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J. Christopher Maloney
University of Arizona
J. Christopher Maloney
University of Arizona
  1.  22
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information.J. Christopher Maloney - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):299-306.
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  2.  32
    The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language.J. Christopher Maloney - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Christopher Maloney offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of thought. He posits the idea that thinking involves the processing of mental representations that take the form of sentences in a covert language encoded in the mind. The theory relies upon traditional categories of psychology, including such notions as belief and desire. It also draws upon and thus inherits some of the problems of artificial intelligence which it attempts to answer, including what bestows meaning or content upon a thought and (...)
  3. The right stuff.J. Christopher Maloney - 1987 - Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
  4.  12
    What It is Like to Perceive: Direct Realism and the Phenomenal Character of Perception.J. Christopher Maloney - 2018 - New York: Oup Usa.
    Thought, including conscious perception, is representation. But perceptual representation is uniquely direct, permitting immediate acquaintance with the world and ensuring perception's distinctive phenomenal character. The perceptive mind is extended. It recruits the very objects perceived to constitute self-referential representations determinative of what it is like to perceive.
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  5.  98
    Content: Covariation, control, and contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically simple mental representation, proposing that the content of such a representation is determined by (...)
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  6. Mental misrepresentation.J. Christopher Maloney - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (September):445-58.
    An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems not to (...)
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  7. About being a bat.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):26-49.
  8.  22
    A New Way up from Empirical Foundations.J. Christopher Maloney - 1981 - Synthese 49 (3):317 - 335.
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  9.  73
    Sensuous content.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.
  10.  61
    About being a bat.J. Christopher Maloney - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):26-49.
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  11.  93
    Dretske on knowledge and information.J. Christopher Maloney - 1983 - Analysis 43 (January):25-28.
  12.  41
    It's hard to believe.J. Christopher Maloney - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.
  13.  27
    Mental images and cognitive theory.J. Christopher Maloney - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (3):237-47.
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  14.  28
    On what might be.J. Christopher Maloney - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):313-322.
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  15.  7
    Connectionism and conditioning.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 167--197.
  16.  18
    On What Might Be.J. Christopher Maloney - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):313-322.
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  17. William Alston.Ron Amundson, Robert Arrington, Michael Levin, J. Christopher Maloney & Joseph Margolis - 1987 - Behaviorism 15:83.
     
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  18.  30
    Abailard's theory of universals.J. Christopher Maloney - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (1):27-38.
  19.  15
    Akratic Compatibilism and All Too Human Psychology: Almost Enough Is Free Will Enough.J. Christopher Maloney - 2023 - Lanham: Lexington Books.
    J. Christopher Maloney argues that free will is compatible with necessary laws of science and immutable history. For free will emerges from an akratic will that asymptotically approaches the ability to choose to act otherwise than it willfully does.
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  20.  31
    A New Model for Metaphor.J. Christopher Maloney - 1983 - Dialectica 37 (4):285-301.
    Metaphors are expressions in artificial, contrived, alien languages, and we understand metaphors by constructing translation schemes linking our natural, literal languages to these theoretically contrived metaphorical languages. The relation between a literal natural language and a metaphorical contrived language is like the relationship between a natively known language and a system of subsequently acquired languages etymologically emerging from that basic natural language. This model for understanding metaphorically contrived language is kin to the familiar model explaining how speakers of a language (...)
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  21. Excerpt.J. Christopher Maloney - 1990 - The Chesterton Review 16 (2):132-135.
     
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  22.  43
    Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas.J. Christopher Maloney - 1981 - New Scholasticism 55 (2):159-177.
  23.  54
    “God” is a term than which none greater can be used.J. Christopher Maloney - 1981 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):3 - 15.
  24. In praise of narrow minds.J. Christopher Maloney - 1988 - In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Aspects of AI. D.
     
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  25.  6
    L.J. Christopher Maloney - 2017 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 400–432.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind arises with the recognition that thoughts have contents carried by mental representations. For Abelard to think, for example, that Pegasus is winged is for Abelard to be related to a MENTAL REPRESENTATION whose content is that Pegasus is winged. Now, there are different kinds of representations: pictures, maps, models, and words ‐ to name only some. Exactly what sort of REPRESENTATION is mental representation? (see imagery; connectionism.) Sententialism distinguishes itself as a version of rep‐resentationalism (...)
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  26. Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.J. Christopher Maloney - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.
    Current computational psychology, especially as described by Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981), Pylyshyn (1980), and Stich (1983), is both a bold, promising program for cognitive science and an alternative to naturalistic psychology (Putnam 1975). Whereas naturalistic psychology depends on the general scientific framework to fix the meanings of general terms and, hence, the content of thoughts utilizing or expressed in those terms, computational cognitive theory banishes semantical considerations in psychological investigations, embracing methodological, not ontological, solipsism. I intend to argue that computational (...)
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  27. PSYCHOLOGY WITHOUT CONTENT: A Critical Study of Stephen P. Stich's From Folk Psychology To Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Behaviorism 14 (2):159-182.
  28. Sensation and scientific realism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3):471-482.
  29.  89
    Saving psychological solipsism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.
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  30.  72
    The mundane mental language: How to do words with things.J. Christopher Maloney - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):251-294.
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  31.  66
    Book reviews. [REVIEW]David L. Kemmerer, Kenneth Aizawa, Donald H. Berman, Stacey L. Edgar, James E. Tomberlin, J. Christopher Maloney, John L. Bell, Stuart C. Shapiro, Georges Rey, Morton L. Schagrin, Robert A. Wilson & Patrick J. Hayes - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):411-465.
  32. Psychology without Content. [REVIEW]J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Behavior and Philosophy 14 (2):159.
     
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  33.  20
    Representation and Reality. [REVIEW]J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (2):426-428.
    This is Putnam at his critical best; he is once again directing the shape of the philosophy of mind for years to come. Putnam scouts with dissatisfaction the prevailing functionalist/computationalist theory of mental states, a view he himself originated more than thirty years ago. Here he despairs of any reductionist theory of mental states, denying that there are naturalistically specifiable natures comprehending mental states of the same kind, although he continues to allow that token mental states may be emergent from (...)
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  34.  59
    Information, Semantics & Epistemology. [REVIEW]J. Christopher Maloney - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):721-726.