Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Introduction I - Entre fait et norme II - Le passage de l'énonciatif au normatif III - Promesse et obligation IV - Actes psychosociaux et faits institutionnels V - Le langage du droit VI (...) - De l'intuitif audiscursif VII - Retour a hume Épilogue Pages de fin. (shrink)

Les conceptions anthropologiques de Pascal ne se dissocient pas de ses préoccupations d'ordre physique et surtout mathématique.

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Avant-propos Liste des principaux symboles Introduction LIVRE I - Modalités élémentaires I - Les modalités ontiques II - Les modalités temporelles III - Les modalités déontiques IV - Les modalités épistémiques LIVRE II - (...) Modalités composées I - La compatibilité des systèmes normatifs II - Les normes hiérarchiques III - La combinaison des différents ordres de modalités IV - La formalisation despropositions complétives Conclusion Bibliographie sommaire Pages de fin. (shrink)

L'emploi du raisonnement par l'absurde a été source de contestations au cours de l'histoire des sciences. L'auteur en propose une définition, puis montre comment un tel raisonnement indirect peut se retourner en un raisonnement direct qui lui soit logiquement équivalent, ce dont Aristote avait pressenti la possibilité...

According to the author the nature of promise presents a twofold problem. First refers to the question why and how an utterance may cause action; second – to the question why and how this action may cause a duteous state, or action. The conclusions drawn from these analyses can facilitate legal statements concerning the nature of promise.

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

"Proceedings of the 11th IVR World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy... held on August 14-20, 1983 in Helsinki"--Introd.

The difficulty to interpret the iteration of modalities, already ontic and still more deontic, incites to pay attention to the system B of basic modal logic that John L. Pollock proposed in 1967. The Pollock’s system brought all the theses which, in the classical ontic modal systems, from Sl to S5, contain no iteration of the modal functors. With this basic ontic system we characterize a basic deontic system, and a basic ontico-deontic system, the former including all the theses of (...) the first two. Each of the three systems is based axiomatically and assorted with a semantics for which the soundness and the completeness hold. (shrink)

La démocratie athénienne a élaboré une forme très particulière de procès laquelle a modelé à son tour le style de l'argumentation, en particulier dans les démonstrations mathématiques. Le procès de la raison qu'Athènes nous a légué s'est ainsi initialement construit à l'imitation du procès judiciaire.

De nombreux mathematiciens ont affirme que les objets dont ils traitaient n'etaient pas le produit de leur esprit, qu'ils existaient, comme existent les fleuves et les montagnes, les animaux et les plantes que peuvent rencontrer, decouvrir, examiner l'explorateur, le geographe, le zoologiste ou le botaniste. Sur quelques exemples empruntes a l'histoire des mathematiques, depuis les Grecs jusqu'aux Modernes en passant pas la tradition arabo-islamique et la Geometrie de Descartes, l'ouvrage s'attache a la question de savoir si les objets de la (...) mathematique peuvent effectivement avoir un autre mode d'existence, que celui d'objets construits, elabores par l'esprit du mathematicien. Un tel examen amene a reconsiderer la notion d'existence en tant que telle. Comment dire en effet si les objets de la mathematique existent par eux-memes sans s'interroger, sinon prealablement, du moins parallelement sur ce que cette notion peut en l'occurrence signifier? (shrink)

Georges Kalinowski, né en 1916 à Lublin, est dédédé le 21 octobre 2000 à Dijon, où, depuis la mort de son épouse, il s'était retiré auprès de sa fille, son gendre et ses petits-enfants.

This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from the Aristotle’s Topics down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain particularly: first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at the end of the nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the leibnitian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why Dedekind, Peano, Schröder, etc. made, between two possible definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later made it necessary to postulate (...) in set theory the axiom of extensionality. (shrink)

This paper sketches a history of definition of identity from the Aristotle’s Topics down to the modern set theory. The author tries to explain particularly: first, how the transformation of the concept of predicate at the end of the nineteenth century made it necessary to revise the leibnitian definition of the identity of individuals; secondly, why Dedekind, Peano, Schröder, etc. made, between two possible definitions of identity of predicates or of sets, a choice which later made it necessary to postulate (...) in set theory the axiom of extensionality. (shrink)

Les deux siecles qui se sont ecoules entre la naissance deTheetete et la mort d'Archimede ont connu un developpement des mathematiques certes exceptionnel, bien qu'il faille aujourd'hui le reconstituer a partir des seuls textes qui nous soient parvenus. Le present ouvrage cherche a contribuer a une telle reconstitution a travers ces etudes; l'auteur, qui s'etait precedemment attache a analyser l'heritage que les mathematiques ont recu d'Eudoxe de Cnide, essaie de montrer que la synthese euclidienne temoigne d'une sorte de concurrence entre (...) l'oeuvre de celui-ci et celle de Theetete, l'une et l'autre procedant d'une originalite radicale, qu'Euclide aura beaucoup de peine a concilier dans ses Elements. Le travail s'appuie moins sur les temoignages historiques que sur les textes mathematiques eux-memes; ce sont les anomalies de leurs ajustements qui laissent deviner, par l'incompatibilite de certaines de leurs inspirations philosophiques, l'irreductible diversite de leurs origines. (shrink)