En el presente artículo presentaremos dos posibles enfoques sobre la actividad analógica de la conciencia en L’imaginaire de Jean-Paul Sartre: el primero, centrado en la composición ontológica del analogon, distinguirá el “analogon psíquico” del “analogon físico” y deducirá a partir de allí las dificultades y limitaciones del planteo sartreano y planteará a su vez los medios para dar respuesta a tales problemas. El segundo intentará explicar la función analógica de la conciencia imaginante como el resultado de un proceso de (...) emancipación de la fenomenología de Husserl en la que la distinción material del analogon expresa el punto de partida de un desarrollo crítico que conducirá al abandono de la dimensión hylética del analogon a favor de la función analógica de la conciencia. Estas perspectivas nos brindarán un panorama de los límites legítimos de cada una, así como de la profundidad y el dinamismo del pensamiento sartreano.In this article we will present two possible approaches on the analogical activity of consciousness in L'imaginaire of Jean-Paul Sartre: the first one, focused on the ontological composition of the analogon, will distinguish the “psychological analogon” from “physical analogon” and will deduce the difficulties and limitations of Sartrean argument and the means to resolve them. The second one will try to explain the analogical function of imaginative consciousness as the result of a process of emancipation of Husserl's phenomenology in which the material distinction of the analogon expresses only the starting point of a critical development that will lead to the abandonment of the hyletic dimension of the analogon for the analogical function of consciousness. These perspectives will give us an overview of the legitimate limits of each one, as well as the depth and dynamism of Sartrean thought. (shrink)
Tradução para o português do capítulo 5 do livro "Berkeley" (Oxford University Press, 1982), Cap. 5, p. 47-57. Republicado em The British Empiricists: Locke, Berkeley, Hume (Oxford University Press, 1992).
Human conflict and its resolution is obviously a subject of great practical importance. Equally obviously, it is a vast subject, ranging from total war at one end of the spectrum to negotiated settlement at its other end. The literature on the subject is correspondingly vast and, in recent times, technical, thanks to the valuable contributions made to it by game theorists, economists, and writers on industrial and international relations. In this essay, however, I shall discuss only one familiar form of (...) conflict-resolution. There is room for such a discussion, because philosophers have lately neglected compromise, despite the interest shown in it by the aforementioned experts, and despite the classic treatments of it by Halifax, Burke and Morley. Truly, ‘…compromise is not so widely discussed by philosophers as one might expect’, and ‘…the idea of compromise has been largely neglected by Anglo-American jurisprudence’. (shrink)
The philosophical problems of liberty may be classified as those of definition, of justification and of distribution. They are so complex that there is a danger of being unable to see the wood for the trees. It may be helpful, therefore, to provide an aerial photograph of a large part of the wood, namely, the liberty of individual persons . But it is, of course, a photograph taken from an individual point of view, as Leibniz would have put it.
Apresentam-se os resultados clínicos principais de uma primeira investigação efectuada a familiares de doentes sob tratamento paliativo no domicílio da área de Lisboa, com o instrumento de medida da satisfação SERVQUAL Modificado. Dos 58 familiares/doentes que responderam ao questionário apenas uma minona estava insatisfeita (uma classe de 5 indivíduos mostra-se francamente insatisfeita), uma classe de 15 estava moderadamente satisfeita, havendo 38 individuos fortemente satisfeitos com a qualidade e prontidäo dos serviços prestados. Porém urna percentagem elevada de doentes, segundo a (...) opinião retrospectiva dos cuidadores, faleceu com sintomatologia agravada, nomeadamente dores (60%), obstipação (67%) e depressão/ansiedade (43%). Discute-se a consistência e validade do questionáno SERVQUAL Modificado, contextualizam-se os resultados no que é o standard da prática da MCP e integram-se na promoção da dignidade humana no fim da vida. We present the main clinical findings of research on palliative home care, carried out among relatives of patients in the Lisbon area. An adapted version of SERVQUAL was used. Of a total of 58 carers surveyed only a small number (5) was unsatisfied 15 were only moderately satisfied. 38 family carers were strongly satisfied with the services. Yet, a high percentage of patients, as viewed in retrospect by their relatives died with some aggravated symptoms: 60% with more pain, 67% constipation, and 43% anxiety/depression. We discuss the consistency and validity of this adapted SERVQUAL tool and the main results are contextualized beanng in mind the standard practice of palliative medicine and the pursuit of human dignity in death. (shrink)
In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that (...) such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem. (shrink)
Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and (...) how we are incentivized to perform these actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to institutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies. We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of the incentivized action view. (shrink)
What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are (...) best interpreted as implementing the same basic protocol. Money, i.e. the thing that we coordinate on acquiring in order to lower our transaction costs, is, in all cases, a set of positions on an abstract mathematical object, namely a relative ratio scale. The things that we ordinarily call ‘money’ are merely records of positions on such a scale. (shrink)
O slogan "Conhecimento gera dogmatismo" causa-nos imediata perplexidade. O dogmatismo é trivialmente tomado como uma postura irracional de manutenção de crenças. Saul Kripke, contra esta intuitiva perspectiva, ofereceu um argumento que supostamente prova que se você sabe que uma proposição P é verdadeira, então você está autorizado a ser dogmático quanto a se P. Neste ensaio, temos os seguintes objetivos. Em primeiro lugar, vamos criticar uma recente objeção ao argumento pró-dogmatismo de Kripke feita por Rodrigo Borges, segundo a qual, (...) uma suposição sobre meta-conhecimento deve ser assumida por Kripke a fim de que seu argumento seja defensável. Em segundo lugar, vamos propor uma outra crítica ao argumento de Kripke, segundo a qual uma de suas premissas assume uma perigosa dose de voluntarismo doxástico, o que compromete irremediavelmente o seu argumento. Concluiremos que embora o argumento de Kripke possa ser defendido de certas críticas, a sua conclusão paradoxical é injustificada. (shrink)
In _Consciousness and the Existence of God_, J.P. Moreland argues that the existence of finite, irreducible consciousness provides evidence for the existence of God. Moreover, he analyzes and criticizes the top representative of rival approaches to explaining the origin of consciousness, including John Searle’s contingent correlation, Timothy O’Connor’s emergent necessitation, Colin McGinn’s mysterian ‘‘naturalism,’’ David Skrbina’s panpsychism and Philip Clayton’s pluralistic emergentist monism. Moreland concludes that these approaches should be rejected in favor of what he calls ‘‘the Argument from Consciousness.’’.
Declarations like “this meeting is adjourned” make certain facts the case by representing them as being the case. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the mechanism whereby the utterance of a declaration can bring about a new state of affairs. In this paper, we use the incentivization account of institutional facts to address this issue. We argue that declarations can serve to bring about new states of affairs as their utterance have game theoretical import, typically in virtue of (...) the utterer signaling a commitment to act in an incentive-changing way. (shrink)
In our earlier work, we argued, contra Searle, that institutional facts can be understood in terms of non-institutional facts about actions and incentives. Butchard and D’Amico claim that we have misinterpreted Searle, that our main argument against him has no merit and that our positive view cannot account for institutional facts created via joint action. We deny all three charges.
I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. I argue that, on the Standard view of communication, neither of these theories can be right. Firstly, both are committed to the existence of conventions with superfluous content. Secondly, any claim to the effect that a speaker employs the conventions associated with these theories cannot have any (...) content, i.e. nothing can count as following these conventions. Bare demonstratives may well not be devices of semantic reference at all, i.e. may not actually contribute a referent to the proposition semantically expressed by an utterance. (shrink)
Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the three arguments Mertz raises against (...) bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable. (shrink)
The majority of our linguistic exchanges, such as everyday conversations, are divided into turns; one party usually talks at a time, with only relatively rare occurrences of brief overlaps in which there are two simultaneous speakers. Moreover, conversational turn-taking tends to be very fast. We typically start producing our responses before the previous turn has finished, i.e., before we are confronted with the full content of our interlocutor’s utterance. This raises interesting questions about the nature of linguistic understanding. Philosophical theories (...) typically focus on linguistic understanding characterized either as an ability to grasp the contents of utterances in a given language or as outputs of this ability—mental states of one type or another. In this paper, I supplement these theories by developing an account of the process of understanding. I argue that it enables us to capture the dynamic and temporal aspect of understanding and reconcile philosophical investigations with empirical research on language comprehension. (shrink)
I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically (...) possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit. (shrink)