Results for 'J. David Abernethy'

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  1. Individual members 2010.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Kuanysh Abeshev, Nate Ackerman, Winfred P. Adams & Miloš Adzic - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (4).
  2. Individual members 2009.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Nate Ackerman, Bryant Adams, Winifred P. Adams & Klaus T. Aehlig - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4).
  3.  55
    Individual members 2008.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Bryant Adams, Klaus T. Aehlig, Fritz Aeschbach & Henry Louis Africk - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4).
  4.  45
    Willing the Law J. David Velleman.J. David Velleman - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27.
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  5. The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  6. Love as a moral emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
  7. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
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  8.  66
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
  9. The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.
    The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent (...)
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  10. Practical reflection.J. David Velleman - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the (...)
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  11. Well‐Being And Time.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.
  12. How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...)
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  13. Narrative explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
    A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will (...)
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  14. A right of self‐termination?J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):606-628.
  15. Self to Self.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39-76.
    Images of myself being Napoleon can scarcely merely be images of the physical figure of Napoleon.... They will rather be images of, for instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic.
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  16. Family History.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):357-378.
    Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.
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  17. What good is a will?J. David Velleman - 2007 - In Anton Leist & Holger Baumann (eds.), Action in Context. de Gruyter/Mouton.
    As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way (...)
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  18. Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Ethics 102 (1):117-128.
     
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  19. The self as narrator.J. David Velleman - 2005 - In Joel Anderson & John Christman (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  20. The Genesis of Shame.J. David Velleman - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (1):27-52.
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    7. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press. pp. 188-210.
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  22. How to endure.J. David Velleman & Thomas Hofweber - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):37 - 57.
    The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than (...)
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  23.  27
    How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...)
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  24. Against the Right to Die.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6):665-681.
    How a "right to die" may become a "coercive option".
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  25. Beyond Price.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):191-212.
  26.  60
    Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
    A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will (...)
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  27. Motivation by Ideal.J. David Velleman - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89-103.
    I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things. * This is the third in a series of four papers on narrative self-conceptions and their role in moral motivation. In the first paper, “The Self as Narrator” (to appear in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. Joel Anderson and John Christman), I explore the motivational role of narrative self-conceptions, (...)
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  28. The Way of the Wanton.J. David Velleman - 2008 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.
    Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action as a prolegomenon to the Zhuangzi.
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  29. The Identity Problem.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221 - 244.
  30.  53
    I. The Identity Problem.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221-244.
  31.  89
    Brandt's definition of "good".J. David Velleman - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):353-371.
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  32. Deciding how to decide.J. David Velleman - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--52.
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  33. The voice of conscience.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):57–76.
    I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral (...)
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  34. From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:349-377.
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming along (...)
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  35. Is Motivation Internal to Value?J. David Velleman - 1998 - In C. Fehige & U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences. Walter de Gruyter.
    The view that something's being good for a person depends on his capacity to care about it – sometimes called internalism about a person’s good – is here derived from the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In the course of this derivation, the limits of internalism are discussed, and a distinction is drawn between two senses of the phrase "a person's good".
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  36. II. The Gift of Life.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):245-266.
  37. A Rational Superego.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):529-558.
    Just when philosophers of science thought they had buried Freud for the last time, he has quietly reappeared in the writings of moral philosophers. Two analytic ethicists, Samuel Scheffler and John Deigh, have independently applied Freud’s theory of the superego to the problem of moral motivation. Scheffler and Deigh concur in thinking that although Freudian theory doesn’t entirely solve the problem, it can nevertheless contribute to a solution.
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  38.  50
    III. Love and Nonexistence.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
  39. Doables.J. David Velleman - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations (1):1-16.
    Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
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  40. Love and Nonexistence.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):266-288.
    This is the second of three papers on issues of personal identity, existence, and nonexistence. Here I argue that the birth of a child leads us to before and after value judgments that appear to be inconsistent. Consider, for example, a 14-year-old girl who decides to have a baby. We tend to think that the birth of a child to a 14-year-old would be a very unfortunate event, and hence that she should not decide to have a child. But once (...)
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  41.  16
    From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):349-377.
  42. Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):225 - 238.
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  43. On the aim of belief.J. David Velleman - manuscript
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  44. A Theory of Value.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):410-436.
  45. Sociality and solitude.J. David Velleman - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):324-335.
    “How can I, who am thinking about the entire, centerless universe, be anything so specific as this: this measly creature existing in a tiny morsel of space and time?” This metaphysically self-deprecating question, posed by Thomas Nagel, holds an insight into the nature of personhood and the ordinary ways we value it, in others and in ourselves. I articulate that insight and apply it to the phenomena of friendship, companionship, sexuality, solitude, and love. Although love comes in many forms, I (...)
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  46. Dying.J. David Velleman - 2012 - Think 11 (32):29-32.
    Some people hope to die in their sleep. Not me. I don't regret having been oblivious at my birth, but I don't want death to catch me napping.
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  47.  75
    Konrad Morgen: The Conscience of a Nazi Judge.Herlinde Pauer-Studer & J. David Velleman - 2015 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    Konrad Morgen: The Conscience of a Nazi Judge recounts the wartime career of Georg Konrad Morgen (1909–1982), a judge who prosecuted crimes committed by members of the SS in Nazi concentration camps, including Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz. In 1943, Morgen discovered the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz-Birkenau. He tried to throw sand in the works by prosecuting concentration camp officials for lesser crimes. He charged the chief of the Auschwitz Gestapo with for 2,000 murders, and even sought an arrest (...)
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  48.  32
    The uncertain response in the bottlenosed dolphin ( Tursiops truncatus ).J. David Smith, Jonathan Schull, Jared Strote, Kelli McGee, Roian Egnor & Linda Erb - 1995 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 124 (4):391.
  49.  49
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman J. - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  50. The Story of Rational Action.J. David Velleman - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):229-254.
    Decision theory comprises, first, a mathematical formalization of the relations among value, belief, and preference; and second, a set of prescriptions for rational preference. Both aspects of the theory are embodied in a single mathematical proof. The problem in the foundations of decision theory is to explain how elements of one and the same proof can serve both functions. I hope to solve this problem in a way that anchors the decision-theoretic norms of rational preference in fundamental intuitions about rationality (...)
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