The bookModeling Reality covers a wide range of fascinating subjects, accessible to anyone who wants to learn about the use of computer modeling to solve a diverse range of problems, but who does not possess a specialized training in mathematics or computer science. The material presented is pitched at the level of high-school graduates, even though it covers some advanced topics (cellular automata, Shannon's measure of information, deterministic chaos, fractals, game theory, neural networks, genetic algorithms, and Turing machines). These advanced (...) topics are explained in terms of well known simple concepts: Cellular automata - Game of Life, Shannon's formula - Game of twenty questions, Game theory - Television quiz, etc. The book is unique in explaining in a straightforward, yet complete, fashion many important ideas, related to various models of reality and their applications. Twenty-five programs, written especially for this book, are provided on an accompanying CD. They greatly enhance its pedagogical value and make learning of even the more complex topics an enjoyable pleasure. (shrink)

Authenticity and theatricality: Andrzej Falkiewicz’s model of homo theatralis in the context of Helmuth Plessner’s criticism of radicalismThe aim of this work is to confront Andrzej Falkiewicz’s model of “homo theatralis” and—to a lesser degree—“being-as-metaphor” with Helmuth Plessner’s criticism of radicalism. In the first step the author shows generally the problem of “self” and moral sources of identity. In the second step the author analyzes the concept of “homo theatralis” “theater man” and “being-as-metaphor” by the Polish writer, critic, and philosopher (...) Andrzej Falkiewicz—Leszek Nowak’s cooperator. In the third step the author is trying to connect Falkiewicz’s ideas with Helmuth Plessner’s model of radicalism connected with his concept of commonwealth and society and difference between them. Then the author answers the question of the possibility of freedom in building our individual moral horizon. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to expound a notion of conceptual apparatus, by revealing structure and functions of objects it designates. The notion has been developed by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in the mid of 30ties, within a standpoint of radical conventionalism. According to its proponents, a picture of world one bears is not stated directly by the data of experience, but depends on conceptual apparatus chosen. Ajdukiewicz defines the notion consequently, referring it to a set of all meanings attributed to (...) expressions in a closed and compact language. Nevertheless, it turns out to be vague, since it inherits the vagueness from presupposed categories, especially from ambiguously used category of meaning. (shrink)

Michael Polanyi’s philosophical ideas are interpret in various ways worldwide. In Poland the name remains (barely) listed among such philosophers of science as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, whereas English or German authors regard him rather as a theorist of knowledge and place aside Gilbert Ryle, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans-Georg Gadamer or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The aim of the paper is to describe typical ways of how Polanyi’s ideas are being currently received and to report his main statements. It is proceeded (...) in four steps. After short biography of the author briefed in first point, second one sums up the content of all his main works, depicting thereby the evolution of his views. In third point receptions published in Polish, English and German literature are screened and discussed, focusing on issues of rationality, personal knowledge, tacit knowledge and tacit knowing. Fourth point states a problem of alleged holism and eclecticism as interpretative characteristics of Polanyi’s philosophical views. (shrink)

How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge.

Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — (...) in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). (shrink)

There is a productive and suggestive approach in philosophical logic based on the idea of generalized truth values. This idea, which stems essentially from the pioneering works by J.M. Dunn, N. Belnap, and which has recently been developed further by Y. Shramko and H. Wansing, is closely connected to the power-setting formation on the base of some initial truth values. Having a set of generalized truth values, one can introduce fundamental logical notions, more specifically, the ones of logical operations and (...) logical entailment. This can be done in two different ways. According to the first one, advanced by M. Dunn, N. Belnap, Y. Shramko and H. Wansing, one defines on the given set of generalized truth values a specific ordering relation (or even several such relations) called the logical order(s), and then interprets logical connectives as well as the entailment relation(s) via this ordering(s). In particular, the negation connective is determined then by the inversion of the logical order. But there is also another method grounded on the notion of a quasi-field of sets, considered by Białynicki-Birula and Rasiowa. The key point of this approach consists in defining an operation of quasi-complement via the very specific function g and then interpreting entailment just through the relation of set-inclusion between generalized truth values. In this paper, we will give a constructive proof of the claim that, for any finite set V with cardinality greater or equal 2, there exists a representation of a quasi-field of sets isomorphic to de Morgan lattice. In particular, it means that we offer a special procedure, which allows to make our negation de Morgan and our logic relevant. (shrink)

This article examines the structure and processing of editorial cartoons appropriating Joe Rosenthal's famous Iwo Jima photograph in view of the theory of conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002 Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M. 2002. The way we think: Conceptual blending and the mind's hidden complexities, New York,, NY: Basic Books. [Google Scholar]). The main claim argued is that Blending theory accounts for complex processes of meaning constructing provoked by editorial cartoons that invoke several conceptual domains to define and evaluate (...) their topic, Iwo Jima cartoons being cases in point. The second section introduces the relevant aspects of Blending theory: mental spaces and types of blending networks. The third section addresses the Iwo Jima image as one particular input space; a moral criterion to which the selected sociopolitical topic of the cartoon is compared and judged. The fourth section isolates four types of graphic operations blending the Iwo Jima image with topical entities. The fifth section demonstrates how various kinds of blends give rise to either positive or negative evaluations. The final section argues that the study's scope of application extends to any kind of multi-domain cartoon, not just those addressed in this article. (shrink)

서양의 도전적 자연관이 아닌, 동야의 순응하는 자연관을 토대로, 무위자연의 도에서 출발하는 저자 나름의 도치정치사상을 설명했다. 동양의 신 자연혁명의 개요부터 도치정치의 개념과 정워, 도치정치의 대의원 제도의 이론적 근거, 도치정치의 세계정부 제안 등의 내용을 담고 있다. (제1권).

During the battle of Iwo Jima in June 1944, Private First Class Jackylin Harold Lucas and three other U.S. Marines came under attack while making their way along a ravine. Upon seeing two grenades thrown near the soldiers, Lucas dove onto one grenade and pulled the other under his body, saving his companions from serious injury or death. Lucas survived, but his injuries were so grave that his companions left him for dead. Lucas’s act was one of spectacular and nearly (...) suicidal altruism. What does such an act show us about our nature and the human capacity for good and evil? Perhaps it offers a window onto our true nature—a nature ultimately good, though susceptible to corrupting influences. Or perhaps it seems extraordinary precisely because we are greedy and violent by nature but can, in rare instances, rise above those instincts. Questions about what human nature is and how we can learn about it are difficult to answer. They are difficult not just because humans are complex creatures whose behavior is deeply embedded in the cultural environment that they are a part of, but also because it is not obvious what a concept of human nature is supposed to do or what it is for. The concept of human nature is often used as a normative concept, one that can serve as a guide to action, showing us how we ought to behave. Less commonplace is an approach that seeks a descriptive account of human nature, one that characterizes what humans do and are disposed to do. I argue in this essay that the normative and descriptive approaches are at odds and that we should not expect a single concept of human nature to play both roles. Furthermore, there are deep problems with normative accounts. They often ignore or contradict the contemporary scientific worldview, and they often merely reflect biases about how we ought to be and what we ought to do. Human nature in this sense becomes politicized and serves in arguments about the moral status of issues like homosexuality, abortion, or biomedical enhancement. Because of the problems inherent in normative notions of human nature, I offer a descriptive alternative. My alternative attempts to align the scientific study of the human with human nature. (shrink)

The genre of public service advertisements that appear with two- and four-year cyclical regularity is familiar. Cameras pan across scenes of marines hoisting the flag on Iwo Jima, a bald eagle soaring in splendid flight, rows of grave markers at Arlington. The somber-voiced announcer remonstrates: “ They did their part; now you do yours.” Once again it is the season to fulfill one's civic duty, to vote.

The role of chance in producing a picture by snapping a shutter release before a complex and quickly changing scene weakens the bond between the historic action photograph and the meanings it is routinely asked to bear. To appreciate this problem and to understand the array of popular notions that have been marshaled to finesse or suppress the role of chance in photographic production, I consider the case of Joe Rosenthal’s 1945 photograph of American servicemen raising a flag on Iwo (...) Jima. The analysis pushes the production of this famous photograph through a series of zoological analogies: Is it like a fisherman reeling in a trophy catch? Like a cat pouncing on a mouse or a spider setting a trap for a fly? Like a pig pushing its snout through the dirt? Like chimpanzees banging at typewriters? These analogies are playful but also serious. We need new models for understanding the production of the historic action photograph because the predominant modern and postmodern approaches to that production have suppressed the role of chance. Whereas the modern regime tends to understand the historic action photograph as an inspired flash of history, the postmodern regime tends to understand it as a discursive effect. Entertaining the notion that such a photograph is instead a stochastic result leads to a new conception of photography and its relationship to history. Chance emerges as a third kind of photographic madness, alongside the industrial madness decried by Charles Baudelaire and the indexical madness that moved Roland Barthes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Propaedeutic to Walter BenjaminDavid Socher (bio)I took the picture—the Marines took Iwo Jima.—Joe Rosenthal (1912-2006)The Emerson College Web site on Walter Benjamin's essay The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction1 nicely animates some ideas of the essay. One such idea is the following: To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. When Benjamin wrote this (...) essay and this maxim, Norman Rockwell had been illustrating magazine covers for both Boy's Life and the Saturday Evening Post for several years. Rockwell, who also made paintings for advertisements, said he didn't "want to paint for the few who can see a canvas in a museum." He wanted his "pictures to be published," exemplifying Benjamin's point.2 Wood engravings have been around for a thousand years and coins with portraits for two thousand. I don't mention these old examples to dispute Benjamin's point—certainly to an ever-greater degree the modern age designs for reproducibility. And Benjamin himself at the outset mentions the stampings, coins, and terra cottas of the Greeks as ancient cases of reproduction of a work of art. I merely intend to highlight the distinction between creating a print and painting a painting or drawing a drawing. In the latter cases the artist's goal is to produce one particular physical surface. We often imbue this surface with what Benjamin called an aura.3 Collectors of Rockwell Post covers don't have Rockwell's auras,4 and even less so those who have and hang reproductions of such covers. The making of prints has its own cachet, however. Although he is far from a typical printmaker, M. C. Escher here expresses a thought applicable to all printmakers: "The printmaker has [End Page 1] something of the minstrel spirit; he sings, and in every print … he repeats his song over and over again."5As is usual with such illustrations, Rockwell's paintings were put on magazine covers by photographic processes. Rockwell, of course, is not a photographer. His name will not be included in the history of photography. Why is it even worth stating such more-than-obvious observations? Because Benjamin seems to me to be mixed up about photography and the mix-up pervades his essay, even including his very title. Getting clear about exactly what photography is will help untangle things. Therefore, before turning to Benjamin's text, allow me a few words on photography.It is hard to overstate the importance of photography. About his own parents, whom he had never seen, Dickens's Pip says, he "never saw any likeness of either of them (for their days were long before the days of photographs)."6 Many school textbooks feature photos of children in a classroom, but often these are staged photos not actually taken in a classroom. At least one textbook publisher keeps props, including a wheelchair to take photos of "Able bodied children selected through modeling agencies [posing] in the wheelchair."7 Well, it's hard to get disabled children to serve as models, and in this way the publisher meets his disability quota. In such a case the photo is not doctored. It does picture the event in front of the camera, although unknown to the student, the picture is staged and the pictured student is neither in a classroom, nor disabled. This is a small deception; it is, however, a greater deception than is normal for, say, clothing catalogues. In such a catalogue all know that the model photographed is not actually skiing or chopping wood, although the model is so pictured. In the textbook an able-bodied child is presented as a disabled one, however, no direct falsehoods are being taught and no picture is falsely captioned. On the other hand, when a news agency doctors, falsely captions, or stages a picture, the deception is great.Newspapermen and newspaperwomen know well that photo-ops and managed news are cases where the tail wags the dog inasmuch as the event itself was only created for the sake of the picture. Somewhat similarly, staged wedding photos and other... (shrink)