The opponent in either an ordinary or religious disagreement asserts you have made a mistake. To avoid mistakes we strive to have good justification for beliefs which holds us connected to them during difficult challenges, similar to how a good boat tether, pictured on this book's front cover, holds a valuable boat throughout the many stresses placed on it. The problem is that an equivalently informed and capable opponent shows a possible mistake as relevant, and this ought to reduce confidence (...) in the justification of the religious belief. The Epistemology of Religious Disagreement develops, by looking at foundational issues in the theory of knowledge, an understanding of justification specifically designed to describe exactly why this reduction happens. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to (...) apply also in the latter. (shrink)

In the Enneads Plotinus articulates an account of ‘creation’ following in the tradition, albeit critically, of Plato’s Timaeus. This article compares Hart’s account of creation, as expressed in The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth , and other secondary literature, with that of Plotinus’s. Some significant differences and interesting parallels are highlighted.

This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one's belief when one discovers an epistemic peer with conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to (...) apply also in the latter. (shrink)

This paper uses developments in externalist epistemology and philosophy of mind as a foundation for a tolerance-producing attitude of epistemic humility towards the beliefs one retains in light of religious diversity. The first section of this paper describes the conditions under which epistemic humility tends to occur in both the philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology due to what shall be called the resolution problem, and the second section argues that these conditions often obtain in the presence of religious diversity. (...) A third section argues that epistemic humility tends to lead to religious tolerance. (shrink)

While many ground religious tolerance on a sense of unity or enrichment resulting from religious diversity, the acclaimed scholars contributing to this volume place under scrutiny a fascinating alternative proposal for a pathway to religious tolerance: that the serious consideration of religious diversity tends to reveal the weakness of support many have for their religious commitments and that the humility produced tends to result in religious tolerance. The authors illuminate the debate within philosophyabout the way beliefs are supported, the controversy (...) between internalism and externalism, and disagreement about how humility and tolerance are related. (shrink)

Attentional control has grown in importance within theoretical and predictive models of psychopathology over past decades. The Attentional Style Questionnaire is a novel measure of internal a...

Liebe Grete Herrmann, besten Dank für Ihren Brief vom 19.5! Auch ich freue mich, Sie auf dem Pariser Kongreß zu sehen; wahrscheinlich werde ich auch an der vorangehenden Positivistentagung teilnehmen, also schon am 29.7. in Paris sein. Es interessiert mich, diese antimetaphysischen Metaphysiker einmal aus der Nähe zu beobachten. Ich werde sehen, es so einzurichten, daß ich eventuell auch nach dem Hauptkongreß noch einige Tage in Paris sein kann, um die von Ihnen angeregten Diskussionen mitzuführen. Jedenfalls hoffe ich auf einige (...) gründliche Gespräche mit Ihnen. (shrink)

Choo and Pittard recently have presented new attractive incommensurability arguments for remaining steadfast in religious beliefs even when disagreeing with sophisticated disputants. This article responds to the latest iteration of this genre in the work of Choo, and does double duty evaluating more generally the merits of this genre, which is becoming increasingly more popular since originally championed by Alston. Both Choo and Alston argue that it is reasonable to stay steadfast in one’s religious beliefs when there are no commensurable (...) ways of evaluating the disputant’s claims. This paper first describes four views about disagreement that inform Choo’s conclusion, one of which is the incommensurability argument similarly championed by Alston. Incommensurability arguments are attractive, but, when deployed in the most challenging disagreements, ultimately complacent. (shrink)

In this essay I describe seven central characteristics of Philip Quinn's approach to the epistemic challenge of religious diversity as they surface in his responses to other contemporary approaches. In the process an assessment is given of Quinn's contribution, and continued relevance, to the contemporary discussions about this topic. The first three sections describe Quinn's confrontations with Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The next section presents critical comments on Quinn's unique notion of thinning.

L’état présent de la philosophie est la contre-partie vivante de la recherche cartésienne de la vérité : la philosophie actuelle cherche а éliminer la notion de vérité. Afin d’éviter ce scepticisme, on déteгmine d’abord la notion de vérité d’après la formule classique : adaequatio rei et intellectus. Puis on introduit le probleme des fondements de la connaissanec en distinguant la notion de vérité et le critère de la vérité, en montrant que la confusion entre les deux amène à la mystique (...) de la connaissance ou au relativisme. On limite l’exigence d’un critère de la vérité aux «aperceptions réductibles», et l'оп montre comment les « aperceptions irréductibles»s’ordonnent en rapport aux aperceptions réductibles. (shrink)