One tolerably clear statement of Determinism has it that all events are caused. Expanded upon, this thesis has been taken as the claim that the existence of any event E1, has a set of events, E2 … En which antedate E1, and which are causally sufficient for the occurrence of E1. That is, given the occurrence of E2 … En, E1 is causally necessary. I would hardly wish to claim that this is the only plausible statement of the doctrine (...) of Determinism; nonetheless it is a common one, and the one that I’ll use as definitive. Some have believed both that this premise is true and that it inevitably leads to a denial of free actions. While remaining neutral as to the merits of the Hard Determinist position, what I wish to show is that the consequences of the argumentation that has led them to such a position have been neither fully nor adequately understood. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to introduce the logics of evidence and truth $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ together with sound, complete, and decidable six-valued deterministic semantics for them. These logics extend the logics $$LET_{K}$$ and $$LET_{F}^-$$ with rules of propagation of classicality, which are inferences that express how the classicality operator $${\circ }$$ is transmitted from less complex to more complex sentences, and vice-versa. The six-valued semantics here proposed extends the 4 values of Belnap-Dunn logic with 2 more values (...) that intend to represent (positive and negative) reliable information. A six-valued non-deterministic semantics for $$LET_{K}$$ is obtained by means of Nmatrices based on swap structures, and the six-valued semantics for $$LET_{K}^+$$ is then obtained by imposing restrictions on the semantics of $$LET_{K}$$. These restrictions correspond exactly to the rules of propagation of classicality that extend $$LET_{K}$$. The logic $$LET_{F}^+$$ is obtained as the implication-free fragment of $$LET_{K}^+$$. We also show that the 6 values of $$LET_{K}^+$$ and $$LET_{F}^+$$ define a lattice structure that extends the lattice L4 defined by the Belnap-Dunn four-valued logic with the 2 additional values mentioned above, intuitively interpreted as positive and negative reliable information. Finally, we also show that $$LET_{K}^+$$ is Blok-Pigozzi algebraizable and that its implication-free fragment $$LET_{F}^+$$ coincides with the degree-preserving logic of the involutive Stone algebras. (shrink)

Two constructions for adding an involution operator to residuated ordered monoids are investigated. One preserves integrality and the mingle axiom x 2x but fails to preserve the contraction property xx 2. The other has the opposite preservation properties. Both constructions preserve commutativity as well as existent nonempty meets and joins and self-dual order properties. Used in conjunction with either construction, a result of R.T. Brady can be seen to show that the equational theory of commutative distributive residuated lattices (without involution) (...) is decidable, settling a question implicitly posed by P. Jipsen and C. Tsinakis. The corresponding logical result is the (theorem-) decidability of the negation-free axioms and rules of the logic RW, formulated with fusion and the Ackermann constant t. This completes a result of S. Giambrone whose proof relied on the absence of t. (shrink)

This paper establishes several algebraic embedding theorems, each of which asserts that a certain kind of residuated structure can be embedded into a richer one. In almost all cases, the original structure has a compatible involution, which must be preserved by the embedding. The results, in conjunction with previous findings, yield separative axiomatizations of the deducibility relations of various substructural formal systems having double negation and contraposition axioms. The separation theorems go somewhat further than earlier ones in the literature, which (...) either treated fewer subsignatures or focussed on the conservation of theorems only. (shrink)

Excerpt from Involution The word "involution" implies a folding in towards the centre. It seems to bear a different sense to the word "concentration," inasmuch as the latter carries with it the suggestion of an organised movement directed from outside, while involution takes rather the form of an automatic convergence. The word is here used in the latter sense, and it has been chosen as the title of this book because it is the word which seems to describe best the (...) cosmic process at which a glimpse is taken in the following pages. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In [5] we study Nonassociative Lambek Calculus augmented with De Morgan negation, satisfying the double negation and contraposition laws. This logic, introduced by de Grooté and Lamarche [10], is called Classical Non-Associative Lambek Calculus. Here we study a weaker logic InNL, i.e. NL with two involutive negations. We present a one-sided sequent system for InNL, admitting cut elimination. We also prove that InNL is PTIME.

A recent paper by Jakl, Jung and Pultr succeeded for the first time in establishing a very natural link between bilattice logic and the duality theory of d-frames and bitopological spaces. In this paper we further exploit, extend and investigate this link from an algebraic and a logical point of view. In particular, we introduce classes of algebras that extend bilattices, d-frames and N4-lattices to a setting in which the negation is not necessarily involutive, and we study corresponding logics. We (...) provide product representation theorems for these algebras, as well as completeness, algebraizability results for the corresponding logics. (shrink)

This paper develops the basics of the theory of involutive categories and shows that such categories provide the natural setting in which to describe involutive monoids. It is shown how categories of Eilenberg-Moore algebras of involutive monads are involutive, with conjugation for modules and vector spaces as special case. A part of the so-called Gelfand–Naimark–Segal (GNS) construction is identified as an isomorphism of categories, relating states on involutive monoids and inner products. This correspondence exists in arbritrary involutive symmetric monoidal categories.

Involutive Nonassociative Lambek Calculus is a nonassociative version of Noncommutative Multiplicative Linear Logic, but the multiplicative constants are not admitted. InNL adds two linear negations to Nonassociative Lambek Calculus ; it is a strongly conservative extension of NL Logical aspects of computational linguistics. LNCS, vol 10054. Springer, Berlin, pp 68–84, 2016). Here we also add unary modalities satisfying the residuation law and De Morgan laws. For the resulting logic InNLm, we define and study phase spaces. We use them to prove (...) the cut elimination theorem for a one-sided sequent system for InNLm, introduced here. Phase spaces are also employed in studying auxiliary systems InNLm, assuming the k-cyclic law for negation. The latter behave similarly as Classical Nonassociative Lambek Calculus, studied in de Groote and Lamarche :355–388, 2002) and Buszkowski. We reduce the provability in InNLm to that in InNLm. This yields the equivalence of type grammars based on InNLm with -free) context-free grammars and the PTIME complexity of InNLm. (shrink)

We prove that there are two involutions defined by monadic terms that characterize Monadic Algebras. We further prove that the variety of Monadic Algebras is the smallest variety of Interior Algebras where these involutions give rise to an interpretation from the variety of Bounded Distributive Lattices into it.

‘Creative Involution’ posits something of a philosophical genealogy, a line of flight that has neither need for nor interest in the periodisation of Modernism, a line of which Beckett (even reluctantly) is part. Murphy, among others, is deterritorialised as much as Beckett's landscapes are, and so he/they become a ‘complexification’ of being that manifests itself in Beckett not as represented, representative or a representation, since so much of Beckett deals with that which cannot be uttered, known or represented, but whose (...) image the works (and its figures) have become, a thinking through of negativity, becoming, and multiplicity through non-Newtonian motion, of being as becoming, where every movement brings something new into the world, but in something of a reverse Darwinism that moves from complex to simple organism, from Murphy to Worm, or Watt to Pim, or among the nameless figures in the short prose, a ‘becoming-animal’, in something not so much of a creative devolution but rather a ‘neoevolution’, or to adopt another term from Deleuze and Guattari, an ‘involution’, which ‘is in no way confused with regression’ (1987: 238), becomings creating nothing less than new worlds. Writing casually to his post-war confidant Georges Duthuit on 26 July 1951, Beckett noted in the midst of gardening chores, ‘Never seen so many butterflies in such worm-state, this little central cylinder, the only flesh, is the worm’ (2011: 271). The observation comes after the writing but before the premiere performance of Waiting for Godot in which Gogo tells Didi, ‘You and your landscapes! Tell me about the worms!’ (1954: 67). Such ‘becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short a multiplicity’ (1987: 239), Deleuze and Guattari tell us. For Beckett it defines creativity as well, only possible through such un-tethered selves or beings, amid the generation of varieties and differences, accessible through moments of deterritorialisation, characterised by, ‘A fearsome involution calling us toward unheard-of becomings’ (240). (shrink)

As we settle further into the era of digital media and globalized visual culture, it might be tempting to think that photography holds no more than historical interest. Yet it continues to feature in debates with considerable significance for the present.1 The terms by which it was negotiated in the twentieth century – the print, the negative and the mechanical-optical apparatus, the affective experience of a moment stilled, and any truth that its rendering promises – have been technically and culturally (...) displaced and expanded. New instabilities have become familiar and have distanced us from how photography was understood, even in the fairly recent past. The current historical conjuncture is marked by a widespread suspicion that existing theories – including those that turned, in the 1970s, to Marxism, feminist critique, semiotics or psychoanalysis so as to politicize and contest mainstream photographic culture – might no longer be adequate to photography’s contemporary situation. That photography still matters, however, can be evidenced, prosaically and contingently, by noting the increasing number of new scholarly journals and exhibitions devoted to its past, present and future in recent years.2 There is, in this – as Fred Ritchin is only the latest to note – a sense that the undoing of photography’s prior certainties constitutes an ending and an enlargement. The fate of photography provides an ‘expansive filter’ through which to chart the ‘chaos of possibilities that emerge and recede, back up and move forward, crisscrossing each other.’3 Expectations of the new and the old, the obsolete and as yet only anticipated, are thrown into temporal disarray as its openness to reformation gives the photographic past a futural slant. (shrink)

This article argues that the Indian philosopher-mystic Sri Aurobindo espoused a sophisticated form of cosmopsychism that has great contemporary relevance. After first discussing Aurobindo’s prescient reflections on the “central problem of consciousness” and his arguments against materialist reductionism, I explain how he developed a panentheistic philosophy of “realistic Adwaita” on the basis of his own spiritual experiences and his intensive study of the Vedāntic scriptures. He derived from this realistic Advaita philosophy a highly original doctrine of evolutionary cosmopsychism, according to (...) which the Divine Saccidānanda is “involved” in everything in the universe and gradually manifests itself at each stage of the evolutionary process from matter to life to mind, and ultimately, to Supermind—the final stage that is yet to come, upon the attainment of which we will attain knowledge of our true divine nature as Saccidānanda. I then reconstruct Aurobindo’s novel solution to the individuation problem, according to which the Divine Saccidānanda individuates into various distinct consciousnesses by playfully limiting itself through a process of “exclusive concentration.” Finally, I highlight the continued relevance of Aurobindo’s evolutionary cosmopsychism by bringing him into conversation with Itay Shani, a contemporary proponent of cosmopsychism. (shrink)

The paper deals with involutive FLe-monoids, that is, commutative residuated, partially-ordered monoids with an involutive negation. Involutive FLe-monoids over lattices are exactly involutive FLe-algebras, the algebraic counterparts of the substructural logic IUL. A cone representation is given for conic involutive FLe-monoids, along with a new construction method, called twin-rotation. Some classes of finite involutive FLe-chains are classified by using the notion of rank of involutive FLe-chains, and a kind of duality is developed between positive and non-positive rank algebras. As a (...) side effect, it is shown that the substructural logic IUL plus t ↔ f does not have the finite model property. (shrink)

It is generally thought that objective chances for particular events different from 1 and 0 and determinism are incompatible. However, there are important scientific theories whose laws are deterministic but which also assign non-trivial probabilities to events. The most important of these is statistical mechanics whose probabilities are essential to the explanations of thermodynamic phenomena. These probabilities are often construed as 'ignorance' probabilities representing our lack of knowledge concerning the microstate. I argue that this construal is incompatible with the (...) role of probability in explanation and laws. This is the 'paradox of deterministic probabilities'. After surveying the usual list of accounts of objective chance and finding them inadequate I argue that an account of chance sketched by David Lewis can be modified to solve the paradox of deterministic probabilities and provide an adequate account of the probabilities in deterministic theories like statistical mechanics. (shrink)

Adams presents an in-depth interpretation of three important parts of Leibniz's metaphysics, thoroughly grounded in the texts as well as in philosophical analysis and critique. The three areas discussed are the metaphysical part of Leibniz's philosophy of logic, his essentially theological treatment of the central issues of ontology, and his theory of substance. Adams' work helps make sense of one of the great classic systems of modern philosophy.

An algebraic proof is presented for the finite strong standard completeness of the Involutive Uninorm Logic with Fixed Point ($${{\mathbf {IUL}}^{fp}}$$ IUL fp ). It may provide a first step towards settling the standard completeness problem for the Involutive Uninorm Logic ($${\mathbf {IUL}}$$ IUL, posed in G. Metcalfe, F. Montagna. (J Symb Log 72:834–864, 2007)) in an algebraic manner. The result is proved via an embedding theorem which is based on the structural description of the class of odd involutive FL$$_e$$ (...) e -chains which have finitely many positive idempotent elements. (shrink)

A new logic, quantized intuitionistic linear logic, is introduced, and is closely related to the logic which corresponds to Mulvey and Pelletier's involutive quantales. Some cut-free sequent calculi with a new property quantization principle and some complete semantics such as an involutive quantale model and a quantale model are obtained for QILL. The relationship between QILL and Wansing's extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation is also observed using such syntactical and semantical frameworks.

The logic just corresponding to involutive quantales, which was introduced by Wendy MacCaull, is reconsidered in order to obtain a cut-free sequent calculus formulation, and the completeness theorem for this logic is proved using a new admissible rule.

We establish the existence uncountably many atoms in the subvariety lattice of the variety of involutive residuated lattices. The proof utilizes a construction used in the proof of the corresponding result for residuated lattices and is based on the fact that every residuated lattice with greatest element can be associated in a canonical way with an involutive residuated lattice.

Strong nativist views about numerical concepts claim that human beings have at least some innate precise numerical representations. Weak nativist views claim only that humans, like other animals, possess an innate system for representing approximate numerical quantity. We present a new strong nativist model of the origins of numerical concepts and defend the strong nativist approach against recent cross-cultural studies that have been interpreted to show that precise numerical concepts are dependent on language and that they are restricted to speakers (...) of languages with the right kind of structure. (shrink)

Rational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are (...) relevant and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT. (shrink)

Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. Specifically, (...) a formal study of swap structures for LFIs is developed, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s representation theorem is obtained for each class of swap structures. Moreover, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logics J3 and Ciore, their classes of algebraic models are retrieved, and the swap structures semantics become twist structures semantics. This fact, together with the existence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category of swap structures for each LFI, suggests that swap structures can be seen as non-deterministic twist structures. This opens new avenues for dealing with non-algebraizable logics by the more general methodology of multialgebraic semantics. (shrink)

We establish a duality between the category of involutive bisemilattices and the category of semilattice inverse systems of Stone spaces, using Stone duality from one side and the representation of involutive bisemilattices as Płonka sum of Boolean algebras, from the other. Furthermore, we show that the dual space of an involutive bisemilattice can be viewed as a GR space with involution, a generalization of the spaces introduced by Gierz and Romanowska equipped with an involution as additional operation.

Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just Os and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance.

We discuss Einstein’s knowledge of projective geometry. We show that two pages of Einstein’s Scratch Notebook from around 1912 with geometrical sketches can directly be associated with similar sketches in manuscript pages dating from his Princeton years. By this correspondence, we show that the sketches are all related to a common theme, the discussion of involution in a projective geometry setting with particular emphasis on the infinite point. We offer a conjecture as to the probable purpose of these geometric considerations.

Motivated by an old construction due to J. Kalman that relates distributive lattices and centered Kleene algebras we define the functor K • relating integral residuated lattices with 0 with certain involutive residuated lattices. Our work is also based on the results obtained by Cignoli about an adjunction between Heyting and Nelson algebras, which is an enrichment of the basic adjunction between lattices and Kleene algebras. The lifting of the functor to the category of residuated lattices leads us to study (...) other adjunctions and equivalences. For example, we treat the functor C whose domain is cuRL, the category of involutive residuated lattices M whose unit is fixed by the involution and has a Boolean complement c. If we restrict to the full subcategory NRL of cuRL of those objects that have a nilpotent c, then C is an equivalence. In fact, C M is isomorphic to C e M, and C e is adjoint to, where assigns to an object A of IRL0 the product A × A 0 which is an object of NRL. (shrink)

It is introduced a new algebra$$(A, \otimes, \oplus, *, \rightharpoonup, 0, 1)$$(A,⊗,⊕,∗,⇀,0,1)called$$L_PG$$LPG-algebra if$$(A, \otimes, \oplus, *, 0, 1)$$(A,⊗,⊕,∗,0,1)is$$L_P$$LP-algebra (i.e. an algebra from the variety generated by perfectMV-algebras) and$$(A,\rightharpoonup, 0, 1)$$(A,⇀,0,1)is a Gödel algebra (i.e. Heyting algebra satisfying the identity$$(x \rightharpoonup y ) \vee (y \rightharpoonup x ) =1)$$(x⇀y)∨(y⇀x)=1). The lattice of congruences of an$$L_PG$$LPG-algebra$$(A, \otimes, \oplus, *, \rightharpoonup, 0, 1)$$(A,⊗,⊕,∗,⇀,0,1)is isomorphic to the lattice of Skolem filters (i.e. special type ofMV-filters) of theMV-algebra$$(A, \otimes, \oplus, *, 0, 1)$$(A,⊗,⊕,∗,0,1). The variety$$\mathbf {L_PG}$$LPGof$$L_PG$$LPG-algebras (...) is generated by the algebras$$(C, \otimes, \oplus, *, \rightharpoonup, 0, 1)$$(C,⊗,⊕,∗,⇀,0,1)where$$(C, \otimes, \oplus, *, 0, 1)$$(C,⊗,⊕,∗,0,1)is ChangMV-algebra. Any$$L_PG$$LPG-algebra is bi-Heyting algebra. The set of theorems of the logic$$L_PG$$LPGis recursively enumerable. Moreover, we describe finitely generated free$$L_PG$$LPG-algebras. (shrink)

Bobzien presents the definitive study of one of the most interesting intellectual legacies of the ancient Greeks: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. She explains what it was, how the Stoics justified it, and how it relates to their views on possibility, action, freedom, moral responsibility, moral character, fatalism, logical determinism and many other topics. She demonstrates the considerable philosophical richness and power that these ideas retain today.

Nous tentons dans cet article de proposer une thèse cohérente concernant la formation de la notion d’involution dans le Brouillon Project de Desargues. Pour cela, nous donnons une analyse détaillée des dix premières pages dudit Brouillon, comprenant les développements de cas particuliers qui aident à comprendre l’intention de Desargues. Nous mettons cette analyse en regard de la lecture qu’en fait Jean de Beaugrand et que l’on trouve dans les Advis Charitables.

It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, (...) in turn, tend to proceed as if showing that determinism is not a problem thereby shows that we have free will, as if determinism is the only thing that might threaten free will. In this chapter, I reject both of these elements of the traditional debate; the question of whether we have free will should neither begin nor end with the so-called problem of determinism. I present and discuss evidence from a variety of studies that suggests that incompatibilism is not particularly intuitive. Most people do not have to be talked out of incompatibilism but rather talked into it. This provides some reasons—though certainly not decisive reasons—to think that compatibilism is true. I conclude by pointing out that, even if compatibilism were true, it would not dissolve the problem of free will, because there are problems other than determinism that need to be confronted—namely, challenges to free will suggested by current and “future science,” including neuroscience and psychology. The threats to free will suggested by these sciences are distinct from the traditional threat of determinism, and they are the ones that “ordinary persons” find intuitively threatening to free will. In fact, I will argue that the reason incompatibilism about free will and determinism appears to be intuitive is that determinism is often and easily misunderstood to involve these distinct threats to free will—threats that suggest that our rational, conscious mental activity is bypassed in the process of our making decisions and coming to act. (shrink)

Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also (...) that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability. (shrink)

I sketch a new constraint on chance, which connects chance ascriptions closely with ascriptions of ability, and more specifically with 'CAN'-claims. This connection between chance and ability has some claim to be a platitude; moreover, it exposes the debate over deterministic chance to the extensive literature on (in)compatibilism about free will. The upshot is that a prima facie case for the tenability of deterministic chance can be made. But the main thrust of the paper is to draw attention to the (...) connection between the truth conditions of sentences involving 'CAN' and 'CHANCE', and argue for the context sensitivity of each term. Awareness of this context sensitivity has consequences for the evaluation of particular philosophical arguments for (in) compatibilism when they are presented in particular contexts. (shrink)

A strongly deterministic theory of physics is one that permits exactly one possible history of the universe. In the words of Penrose (1989), "it is not just a matter of the future being determined by the past; the entire history of the universe is fixed, according to some precise mathematical scheme, for all time.” Such an extraordinary feature may appear unattainable in any realistic and simple theory of physics. In this paper, I propose a definition of strong determinism and (...) contrast it with those of standard determinism and super-determinism. Next, I discuss its consequences for explanation, causation, prediction, fundamental properties, free will, and modality. Finally, I present the first example of a realistic, simple, and strongly deterministic physical theory--the Everettian Wentaculus. As a consequence of physical laws, the history of the Everettian multiverse could not have been different. If the Everettian Wentaculus is empirically equivalent to other quantum theories, we can never empirically find out whether or not our world is strongly deterministic. Even if strong determinism fails to be true, it is closer to the actual world than we have presumed, with implications for some of the central topics in philosophy and foundations of physics. (shrink)

Physicists are increasingly beginning to take seriously the possibility of laws outside the traditional time-evolution paradigm; yet many popular definitions of determinism are still predicated on a time-evolution picture, making them manifestly unsuited to the diverse range of research programmes in modern physics. In this article, we use a constraint-based framework to set out a generalization of determinism which does not presuppose temporal evolution, distinguishing between strong, weak and delocalised holistic determinism. We discuss some interesting consequences of (...) these generalized notions of determinism, and we show that this approach sheds new light on the long-standing debate surrounding the nature of objective chance. (shrink)

This monograph deals with the controversy about determinism versus freedom of will. The book is addressed to scholars, especially in the areas of philosophy and psychology, and also to thinking and serious-minded laypersons who are interested in the implications of being human. The book attempts to help the reader understand and resolve the dilemma of determinism. The solution offered by this book has not been previously offered by any other book, even though the literature on this topic is (...) vast. The deterministic position is that all events are effects of previous events and causes of future events, in inexorable cause-effect sequences, which leave no room for intervention of anything outside of the stream of causal relationships, such as free will, thus rendering moral responsibility meaningless. Libertarians believe in freedom of will which is, for them, indispensable for moral responsibility. This controversy can be resolved only by making a clear distinction between two kinds of freedom. In common parlance, freedom means freedom from constraint or compulsion, which can be designated as contra-constraintual freedom. The second meaning of freedom is freedom from causation, which has been referred to as contra-causal freedom, and this is the meaning that is inherent in the concept of freedom of will. If we have contra-causal freedom, we can choose or decide to act irrespective of antecedent conditions including our own past. The distinction between contra-causal freedom and contra-constraintual freedom is the key to the resolution of the controversy between determinism and libertarianism. The absence of contra-causal freedom prevails at the theoretical, conceptual, objective, abstract, or as-is level, whereas contra-constraintual freedom functions at the practical, behavioral, subjective, concrete, or as-if level. All we need for moral responsibility is contra-constraintual freedom, and not contra-causal freedom. At the as-is level, there is neither freedom nor dignity, neither morality nor accountability, and neither purpose nor meaning for human existence. It is only at the as-if level that these terms make any sense at all. In theory there is no choice from alternative courses of action in light of the absence of contra-causal freedom; in practice there is, in direct proportion to contra-constraintual freedom. (shrink)

This volume unites established authors and rising young voices in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion to offer the single most wide-ranging examination of theological determinism-in terms of both authors represented and issues investigated-published to date. Fifteen contributors present discussions about theological determinism, the view that God determines everything that occurs in the world. Some authors provide arguments in favor of this position, while others provide considerations against it. Many contributors investigate the relationship between theological determinism and (...) other philosophical issues, theological doctrines, or moral attitudes and practices. This book is essential reading for all those interested in the relationship between theological determinism and philosophical thought. (shrink)

This volume examines Diderot's and d'Holbach's views on determinism to illuminate some of the most important debates taking place in eighteenth-century Europe. It problematises their atheism by showing their philosophy to be deeply rooted in the Christian tradition and provides a more nuanced and historicised interpretation of the so-called 'Radical Enlightenment', challenging the notions that this movement can be taken to be a perfectly coherent set of ideas and that it represents a complete break with 'the old'.

Determinism is a perennial topic of philosophical discussion. Very little acquaintance with the philosophical literature is needed to reveal the Tower of ...

Originally published in 1934, this book presents the content of an inaugural lecture delivered by the British philosopher Charles Dunbar Broad (1887-1971), upon taking up the position of Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University. The text presents a discussion of the relationship between determinism, indeterminism and libertarianism. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the writings of Broad and the history of philosophy.

The hole argument contends that a substantivalist has to view General Relativity as an indeterministic theory. A recent form of substantivalist reply to the hole argument has urged the substantivalist to identify qualitatively isomorphic possible worlds. Gordon Belot has argued that this form of substantivalism is unable to capture other genuine violations of determinism. This paper argues that Belot's alleged examples of indeterminism should not be seen as a violation of a form of determinism that physicists are interested (...) in. What is undetermined in these examples, and in the hole argument, is a haecceitistic feature of the world. It is argued that these features are not among those we should expect the physical state of the world to determine. This vindicates the substantivalist reply to the hole argument, but also illustrates that philosophers of physics cannot ignore metaphysics when characterizing determinism for a physical theory. (shrink)

This article illustrates in which sense genetic determinism is still part of the contemporary interactionist consensus in medicine. Three dimensions of this consensus are discussed: kinds of causes, a continuum of traits ranging from monogenetic diseases to car accidents, and different kinds of determination due to different norms of reaction. On this basis, this article explicates in which sense the interactionist consensus presupposes the innate?acquired distinction. After a descriptive Part 1, Part 2 reviews why the innate?acquired distinction is under (...) attack in contemporary philosophy of biology. Three arguments are then presented to provide a limited and pragmatic defense of the distinction: an epistemic, a conceptual, and a historical argument. If interpreted in a certain manner, and if the pragmatic goals of prevention and treatment are taken into account, then the innate?acquired distinction can be a useful epistemic tool. It can help, first, to understand that genetic determination does not mean fatalism, and, second, to maintain a system of checks and balances in the continuing nature?nurture debates. (shrink)

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility brings together nine substantial essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in antiquity by Susanne Bobzien. The essays present the main ancient theories on these subjects, ranging historically from Aristotle followed by the Epicureans, the early Stoics, several later Stoics, and up to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third century CE. -/- The author discusses questions about rational and autonomous human agency and their compatibility with a large range of important philosophical issues, including (...) their compatibility with divine predetermination and other theological questions; with atomism and continuum theory and with the physical sciences more generally; with the determination of character and its development from childhood through nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with theories of necessity, possibility and contingency; with external or internal preceding causes and impediments; and with folk theories of fatalism. Room is also given to the questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, and to blame and praise. -/- Historically unified, philosophically profound, and methodologically rigorous, Bobzien’s essays show that in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy these topics were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or to a free will, and that the latter two notions were fully developed only later. The volume will be of interest both to philosophers and to historians of philosophy, with more than half of the essays accessible to advanced undergraduates. (shrink)