The “therapeutic obligation” is a physician’s duty to provide his patients with what he believes is the best available treatment. We begin by discussing some prominent formulations of the obligation before raising two related considerations against those formulations. First, they do not make sense of cases where doctors are permitted to provide suboptimal care. Second, they give incorrect results in cases where doctors are choosing treatments in challenging epistemic environments. We then propose and defend an account of the therapeutic obligation (...) that solves the problems that undermined previous efforts at formulating the TO. We conclude by considering how apparent problems with our proposal actually rest on difficulties with informed consent. (shrink)

In this much-vexed passage a form or variant of ναγνρισς is described and exemplified. It is said to be συνθετ, which word all the translations I have seen render ‘compound’ or ‘composite,’ but their authors either omit or clearly fail to explain in what sense this form is said to be ‘composite.’ I believe that this translation is wrong, and that the word here means something else, συνθετος λόγος is good Greek for ‘a made-up tale’. The point is not that (...) what is said or told is necessarily a lie, but that it is untrue, baseless, not founded on fact. All this is supported by the use of the corresponding verb in e.g. Thuc. I. cc. XXI. and XCVII., where it is opposed to the truthful recording of facts. Further, it justifies Dacier's reading in 1459a 21, where the relative clause refers to στοραις not to τς συνθσεις. The characteristic of a poetic σνθεσις is that it is a connected narrative which has a causal nexus between its parts, and so is of μα πρξις, whereas an στορα is a record of disconnected happenings to a single person or group of persons during a certain period. Such a σνθις may be merely made-up or fictional. It is specially so where it has no basis in fact, but is the sheer invention of the poet. Clearly such a fiction must be rendered acceptable or plausible, and this can only be done through someone being misled, and this misleading implies that that someone draws a wrong conclusion from evidence present or presented to him— i.e. it presupposes a παραλογισμός. (shrink)

When we from what may be called Aristotle's Cosmology turn to his work traditionally called the Metaphysics, we are faced with something—an inquiry or doctrine—of a surprisingly different character. There what we find is the exposition of a sort or degree of knowledge superior to that of the Sciences. This is what we call his metaphysics, but he does not so name it; he names it Wisdom, or Theoretical Wisdom. At times he calls it First Philosophy, or, again, Theology. It (...) is par excellence knowledge, the consummate achievement of theoretic or cognitive power. It is the supreme Science, scientia scientiarum. Of what is it knowledge? It is knowledge not about, but of, whatsoever is real, really real, and of its universal and necessary attributes. The latter are distinct from one another, and from that to which they indissolubly belong, and metaphysics apprehends all this in its distinctions and interconnections. Further, it is a knowledge of itself, a knowledge of knowledge, and so a Wissenschaftslehre, or“super-Logic.” Finally, it is knowledge commensurate with the real Universe as a whole, so that nothing which is genuinely a part of that escapes its view. (shrink)

In the history of human thought the name of ARISTOTLE must be written in capital letters. Of few of the Great Thinkers of history is it so true that he was one of what William James called “the folio editions of mankind.” In speaking of him, whether in praise or dispraise, it has been found almost impossible to avoid superlatives. The later ancients ranked the disciple level with his master Plato as occupying the twin summits of philosophical attainment. Since then (...) they have divided the allegiance of the thinkers of the Western World. No doubt it is a rather wild judgment of Coleridge's that every man is born either a natural Platonist or a natural Aristotelian, but it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no man has attained any width of knowledge or depth of reflection who is not driven to recognize, and often to express, a preference for the one over the other. (shrink)

In this much-vexed passage a form or variant of ναγνρισς is described and exemplified. It is said to be συνθετ, which word all the translations I have seen render ‘compound’ or ‘composite,’ but their authors either omit or clearly fail to explain in what sense this form is said to be ‘composite.’ I believe that this translation is wrong, and that the word here means something else, συνθετος λόγος is good Greek for ‘a made-up tale’ . The point is not (...) that what is said or told is necessarily a lie, but that it is untrue, baseless, not founded on fact. All this is supported by the use of the corresponding verb in e.g. Thuc. I. cc. XXI. and XCVII., where it is opposed to the truthful recording of facts . Further, it justifies Dacier's reading in 1459a 21, where the relative clause refers to στοραις not to τς συνθσεις. The characteristic of a poetic σνθεσις is that it is a connected narrative which has a causal nexus between its parts, and so is of μα πρξις, whereas an στορα is a record of disconnected happenings to a single person or group of persons during a certain period. Such a σνθις may be merely made-up or fictional. It is specially so where it has no basis in fact , but is the sheer invention of the poet. Clearly such a fiction must be rendered acceptable or plausible, and this can only be done through someone being misled, and this misleading implies that that someone draws a wrong conclusion from evidence present or presented to him— i.e. it presupposes a παραλογισμός. (shrink)

I. Eth. Nic. III. c. I, § 16. In spite of what Bernays and others have done to clear up this chapter, many perplexities remain. To some of these I propose later to return, but here I confine myself to one. Among the possible circumstances of an act, ignorance of which is excusable and may excuse, is enumerated τò ο νεκα. Nothing but desperation could have led the commentators to suggest that here τò ο νεκα means the actual effect or (...) result of the act . It may be sufficient to quote the notes ad loc. of these two scholars: 1. Stewart: ‘The o νεκα here is not, as usual, the intention of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the outcome or result of what he actually does, which is the opposite of the intention.’. (shrink)