The title is somewhat misleading in the current situation, since these essays stem from a Neoscholastic rather than a Neopositivistic background, and are chiefly concerned with suggesting in a rough way some relations between Aristotelian or Scholastic and contemporary scientific methods. The volume includes "Questions Science Cannot Answer" by Mortimer Adler, "The Logic of Induction" by Roland Houde, "Physico-chemical Methods and the Philosophy of Nature" by Léon Lortie, and "The Evolution of Scientific Method" by James A. Weisheipl.—J. J.

The author explores the relationships among science, theology, and philosophy, and the way in which each relates to mythical language or statement. The starting point is the scientific nature of our culture and certain of its features which are untenable; the assumption is that a mythical, eternistic [[sic]] point of view of the traditional religious type constitutes the only alternative to that which takes as its model the experimental sciences. There is a review of the familiar incursions which science has (...) made into the theological domain, to the point where the latter has doubted its own legitimacy. The effort on behalf of religion begins by an evaluation of science: it is seen to be less exact, less rigorous, and more dramatic, more human than it often is thought to be. In effect, science does not know itself, and can hardly dictate the limits of religion on the basis of ideals which are illusory. In fact, science has a need for mythical presentation of its own interests and activities; it has its own myths, and some are at odds with others. For example, the notion of objective man is not wholly compatible with the notion of man as object. The way has been cleared to claim that mythical language is legitimate, that it is central to the religious enterprise, and that religious myth may even serve science in the very way that science and the methodology of science have often sought to serve religious discourse--as a therapeutic device. This depends on an historical perspective: given the role that myth has played in religion and the role that it now plays in science, a more felicitous situation would be achieved if some of our convictions about myth were radically revised. The role of the philosopher in this projected task is analyzed and described as central. The conclusion is that science, far from being the force that eliminates religious language, shows, in its own activity, the urgent need for religious language.--J. J. E. (shrink)

This volume of selections provides a fresh translation of some of the major philosophical and literary achievements of the beleaguered editor of the Encyclopedie. For the most part, the selections follow a chronological sequence with each selection given a brief explanation in which the reader is referred to the 1875 Assezat and Tourneux edition of Diderot's works. The main thrust of Diderot's philosophical materialism is embodied in D'Alembert's Dream, in which the author argues that the mechanized-physical view gives coherent unity (...) to cosmological, biological, and moral speculation. Yet, if Diderot is to be a materialist, he is to be a humanistic one, for in his Refutation of Helvetius he rails against the latter's view of man as a mere sensory-bound animal devoid of real moral feelings. Thus there is in Diderot a vacillation between a heartfelt desire for moral values which beg to be grounded on reason, and a reason that cannot accept the basis for the values of his day since experience seems to contradict such a basis. Diderot expresses this dichotomy well in Rameau's Nephew. In the mastery of his dialogue form, Diderot plays the man of moral stability while the nephew represents the moral nihilist. It is interesting to note that Hegel saw in the nephew a cultural alienation or self-estrangement which gradually produced the characteristic cleavage between faith and reason in the age of the French Enlightenment. Since he bore this inner tension within himself, and since it is men who make up "ages," one can say that Diderot was the French Enlightenment.—J. J. R. (shrink)

Opstellen van een hoogleraar in de wijsbegeerte.

This handy paperback edition offers a new translation of the almost untranslatable style of Pascal. As expected, the greater portion of the book is made up of selections from Pensées. Works classified as "Religious" and "Moral" are also offered, along with one of Pascal's witty and biting Provincial Letters in which Pascal had aligned himself with the Jansenists of Port Royal. Several selections highlight Pascal's pioneering in scientific method—"Treatise on the Vacuum" and "Reflections on Geometry and the Art of Persuading."—J. (...) J. R. (shrink)

Two functions are performed by this very enlightening book. First, it gives the most detailed picture we have of the backgrounds and methods of controversy of the first Quakers. In this the author is especially successful in portraying the similarities and differences between the Quakers and their neighbors and in illustrating the type of religious controversy in which the Quakers and their adversaries engaged. Second, it describes the way in which relations between Quakers and non-Quakers have changed since the seventeenth (...) century, ending with a contrast of original and contemporary Quaker experience.—J. J. (shrink)

This is a paperback edition of a translation that was done in 1942. The present edition is an exact copy of the first work; nothing has been added; no new preface has been written. The purpose of this translation was to present the "average student" with a clear version of the Poetics without a surfeit of references and cross-references that would interest only the scholar. Adhering to this norm, the translator adds only a few explanatory footnotes to an otherwise uninterpreted (...) text of Aristotle. Since 1942 however, other translations have reached the sophistication of today's student without being too pedantic. Gerald Else's 1967 translation, for example, contains original elements that stimulate thought and discussion. Key words such as 'mimesis', 'harmatia', 'catharsis', seem too important to gloss over--even for the "average student."--J. J. R. (shrink)

This volume deals with the nature of Presocratic thought in general; the sources of our knowledge of the Presocratics; the earliest philosophers up to Heraclitus. The articles cover a wide range of significant topics: mathematics, contrary qualities in Presocratic thought, equality and justice, the question of Ionian "science". Several traditional views are challenged and tempered. Gregory Vlastos shows how it is quite wrong to divorce the Presocratic Physiologoi from their religious heritage. He thinks that Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy has created (...) the impression that the Presocratics were mere naturalists completely bracketed off from their religious beliefs and feelings. W. K. C. Guthrie has an interesting article on "Aristotle as Historian." Guthrie has found scholars who have so canonized Cherniss' work on Aristotle's criticism of the Presocratics that Aristotle is completely written off as biased. Guthrie reasons that there is much historical merit in Aristotle's references to Presocratic thought even though Aristotle approaches them from his own point of view. This volume also contains a very spirited controversy between Karl Popper and G. S. Kirk. Popper advocates a return to the Presocratic tradition which witnessed a new cosmology with each generation. This was possible, Popper claims, because it was "a tradition of critical discussion which tolerated "criticism and refutation," e.g., Anaximander's challenge of Thales. Popper asserts that each man put forth a new view because he was not tied to observation and inductive methods. Kirk takes issue with Popper, maintaining that Presocratic theories are very much a part of their observations. He strongly criticizes Popper for ignoring the historicity of the Presocratic theories and attempting to force them into a contemporary frame-work. All in all, this volume is an excellent edition of Presocratic scholarship. A second volume will range from Parmenides to Democritus.--J. J. R. (shrink)

This book evaluates Moore's contribution to the discussion of a number of epistemological problems, and arrives at the conclusion that Moore's contribution is not considerable. The author maintains that Moore was able to succeed philosophically in the refutation of Idealism, in the establishment of analytical techniques, and in his recognition of the role of common sense; but in those technical areas which were most interesting to Moore, the author finds little accomplishment, and even some confusion. For example, in considering the (...) problem of the relation between perception and an external world, Moore defends the common sense notions, but only on common sense grounds. The external world, which we know to exist with a high degree of certainty according to our common sense, we do not know to exist with any certainty at all when we approach the problem through an analysis of sense perception; and Moore will only say that we do not know that we do not know that external objects exist. Concerning the problem of truth and falsity the author finds Moore constructive but in need of revision and reconstruction, which the author obligingly attempts where necessary. Moore's position with respect to meaning and analysis is also evaluated with the same critical eye. Finally, the author shows the relative positions of common sense and ordinary language in Moore's thought.--J. J. E. (shrink)

The author shows that the often misunderstood relation between Husserl's transcendental and factual egos is not a relation between independent realms of the ego; these egos are moments of a single structure in which the ego comes to an understanding of itself through the free choice of successive Einstellungen. Husserl's positions are further illustrated by contrasting them with Kant's.—J. J.

Since all of the distinguishing features of the early development of modern physical science seem to be embodied in the works of Newton, e.g., the abhorrence of occult qualities and the great surge of experimental knowledge, the mechanical view of matter explained by mathematical theory, the constant attempt to reconcile the God of revelation with the world machinery, Robert Boyle has too often been overlooked. In addition to giving a short sketch of Boyle's life, Mrs. Hall has admirably selected texts (...) from the eighteenth century Birch edition which at once manifest the genius of Boyle and his influence on Newton. Each selection is adequately explained and commented upon by Mrs. Hall in Part One. The chapter headings in the author's introductory essay parallel the headings she has given to the selections in Part Two: "The New Learning and its Method," "The Mechanical Philosophy," "Chemistry," and "Pneumatics." The sections on mechanical philosophy contain the core of Boyle's natural philosophy. The characteristic blend of natural philosophy with natural religion which was common to many members of the Royal Society led Boyle to disdain the Baconian attempt to banish teleology from investigations. Boyle's view of a world machinery is never considered as a scientific hypothesis as that term is understood today, but rather it appears to be at times a theological doctrine. The mechanical theory itself—the corpuscular theory of matter—which Boyle promised to set down in systematic form was actually never written as a complete system. Mrs. Hall has done much to give systematic coherence to Boyle's corpuscular theory in her excellent commentary and selection of texts. The book contains an adequate index, bibliographical notes, and a partial list of Boyle's works. One with an historical interest in the Newtonian age will discover another giant whose shoulders made it all possible.—J. J. R. (shrink)

This is a collection of sixteen essays by the late Arnold Isenberg. All but one of the essays has had prior publication in journals, but only three of them have been reprinted in other anthologies. The collection is divided into three sections titled "Aesthetics," "Criticism," and "Ethics and Moral Psychology" respectively.

These papers were first presented at a symposium held under the auspices of the A. P. A. Western Conference. The general theme involves the role of science and philosophy in teaching, more specifically, the role of human reason and its ability and/or inability to plumb the depths of physics, psychology, mathematics and to convey any results in an intelligible way. Anton offers an essay on the teaching of philosophy in a general science-culture background. Carl C. Lindegren evaluates the role of (...) philosophy in the teaching of sciences. Alden L. Fisher relates philosophy to psychology. Hippocrates G. Apostle views the teaching of mathematics in a philosophical atmosphere, and William Earle distinguishes philosophy from science as "king of the humanities" rather than merely "a handmaiden of science."—J. J. R. (shrink)

The thesis of this new translation, that the relatively simple language of the original is best rendered by plain English, is well confirmed by this remarkably accurate, yet fully idiomatic version. Among the best modern translations; superior on the whole in literary quality and even literal accuracy to the New English Bible.—J. J.

A response to Bonhoeffer's demand that Christianity be reinterpreted for a world come of age, this study of the language of the Gospel and of traditional Christology not only draws on Flew, Hare, Ramsey, and Braithwaite, but bases the linguistic analysis on the results of recent existentialist theological investigations. Thus, besides providing an excellent review of much contemporary religious thought, the author will interest philosophers with his demonstration of the way in which English and Continental methods can be used in (...) conjunction. His main conclusions are that the Gospel must be understood as giving a particular historical perspective to the believer, rather than as making quasi-cognitive statements about a "three-storied-universe," and that Christ should be seen as the one free person whose freedom was so powerfully "contagious" that it can set free the hearer of the Gospel. Whether his attempt will satisfy everyone is very doubtful, but this is surely a pioneering work in the effort, now visibly gaining momentum, to explain traditional belief to modern man.--J. J. (shrink)

An outline of a metaphysical system of idealist character, but developed against the background of linguistic criticism of traditional metaphysics. The central argument is "that certain conditions must be met by reality, or parts of it, if we are able to talk sense at all and,... that having experience or being aware depends upon the possibility of talking sense." Some of the problems discussed concern thought and the self, thought and reality, possibility, value and reality.--J. J.

As an introduction to the proper understanding of Berkeley, Otero examines the interrelations between the epistemological criticism of abstraction and the ontological theory of the world of ideas in Berkeley's earlier works. The contemporary relevance of these themes is also demonstrated with Husserl's treatment of abstraction. The author's conclusions are incisive and clearly expressed, to the point perhaps that they fail to reproduce some of the necessary ambiguities of Berkeley's thought, with the result that Berkeley tends to come out as (...) a naïve realist.—J. J. (shrink)

Elders' work is patterned after Ross's editions of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Analytics, except that Elders does not include the Greek text to accompany his commentary. Each chapter of the four books of De Caelo is briefly summarized and a line by line commentary ensues with special consideration given to the more controversial passages. In an introduction to his commentary, Elders develops the essential themes surrounding Aristotle's cosmology: 1) The proper historical setting, 2) The notion of natural movement and elementary (...) bodies, 3) The role of metaphysics in Aristotle's cosmology, Aristotle's notion of science and methodology. Elders seems to gloss over the main problem that Aristotle's Cosmology engenders, viz., whether the heavenly spheres move by a natural necessity or are moved by a supra-celestial principle. His comment on the first chapter of Book III points out Aristotle's intention of including both the heavens and the sub-lunar sphere under the study of Physics. He correctly points out that if one is to understand the De Caelo, then one must "look upon cosmology the way its author did, viz., as a science of intellectual vision, rather than as a labor of toilsome research: the study of the cosmos is an intellectual effort which finds its end and its reward in itself."—J. J. R. (shrink)

The aim of this index of pre-1500 Platonic manuscripts is to prepare for a complete reediting of a new edition of Plato's works. The project, which began over ten years ago, brings together in one collection microfilms of all the older extant manuscript material. The index first lists the manuscripts according to the libraries in which they are found, including the library shelf number. The second half of the index lists the manuscripts by dialogue. The need for a new edition (...) of the Platonic text is based--for the most part--on the findings of E. R. Dodds in his work on the Gorgias. Dodds discovered that the nineteenth-century textual scholars oversimplified matters by assuming that the extant manuscripts were handed down by scribes. Dodds has shown that as much editing was done as transcribing; hence, the manuscripts could include "extensive possible unsystematic contamination." Also, the nineteenth-century scholars erred in assuming a "fixed rule of evidence." Thus--of three manuscripts-two having similar readings would be accepted and the third considered erroneous. However, probability theory shows that the agreement of two against one will work seven out of eight times. But the eighth instant will have the single reading as the right one--with no way of telling which out of the eight instances will have the single reading as the original. This new and convenient index should enhance Platonic scholarship.--J. J. R. (shrink)

An ecumenical effort, sensitive to both the scriptural and dogmatic issues, and directed at laying open the often overlooked, historical and doctrinal affinities underlying Protestant and Catholic Marian theology. As O'Meara correctly points out, while Luther and Calvin did indeed remove Mary from some aspects of the Church, it was some of their later followers who removed her entirely from any essential involvement with the mystery of Christ and the Church. But as in all ecumenical discussions worthy of that name, (...) genuine difficulties are not glossed over. In particular O'Meara questions the prevailing, either/or tendency in Protestant theology not to admit the possibility of a middle range of worship, i.e., hyperdulia, as falling between latria and dulia. While the treatment is for the most part scrupulously fair, O'Meara's defense of the traditional Catholic exegesis of the "I know not man" passage, which is crucial for the Catholic teaching on the virginity of Mary, seems to place an unfair burden of proof on the Protestant interpretation, which is prima facie the more obvious one.—J. J. O. (shrink)

Some will wonder why this book was ever written, thinking perhaps that there is nothing more to be said about "proofs" for the existence of God. Others of a more traditional inclination might be surprised at some of the conclusions drawn by the author. Kenny carefully scrutinizes the five ways of St. Thomas and concludes that they do not constitute rational proofs for God's existence. Kenny's chief criticism is that the arguments of Aquinas are too closely wedded to a cosmology (...) that cannot stand up under a modern critique. The value of this book rests precisely in its use of contemporary philosophy in evaluating the five ways. Perhaps the author's most serious criticism is directed against the Thomistic concept of esse and the notion of God as ipsum esse subsistens. These metaphysical notions of Aquinas have long been acclaimed as extensions of Aristotelian thought. Kenny, however, claims that they are Platonic in nature and hence subject to the centuries of criticism leveled against Plato's Ideas. Under a logical analysis, the notion of God as ipsum esse subsistens "turns out to be the Platonic Idea of a predicate which is at best uninformative and at worst unintelligible."--J. J. R. (shrink)

Philosophers are notorious for their disagreements and this seems to be intensified in the area of aesthetics. One of the few matters in aesthetics on which there has been general agreement concerns the concept of beauty. The prevailing attitude in our century towards theories of beauty has been that they are useless or nonsensical or worse. That there has been general agreement with this thesis is evident from the fact that discussions about beauty are rare today and favorable discussions of (...) beauty are rarer still. Thus, it is surprising to read the bold thesis in Sircello’s title. Not only does he report that beauty is a respectable topic for philosophical investigation, but he offers a "new theory" designed to overcome the deficiencies of those which preceded his. (shrink)

This book basically traces the historical movements that saw Aristotelian thought introduced to Islamic studies. The most significant translation movement was begun in Baghdad in the eighth century and sporadically continued until the middle of the eleventh century. When this movement was completed, every extant work of Aristotle was translated into Arabic. Peters offers a formidable collection of bibliography, doxography, and gnomonology that appeals more to eastern classical scholars than to Aristotelian philosophers. No significant philosophical issues are raised--this is really (...) not the author's intention. Whenever a remote philosophical point does arise, however, it does so a bit arbitrarily. For example, when Peters introduces a chapter on the triumph of Kalam in Islamic thought, he asserts, "it was the Greeks themselves who reduced philosophy to its status of 'handmaiden of theology'." No further explanation is given and Peters continues on his more certain ground--Islamic culture.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Subtitled "A Study of St. Paul's Application of Old Testament and Early Jewish Conceptions of Human Solidarity," this book includes extensive discussions of the relation between individual and group in the Old Testament, the solidarity of the human race in sin and through creation, and Paul's conceptions of Adam as the father of mankind, Christ as the second Adam, the Church as the true Israel of God, and faith, baptism and the Eucharist as related to the new fellowship of man. (...) Many of Paul's major doctrines are shown to be applications of traditional Hebraic themes of group solidarity.—J. J. (shrink)

A critical text and German translation of the Hamburg Logic of Joachim Jung, who was esteemed by Leibniz as a mathematician, botanist, and methodologist. The complete works of Jung are being published.--J. J. C.

This is a translation of a tenth century Arabic work that purports to be Aristotelian but is obviously written by one who prefers Plato's philosophy. In fact, the Phaedo is apparently the model after which this dialogue is fashioned. Aristotle is on his deathbed surrounded by his disciples. He periodically sniffs at an apple in his hand in order to sustain his failing breath while urging his followers toward philosophy that will reject this world and lead them to salvation. The (...) Aristotle of The Apple wants at least two points clear: the soul is immortal and the world is not eternal. The book might well be called, "The Recantation of Aristotle." The Apple was introduced to European philosophers in 1235 in Barcelona where it was translated from Arabic to Hebrew. In 1255, a Latin translation was made and it was pretty much accepted as part of the Aristotelian corpus for several centuries. This English translation is part of a series of "Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation." The translator admits that The Apple contributes little to the development of philosophy. From an historical point of view, however, she thinks it is a "semiprecious document." It is interesting to see how concerned certain Moslem, Hebrew, and Christian thinkers were to get Aristotle on God's side.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Which offers the better philosophical explanation, a philosophy of nature or a philosophy of space? Yves Simon posed this question in a series of lectures at the University of Chicago in 1959. Aristotle champions the philosophy of nature which recognizes a world of substantiality, individuality, qualitative differences, and mutability. Such a world is best explained in terms of causes; causes of real things. Descartes advocates a philosophy of space which ignores or denies qualitatively distinct realities and establishes "appearance saving" laws. (...) Thus Simon establishes the protagonists of the great dialogue: Nature versus Space, real things versus phenomena, causality versus laws, Aristotle versus Descartes. Simon does not pretend to be neutral in this debate. He favors Aristotle's theory of causality with its metaphysical-based view of nature. The Cartesian physics pays too great a price in "saving the appearances." In fact, Simon contends, it leads to an erroneous notion of science. Simon is critical of modern thinkers who have defined science in such a way that "Nature" is excluded. He is critical of early positivists in general, and Comte and Mach in particular, for giving inadequate descriptions of science. Simon contends that an Aristotelian framework is helpful in understanding science's role. In his style and approach to Aristotle's philosophy of Nature, Simon is similar to Frederick Woodbridge in the latter's efforts to show the relevance of Aristotle's view of nature. Because of his terminal illness, Yves Simon was not able to revise and publish the lectures he began in 1959. This collection of rather informal talks shows why he was a popular teacher and lecturer.--J. J. R. (shrink)

In order to assay the dynamism in the philosophy of Wolff, Father Burns examines "substance," "bodies," and "elements" in Christian Wolff's philosophy, and in so doing provides some valuable information on a philosopher who has had scant attention in the English-speaking world. In the first chapter, simple substance is distinguished from composed substance, with the former being the only true substance for Wolff. Even here, the author contends, substance for Wolff is solely a concept of essences and, hence, Wolff's ontology (...) is restricted to the realm of possible beings and excludes actual existing things. In an informative chapter on "Bodies," the Wolffian notion of active force as the principle of motion in bodies is challenged. The author maintains that an a priori commitment necessitated that Wolff locate the force principle in simple substances; and further, that Wolff's reasoning to simple substances involves a basic fallacy of identifying unity with indivisibility. A brief third chapter identifies the elements or first principles of bodies with the simple substances. While the author rightly claims that the terminology of Wolff makes it necessary to compare and contrast Wolff's ontology-cosmology with Aristotelian-scholastic thought, the conclusion of the book makes it difficult at times to ascertain whether the main task is a critical exposition of Wolff's dynamism or a staunch defense of traditional metaphysics. Within the latter frame of reference, Wolff's notion of force and motion is shown to be physical and/or mathematical rather than metaphysical, and is summarily set down as a distortion of the "true picture of substance and actuality into a caricature."—J. J. R. (shrink)

A textbook of formal logic which uses a semantical method to present logic to the student as an integral part of life and philosophy--in this case, moderate realism. The authors greatly enrich the traditional treatment of signs, terms, propositions, syllogisms and inductive arguments with discussions of recent developments in logic.--J. J. C.

The argument of this paper is that one person's knowledge of another depends largely on the perception of Gestalten that cannot be fully described by that person, that is, on the following of rules that are known in the sense of "knowing how," not in that of "knowing that," and that it is therefore likely that empirical science will never be able to give a complete account of all of these perceptions: "If it should turn out that it is basically (...) impossible to state or communicate all the rules which govern our actions, including our communications and explicit statements, this would imply an inherent limitation of our possible explicit knowledge and, in particular, the impossibility of ever fully explaining a mind of the complexity of our own. Yet, though I am not able to supply a strict proof, this seems to me indeed to follow from our considerations." The suggestion is made that a kind of generalization of Gödel's theorem may apply here, so that the explicit awareness and statement of a set of rules always requires a system of rules that cannot be described in terms of the former set. This idea seems worth developing, although a clearer distinction should be drawn between rules and regularities than Hayek draws.—J. J. (shrink)

An anthology of texts in Italian from the Presocratics to Plotinus and Philo. The editors have made a good use of the available space, including a large amount of highly representative material. A short note, giving biographical, bibliographical, and doctrinal information, is provided for each philosopher.--J. J.