The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...) by more briefly focusing on the idea of a significant reason. By placing these results against the broader historical and ongoing contexts in which the lives of those with disabilities have been deemed of inferior quality, we conclude with a call for greater humility about disability and well-being in thought and practice. (shrink)

Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...) and critique, it remains underdeveloped and is often misrepresented by its critics (section 8). (shrink)

A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...) are central to the view we discuss. We conclude by tracing four broader implications for the study and conceptualization of species. (shrink)

Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept x should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of concepts x1, x2, … xn. This article focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, and that this reveals a quite general dilemma, one that poses a defeasible presumption against many (...) eliminative pluralisms about various scientific concepts. The article ends by outlining a novel integrative alternative in defence of species. 1) Introduction 2) The species Concept, the Category ‘Species’, and the ‘Species’ Category Problem 3) What Are Eliminative Pluralism about species, and the Arguments for It? 4) Evaluation of Arguments 4.1 Splitting? 4.2 Lumping? 4.3 The eliminative pluralist’s dilemma 5) More General Lessons6Species Cohesion: An Integrative Alternative7Conclusion. (shrink)

We argue for a new conventionalism about many kinds of evolutionary groups, including clades, cohesive units, and populations. This rejects a consensus, which says that given any one of the many legitimate grouping concepts, only objective biological facts determine whether a collection is such a group. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This is a novel pluralism underlying most any one group concept, rather than a (...) familiar pluralism claiming many concepts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help biological facts determine grouphood, even when given a single grouping concept. (shrink)

Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism. I show that his arguments for the resurrection fail, and (...) I identify challenges that face anyone wishing to defend Intrinsic Biological Essentialism. (shrink)

Individuals are a prominent part of the biological world. Although biologists and philosophers of biology draw freely on the concept of an individual in articulating both widely accepted and more controversial claims, there has been little explicit work devoted to the biological notion of an individual itself. How should we think about biological individuals? What are the roles that biological individuals play in processes such as natural selection (are genes and groups also units of selection?), speciation (are species individuals?), and (...) organismic development (do genomes code for organisms)? Much of our discussion here will focus on organisms as a central kind of biological individual, and that discussion will raise broader questions about the nature of the biological world, for example, about its complexity, its organization, and its relation to human thought. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new and testable view about the nature of species and other evolving lineages, according to which they are feedback systems. On this view, it is a mistake to think gene flow, niche sharing, and trait frequency similarities between populations are among variables that interact to cause some further downstream variable that distinguishes evolving lineages from each other, some sort of “species cohesion” for example. Instead, gene flow, niche sharing, similarities between populations, and other causal variables feed (...) into each other—instances of these at earlier times help cause instances of these same variables at later times. And any lineage-identifying cohesion just is the recurrence or cycling of these feedback relations within metapopulations over generations. Such cohesion can then be represented as variable M within multi-dimensional variable spaces, where values of M vary dynamically with the frequency and magnitude of feedback relations. Related conditions for being a species or other evolving lineage are then clarified. To argue for the development and testing of this view, the paper shows how it improves upon others. (shrink)

This paper isolates a hard, long-standing species problem: developing a comprehensive and exacting theory about the constitutive conditions of the species category, one that is accurate for most of the living world, and which vindicates the widespread view that the species category is of more theoretical import than categories such as genus, sub-species, paradivision, and stirp. The paper then uncovers flaws in several views that imply we have either already solved that hard species problem or dissolved it altogether – so-called (...) We Are Done views. In doing so the paper offers new criticisms of the general lineage species concept (GLSC), evolutionary species concept (EvSC), biological species concept (BSC), other similar concepts, Ereshefsky’s eliminative pluralism about the species category, and both Mishler’s pessimism and Wilkins’ phenomenalism about that category. Opposed to We Are Done views, the paper argues for a Revving Up view, on which we are nearly ready to begin the hard species problem in earnest. To help work towards these conclusions, the paper begins with an outline of a new kind of view of species (Barker 2019a), which proposes they are feedback systems of a mathematically specifiable and empirically testable sort. (shrink)

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

In this article applied and theoretical epistemologies benefit each other in a study of the British legal case of R. vs. Clark. Clark's first infant died at 11 weeks of age, in December 1996. About a year later, Clark had a second child. After that child died at eight weeks of age, Clark was tried for murdering both infants. Statisticians and philosophers have disputed how to apply Bayesian analyses to this case, and thereby arrived at different judgments about it. By (...) dwelling on this applied case, I make theoretical gains: clarifying and defending pragmatic principles of inference that are important for estimating key probabilities in a range of cases. Then, partly by drawing on such principles, and uncovering overlooked data on post-partum psychosis, I make applied gains: improving the rationality of judgments about the Sally Clark case in particular, judgments important to future similar cases. (shrink)

This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed. ‡I'm grateful to Rob Wilson, Alex Rueger and Lindley Darden for important comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Nagel, Heather Proctor, Ken Bond, members of the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group, and audience (...) members at the November 2006 meeting of the PSA, for helpful comments or discussion. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada fellowship 752-2005-1208 supported research. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: [email protected] (shrink)

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this (...) paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is. (shrink)

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do (...) this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

This ~4000 word essay introduces topics of essentialism, as they arise in social sciences. It distinguishes empirical (e.g., psychological) from philosophical studies of essentialisms, and both metaphysical and scientific essentialisms within philosophy. Essentialism issues in social science are shown to be more subtle and complex than often presumed.

This is an extended review of John Dupré's _Processes of Life_, a collection of essays. It clarifies Dupré's concepts of reductionism and anti-reductionism, and critically examines his associated discussions of downward causation, and both the context sensitivity and multiple realization of categories. It reviews his naturalistic monism, and critically distinguishes between his realism about categories and constructivism about classification. Challenges to his process ontology are presented, as are arguments for his pluralism about scientific categories. None of his main conclusions are (...) rejected; rather it is main arguments for them that are the focus. (shrink)

This letter was submitted to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Government of Canada, on 29th January, 2021, as final debate over Bill C-7 was being undertaken in the Senate regarding MAiD and the strong opposition to the legislation expressed across the Canadian disability community. It draws on our individual and joint work on eugenics, well-being, and disability.

This short paper, written for a wide audience, introduces "science and values" topics as they have arisen in the context of eugenics. The paper especially focuses on the context of 20th century eugenics in western Canada, where eugenic legislation in two provinces was not repealed until the 1970s and thousands of people were sterilized without their consent. A framework for understanding science-value relationships within this context is discussed, and so too is recent relevant work in philosophy of science.

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do (...) this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies. (shrink)

A three-page review of Philip Cafaro's book *Thoreau's Living Ethics*.

The threat of bioterrorism, the emergence of the SARS epidemic, and a recent focus on professionalism among physicians, present a timely opportunity for a review of, and renewed commitment to, physician obligations to care for patients during epidemics. The professional obligation to care for contagious patients is part of a larger "duty to treat," which historically became accepted when 1) a risk of nosocomial infection was perceived, 2) an organized professional body existed to promote the duty, and 3) the public (...) came to rely on the duty. Physicians' responses to epidemics from the Hippocratic era to the present suggests an evolving acceptance of the professional duty to treat contagious patients, reaching a long-held peak between 1847 and the1950's. There has been some professional retrenchment against this duty to treat in the last 40 years but, we argue, conditions favoring acceptance of the duty are met today. A renewed embrace of physicians' duty to treat patients during epidemics, despite conditions of personal risk, might strengthen medicine's relationship with society, improve society's capacity to prepare for threats such as bioterrorism and new epidemics, and contribute to the development of a more robust and meaningful medical professionalism. (shrink)

: This paper presents a method of moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John Dewey. This method, called "clinical pragmatism," integrates clinical and ethical decision making. Clinical pragmatism focuses on the interpersonal processes of assessment and consensus formation as well as the ethical analysis of relevant moral considerations. The steps in this method are delineated and then illustrated through a detailed case study. The implications of clinical pragmatism for the use of principles in (...) moral problem solving are discussed. (shrink)

Inductive generalization, where people go beyond the data provided, is a basic cognitive capability, and it underpins theoretical accounts of learning, categorization, and decision making. To complete the inductive leap needed for generalization, people must make a key ‘‘sampling’’ assumption about how the available data were generated. Previous models have considered two extreme possibilities, known as strong and weak sampling. In strong sampling, data are assumed to have been deliberately generated as positive examples of a concept, whereas in weak sampling, (...) data are assumed to have been generated without any restrictions. We develop a more general account of sampling that allows for an intermediate mixture of these two extremes, and we test its usefulness. In two experiments, we show that most people complete simple one-dimensional generalization tasks in a way that is consistent with their believing in some mixture of strong and weak sampling, but that there are large individual differences in the relative emphasis different people give to each type of sampling. We also show experimentally that the relative emphasis of the mixture is influenced by the structure of the available information. We discuss the psychological meaning of mixing strong and weak sampling, and possible extensions of our modeling approach to richer problems of inductive generalization. (shrink)

We argue that in contemporary business organizations, in which fundamental purpose is construed to be increased value—especially in ‘participative’ organizations, in which non–hierarchal interaction is the norm; and in ‘adaptive’ organizations, in which unpredictable change is the rule—a process of values covenanting will be much more valueable than just espoused values or even values covenants. We propose such a process model for organizational values covenanting and argue that such covenanting reflects an anthropomorphism of the human character development process, validated in (...) terms of the theory of viable systems. (shrink)

Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a (...) species of soul-to-brain causation, but soul-to-soul, and we don’t need to suppose demons have the power to directly affect the physical world. Materialist solutions, in contrast, are ad hoc. (shrink)

Mississippian Meramec reservoirs of the Sooner Trend in the Anadarko in Canadian and Kingfisher Counties play are comprised of silty limestones, calcareous siltstones, argillaceous calcareous siltstones, argillaceous siltstones, and mudstones. We found that core-defined reservoir lithologies are related to petrophysics-based rock types derived from porosity-permeability relationships using a flow-zone indicator approach. We classified lithologies and rock types in noncored wells using an artificial neural network with overall accuracies of 93% and 70%, respectively. We observed that mudstone-rich rock type 1 exhibits (...) high clay and relatively low calcite, whereas calcareous-rich rock type 3 has high calcite and low clay content with rock type 2 falling in between as a balance between rock types 1 and 3. Results of the ANN were applied to a suite of well logs in noncored wells in which we generated lithology and rock-type logs for the Meramec. We identified that the Meramec consists of seven stratigraphic units characterized as strike-elongate, shoaling-upward parasequences; each parasequence is capped by a marine-flooding surface. The lower three parasequences form a retrogradational parasequence set that back steps to the northwest and is capped by a maximum flooding surface. The upper Meramec is characterized by parasequences that form an aggradational to progradational stacking pattern followed again by a retrogradational trend. We predict that the parasequence stacking, associated lithology distribution, and diagenetic cements appear to control the spatial distribution of petrophysical properties, pore volume, and hydrocarbon pore volume. Calcareous-rich lithologies exhibit lower porosity, permeability, HCPV, and higher water saturation. We deduced that argillaceous-rich lithologies that occur near the maximum flooding surface are the most favorable reservoir intervals because they exhibit relatively higher porosity, permeability, HCPV, and lower water saturation. Productivity could not be directly correlated to rock types as operational and completion factors as well as overpressure and oil phase play important roles on production. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, Page 22-24, February 2012.

This article challenges the recurrent critique that Pierre Hadot’s identification of ancient philosophy with the practice of spiritual exercises introduces a non- or irrational dimension into metaphilosophy. The occasion to do this is provided by Kerem Eksen’s recent reading of Descartes’s Meditations as consisting of solely intellectual, rather than spiritual, exercises—since the latter, Eksen claims, involve extrarational means and ends. Part 2 presents an alternative account of the role of cognition in the ancient meditatio at issue in understanding Descartes’s antecedents. (...) This account is indebted to Michel Foucault’s characterization of ancient meditation as involving two cognitive mechanisms: an appropriation of thought, and an experiment in identification. Part 3 argues that attempts such as Eksen’s to depict spiritual exercises as wholly noncognitive themselves are the product of an “unexamined Cartesianism” that is fundamentally at odds with the monistic psychology of ancient Stoics like Marcus Aurelius as discussed in Hadot’s studies. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 27-29, December 2011.

The Lower Cretaceous Burro Canyon Formation in the southwestern Piceance Basin, Colorado, is composed of deposits that represent a braided fluvial system with high net to gross that transitions stratigraphically upward into a low net-to-gross, low-sinuosity, meandering fluvial system. The fluvial deposits are composed of multiple upward-fining, conglomeratic-to-sandstone successions forming bars and bar sets that exhibit inclined heterolithic strata that we have interpreted to have formed by oblique and downstream accretion. We used well-exposed outcrops, detailed measured sections, and unmanned aerial (...) system-based imagery to describe the fluvial architecture of the Late Cretaceous formation using a hierarchical approach. We described the Burro Canyon Formation as comprising sandstone-rich amalgamated channel complexes overlain by non- to semiamalgamated channel complexes. The lower interval of the formation is composed of ACC that contain channel-fill elements with cross-stratification and numerous truncated contacts. These stacked channel-fill elements exhibit an apparent width range of 137–1300 ft and a thickness range of 5–60 ft. The upper interval of the Burro Canyon Formation comprises mudstone-prone intervals of the nonamalgamated channel complex with isolated channel-fill elements interbedded with floodplain mudstones that represent a period of relatively high base level. Associate channel fill elements range in apparent width from 200 to 1000 ft and thickness from 20 to 30 ft. The characteristics and spatial distribution of architectural elements of the Burro Canyon Formation correspond to one depositional sequence. The erosional basal surface of the formation, as well as lateral changes in thickness and net to gross, suggest that the Burro Canyon Formation within this study area was deposited as an incised valley fill. Fluvial deposits of the Burro Canyon Formation serve as outcrop analogs for subsurface interpretations in similar reservoirs. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDespite emotional clarity and attention to emotion being dynamic in nature, research has largely focused on their trait forms. We examined the association between state and trait forms of t...

Der folgende Artikel ist im Jahr 2003 unter dem Titel „Clinical Pragmatism: A Method of Moral Problem Solving“ in dem Sammelband „Pragmatic bioethics“ erschienen, welcher sich mit der Bedeutung der pragmatistischen Philosophie für die Praxis befasst. In dem vom Internisten und Bioethiker Joseph J. Fins, dem Thoraxchirurgen Matthew D. Bacchetta und dem Philosophen und Medizinethiker Franklin G. Miller verfassten Beitrag wird der pragmatistische Ansatz in der klinischen Ethik anhand eines Fallbeispiels gleichzeitig beschrieben, begründet und demonstriert. Obgleich die Denkrichtung der (...) pragmatistischen Philosophie sowohl wissenschaftstheoretisch wie praktisch hoch bedeutsam ist – ohne diese ist weder die heutige sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung noch die angewandte, insbesondere die klinische Ethik denkbar –, werden pragmatistische Ansätze im deutschsprachigen Raum bis heute eher rudimentär rezipiert. (shrink)

The Lower Cretaceous Burro Canyon Formation in the southwestern Piceance Basin, Colorado, is composed of deposits that represent a braided fluvial system with high net-to-gross that transitions stratigraphically upward into a low net-to-gross, low-sinuosity meandering fluvial system. The fluvial deposits are composed of multiple upward-fining, conglomeratic-to-sandstone successions forming bars and bar-sets that exhibit inclined-heterolithic strata that we interpreted to have formed by oblique and down-stream accretion.We used well-exposed outcrops, detailed measured sections, and UAS-based imagery to describe the fluvial architecture of (...) late Cretaceous formation using a hierarchical approach. We described the Burro Canyon Formation as comprised of sandstone-rich amalgamated channel complexes overlain by non- to semi-amalgamated channel complexes. The lower interval of the formation is composed of amalgamated channel complexes that contain channel-fill elements with cross-stratification and numerous truncated contacts. These stacked channel-fill elements exhibit an apparent-width range of 137-1300 ft and a thickness range of 5-60 ft. The upper interval of the Burro Canyon Formation is comprised of mudstone-prone intervals of the non-amalgamated channel complex with isolated channel-fill elements interbedded with floodplain mudstones that represent a period of relatively high base level. Associate channel fill elements range in apparent width from 200-1000 ft and thickness from 20-30 ft. The characteristics and spatial distribution of architectural elements of the Burro Canyon Formation correspond to one depositional sequence. The erosional basal surface of the formation, as well as lateral changes in thickness and net-to-gross, suggest that the Burro Canyon Formation within this study area was deposited as an incised-valley fill. Fluvial deposits of the Burro Canyon Formation serve as outcrop analogs for subsurface interpretations in similar reservoirs. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence methods have a very wide range of applications. From speech recognition to self-driving cars, the development of modern deep-learning architectures is helping researchers to achieve new levels of accuracy in different fields. Although deep convolutional neural networks have reached or surpassed human-level performance in image recognition tasks, little has been done to transport this new image classification technology to geoscientific problems. We have developed what we believe to be the first use of CNNs to identify lithofacies in cores. (...) We use highly accurate models and transfer learning to classify images of cored carbonate rocks. We found that different modern CNN architectures can achieve high levels of lithologic image classification accuracy and can aid in the core description task. This core image classification technique has the potential to greatly standardize and accelerate the description process. We also provide the community with a new set of labeled data that can be used for further geologic/data science studies. (shrink)

The potential to instrumentalize drug use based upon the detection of very many different drug states undoubtedly exists, and such states may play a role in psychiatric and many other drug uses. Nevertheless, nonaddictive drug use is potentially more parsimoniously explained in terms of sensation seeking/impulsivity and drug expectations. Cultural factors also play a major role in nonaddictive drug use.

Thirteen original essays by leading scholars explore aspects of Spinoza's ethical theory and, in doing so, deepen our understanding of it as the richly rewarding core of his system. They resolve interpretive difficulties, advance longstanding debates, and point the direction for future research.

Barker and Smart have argued that dispositional monism is just as susceptible to the ultimate regress problem as Armstrong’s contingent necessitation view of laws. In this response, I consider what implications this conclusion has for the dispositional essentialist project more generally. I argue that it is the monistic aspect of dispositional monism, rather than the dispositional essentialist aspect, which is the source of the problem raised by Barker and Smart. I then outline a version of dispositional essentialism which (...) avoids the ultimate problem by avoiding the commitment to monism. Despite the article by Barker and Smart, it is not time to give up on the dispositionalist project yet. (shrink)

This article will take up Deleuze and Guattari’s allusive yet insightful writings on ‘the secret’ by considering the secret across three intermingling registers or modulations: as content, as form, and as expression. Setting the secret in relation to evolving modes of technological mediation and sociality as respectively pocket, pooling, and plasma, the article works through a trio of examples in order to understand the contemporary movements of secrets: the memories of secrets evoked in an intimately interactive music video by the (...) band Arcade Fire ; the movements of secrecy turned fabulative in the scopic-doublings of airport full-body scanners ; and, finally, the collective secretions that come to saturate and stretch around the globe as expressed by liquidity-seeking financial innovations. These three instantiations of contemporary secrecy are framed by a discussion of Julian Assange of WikiLeaks and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook – truly a couple for our age: each intent, in their own way, upon bringing an end to secrets. Throughout, we try to maintain close attention to the emerging rhythms and dissonances that engage secrecy in a dance between the half-voluntary and the half-enforced. (shrink)