in the analysis of logical structures, sentences, or axioms for their own sake. Rather, Hegel’s task was a reflection upon the presuppositions, (...) potentialities, and limitations of logic and analysis themselves, and to describe their final inability to give a logos, or to complete a discursive account of the totality of experience which philosophers since Plato have called the Whole. Rosen shows that approaching Hegel as, say, a philosopher of history leads inescapably to facing Hegel as a metaphysician, or, that is, as a logician. (shrink)

A dozen essays were initially presented at the 1972 conference of the Hegel Society of America. Two themes are treated. In the first three essays there is presentation and criticism of Hegel’s own evaluation of the relation between philosophic positions prior to his own, and philosophic truth; in the last nine there is more detailed discussion of Hegel’s dependence or influence of individual philosophers before and after his time. Of the first, for instance, A. R. Caponigri argues that there is (...) a dilemma within Hegel: either the history of philosophy is irrelevant or redundant, over and above the logical deduction of its stages, or the actual deduction is redundant, because of the well-ordered nature of the history of philosophy. Thus he claims that Hegel is finally committed to moving in the direction of an "absolute historicism." Joseph Flay discusses the vexed problem of relating the history of philosophy to the point of departure for the Logic which Hegel claimed the Phenomenology to be. He argues cogently that a familiarity with the history of philosophy is presupposed by the Phenomenology, in order that it might be recalled; if the history of philosophy is not known, the experience recounted in the Phenomenology would collapse into a series of discrete stances towards truth, external to the philosopher. (shrink)

The occasion for this collection of four essays—by Vlastos, Ostwald, Callahan, and Solmsen—was Plato’s 2400th birthday in 1974. We note at once the book’s most disappointing and inexplicable flaw: it includes no example of North’s own fine classical scholarship and luminous understanding of the spirit of Platonic thought. Ostwald’s essay, ranging over much of the Platonic corpus, tills the well-plowed field of Plato’s contribution to the nomos-physis problem. His thesis is clear and familiar: Plato introduces new objects, eide, into nature, (...) the knowledge of which objects founds both the techne [[sic]] of the true king and justice. The science of such knowledge is the bulwark against Thrasymachus’s, Callicles', and Glaucon’s arguments concerning ‘natural law'. Ostwald seems unwilling, though, to grapple with the practical details of this techne [[sic]] in the political sphere. Rep. 546b-e and Polit. 310d ff. are programmatic, not substantive, and supply more puzzlement than answer. Callahan takes no smaller a topic than dialectic, myth, and history in Plato. His most interesting claim is that myth provides a setting for dialectic; each dialogue, he argues, is itself a myth, providing a locus wherein mythical topics, historical personages, and records of dialectical examinations can themselves be examined. Solmsen’s quite suggestive essay asks why Plato should investigate the physical world, which is intrinsically less than fully knowable, as well as being an insufficient source of guidance for man on issues of justice, moderation, and conduct. Though pointing out that physical bodies and their science must be of lesser rank than dialectic, Solmsen reminds us that not only did bodies provide a starting-point for mathematical demonstrations, and the incentive for solid geometry, but also that the planetary motions provided a taxis, an order, which was an image of an ordered cosmos, itself an image of an ordered eidetic realm. (shrink)

Day argues that the meaning of "probable" is partly evaluative and partly descriptive--to say that a proposition is probable is both to recommend its assertion and to say that a certain procedure shows it to be so. The paradigm of an inductive probability judgment, which is the major concern of the book, is "The fact that all observed A's are B's makes it probable that all A's are B's." Several more complex kinds of probability judgments are distinguished and discussed in (...) detail, the author's own theory being illuminated by extensive criticism of the views of other philosophers, including Aristotle, Hume, Whewell, Mill, Peirce, Russell, Braithwaite, Carnap, and Von Wright. Philosophic problems related to induction, such as the existence of other minds and the reliability of memory, are briefly discussed. Ambitious in scope and carefully executed, the book demands, and rewards, close study.--J. R. W. (shrink)

Scabini's doctoral thesis from the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in Milan focuses primarily on the philosophical methodology pervading Tillich's three volume Systematic Theology, although the author demonstrates a solid familiarity with all of Tillich's writing. The study has two major divisions. Part one summarizes Tillich's existential dialectic, method of correlation, his concept of reason and revelation and his treatment of ontology. Part two explores Tillich's theology of culture with particular emphasis on his concept of history. Tillich's development of existence (...) and the Christ, the New Being, receives only passing attention, although Scabini has certainly grasped the significance of the New Being in Tillich's comprehensive system. While the author's summation of Tillich's philosophical structures affords a precise and competent overview, some of her critical reflections appear too modest and beg further development and clarification. Scabini's most dominant criticism is that Tillich failed to articulate a rigorous metaphysics and thus succumbed to imprecision and ambiguity. The author also contends that Tillich, even if he would deny the charge, has produced a natural theology in his treatment of Being and God. Given the Tillichian distinction and dilemma between controlling knowledge and receiving knowledge, Scabini asks on what rational principle Tillich opts for receiving knowledge and its openness to revelation since both types of knowledge are equally acceptable. Since Tillich views the existential situation of man as offering only partial meaning to life's ambiguities, Scabini asks on what metaphysical grounds partial meaning demands ultimacy in meaning. The author presents a thorough bibliography on Tillich. Scabini deserves honest commendation for her engaging study and becomes the first scholar to present the systematic thought of Paul Tillich to an Italian audience.--J. R. (shrink)

With this publication, Harvard University Press completes its ten-volume Loeb Classical Library edition of Seneca. Professor Corcoran has provided a complete text of the Naturales Quaestiones, Seneca’s last work; he has supplied detailed annotation of most of the classical authorities whom Seneca usually cites only by name; he has given many of the major mss variants, and made a lucid and readable translation. The first volume contains a brief introductory summary. There is a subject-index but, unfortunately, there is no bibliography. (...) He has put the fragmentary Nile-book as fourth, although both Diels and Gercke call it liber secundus and Oltramare assigns it eighth place. The five books in this volume concern: the Nile and its sources, flora and fauna, and the periodicity of its flooding; Hail and Snow; Winds; Earthquakes; and Comets. The form of these treatises is that of a series of letters or addresses to Lucilius, Rome’s procurator in Sicily about 62 A.D., and the same Lucilius to whom the more famous Epistulae are addressed. (shrink)

A social realist discussion of art.--R. L. J.

This detailed monograph deals with such problems as "The Unity of the Finite and Infinite," "Logic and the Concept of Function," "Mathematical Logic," "Formal and Dialectical Logic." The author mentions the work of Reichenbach and Lukasiewicz.--R. L. J.

After describing the three main kinds of probability theories, the author presents a new logical theory of probability. Probability, for him, is a logical relation between bodies of evidence and statements. The theory is an advance over Carnap's logical theory of probability in that it is not based on a formal language with strong completeness properties. The theory is formalized in Quine's protosyntax, which has two disadvantages: first, long formulas couched in terms of a large number of defined symbols disfigure (...) the book and obscure the exposition; and secondly, it is desirable to keep our theories of inductive logic and deductive logic independent. There seems to be no reason to burden one sort of theory with the other. There is no index.--J. R. W. (shrink)

The pedagogic intention of this unusual book is to present a unified picture of the whole of Plato, taking his metaphysical position with a seriousness rare in Anglo-American Plato-scholarship. The substance of the work depends on three claims. First, eide are not postulated or secondary entities, alongside sensibles. For Findlay, it is the eide which are ultimately real; the proper characterization of the being of sensibles is as "parasitic" on the original entities, the eide. There is a gradation of being, (...) and eide rather than sensibles are the measure. Beneath the full reality of the eide lies the partial or relative non-being of sensibles, and then the absolute non-being which Findlay identifies with the chora of Timaeus 52b. Above the reality of eide are their principles: the One, and the Dyad. Second, Findlay claims that even from the earliest dialogues in which the eide are suggested, Plato envisioned but did not complete a program of mathematizing the eide, and of using this mathematicization to account for the relation between the principles of eide and the sensible instantiations of the eide. This program, Findlay says, had to do with establishing ratios between eide, but is not described further than this. Third, as an exegetic requirement, Findlay has stated that this Prinzipienlehre is fully consistent with, and elucidated and supported by, the reports of Aristotle and of his commentators, especially Syrianus. This is, of course, the "unwritten doctrine" to which the title of the book alludes. Perhaps the greatest value of the work is that it challenges the prevalent interpretative opinion, supported by Professor Cherniss’ "almost superhuman scholarship," that the Aristotelian reports are distortions of Plato, and thus to be discounted, while the "real Plato" is in the dialogues alone. (shrink)

Volume three of Jaspers' Philosophy, which first appeared in German in 1932, contains his treatise on metaphysics with almost exclusive reference to the category of transcendence. In Jaspers' thought freedom aims at unconditional validity, and the realization of unconditionality can occur only in relation to transcendence. The appearance of transcendence is a phenomenon of historicity. Jaspers elaborates the meaning of transcendence in terms of formal transcending, existential relations to transcendence and in the reading of ciphers of transcendence. Formal transcending is (...) to aim at being itself. Jaspers thematizes upon those principles which attempt to discover being itself: a development from the thinkable to the unthinkable, the dialectics of transcending in thought, transcending beyond subject and object, three spheres of transcending along categorial lines. Jaspers devotes a substantial inquiry into the notion of transcendence relative to the categories of objectivity, reality and freedom. He recognizes that transcendence cannot be forced upon one's Existenz. Rather "transcendence manifests itself in my own attitude toward it. I grasp its being in the inner action that makes me myself; its hand is offered to me as I take it." The recognition of transcendence arises in existential boundary situations which Jaspers identifies by a kind of phenomenology of defiance and surrender, rise and fall, diurnal law and nocturnal passion, the wealth of diversity and the one. The final portion of the book deals with the reading of ciphers. A cipher is the language of transcendence, although it is not a communication that can be readily understood or even heard in consciousness at large. "It is only in the absolute consciousness of Existenz that a direct language of transcendence is truly, substantially present." Jaspers admits that ciphers of transcendence are ambiguous for the precise reason that the symbol is inseparable from that which it symbolizes. Consequently, even though ciphers bring transcendence to mind, because of the inseparable union between the symbol and the symbolized, there is no interpreting of ciphers. Jaspers develops the thesis that Existenz is the place of reading ciphers. Alluding toward the end of his metaphysics to the arguments for the existence of God, Jaspers affirms that the arguments over the course of history have floundered because transcendence is not as such. "No empirical determination and no cogent inference can assure us that there is transcendence at all. Transcendent being is encountered in transcending, but it is neither observed nor conceived."--J. R. (shrink)