Results for 'Introspection'

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  1.  37
    A Simple Theory of Introspection.I. What is Introspection - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  2. Introspection and Consciousness.Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2012 - , US: Oxford University Press.
    The topic of introspection stands at the interface between questions in epistemology about the nature of self-knowledge and questions in the philosophy of mind about the nature of consciousness. What is the nature of introspection such that it provides us with a distinctive way of knowing about our own conscious mental states? And what is the nature of consciousness such that we can know about our own conscious mental states by introspection? How should we understand the relationship (...)
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  3. Introspection as practice.Pierre Vermersch - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):17-42.
    In this article I am not going to try and define introspection. I am going to try to state as precisely as possible how the practice of introspection can be improved, starting from the principle that there exists a disjunction between the logic of action and of conceptualization and the practice of introspection does not require that one should already be in possession of an exhaustive scientific knowledge bearing upon it. . To make matters worse, innumerable commentators (...)
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  4. Introspection and Consciousness: An Overview.Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Daniel Stoljar & Declan Smithies (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Introspection stands at the interface between two major currents in philosophy and related areas of science: on the one hand, there are metaphysical and scientific questions about the nature of consciousness; and on the other hand, there are normative and epistemological questions about the nature of self-knowledge. Introspection seems tied up with consciousness, to the point that some writers define consciousness in terms of introspection; and it is also tied up with self-knowledge, since introspection is the (...)
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  5. Introspective evidence in psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2005 - In P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
    In preparation for examining the place of introspective evidence in scientific psychology, the chapter begins by clarifying what introspection has been supposed to show, and why some concluded that it couldn't deliver. This requires a brief excursus into the various uses to which introspection was supposed to have been put by philosophers and psychologists in the modern period, together with a summary of objections. It then reconstructs some actual uses of introspection (or related techniques, differently monikered) in (...)
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  6. Introspective knowledge by acquaintance.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-23.
    Introspective knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge we have by being directly aware of our phenomenally conscious states. In this paper, I argue that introspective knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to any sort of propositional knowledge and is wholly constituted by a relationship of introspective acquaintance. My main argument is that this is the best explanation of some epistemic facts about phenomenal consciousness and introspection. In particular, it best explains the epistemic asymmetry (...)
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  7. Introspection.Fred Dretske - 19934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:263-278.
    Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
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  8. Introspection without Judgment.Anna Giustina - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86:407-427.
    The focus of this paper is introspection of phenomenal states, i.e. the distinctively first-personal method through which one can form beliefs about the phenomenology of one’s current conscious mental states. I argue that two different kinds of phenomenal state introspection should be distinguished: one which involves recognizing and classifying the introspected phenomenal state as an instance of a certain experience type, and another which does not involve such classification. Whereas the former is potentially judgment-like, the latter is not. (...)
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  9. Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes (...)
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  10. Introspection and Belief: Failures of Introspective Belief Formation.Chiara Caporuscio - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):165-184.
    Introspection has traditionally been defined as a privileged way of obtaining beliefs about one’s occurrent mental states, and the idea that it is psychologically and epistemically different from non-introspective belief formation processes has been widely defended. At the same time, philosophers and cognitive scientists alike have pointed out the unreliability of introspective reports in consciousness research. In this paper, I will argue that this dissonance in the literature can be explained by differentiating between infallible and informative introspective beliefs. I (...)
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  11. The introspectibility of brain states as such.Pete Mandik - 2006 - In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical (...)
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  12. Introspective misidentification.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758.
    It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to error through misidentification , relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is (...)
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  13. Introspection and subliminal perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.
    Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity (...)
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  14.  10
    Perception, introspection, and attention, Johannes Roesler.Quarterl Y. Interna Tlonal Philosohpical - 1999 - European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1).
  15. Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):143-164.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we (...)
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  16. Introspective humility.Tim Bayne & Maja Spener - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also (...)
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  17. Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise (...)
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  18. Introspective Acquaintance: An Integration Account.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, I develop a new version of the acquaintance view of the nature of introspection of phenomenal states. On the acquaintance view, when one introspects a current phenomenal state of one’s, one bears to it the relation of introspective acquaintance. Extant versions of the acquaintance view neglect what I call the phenomenal modification problem. The problem, articulated by Franz Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, is that drawing introspective attention to one’s current conscious experience may (...)
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  19.  95
    Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):11--7.
    To study conscious experience we must, to some extent, trust introspective reports; yet introspective reports often do not merit our trust. A century ago, E.B. Titchener advocated extensive introspective training as a means of resolving this difficulty. He describes many of his training techniques in his four-volume laboratory manual of 1901- 1905. This paper explores Titchener's laboratory manual with an eye to general questions about the prospects of introspective training for contemporary consciousness studies, with a focus on the following examples: (...)
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  20.  97
    Introspection, What?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--48.
    My thesis is: introspection is not a single process but a plurality of processes. It’s a plurality both within and between cases: most individual introspective judgments arise from a plurality ofprocesses (that’s the Within-case claim), and the collection of processes issuing in introspective judgments differs from case to case (that’s the between-case claim). Introspection is not the operation of a single cognitive mech- anism or small collection ofmechanisms. Introspective judgments arise from a shift- ing confluence ofmany processes, recruited (...)
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  21. Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Robert William Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts. Springer. pp. 231-251.
    Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook (...)
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  22. Introspection and phenomenological method.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):239-254.
    It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but (...)
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  23.  59
    Introspective disputes deflated: The case for phenomenal variation.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3165-3194.
    Sceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (Kriegel, 2007; Bayne and Spener, 2010; Schwitzgebel, 2011): introspectors massively diverge in their opinions about experiences, and there seems to be no method to resolve these issues. Sceptics take this to show that introspection lacks any epistemic merit. Here, I provide a list of paradigmatic examples, distill necessary and sufficient conditions for IDs, present the sceptical argument encouraged by IDs, and review the two (...)
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  24. Consciousness, introspection, and subjective measures.Maja Spener - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less (...)
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  25.  32
    Introspection.Cynthia Macdonald - 2009 - In A. Beckermann, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 741-766.
    Introspection’ is a term used by philosophers to refer to a special method or means by which one comes to know certain of one's own mental states; specifically, one's current conscious states. It derives from the Latin ‘spicere’, meaning ‘look’, and ‘intra’, meaning ‘within’; introspection is a process of looking inward. Introspectionist accounts of self-knowledge fall within the broader domain of theories of self-knowledge, understood as views about the nature of and basis for one's knowledge of one's own (...)
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  26. Introspective knowledge of experience and its role in consciousness studies.Jesse Butler - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic (...)
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  27. Is introspection inferential?Murat Aydede - 2003 - In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.
    I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it.
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  28. Emotional introspection.William E. Seager - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.
    One of the most vivid aspects of consciousness is the experience of emotion, yet this topic is given relatively little attention within consciousness studies. Emotions are crucial, for they provide quick and motivating assessments of value, without which action would be misdirected or absent. Emotions also involve linkages between phenomenal and intentional consciousness. This paper examines emotional consciousness from the standpoint of the representational theory of consciousness . Two interesting developments spring from this. The first is the need for the (...)
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  29. Introspecting phenomenal states.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
    This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key (...)
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  30. Introspecting knowledge.John Gibbons - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):559-579.
    If we use “introspection” just as a label for that essentially first-person way we have of knowing about our own mental states, then it’s pretty obvious that if there is such a thing as introspection, we know on that basis what we believe, and want, and intend, at least in many ordinary cases. I assume there is such a thing as introspection. So I think the hard question is how it works. But can you know that you (...)
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  31. Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume (...)
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  32.  88
    Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.
    RÉSUMÉ: Fred Dretske a développé, à titre de composante de sa théorie de la conscience, une théorie de l'introspection. Celle-ci présente une plausibilité indépendante, elle résiste à des objections qui affectent nombre d'autres théories et elle suggère des liens très féconds dans plusieurs domaines de la science cognitive. La version qu'en donne Dretske est restreinte à la connaissance introspective des états perceptuels. Mon objectif ici est d'étendre la théorie à tous les états mentaux. Le mécanisme qui est fondamental dans (...)
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  33. Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: from stimulus–response to script–report.Anthony Ian Jack & Andreas Roepstorff - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):333-339.
    Cognitive science has wholeheartedly embraced functional brain imaging, but introspective data are still eschewed to the extent that it runs against standard practice to engage in the systematic collection of introspective reports. However, in the case of executive processes associated with prefrontal cortex, imaging has made limited progress, whereas introspective methods have considerable unfulfilled potential. We argue for a re-evaluation of the standard ‘cognitive mapping’ paradigm, emphasizing the use of retrospective reports alongside behavioural and brain imaging techniques. Using all three (...)
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  34.  43
    Introspection distinct from first-order experiences.Morten Overgaard & T. A. Sorenson - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):11--7.
    As is the case with other concepts about mental affairs, the concept of introspection has many different interpretations. Some seem to consider introspecting a perceptive act and others see it as a thinking activity . For the present purpose, we will claim it as a common understanding in all such theories that introspection presupposes consciousness . States of consciousness, broadly discussed in the philosophical and empirical literature as first order states of consciousness, are states in which a subject (...)
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  35. Affording introspection: an alternative model of inner awareness.Tom McClelland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2469-2492.
    The ubiquity of inner awareness thesis states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained (...)
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  36. Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience.Tim Crane - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):49-67.
    Some philosophers have argued recently that introspective evidence provides direct support for an intentionalist theory of visual experience. An intentionalist theory of visual experience treats experience as an intentional state, a state with an intentional content. (I shall use the word ’state’ in a general way, for any kind of mental phenomenon, and here I shall not distinguish states proper from events, though the distinction is important.) Intentionalist theories characteristically say that the phenomenal character of an experience, what it is (...)
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  37.  84
    Introspection.Amy Kind - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Introspection is the process by which someone comes to form beliefs about her own mental states. We might form the belief that someone else is happy on the basis of perception – for example, by perceiving her behavior. But a person typically does not have to observe her own behavior in order to determine whether she is happy. Rather, one makes this determination by introspecting.
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  38. Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-173.
    Some analytic philosophers have recently been defending the thesis that there’s “something it’s like” to consciously think a particular thought, which is qualitatively different from what it’s like to be in any other kind of conscious mental state and from what it’s like to think any other thought, and which constitutes the thought’s intentional content. (I call this the “intentional phenomenology thesis”). One objection to this thesis concerns the introspective availability of such content: If it is true that intentional phenomenology (...)
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  39.  86
    Introspection and self-knowledge.Gerald E. Myers - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):199-207.
    Since locke, introspection has been generally defined as a form of observation. this is true, for example, of the classical tradition in psychology exemplified by wundt and titchener. recent experimental work by cognitive psychologists continues to treat introspection as a mode of observation while denying its alleged success in identifying cognitive processes. besides psychologists, philosophers such as james, ryle, and quinton are discussed, and they, too, define introspection as a type of observation analogous to perception. the present (...)
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  40.  26
    XI*—Introspection.Fred Dretske - 1994 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1):263-278.
    Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
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  41. Rethinking Introspection: A Pluralist Approach to the First-Person Perspective.Jesse Butler - 2013 - Palgrave MacMillan.
    We seem to have private privileged access to our own minds through introspection, but what exactly does this involve? Do we somehow literally perceive our own minds, as the common idea of a 'mind's eye' suggests, or are there other processes at work in our ability to know our own minds? Rethinking Introspection offers a new pluralist framework for understanding the nature, scope, and limits of introspection. The book argues that, contrary to common misconceptions, introspection does (...)
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  42.  17
    Introspective forgetting.Hans Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, Jérôme Lang & Pierre Marquis - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):405-423.
    We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of each others’ or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation, it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true.
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  43. From Introspection to Essence: The Auditory Nature of Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    To some it is a shallow platitude that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component. To others, it is an empirical hypothesis with accumulating support. To yet others it is a false dogma. In this chapter, I defend the claim that inner speech always has an auditory-phonological component, confining the claim to adults with ordinary speech and hearing. It is one thing, I emphasize, to assert that inner speech often, or even typically, has an auditory-phonological component—quite another to propose that (...)
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  44. Introspective awareness of sensations.Christopher S. Hill - 1988 - Topoi 7 (March):11-24.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs.
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  45. Introspection & Remembering.Josef Perner, Daniela Kloo & Elisabeth Stöttinger - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):253 - 270.
    We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving (...)
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  46. Introspection and the self.Sydney Shoemaker - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):101-120.
    The absence of identification of oneself tells against the view that introspection is a form of self-perception.
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  47. Introspection and phenomenal character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  48. Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):89-105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  49.  67
    Introspection and the phenomenology of free will: Problems and prospects.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):180-205.
    Inspired and informed by the work of Russ Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel in their 'Describing Inner Experience', we do two things in this commentary. First, we discuss the degree of reliability that introspective methods might be expected to deliver across a range of types of experience. Second, we explore the phenomenology of agency as it bears on the topic of free will. We pose a number of poten-tial problems for attempts to use introspective methods to answer var-ious questions about the (...)
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  50. Introspective Training Apprehensively Defended: Reflections on Titchener's Lab Manual.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):58-76.
    To study conscious experience we must, to some extent, trust introspective reports; yet introspective reports often do not merit our trust. A century ago, E.B. Titchener advocated extensive introspective training as a means of resolving this difficulty. He describes many of his training techniques in his four-volume laboratory manual of 1901- 1905. This paper explores Titchener's laboratory manual with an eye to general questions about the prospects of introspective training for contemporary consciousness studies, with a focus on the following examples: (...)
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