Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis. While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality/potentiality and activity/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of Metaphysics Theta, Beere argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both "actuality" and "activity" as translations of energeia, and by working out an analogical conception of energeia. This approach enables Beere to discern a hitherto unnoticed (...) connection between Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in Metaphysics Theta, the claim that energeia is prior in being to capacity and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good. (shrink)

Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's philosophy: energeia and dunamis.

The paper examines the connection between Aristotle's theory of generated substance and his notion of potentiality in "Metaphysics" Θ.7. Aristotle insists that the matter of a substance is not what that substance is, against a competing view that was widely held both in his day and now. He coined the term thaten (ἐ[unrepresentable symbol]νινονον) in order to make this point. The term highlights a systematic correspondence between the metaphysics of matter and of quality: the relationship between a thing and its (...) matter is like the relationship between a qualified thing and the relevant quality. It is argued that Aristotle's view about the matter of particular substances is connected with his view about ultimate matter. His conception of the matter of particular substances allows him to block an argument, from Plato's "Timaeus", that ultimate matter must be something imperceptible and lacking all perceptible qualities. Aristotle uses the term thaten to introduce an alternative conception of ultimate matter on which ultimate matter might well be an ordinary perceptible kind of thing. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are three distinct senses of possibility at play in the Republic’s discussion of whether the best city is possible: natural possibility, possibility for existing cities, and ideal possibility. It is argued that Socrates makes different claims about each of the three political proposals in Book v. (1) Women guardians are argued to be naturally possible. (2) Socrates considers it an open question whether the common family of guardians (the so-called ‘community of women and children’) is (...) naturally possible. He argues, however, that it is ideally possible. (3) The philosopher-king is claimed to be possible in the strongest sense: it is not only naturally possible, it is also possible for existing cities. It is for this reason that the common family of guardians is ideally possible. This clarifies the sense in which the best city is best. (shrink)

Die Erklärung der Begriffe ›Akt‹ und ›Potenz‹ erfordert es, zunächst den sprachlichen Hintergrund dieser Begriffe zu erörtern. Es handelt sich dabei nämlich um Ausnahmen in Aristoteles’ Philosophie. Während er sich meistens des Wortschatzes der natürlichen Sprache bedient, oder bisweilen termini technici von seinen Vorgängern übernimmt, sind energeia und entelecheia höchstwahrscheinlich neu erfundene Wörter.

Die Begriffe ›Form‹ und ›Materie‹ kommen bei Aristoteles zunächst in seiner Analyse der Veränderung vor. In Physik I 7 beispielsweise erläutert Aristoteles die verschiedenen Sinne, in denen man sagen kann, dass etwas zu etwas wird. Er unterscheidet zwischen einfacher und komplexer Rede: Wenn X Y wird, können X und Y mit je einem Wort bezeichnet warden oder mit einem aus mindestens zwei Wörtern bestehenden Ausdruck.