Colloque international sur « Les adjectifs » Responsables : Georgette Dal, Jan Goes, Rafael Marín, Philip Miller, Fayssal Tayalati). Université de Lille 3, 13-15 septembre 2007. Programme téléchargeable en annexe Symposium « L’interprétation des fragments, I : recompositions antiquaires, usages esthétiques, enjeux philosophiques » Organisé dans le cadre du PICS Lille-Munich « L’interprétation entre logique et philologie ». Responsable du c...

Cécile Conduché, Les exemples grecs des Institutions grammaticales de Priscien, héritages et doctrines Thèse soutenue le 13 octobre 2012 à l’Université Lille 3 Composition du jury Jean-Christophe Jolivet, Professeur à l’Université de Lille 3 Guillaume Bonnet, Professeur à l’Université de Bourgogne Jean Schneider, Professeur à l’Université de Lyon 2 Marc Baratin, Professeur à l’Université de Lille 3, Directeur de thèse Gweltaz Guyomarc’h, Aux origines de la métaphysique : l’interprétation par ..

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Philosophers have debated whether the advance directives of Alzheimer’s patients should be enforced, even if patients seem content in their demented state. The debate raises deep questions about the nature of human autonomy and personal identity. But it tends to proceed on the assumption that the advance directive’s terms are clear, whereas in practice they are often vague or ambiguous, requiring the patient’s healthcare proxy to make difficult judgment calls. This practical wrinkle raises its own, distinct but related, philosophical question: (...) what criteria may the proxy bring to bear when making such interpretive judgments on which the patient’s life may depend? After defending a general policy of enforcing advance directives on normative (rather than metaphysical) grounds, I argue that when advance directives are vague, a patient’s proxy may permissibly make her own fresh evaluation of the patient’s life as a whole and, in so doing, consider how the patient’s character as a demented person contributes or fails to contribute to that life. (shrink)

Can there be a theory of law? -- Two views of the nature of the theory of law : a partial comparison -- On the nature of law -- The problem of authority : revisiting the service conception -- About morality and the nature of law -- Incorporation by law -- Reasoning with rules -- Why interpret? -- Interpretation without retrieval -- Intention in interpretation -- Interpretation : pluralism and innovation -- On the authority and interpretation of constitutions : some (...) preliminaries -- Postema on law's autonomy and public practical reasons : a critical comment. (shrink)

Various features of the interpretation of these schools main positions, the reasons for their appearance and the consequences for the development of Mahayana Buddhism have been the subject of discussion in this research. Attention is drawn to the existence of various ideas of Buddhist authors about the interpretation of fundamental philosophical ideas of these schools. The influence of the peculiarities of translation into other languages for the adequate transmission of the author’s thought is discussed. It is noted that the possibility (...) of different interpretations was already established in the very methodology of the transmission of Buddhist doctrines, formed at the earliest stages of Buddhism. The opinions of a number of Tibetan authors are analyzed. The study presents the derivation of the existence of different interpretations of some categories central to Mahayana Buddhism due to the presence of different philosophical methodologies. A number of features were associated with the interpretation of the correlation of logical-critical knowledge, yogic methods and their priority in choosing ways to achieve an exit from the chain of rebirth. The factor of similarities in the positions of such authors as Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu (traditionally attributed to different schools) makes it problematic to unambiguously interpret their philosophical positions; Some features of these schools were determined not only by theoretical backgrounds, but also by political struggle for a leading place in the Buddhist hierarchy of a certain country, as well as the desire to affect authorities. (shrink)

People can be autonomous, if they are subject to authority. In particular, they can be autonomous if they are subject to the authority of law. I defend the first claim through a study of Joseph Raz's compelling account of authority; I claim that his work leads to the conclusion that autonomous judgment is needed to determine the jurisdiction of an authority, and to interpret its directives. I defend the second claim by arguing that law does not claim unlimited jurisdiction, and (...) need not claim unlimited scope for its directives. But the requirements of the rule of law create a standing risk that the law will not adequately recognize the autonomy of its subjects, because of its artificial techniques for controlling its own jurisdiction and for controlling the scope of its own directives. (shrink)

This collection of essays brings together the central lines of thought in Onora O'Neill's work on Kant's philosophy, developed over many years. Challenging the claim that Kant's attempt to provide a critique of reason fails because it collapses into a dogmatic argument from authority, O'Neill shows why Kant held that we must construct, rather than assume, the authority of reason, and how this can be done by ensuring that anything we offer as reasons can be followed by others, including others (...) with whom we disagree. She argues that this constructivist view of reasoning is the clue to Kant's claims about knowledge, ethics and politics, as well as to his distinctive accounts of autonomy, the social contract, cosmopolitan justice and scriptural interpretation. Her essays are a distinctive and illuminating commentary on Kant's fundamental philosophical strategy and its implications, and will be a vital resource for scholars of Kant, ethics and philosophy of law. (shrink)

I discuss three theories regarding the interpretation of fictional literature: actual intentionalism (author's intentions constrain how their works are to be interpreted), hypothetical intentionalism (interpretations are justified as those most likely intended by a postulated author), and the value-maximizing theory (interpretations presenting the work in the most favourable light are to be preferred). I claim that actual intentionalism cannot account for the appropriateness or legitimacy of some interpretations, or alternatively that it must be weakened to the point that the considerations (...) raised by hypothetical intentionalists and value maximizers come into play. And I argue that hypothetical intentionalism either reduces to the value-maximizing theory, which provides a more accurate and clearer expression of the position than does hypothetical intentionalism, or it mistakenly attributes to hypothesized intentions the kind of force that attaches only to actual intentions. (shrink)

"What is it to claim that misogyny might be ironic? Why is it that, in the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, the possibility of irony constantly interferes with a conclusive ethical judgment over the meaning of their misogyny? How do we hold our interpretations of such ambiguous texts ethically accountable? This book brings together the driving concerns of hermeneutics, feminist philosophy and the history of philosophy in dealing with the problem of irony. It develops a thematic account of the (...) concept of irony as a philosophical form of interpretation, and explores this through close readings of three key sites of controversy regarding the relationship between irony and misogyny: Schopenhauer's On Women, Kierkegaard's In Vino Veritas and Nietzsche's Woman and Child. Rather than aiming to rescue their misogynistic texts by appealing to irony, the book suggests that ironic ambiguity is a formative, rather than distractive, aspect of these texts' misogyny. Working from the productive intersection between hermeneutics and deconstruction, the book explores the substantial ways in which authority and value are constructed in terms of ironic possibility"--Publisher. (shrink)

The utterance model is a popular basis for theories of interpretation in the contemporary analytic philosophy of literature. This model suggests that interpretation should be constrained by a work's identity‐relevant factors in its context of production because a work, like an utterance, acquires its identity and content in part from its relations with that context. From a descriptive point of view, I argue that the implied author account of interpretation best describes critical practice following the current positions based on the (...) utterance model. That is, people who interpret in accordance with these positions end up interpreting an implied author. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend these (...) essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

Proper interpretations of symbols of authority are important for navigating both our cultural settings and the contours of Scripture. This paper looks at the ways the Book of Revelation contrasts images of competing authoritative kings, asking the question, who is worthy of worship, Caesar or Christ? In the African Folk-Islamic context of the Makua-Metto people of Mozambique, familiar national and traditional symbols of authority provide a framework for a robust reading of John’s Apocalypse.

This essay argues that many modern discussions of Locke's political theory are unconsciously shaped by an imaginative picture of the world inherited from the past, on which authority and freedom are fundamentally antipathetic. The consequences of this picture may be seen in the distinction made customarily in Locke studies between the 'authoritarian' Locke of Two Tracts on Government, for whom authority descends from God, and the later, 'liberal,' Locke, for whom authority arises from the will and agreement of individuals, and (...) felt in the emphases placed on consent and resistance in most interpretations of Lockean political thought. The essay examines the composition and contours of this picture and, by holding up a mirror to contemporary Locke scholarship, draws attention to some of the ways in which it unwittingly distorts Locke's thinking. (shrink)

With its June 2004 statement Catholics in Political Life, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops opened an important and far-reaching discussion about how Catholic individuals ought to comport themselves in political life, and-indirectly-about how Catholic institutions-including Catholic law schools-ought to decide whether or not to give awards, honors, or platforms to those whose views about key moral and political issues may differ from the views expressed in the teachings of the Catholic Church. On the basis of a simple and (...) straightforward reading of the 2004 statement, it might appear that the bishops wanted to say that no Catholic institution-and thus no Catholic law school-should give awards, honors, or platforms to those who endorse or promote views that differ from the fundamental moral teachings of the Church. An important part of the statement plainly declares: "The Catholic community and Catholic institutions should not honor those who act in defiance of our fundamental moral principles. They should not be given awards, honors or platforms which would suggest support for their actions." A few moments of reflection will reveal, however, that the issue here is somewhat more complicated than what one might infer from a simple and straightforward reading of the statement. The aim of the present paper is not to settle the question of whether and how a Catholic law school ought to give awards, honors, or platforms to certain individuals or groups. Instead, the aim is to begin articulating some of the underlying conceptual issues that perhaps ought to be addressed in preparation for answering the further question of whether and how a Catholic law school ought to give awards, honors, or platforms to certain individuals or groups. (shrink)

: I focus on the group of clarifications concerning questions about the indeterminacy of semiosis, its systemic-processual character and what the absence of a metalanguage means for an ….

(No abstract is available for this citation).

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but (...) to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities. (shrink)

Combining literary and philosophical analysis, this study defends an utterly innovative reading of the early history of poetics. It is the first to argue that there is a distinctively Socratic view of poetry and the first to connect the Socratic view of poetry with earlier literary tradition.Literary theory is usually said to begin with Plato's famous critique of poetry in the Republic. Grace Ledbetter challenges this entrenched assumption by arguing that Plato's earlier dialogues Ion, Protagoras, and Apology introduce a distinctively (...) Socratic theory of poetry that responds polemically to traditional poets as rival theorists. Ledbetter tracks the sources of this Socratic response by introducing separate readings of the poetics implicit in the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. Examining these poets' theories from a new angle that uncovers their literary, rhetorical, and political aims, she demonstrates their decisive influence on Socratic thinking about poetry.The Socratic poetics Ledbetter elucidates focuses not on censorship, but on the interpretation of poetry as a source of moral wisdom. This philosophical approach to interpreting poetry stands at odds with the poets' own theories--and with the Sophists' treatment of poetry. Unlike the Republic's focus on exposing and banishing poetry's irrational and unavoidably corrupting influence, Socrates' theory includes poetry as subject matter for philosophical inquiry within an examined life.Reaching back into what has too long been considered literary theory's prehistory, Ledbetter advances arguments that will redefine how classicists, philosophers, and literary theorists think about Plato's poetics. (shrink)

Combining literary and philosophical analysis, this study defends an utterly innovative reading of the early history of poetics. It is the first to argue that there is a distinctively Socratic view of poetry and the first to connect the Socratic view of poetry with earlier literary tradition. Literary theory is usually said to begin with Plato's famous critique of poetry in the Republic. Grace Ledbetter challenges this entrenched assumption by arguing that Plato's earlier dialogues Ion, Protagoras, and Apology introduce a (...) distinctively Socratic theory of poetry that responds polemically to traditional poets as rival theorists. Ledbetter tracks the sources of this Socratic response by introducing separate readings of the poetics implicit in the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. Examining these poets' theories from a new angle that uncovers their literary, rhetorical, and political aims, she demonstrates their decisive influence on Socratic thinking about poetry. The Socratic poetics Ledbetter elucidates focuses not on censorship, but on the interpretation of poetry as a source of moral wisdom. This philosophical approach to interpreting poetry stands at odds with the poets' own theories--and with the Sophists' treatment of poetry. Unlike the Republic's focus on exposing and banishing poetry's irrational and unavoidably corrupting influence, Socrates' theory includes poetry as subject matter for philosophical inquiry within an examined life. Reaching back into what has too long been considered literary theory's prehistory, Ledbetter advances arguments that will redefine how classicists, philosophers, and literary theorists think about Plato's poetics. (shrink)

Early period (h. I-III) works are the most basic data sources in tafsīr studies. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. In this process, the literacy and schooling rate is low. It is not easy to obtain sufficient writing materials. For this reason, the information was initially transferred as a verbal, some of the original material that has been written has not survived. The information, which is usually narrated and sometimes written, can be learned through (...) the written copies of the next dates. However, there are serious time intervals between the author and the manuscript copies. This time period has led to some problems. There are such works that the author is controversial. There is such information that it is obvious that it was added later. Although some works belonging to the period were compiled from the sources of the following centuries, they were printed under the name of some people who lived in the early period, as if they gave the impression of author copy. Each of these matters has the quality to affect the nature of the information to be used as reference and the perception to be created on it. The relation of the subject with the interpretation of the Qur'ān and the fact that it is binding has a special importance, therefore, it requires knowing the formation stages of the reference source, especially in the commentary of tafsīr. In the article, the author-work relation in early tafsīr works has been tried to be processed on a sufficient number of examples with their respective dimensions.Summary: Early works in tafsīr studies are the most basic data sources. However, the related works were shaped within the conditions of the period. The data at the beginning were verbally transmitted, but some original material that has been written has not survived until nowadays. Therefore, the information about tafsīr are derived from the mainly Buhkārī (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 261/875), Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Nasā’ī (d. 303/915) which have tafsīr contents, and encyclopedic sources which have been contended narrations suhc as Țabarī (d. 310/923) and Ibn Abī Ḥātim (d. 327/938).Some later dated work/s belonged to people who lived in the early period alo contribute to this accumulation. However, in scientific studies it is necessary to pay attention to the harmony or difference between the author manuscripts and copies which have been survived. Because the limited possibilities of the period, the time interval between the author and the writing copy, the corrosion that occurred in the texts over time, the capacity or thought the scribe has caused the addition and reduction of the original copy of the text. Although it is rare, it is also possible to attribute the work to a well-known person of the period in order to gain the reputation of the views in the work.In this regard, the article first draws attention to the time difference between the author and the copies that have survived to the present day. Accordingly, it was emphasized that there may be works with controversial belonging to the author. Because, it may be that the names of those who expand, explain or shorten the work with additions are given as the author's name.It is shown with examples that additions to the work could be made in the time interval between the author and the manuscript that has survived to the present day. However, sometimes the difference between copies can be based on many reasons, from the ignorance of the obscene to its forgetfulness and even deliberate replacement. Even in the hadith narrations that attribute special importance to its narration, it is quite possible that the additions were made intentionally or unknowingly, even after the transition to the written period.However, this study was carried out only on tafsīr works. Because even the sampling on a limited number of tafsīr works pushes the limits of the article.In the study, the original texts of the selected works as samples such as Ibn ʿAbbās, al-Farrāʾ, Abū ʿUbayda, etc. were reviewed, and the master's and doctorate studies on the relevant works and the period, especially their editorial evaluations, were tried to be examined as much as possible. In the evaluations, the classical period sources such as Ibnu-Nadīm, Thaʻlabī and Ibn Khallikān, where tafsīr works were subject, as well as the Ottoman period like Edirnevī; Modern era works such as Brockelman and Sezgin were used. Books, articles and encyclopedia articles evaluating the manuscripts were also used.The study revealed that when the early tafsīr references were given, the author-copy relationship should be taken into consideration. Because, although some names are mentioned as mufassīr in the sources, it is controversial whether some of them convert the relevant information into written form. Because the period of the compilation is started in the period of tâbiûn in its earliest form. It is understood that even though the writing is partially activated, the tendency to convey information by narration continues from the examples given.The fact that no original work of the period reaches the present day, there is a serious time gap between the oldest manuscripts carrying the relevant information to the present day and its authors raises the issue of the reliability of the information. This is an issue to be considered in research and updating of information. Because it was seen that some information was difficult to determine the author. In addition, it has been understood that there may be additions afterwards besides the possibility of missing or misreported information due to various factors during the transfer. The fact that narration analysis has not been done properly in the context of the tafsīr science can lead to wrong conclusions in some works, if the possibility of reaching the information added later has not been taken into consideration.In addition, creating author copies from manuscripts is a challenging process with some difficulties in itself. No matter how fastidious it is shown, it should not be forgotten that the work is compiled from manuscripts, it should be known that errors may occur despite the maximum sensitivity.It is another point to consider that some information should be associated with the author and turned into a book based on the narrations in the sources of the next period. It should not be forgotten that some works were created by collecting the narrations of the next period. When the process in its formation is not taken into account, there is a possibility that the relevant information creates an early perception of false perception, as well as the belief that it expresses correct and precise information in all aspects due to its connection with the sacred. It is obvious that there is a difference between the original information from the author's pen and the quality and knowledge value of the information collected by claiming belonging to the author from later works. It is necessary to pay attention to this difference in information transfer.Therefore, during the investigation of the envoy, whose main task is to determine the will of Allah, he has to take into account the mentioned features of the early works. Reliable knowledge transfer and correct religion perception can only be achieved with this care. (shrink)

Interpreting Figurative Meaning critically evaluates the recent empirical work from psycholinguistics and neuroscience examining the successes and difficulties associated with interpreting figurative language. There is now a huge, often contradictory literature on how people understand figures of speech. Gibbs and Colston argue that there may not be a single theory or model that adequately explains both the processes and products of figurative meaning experience. Experimental research may ultimately be unable to simply adjudicate between current models in psychology, linguistics (...) and philosophy of how figurative meaning is interpreted. Alternatively, the authors advance a broad theoretical framework, motivated by ideas from 'dynamical systems theory', that describes the multiple, interacting influences which shape people's experiences of figurative meaning in discourse. This book details past research and theory, offers a critical assessment of this work and sets the stage for a new vision of figurative experience in human life. (shrink)

This paper highlights the relevance of moral authority, and the role that egoistic ethical claims have in waging war. This is done, in view of the just war tradition, by drawing a parallel between the crusades in the 'kingdom of heaven' proclaimed in 1095, and the present Islamic jih d , as well as the Bush administration's declaration of a war on terror. It maintains that the role of self-legitimized leaders is crucial in shaping the order of the jus ad (...) bellum criteria, in both Christian and Muslim societies, and that the indiscriminate usage of just war rhetoric proves to be a formidable weapon. Moral authority is described as a power resource, capable of capsizing the relevance of ethics, subjecting the interpretation of justice to declare war to the self-proclaimed authorities, and moving masses on the grounds of enthusiasm. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a contextualist account of the role of authors’ intentions in interpretation, according to which their role depends on readers’ interpretive interests. In light of a general discussion of intentions and responsibility, I argue that insofar as readers are interested in attributing authorial responsibility for interpretations of fictional works, authors’ intentions need to play a central role in those interpretations. And I investigate the implications of this account for ‘accidental authorship’, cases in which interpretations of a (...) work are neither intended nor reasonably foreseen by the author. (shrink)

"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

This article focuses on examining a particular method of Biblical Interpretation. This specific method is that of the Patristic Method of Biblical Interpretation, proposed by Richard Swinburne. The Patristic Method faces a specific issue, ‘the Authority’ Issue, which will thus be dealt with within this article by utilising the notion of epistemic authority, as conceptualised by Linda Zagzebski, and restating it within a Catholic interpretative framework. Doing this will thus enable the Patristic Method to be presented as a robust and (...) cogent contemporary method of Biblical Interpretation that offers a unified and accurate understanding of God's revelation in the Bible. (shrink)

Interpretive Political Science is the second of two volumes featuring a selection of key writings by R.A.W. Rhodes. Volume II looks forward and explores the 'interpretive turn' and its implications for the craft of political science, especially public administration, and draws together articles from 2005 onwards on the theme of 'the interpretive turn' in political science. Part I provides a summary statement of the interpretive approach, and Part II develops the theme of blurring genres and discusses a variety of research (...) methods common in the humanities, including: ethnographic fieldwork, life history, and focus groups. Part III demonstrates how the genres of thought and presentation found in the humanities can be used in political science. It presents four examples of such blurring 'at work' with studies of: applied anthropology and civil service reform; women's studies and government departments; and storytelling and local knowledge. The book concludes with a summary of what is edifying about an interpretive approach, and why this approach matters, and revisits some of the more common criticisms before indulging in plausible conjectures about the future of interpretivism. The author seeks new and interesting ways to explore governance, high politics, public policies, and the study of public administration in general. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to reconstruct Anthony Collins’ challenge to the authority of orthodox Anglican figures, which arises due to arguments Collins develops in his Vindication of the Divine Attributes (1710) and Discourse on Free-Thinking (1713). In addition to shedding light on a hitherto underappreciated argument by Collins, my reconstruction allows me to propose a solution to the interpretive problem posed by §§16–22 of the fourth dialogue of Berkeley’s Alciphron (1732). While it has been acknowledged that Collins looms (...) large in the background of these sections, Berkeley’s argumentative strategy has remained perplexing to commentators, particularly his references to several Scholastic thinkers. I argue that we can make sense of Berkeley’s strategy and references if we appreciate that these sections are intended to evade Collins’ challenge. (shrink)