First published in 1913, this _Routledge Revivals_ title reissues J. A. Hobson’s seminal analysis of the causal link between the rise in gold prices and the increase in wages and consumer buying power in the early years of the Twentieth Century. Contrary to the assertions of some notable contemporary economists and businessmen, Hobson contended that the relationship between gold prices and wages was in fact much more complex than it initially appeared and that there were significantly more important factors in (...) the rise of contemporary wealth, such as the rapid enlargement of state enterprise and joint stock companies; a wide extension of banking and general financial apparatus; and the opening of profitable fields of investment for the development of underdeveloped countries, which helped raise the rate of interest and profits. (shrink)

This paper argues that there may be instances where assessing wildlife for monetary valuation might be quite reasonable and useful for public policy, even when there are strong arguments against valuation of wildlife and nature. A case of deer population management is considered where continued growth of the deer population will lead to more property damage and habitat loss. However, deer population control raises ethical questions on the rights of animals to exist and on the rights of humans to arbitrarily (...) interfere. The contingent valuation methodology is used to value preferences for deer management for the purpose of guiding public policy. The valuation estimates show that ethical concerns about killing deer affect the level of willingness to pay in a quite a logical manner. However, for individuals with rights-based preferences, CVM is not appropriate. The survey results also show that individuals with rights-based preferences are a small minority in this particular example. (shrink)

When real-valued utilities for outcomes are bounded, or when all variables are simple, it is consistent with expected utility to have preferences defined over probability distributions or lotteries. That is, under such circumstances two variables with a common probability distribution over outcomes – equivalent variables – occupy the same place in a preference ordering. However, if strict preference respects uniform, strict dominance in outcomes between variables, and if indifference between two variables entails indifference between their difference and the status quo, (...) then preferences over rich sets of unbounded variables, such as variables used in the St. Petersburg paradox, cannot preserve indifference between all pairs of equivalent variables. In such circumstances, preference is not a function only of probability and utility for outcomes. Then the preference ordering is not defined in terms of lotteries. (shrink)