Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality of enmity can (...) be justified through projects or the value inherent in the relationship, following two influential views about the justification of positive partiality. We argue that both accounts of partiality can be conceptually extended to the negative analogue, but doing so brings into focus the problems with such accounts of the grounds of partiality. (shrink)

At the outset of the Republic, Polemarchus advances the bold thesis that “justice is the art which gives benefit to friends and injury to enemies”. He quickly rejects the hypothesis, and what follows is a long tradition of neglecting the ethics of enmity. The parallel issue of how friendship affects the moral sphere has, by contrast, been greatly illuminated by discussions both ancient and contemporary. This article connects this existing work to the less explored topic of the normative significance of (...) our negative relationships. I explain how negative partiality should be conceptualized through reference to the positive analogue, and argue that at least some forms of negative partiality are justified. I further explore the connection between positive and negative relationships by showing how both are justified by ongoing histories of encounter. However, I also argue that these relationships are in some important ways asymmetrical. (shrink)

We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call (...) Morality’s Harmonious Propensity. According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard is well-known as an original philosophical thinker, but less known is his reliance upon and development of the Christian tradition of the Seven Deadly Sins, in particular the vice of acedia, or sloth. As acedia has enjoyed renewed interest in the past century or so, commentators have attempted to pin down one or another Kierkegaardian concept (e.g., despair, heavy-mindedness, boredom, etc.) as the embodiment of the vice, but these attempts have yet to achieve any consensus. In our estimation, (...) the complicated reality is that, in using slightly different but related concepts, Kierkegaard is providing a unique look at acedia as it manifests differently at different stages on life’s way. Thus, on this “perspectival account”, acedia will manifest differently according to whether an individual inhabits the aesthetic, ethical, or religious sphere. We propose two axes for this perspectival account. Such descriptions of how acedia manifests make up the first, phenomenal axis, while the second, evaluative axis, accounts for the various bits of advice and wisdom we read in the diagnoses of acedia from one Kierkegaardian pseudonym to another. Our aim is to show that Kierkegaard was not only familiar with the concept of acedia, but his contributions helped to develop and extend the tradition. (shrink)

Forgiveness has traditionally been characterized an affective response to a wrongdoing, i.e. a psychological process that involves ridding oneself of resentment or other negative reactive attitudes. In contrast to the prevailing model, this paper advocates for the emerging position that forgiveness should be understood as a normative power akin to a promise. In particular, I argue that forgiveness involves surrendering the right to discount the interests of a perpetrator (a special permission the victim acquires in virtue of having been wronged). (...) I argue that this model fits and/or explains important features of forgiveness, such as the idea that forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy wrong, that forgiveness re-establishes a relation of equality, and that forgiveness is ‘normatively significant’. I further develop the position by showing how it can provide a unified case of paradigmatic forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and third-party forgiveness—this explanatory power distinguishes the view from previous articulations of the idea that forgiveness is a normative power. The final section further explores these distinctions by delimiting the scope of forgiveness to exclude powers related to apologies, compensation, or ‘redemption’. (shrink)

The ease with which genotyping technologies generate tremendous amounts of data on research participants has been well chronicled, a feat that continues to become both faster and cheaper to perform. In parallel to these advances come additional ethical considerations and debates, one of which centers on providing individual research results and incidental findings back to research participants taking part in genetic research efforts. In 2006 the Industry Pharmacogenomics Working Group offered some ‘Points-to-Consider’ on this topic within the context of the (...) drug development process from those who are affiliated to pharmaceutical companies. Today many of these points remain applicable to the discussion but will be expanded upon in this updated viewpoint from the I-PWG. The exploratory nature of pharmacogenomic work in the pharmaceutical industry is discussed to provide context for why these results typically are not best suited for return. Operational challenges unique to this industry which cause barriers to returning this information are also explained. (shrink)

I discuss Aquinas’s view of habit—the genus to which virtue belongs. The first article in both of Aquinas’s sustained treatments of the virtues in general (STh I.II.55-67 and QDV 1) asks whether virtues are habits. Thus, Aquinas’s pedagogical strategy is to elucidate the virtues in terms of their nature as habits. Following this strategy, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in Questions 49-54 of the prima secundae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and (...) the increase of habits. By the end of this paper, the reader will have a strong grasp of the nature and types of habits and the different ways in which they can increase. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas inherits two distinct conceptions of the virtuous human being. From Aristotle, he receives a vision of harmony and human achievement: through the process of habituation, the distinct parts of the virtuous soul are operating as one under the guidance of reason. From Augustine, Aquinas receives a vision of moral struggle and victory through divine assistance: the virtuous person is able to resist the inclinations of the flesh through virtues that are given by God and only fully actualized in (...) the next life. This dissertation explores an underappreciated area of Aquinas’s thought—on the topic of growth in the infused virtues—where he brings these teachings of Aristotle and Augustine into a brilliant harmony. In order to fully understand and appreciate Aquinas’s teaching on growth in infused virtue, one must first understand the essence of the infused virtues and their increase. This is the goal of Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two, I explore Aquinas’s discussion of habits in the Summa Theologiae by tracing three important topics: the essence of habits, the cause of habits, and the increase of habits. In Chapter Three, I elucidate Aquinas’s teaching on the essence of the infused virtues and situate these important virtues within his picture of the flourishing human life. The fourth chapter lays out Aquinas’s teaching on growth in infused virtue. I develop a metaphysical account of increase in infused virtue and pay careful attention to the associated stages. The chapter concludes with a close examination of the important imperfections that Aquinas associates with the infused virtues. I demonstrate that growth in infused virtue—rather than the development of the acquired virtues —is an effective remedy for these imperfections. In the concluding chapter, I emphasize the ways in which Aquinas’s understanding of growth in infused virtue represents the deepest point of his harmony of Aristotle and Augustine. I also situate my project among two prominent interpretive trends in Thomistic literature and highlight two important implications of the project. (shrink)

Socrates’ daimonion has intrigued philosophers for centuries. It seems to command Socrates’ unconditional compliance, despite its extra-rational nature. How does this fit with the common understanding of Socrates as the paragon of rationality? In this paper, I examine Socrates’ response to divinatory experience, concluding that his response to the daimonion is unique. He views its monitions as providing immediate and overriding reasons for action, whereas oracles and dreams are in need of interpretation. Then I explore recent attempts to rationalize Socrates’ (...) trust in the daimonion. After finding that these attempts fail, I propose an alternative way of understanding Socrates’ trust in his daimonion that draws on the work of Merold Westphal. On this view, Socrates’ trust stems from a recognition of the god’s status as the only true absolute. I argue that this interpretation is consistent with all the evidence we have concerning Socrates and the phenomenon of the daimonion. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Apeiron Jahrgang: 50 Heft: 4 Seiten: 415-433.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Liberalism without Illusions: Renewing an American Christian Tradition by Christopher H. Evans, and: Robust Liberalism: H. Richard Niebuhr and the Ethics of American Public Life by Timothy A. Beach-VerheyJames M. BrandtLiberalism without Illusions: Renewing an American Christian Tradition Christopher H. Evans Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010. 207pp. $24.95Robust Liberalism: H. Richard Niebuhr and the Ethics of American Public Life Timothy A. Beach-Verhey Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, (...) 2011. 238pp. $49.95Christopher Evans’s Liberalism without Illusions and Timothy Beach-Verhey’s Robust Liberalism have much in common, although they do not mean the same thing when they refer to “liberalism.” Evans traces the trajectory of liberal Christianity or “liberal theology” from its beginnings in the early nineteenth century to the present and suggests how it might renew itself. Beach-Verhey considers the political tradition of liberal democracy and how the radical monotheism of H. Richard Niebuhr can help form a “robust liberalism.” Both books attend to the present situation of public life in the United States and assert the need for theology that points emphatically to the God who is in and beyond history.Evans admits that liberal theology is difficult to define and that it includes significant diversity. One reason for its elusiveness is the “remarkable elasticity” (7) it has shown over time. Theological liberalism “supports critical engagement with both Christian traditions and contemporary intellectual resources” (6). In a way different from traditional theology, it “has been characterized by an affirmation of personal and collective experience, systemic social analysis and open theological inquiry” (6).At its best, liberal theology, appealing to Jesus’s ministry and especially his teaching of the reign of God, inspired people to believe they could make a difference in the here and now. And liberal theology did this without an uncritical endorsement of Western “progress.” In its heyday, liberal theology’s leaders were pulpiteers who spoke to both personal and social issues and commanded significant and loyal followings.From the pinnacle of its ecclesial and cultural significance in the mid-twentieth century, liberal theology has fallen to a low place. Evans argues that [End Page 190] this has happened because liberal theology has lost its congregational base and become isolated in academia and among denominational leaders. Liberal theology has been unable to sustain its vigor at a popular level. Meanwhile, after its seeming defeat in the 1930s, fundamentalism recast itself as evangelicalism, organized at the grassroots level, and developed popular theologies that resonated with large numbers of people. Much of evangelicalism has been held together by dispensationalism and its attention to the end times. Liberals deemed dispensationalism unworthy of response, but Evans argues that liberals’ failure to engage dispensationalism seriously is to their detriment. While liberals were right to reject dispensationalism’s literalism and pessimism, Evans recognizes that its appeal has been the way it holds biblical texts together with concrete historical events, and that it is a logical development of traditional Protestant insistence on the authority of scripture.Evans’s prescription for the rejuvenation of liberal Christianity includes a posture of exile, knowing that the larger culture will not care much about what liberals say or do. Liberals need to regain a connection with scripture and tradition, offer a compelling alternative to the conservative vision, and get in touch with the deepest yearnings and anxieties of people in the pew (and those not in the pew).Liberal theology has made significant contributions to church and society, not least its call for transformation of structures of oppression. Evans counsels that liberals today need to speak to social issues but avoid being too closely identified with them. He appeals to Reinhold Niebuhr’s claim that the pursuit of justice is important, but it is not what constitutes Christian identity. Liberal Christianity’s enduring legacy is its faith that God is at work in the world. Evans affirms that liberals must continue to function as the church and attend to the deepest truths of the tradition, not least this active hope in the living God.Evans’s book provides a broad overview of the liberal tradition and charts well its historical passage, its strengths, and its failings... (shrink)