Various schools of philosophy have tried to claim Henri Bergson as one of their own. In France he has been regarded primarily as an early phenomenologist. In the United States and Britain he is still regarded as a vitalist philosopher. This introductory study looks at Bergson’s use of philosophical form and aims to dispel the view that Bergson ever stuck to one type of philosophy at all, be it vitalism or phenomenology. The claim of any one form of thought to (...) the title of “first philosophy” is challenged by the idea of a Bergsonian _metaphilosophy,_ which states that, in a universe with no static foundations, there can never be first philosophies. In other words, if everything is changing, then this must be no less true of philosophy. _Bergson and Philosophy_ is an important and lucid reassessment of an influential philosopher that sets his work in philosophical contexts. (shrink)

"François Laruelle is one of the most important French philosophers of the last 20 years, and as his texts have become available in English there has been a rising tide of interest in his work, particularly on the concept of 'Non-Philosophy'. Non-philosophy radically rethinks many of the most cutting-edge concepts such as immanence, pluralism, resistance, science, democracy, decisionism, Marxism, theology and materialism. It also expands our view of what counts as philosophical thought, through art, science and politics, and beyond to (...) fields as varied as film, animality and material objects. Key features: Provides an overview of Laruelle's thought and an understanding of his contemporary relevance to contextualise his work for new readers ; Contains an exclusive interview with Laruelle and a new essay written by Laruelle himself ; Includes a bibliography of Laruelle's work and secondary literature."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

... the first book to examine all the central issues surrounding the vexed relationship between the film-image and philosophy. In it, John Mullarkey tackles the work of particular philosophers and theorists (Žižei, Deleuze, Cavell, Bordwell, Badiou, Branigan, Rancière, Frampton, and many others) as well as general philosophical positions (Analytical and Continental, Cognitivist and Culturalist, Pyschoanalytic and phenomenological). Moreover, he also offers an incisive analysis and explanation of several prominent forms of film theorizing, providing a metalogical account of their mutual advantages (...) and deficiencies that will prove immensely useful to anyone interested in the details of particular theories of film presently circulating, as well as correcting, revising, and re-visioning the field of film theory as a whole. Throughout, Mullarkey asks whether the reduction of film to text is unavoidable. In particular: must philosophy (and theory) always transform film into pre-texts for illustration? What would it take to imagine how film might itself theorise without reducing it to standard forms of thought and philosophy? Finally, and fundamentally, must we change our definition of philosophy and even of thought itself in order to accommodate the specificities that come with the claim that film can produce philosophical theory?"--Publisher's description, p. [4] of cover. (shrink)

At the threshold of the twentieth century, Bergson reset the agenda for philosophy and its relationship with science, art and even life itself. Concerned with both examining and extolling the phenomena of time, change, and difference, he was at one point held as both "the greatest thinker in the world" and "the most dangerous man in the world." Yet the impact of his ideas was so all-pervasive among artists, philosophers and politicians alike, that by the end of the First World (...) War it had become impossibly diffuse. In a manner imitating his own cult of change, the Bergsonian school departed from the scene almost as quickly as it had arrived. As part of a current resurgence of interest in Bergson, both in Europe and in North America, this collection of essays addresses the significance of his philosophical legacy for contemporary thought. (shrink)

The ongoing duel between realist and anti-realist tendencies in film theory usually positions the ideas of André Bazin unambiguously on the realist side. Whatever else we expect to find in his writing – and the current resurgence is finding more and more – we should find this: realism, cinematic realism. But what type of realism? Is it ontological, and, if so, is it based on a claim for the primacy of photography's “analogical” relation to the world, even to the point (...) of a “direct contact” with the physical existence of nature? Is it aesthetic, celebrating depth of field? Unaffected mise-en-scène? The documentary impulse in preference to fantasy or artifice? In this article, however, I want to argue that we must expand the definition of Bazinian realism through its sensitivity to the non-human. The terrain of the cinematic “Real” is inhabited by a singular complex, one that includes physical space, animality, and material objects, as well as persons and events. To shift our attention to these elements and their effects – intimate as well as alienating, familiar as well as jarring and unexpected – offers another way to glimpse the Real. Which is not to say that the socially constituted world drops out. Of course, language, gender and culture are inescapable mediations. Yet they are, in a certain sense, all wrought by a transcendent human hand. Bazin's conception of realism provides access to a space that is less anthropocentric and testifies to an immanence of the Real, such that non-human, objective realism is not about capturing reality in toto but registering the fact that the human is only a part of reality. There are realities beyond human subjectivity – in space, in objects, in animality – realities that we are put in contact with by cinema. Ideally, what cinema makes possible is an equality, a democratic freedom, not merely for the human spectator – to view and explore film worlds – but for the viewed “object” too: a democracy of the viewer-viewed that installs intersubjectivity in the Real. (shrink)

This essay follows two lines - the one cinematic, the other philosophical - towards an intersection located in what we call 'the animal'. Be it the bleak picture of "bare life" drawn by Agamben, or the more positive image of the "animal that therefore I am" depicted by Derrida, philosophers of various hue have shown increasing interest in the idea of the animal as both a normative category (Derrida, Agamben) and a metaphysical one (as when Badiou depicts Deleuze's philosophy as (...) one of "the Animal" in contrast to his own of "Number"). One question that arises from this attention is whether or not these myriad philosophies mediate the animal for their own philosophical purpose as only one, background, instance of aporetic différance (Derrida), proliferated becoming (Deleuze), bare life (Agamben), or even the very model of "bad philosophy" (Badiou). Is every philosophy of the animal a type of what might best be called "philosomorphism" refracting the animal through an image of itself? Adopting the stance of "non-philosophy" from François Laruelle, this essay asks whether, in its (unacknowledged) attempts to shape the animal in its own image, philosophy also succeeds in refracting itself. There is a circularity of philosophical explanations (as Laruelle finds in all philosophy, in fact) that is linked to this sub-species of anthropomorphism: be it positive or negative, inflationary or deflationary, such philosomorphism is indeed resisted by the Real of animals by mutating or morphing what counts as philosophy. The reduction of the non-philosophical presence of the animal to that of being a proxy for différance, rhizomatics, bare life, or whatever else, gains its apparent force in part only by ignoring other aspects of the animal that are placed in the background, namely those that do not fit (or resist) the philosopher and his/her favoured philosophemes. The background revolts. And cinema understood here as a kind of animal, visual-thinking in all of us provides just such a mutation of what we deem thinking to be. The force of cinema simply is the power of the animal that we (always) are when we think in images, or when images think immanently within us. Film images exist where a powerful, animal form of non-human thinking resides. In addition, this essay will argue that the visual-thinking of horror film in particular (or the horrific mode found in all film) demonstrates the monstrous, animal, background as a resistant manifestation of thought. This thought concerns those putatively inert entities that film allows to emerge from the background as living, background life itself, which, by refusing to be ignored any longer, may also reform (or morph) what we mean by philosophy and thought itself. The emergence of the cinematic background horrifies and "revolts" (in both political and affective senses), and this its new kind of thinking. (shrink)

What hubris could possibly have lead me to think that, after two and a half millennia of unsuccessful attempts to answer questions concerning the One and the Many, Reality and Appearance, or Good and Evil, I should have definitive answers to offer; that I should be able to give the final word to problems that have thwarted others for eons? The all-encompassing scope of philosophical problems, not to mention their quality, or the sheer number of previous failures to answer them, (...) should act as a caution against any further attempts to offer any final words. (shrink)

Suitable for those conducting research or teaching in philosophy, this title provides analyses of the continental tradition of philosophy from Kant. Placing continental philosophy within a historical context, it helps define what the continental tradition has been and where it is moving.

This study is an exploration of the place of perspectivism in the philosophy of Henri Bergson. His work is compared with that of Thomas Nagel in terms of the mutual concern of these two philosophers to reconcile our increasingly objecti vist and impersonal understanding of reality with the perspectival apprehension of the world that living and conscious beings instantiate. It argues that Bergson's philosophy of time holds the key both to comprehending and to balancing the demands made upon us by (...) these conflicting interests. It is seldom that Bergson's name is thought of in this connection, his concerns more often than not being identified with some thesis about time, movement, or vital forces. One purpose of the present work, therefore, is to contest this interpretive slant, not merely by offering an alternative image of Bergson, but also by critically exploring his employment of perspectivism (both positive and negative). We pursue this goal through the double strategy of both unravelling the inconsistencies in Bergson's· treatment of perspective and separating his own argument from the multitude of myths, opinions, and interpretations, sympathetic and unsympathetic, that have arisen around what is currently understood by "Bergsonism". In retrieving his thought from such philosophical ghettoes as "vitalism," "spiritualism," and "psychologism," we will argue for a Bergsonian perspectivism which ultimately resides in a thesis propounding the primacy of perception. One consequence of this is the demotion of memory's importance within his thought. Not that the orthodox image of Bergsonism that retains the privileged place of memory is wrong. Rather, we argue that there is enough in Bergson's peculiar picture of perception to obviate the need for memory in his philosophy, and, moreover, that it is actually more Bergsonian that memory should be so discharged. (shrink)

Various schools of philosophy have tried to claim Henri Bergson as one of their own. In France he has been regarded primarily as an early phenomenologist. In the United States and Britain he is still regarded as a vitalist philosopher. This introductory study looks at Bergson’s use of philosophical form and aims to dispel the view that Bergson ever stuck to one type of philosophy at all, be it vitalism or phenomenology. The claim of any one form of thought to (...) the title of “first philosophy” is challenged by the idea of a Bergsonian _metaphilosophy,_ which states that, in a universe with no static foundations, there can never be first philosophies. In other words, if everything is changing, then this must be no less true of philosophy. _Bergson and Philosophy_ is an important and lucid reassessment of an influential philosopher that sets his work in philosophical contexts. (shrink)

What hubris could possibly have lead me to think that, after two and a half millennia of unsuccessful attempts to answer questions concerning the One and the Many, Reality and Appearance, or Good and Evil, I should have definitive answers to offer; that I should be able to give the final word to problems that have thwarted others for eons? The all-encompassing scope of philosophical problems, not to mention their quality, or the sheer number of previous failures to answer them, (...) should act as a caution against any further attempts to offer any final words. (shrink)

. Book Reviews. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 401-418.

This chapter considers the relationship between philosophy and literature both as forms of writing and thinking, but also (which is a more original contribution) as historically specific instititutions of enquiry. The argument is that part of the historical and cultural situatedness of philosophy is as a written form of cultural production, but one located within institutions (Universities above all) that already have a different 'department' specialising in understanding written forms of cultural production. This suggests that there might be an overlooked (...) reciprocal influence. In particular, what new challenges for its own thinking can philosophy discover in the contemporary practices of literary analysis? A case study is detailed concerning recent forms of ecological criticism. (shrink)

The Continuum Companion to Continental Philosophy offers the definitive guide to contemporary continental thought.

In this essay I critique a particular reading of Bergson that places an excessive weight on the concept of the ‘virtual’. Driven by the popularity of Deleuze’s use of the virtual, this image of Bergson (seen especially through his text of 1896, Matter and Memory, where the idea is introduced) generates an imbalance that fails to recognise the importance of concepts of actuality, like space or psychology, in his other works. In fact, I argue that the virtual is not the (...) key concept for Bergsonism and that there is a good deal of evidence in Bergson’s other writings, especially those connected with his actualist notion of ‘refraction’, to think of him as a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, it will be seen that Virtualism resides within an economy of reflection that is subsumed within the broader paradigm of Actualist refraction. Taking these optical metaphors seriously, the virtual becomes a perspectival image seen from an actual position, or rather, an interacting set of actual positions. This interaction is termed ‘virtualization’, denoting the substitution of a substantive conception with a processual one. In the first two parts of the essay, I direct my remarks more towards Deleuzian readings of the actual rather than Deleuze himself (Deleuze is so open about the biases he brings to his reading of Bergson as to be beyond criticism). In the second two sections, I pursue a philosophical argument for the probity of a non-Virtualist position as such within philosophy, based upon the concept of refraction. This is done not only because it is important that we remain open to other readings of Bergson that are not so heavily mediated in one direction, but also in view of the power of refraction as a new concept for reconciling actual modes such as molar identity, the present, and extension, with their virtual opposites. (shrink)