Stronger collaboration between government organizations (GOs), NGOs, and rural people has long been advocated as a means of enhancing the responsiveness, efficiency, and accountability of GOs and NGOs. This paper reviews the arguments and evidence for specific types of collaboration for sustainable agricultural development, setting it into the context of Korten's (1980) concept of “learning process.” Taking recent examples from Udaipur District in India, it reviews the experiences and potential of collaboration, arguing that, while informal interaction increases and enriches the (...) fabric of pluralist development, certain strategic decisions often require a degree of formality. These include decisions on the development of human resources — here both the users and providers of services. Moreover, human resource development (HRD) must be viewed in the context of the mandates, aspirations, and systems of accountability and rewards of the institutions concerned. These determine whether institutions develop and expand their own human resources or draw upon those of others by collaborating with them. Individuals engaged in these organizations can be more effectively induced to collaborate with others by combinations of flexibility and appropriate reward systems than they can be forced to do so by instructions or commands. Several conclusions follow: decisions to act together are unlikely to progress unless translated into concrete actions; authority to take local-level decisions in GOs needs strengthening if they are to provide the necessary flexibility; and, although collaboration should in principle be built on the comparative advantage of different types of organization, in practice, each will have to incorporate the skills of the other, at least to some level, if they are to communicate effectively. NGOs and GOs must also enhance their understanding of farmers' ability to make demands on external organizations. Edging towards collaboration is a delicate and painstaking process. Only if many of the above conditions are given due priority will early examples have something to offer to the numerous NGOs, GOs and international agencies wishing to learn from them. (shrink)

Arnon Avron has written: “Dunn-McCall logic RM is by far the best understood and the most well-behaved in the family of logics developed by the school of Anderson and Belnap.” I agree. There is the famous saying: “Do not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.” I might say: “good enough.” In this spirit, I will examine the logic R-Mingle, exploring how it is only a “semi-relevant logic” but still a paraconsistent logic. I shall discuss the history of (...) RM, and compare RM to Anderson and Belnap’s system R of relevant implication and to classical two-valued logic. There is a “consumer’s guide,” evaluating these logics as “tools,” in the light of my recent work on “Humans as Rational Toolmaking Animals.”. (shrink)

The possibility of extended cognition invites the possibility of extended knowledge. We examine what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended knowledge to arise and whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Answering in the positive, we explore some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and personal rights of the resulting ‘new humans.’.

In General Relativity in Hamiltonian form, change has seemed to be missing, defined only asymptotically, or otherwise obscured at best, because the Hamiltonian is a sum of first-class constraints and a boundary term and thus supposedly generates gauge transformations. By construing change as essential time dependence, one can find change locally in vacuum GR in the Hamiltonian formulation just where it should be. But what if spinors are present? This paper is motivated by the tendency in space-time philosophy tends to (...) slight fermionic/spinorial matter, the tendency in Hamiltonian GR to misplace changes of time coordinate, and the tendency in treatments of the Einstein-Dirac equation to include a gratuitous local Lorentz gauge symmetry along with the physically significant coordinate freedom. Spatial dependence is dropped in most of the paper, both restricting the physical situation and largely fixing the spatial coordinates. In the interest of including all and only the coordinate freedom, the Einstein-Dirac equation is investigated using the Schwinger time gauge and Kibble-Deser symmetric triad condition are employed as a \ version of the DeWitt-Ogievetsky-Polubarinov nonlinear group realization formalism that dispenses with a tetrad and local Lorentz gauge freedom. Change is the lack of a time-like stronger-than-Killing field for which the Lie derivative of the metric-spinor complex vanishes. An appropriate \-friendly form of the Rosenfeld-Anderson-Bergmann-Castellani gauge generator G, a tuned sum of first class-constraints, is shown to change the canonical Lagrangian by a total derivative, implying the preservation of Hamilton’s equations. Given the essential presence of second-class constraints with spinors and their lack of resemblance to a gauge theory, it is useful to have an explicit physically interesting example. This gauge generator implements changes of time coordinate for solutions of the equations of motion, showing that the gauge generator makes sense even with spinors. (shrink)

This book straddles two worlds and attempts to bring them together: that of Lefebvre’s Marxism, on the one hand, and that of real estate development, on the other. Lefebvre has now become a household name amongst many contemporary Marxists, especially those with an interest in urban planning and certain quarters of the architectural profession; however, his work is far less well known by real estate professionals, whether investors, developers, brokers, or, indeed, policymakers. This book has both a large scope and (...) a very bold aim – to use an explication and analysis of the work of Henri Lefebvre not only to present a critique of development, but, on the contrary, also to draw these two worlds together. It therefore, first, aims to present the arguments of this increasingly well-known French Marxist philosopher, sociologist, and pioneer of urban studies; second, to situate contemporary real estate development in the light of Lefebvre’s work; and third, to analyse the potential application of Lefebvre’s work to each of the major components of contemporary real estate, to use Lefebvre’s work in order to recommend practical action for developers, working alongside planners and architects, to influence the future of global real estate. In addition to its direction at developers themselves, this book should be of interest to economists, real estate researchers and professionals, planners, urban studies scholars, and, of course, to those interested in the application of Lefebvre’s work to real estate. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Global biodiversity declines are increasingly recognized as profound ecological and social crises. In areas subject to colonialization, these declines have advanced in lockstep with settler colonialism and imposition of centralized resource management by settler states. Many have suggested that resurgent Indigenous-led governance systems could help arrest these trends while advancing effective and socially just approaches to environmental interactions that benefit people and places alike. However, how dominant management and conservation approaches might be decolonized (i.e., how their underlying colonial structure (...) might be addressed, transformed, and replaced) is not always clear. Here, we describe a ‘Decolonial Model of Environmental Management and Conservation’ as an alternative paradigm to dominant approaches of conservation and management. The tenets of the model describe characteristics that might be expected of decolonized management, contrasted with those of dominant state-led approaches such as those embedded in the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation. The model does not prescribe how Indigenous governments or communities ought to govern their own territories, but instead offers insights into how external management and conservation agencies and practitioners might support (or stop impeding) Indigenous-led governance. We illustrate the model with a conservation ‘bright spot’: grizzly bear stewardship in the area now referred to as the Great Bear Rainforest in British Columbia, Canada, with a focus on work led by or in collaboration with, and within the territories of, the Haíɫzaqv, Kitasoo/xai’xais, Nuxalk, and Wuikinuxv First Nations. While acknowledging the important context-specific variability among place-based management and conservation applications, we also discuss the model’s broader applicability. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that corporate moral responsibility can be an element of functioning corporations and is a choice that society can make. Although many in the lay community would say that of course corporations should attend to moral questions, the philosophy of how this can be rightly said is controversial. Section one (first three chapters) gives an account of the nature of functioning business corporations involving the readily observable facts about a corporation doing business, and a tripartite model of the (...) corporation is presented. The tripartite model consists in 1) the legal entity that owns assets and liabilities, 2) a group of persons contracted to the legal entity and 3) a set of roles and relationships between the corporate associates and the legal entity. Additionally, an account of the main extant theories of the nature of corporations and their inability to account for the readily observable facts of corporations is argued. The conclusion is that the corporation, as a tripartite model, is best served by a theory that designates it as a real entity apart from but dependent on its employees. Chapter three answers the question, ‘What type of real entity is a corporation?’, using John Searle’s theory of social ontology to show that corporations are institutional facts, a social entity. The second part of the thesis argues that corporations have moral dispositions analogous to those held by natural persons and maintains that it is these that allow corporate entities to be capable of moral concern. A constitutive rule is introduced, ‘moral company rule’, that may be used as a guide for society to assess the extent of corporate moral responsibility. An account of the powers and responsibilities corporations would have if the moral company rule was followed is presented. Additionally, the dilemma for society, to insist on corporate moral responsibility or preserve the status quo, is explored. The last chapter recapitulates the argument for corporate moral responsibility to illustrate the two aims of this thesis: first to give a clear understanding of the functioning business corporation as a real entity with a series of moral dispositions, and second to show that society has a choice to insist that these moral dispositions are used in business. (shrink)

J. B. Schneewind's "The Invention of Autonomy" has been hailed as a major interpretation of modern moral thought. Schneewind's narrative, however, elides several serious interpretive issues, particularly in the transition from late medieval to early modern thought. This results in potentially distorted accounts of Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, and G. W. Leibniz. Since these thinkers play a crucial role in Schneewind's argument, uncertainty over their work calls into question at least some of Schneewind's larger agenda for the history of ethics.

The twenty-first century has brought a renewed interest in democratic theory and practices, creating a complicated relationship between time-honoured democratic traditions and new forms of political participation. Reflecting on this interplay between tradition and innovation, Aletta J. Norval offers fresh insights into the global complexities of the formation of democratic subjectivity, the difficult emergence and articulation of political claims, the constitution of democratic relations between citizens and the deepening of our democratic imagination. Aversive Democracy draws inspiration from a critical engagement (...) with deliberative and post-structuralist models of democracy, whilst offering a distinctive reading inspired by contemporary work on the later Wittgenstein. This is a creative and insightful work which reorients democratic theory, elucidating the character of the commitments we engage in when we participate in democratic life together. (shrink)

Change and local spatial variation are missing in canonical General Relativity's observables as usually defined, an aspect of the problem of time. Definitions can be tested using equivalent formulations of a theory, non-gauge and gauge, because they must have equivalent observables and everything is observable in the non-gauge formulation. Taking an observable from the non-gauge formulation and finding the equivalent in the gauge formulation, one requires that the equivalent be an observable, thus constraining definitions. For massive photons, the de Broglie-Proca (...) non-gauge formulation observable A_{\mu} is equivalent to the Stueckelberg-Utiyama gauge formulation quantity A_{\mu} + \partial_{\mu} \phi, which must therefore be an observable. To achieve that result, observables must have 0 Poisson bracket not with each first-class constraint, but with the Rosenfeld-Anderson-Bergmann-Castellani gauge generator G, a tuned sum of first-class constraints, in accord with the Pons-Salisbury-Sundermeyer definition of observables. The definition for external gauge symmetries can be tested using massive gravity, where one can install gauge freedom by parametrization with clock fields X^A. The non-gauge observable g^{\mu\nu} has the gauge equivalent X^A,_{\mu} g^{\mu\nu} X^B,_{\nu}. The Poisson bracket of X^A,_{\mu} g^{\mu\nu} X^B,_{\nu} with G turns out to be not 0 but a Lie derivative. This non-zero Poisson bracket refines and systematizes Kuchař's proposal to relax the 0 Poisson bracket condition with the Hamiltonian constraint. Thus observables need covariance, not invariance, in relation to external gauge symmetries. The Lagrangian and Hamiltonian for massive gravity are those of General Relativity + \Lambda + 4 scalars, so the same definition of observables applies to General Relativity. Local fields such as g_{\mu\nu} are observables. Thus observables change. Requiring equivalent observables for equivalent theories also recovers Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence. (shrink)

Barbarism and Religion - Edward Gibbon's own phrase - is the title of an acclaimed sequence of works by John Pocock designed to situate Gibbon, and his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, in a series of contexts in the history of eighteenth-century Europe. This is a major intervention from one of the world's leading historians of ideas, challenging the idea of 'The Enlightenment' and positing instead a plurality of enlightenments, of which the English was one. Professor Pocock argues (...) that the English Enlightenment of which Gibbon was part was an ecclesiastical as well as a secular phenomenon, one of several Protestant Enlightenments distinct from that of the Parisian philosophes, and part of the reconstitution of Europe after the wars against Louis XIV. The whole sequence is concerned less with the specific historiography of the Roman Empire than with the cultural history of Europe in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that virtue ethics is unfortunately committed to a developmentally detrimental form of moral evaluation in its traditional iterations. That is, first, because both action guidance and moral development are central to virtue ethic and, second, because virtue ethics permits or requires character appraisal in moral education and child-rearing through praise and blame. However, studies from developmental and clinical psychology show that praise or blame involving character appraisal can be detrimental to children and, especially, to women (...) and girls. While not all empirical studies point in this direction, the data are sufficiently murky to warrant an objection to virtue ethics along the lines of a situationism. Using a feminist and care-oriented critique, I argue this could pose a problem for virtue ethics. However, I argue that the criterion of moral evaluation can and must be distinguished from successful moral education of children to avoid this problem. By focusing on behavior instead of character, moral agents can avoid the harm virtue ethics may cause. Finally, I respond to an objection that doing so makes virtue ethics esoteric or self-effacing and argue that it fares no worse than other moral theories. (shrink)

The concept of participation in a transcendent domain of existence is central to the Platonic and the Judaeo- Christian traditions. The essays in this volume analyse and explore this key concept in the history of Western thought, providing a rigorous and accessible account of participation from antiquity to the modern era.