Hegel’s mature system, because of its division into three parts, makes particularly high demands on the argumentative powers when it comes to the demonstration of the necessity of the links between the respective parts of the system. It is a well known fact that the transition from/of logic to natural philosophy is a very critical point in the system, and was already subjected to particular criticism by Schelling as being a weak point in the system. For Hegel, however, the transition (...) from natural philosophy to the philosophy of spirit is also such a critical seam or hinge in his system. The three versions of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences provide documentary evidence of his continuous work on the relevant passages. Hegel’s own handwritten notes and drafts, and also the students’ manuscripts of his lectures on “subjective spirit”, provide interpreters with additional information and thus give them more profound insights into Hegel’s efforts to achieve conceptual precision in this area, as well as into an abundance of empirical material that Hegel gathered and subsequently incorporated from contemporary science as it developed. (shrink)

ResumenEl presente trabajo tiene por objetivo mostrar en qué medida el tratamiento nietzscheano en torno al concepto de vida se revela como el espacio adecuado para pensar la lógica de la comunidad y la inmunidad planteada por Roberto Esposito. En vistas a ello hemos de desarrollar la lógica de la comunidad y la inmunidad, para luego mostrar el modo en que la filosofía nietzscheana ofrece en su tematización del fenómeno de lo vital un adecuado trasfondo ontológico para comprender dicha dinámica.Palabras (...) clave Comunidad, inmunidad, vidaAbstract The aim of this paper is to show to what extent the Nietzschean approach to the concept of life offers an adequate field in which we can understand the logic of community and immunity as developed by Roberto Esposito. Therefore, we will analyze the dynamic of the community and the immunity in order to reveal how the phenomenon of life, as theorized by Nietzsche, provides a proper ontological background to understand such dynamic.Keywords Community, immunity, life. (shrink)

ResumenEl presente trabajo tiene por objetivo mostrar en qué medida el tratamiento nietzscheano en torno al concepto de vida se revela como el espacio adecuado para pensar la lógica de la comunidad y la inmunidad planteada por Roberto Esposito. En vistas a ello hemos de desarrollar la lógica de la comunidad y la inmunidad, para luego mostrar el modo en que la filosofía nietzscheana ofrece en su tematización del fenómeno de lo vital un adecuado trasfondo ontológico para comprender dicha dinámica.Palabras (...) clave Comunidad, inmunidad, vidaAbstract The aim of this paper is to show to what extent the Nietzschean approach to the concept of life offers an adequate field in which we can understand the logic of community and immunity as developed by Roberto Esposito. Therefore, we will analyze the dynamic of the community and the immunity in order to reveal how the phenomenon of life, as theorized by Nietzsche, provides a proper ontological background to understand such dynamic.Keywords Community, immunity, life. (shrink)

One would have thought that Fodor's justly famous computational views about the mind and his covariation approaches to content owed a lot to the twentieth century that he now reviles. On the other hand, a number of lines he pursues in the target article make one wonder whether he hasn’t perhaps changed his mind about those famous views. Specifically, I argue that his own theory of content is open to the very same objections he raises against ‘sorting’ theories, and that (...) the supposed circularity in implicit definitions of logical particles can easily be avoided by the very functional/computational definitions that he fathered decades ago. Fodor's rejection here of sorting and implicit definition does make one worry that he is now opting for what seems the only atomistic alternative that would seem to be left, the first‐person meaning mysticism of the very Cartesian sort he now claims to favor, but from which I would have thought twentieth century role and discrimination views were a welcome relief. Despite all these worries, however, I concede that one could probably do worse than assume for the nonce that meaning is atomic, or, anyway, unanalyzed, and get on with investigating the mind on that basis—but keeping the options open. (shrink)

Aristotle’s conception of vice is notoriously problematic. On the one hand, it appears as the antithesis of virtue; as such, it may seem, like virtue, to rest on principles, except that in the case of vice the principles are bad ones. On the other hand, vice may be something more like the privation or absence of virtue: not the negative pole or opposite of virtue but the condition of not being at all guided by rational principles or logos. As a (...) way of approaching Aristotle’s notion of vice, I propose to examine two disapproved qualities that Aristotle mentions briefly in his Rhetoric, and which are adduced as the opposites of emotions. The two qualities are ingratitude, which is represented as the opposite of feeling grateful, and shamelessness, the opposite of the emotion shame. Both ingratitude and shamelessness have the appearance of vices, even though they are contrasted here not with virtues but with passions or pathê. Examining the logic of these pairings will, I hope, shed light not only on ingratitude and shamelessness but also on the complex and unstable nature of vice itself. (shrink)

In this essay I describe how primary and secondary narcissism are the underlying and motivating psychological states for fundamentalist religious belief. I describe the psychodynamics that produce such a belief state and I make the case that the "fundamentalist personality" is best understood as a form of barely sublimated pathological narcissism. Given the brutality of the human condition, it is understandable why this psychological-metaphysical option is an enticing one, but I follow Ralph Ellis in the conclusion that the consequences of (...) such belief systems produce much more harm than benefit for individuals and humanity at Iarge. (shrink)

Introduction -- By way of nomadism -- Context and generations -- Sexual difference theory -- On the female feminist subject : from "she-self" to "she-other" -- Sexual difference as a nomadic political project -- Organs without bodies -- Images without imagination -- Mothers, monsters, and machines -- Discontinuous becomings : Deleuze and the becoming-woman of philosophy -- Envy and ingratitude: men in feminism -- Conclusion. Geometries of passion : a conversation.

We often hold people morally responsible for their emotions. We praise individuals for their compassion, think less of them for their ingratitude or hatred, reproach self-righteousness and unjust anger. In the cases I have in mind, the ascriptions of responsibility are not simply for offensive behaviors or actions which may accompany the emotions, but for the emotions themselves as motives or states of mind. We praise and blame people for what they feel and not just for how they act. (...) In cases where people may subtly mask their hatred or ingratitude through more kindly actions, we still may find fault with the attitude we see leaking through the disguise. (shrink)

In Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the innocent Tess is the object of Alec d’Urberville’s dishonorable intentions. Alec uses every wile he can think of to seduce the poor and ignorant Tess, who works keeping hens in his mother’s house: he flatters her, he impresses her with a show of wealth, he gives help to her family to win her gratitude, and he reacts with irritation and indignation when she nonetheless continues to repulse his advances, causing her to feel shame at (...) her own ingratitude and confusion as to what is right. Tess, anchored both by her own sense of virtue and her distrust of Alec’s character, continues to hold out until one fatal night when, through Alec’s machinations, they are lost together in a wood. At Tess’s insistence Alec leaves her to scout out the path home. When he returns, he finds her asleep under a tree. Hardy does not go into detail at this critical juncture. Rather, he reflects “why it was that upon this beautiful feminine tissue, sensitive as gossamer, and practically blank as snow as yet, there should have been traced such a coarse pattern as it was doomed to receive; why so often the coarse appropriates the finer thus, the wrong man the woman, the wrong woman the man, many thousand years of analytical philosophy have failed to explain to our sense of order.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper [1] is a defence of a modified version of Jane English's model of filial obligations based on adult children's friendship with their parents. Unlike the more traditional view that filial obligations are a repayment for parental sacrifices, the friendship model puts filial duties in the appealing context of voluntary, loving relationships. Contrary to English's original statement of this view, which is open to the charge of tolerating filial ingratitude, the friendship model can generate obligations to help (...) our parents even if we are no longer friendly with them. Joseph Kupfer has pointed out several ways in which parent‐child relationships differ from peer friendships; but his arguments do not preclude our enjoying a type of friendship with our parents. In response to Christina Hoff Sommers, who objects that feelings of friendship toward our parents are too flimsy a ground for filial duties, the friendship model can provide a plausible, robust account of filial obligations. As for adult children who have never formed friendships with their loving, caring parents, and refuse to give them much‐needed assistance, they can be criticised by moral considerations independent of but compatible with the friendship model. (shrink)

The philosophy of loveFor centuries, popular writers and respected scholars have written about and analyzed the phenomenon of love without exhausting its potential for contemporary debate. By representing the three major traditions in the philosophy of love--Platonic eros, Christian agape, and Aristotelian philia--editor Alan Soble has not only examined the intellectual problem of what "love" is, but has designed a dialogue among the three traditions in genuine philosophical style. "Eros is acquisitive, egocentric or even selfish; agape is a giving love. (...) Eros is an unconstant, unfaithful love, while agape is unwavering and continues to give despite ingratitude. Eros is a love that responds to the merit or value of its object; while agape creates value in its object as a result of loving it... Finally, eros is an ascending love, the human's route to God; agape is a descending love, GodÆs route to humans... Philia is caught between eros and agape."--From the Introduction to Eros, Agape and Philia ISSUES EXPLORED: --What is the state of love today as seen through the eyes of Plato, Aristotle, and Paul? --How do relations between the sexes illustrate the difficulties of love? --What are the nature and effects of exclusivity, reciprocity, and constancy? --What are the conceptual and psychological ties between sex and love? --Does it make any sense to think of love in moral terms? (shrink)

This paper deals with what I take to be one woman’s literary response to a philosophical problem. The woman is Jane Austen, the problem is the rationality of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, and Austen’s response is to deepen the problem. Despite his enthusiasm for virtue, Hume reluctantly concedes in the EPM that injustice can be a rational strategy for ‘sensible knaves’, intelligent but selfish agents who feel no aversion towards thoughts of villainy or baseness. Austen agrees, but adds that ABSENT CONSIDERATIONS (...) OF A FUTURE STATE, other vices besides injustice can be rationally indulged with tolerable prospects of worldly happiness. Austen’s creation Mr Elliot in Persuasion is just such an agent – sensible and knavish but not technically ‘unjust’. Despite and partly because of his vices – ingratitude, avarice and duplicity – he manages to be both successful and reasonably happy. There are plenty of other reasonably happy knaves in Jane Austen, some of whom are not particularly sensible. This is not to say that either Austen or Hume is in favor of knavery It is just that they both think that only those with the right sensibility can be argued out of it. (shrink)

In Kant’s moral theory, we do not have duties to animals, though we have duties with regard to them. I reconstruct Kant’s arguments for several types of duties with regard to animals and show that Kant’s theory imposes far more robust requirements on our treatment of animals than one would expect. Kant’s duties regarding animals are perfect and imperfect; they are primarily but not exclusively duties to oneself; and they condemn not merely cruelty to animals for its own sake, but (...) also, such things as killing them for food when our health does not require it and ingratitude to service animals. Central to understanding these duties is appreciating Kant’s concern for our morally useful emotions, for it is primarily because of the effect that cruelty to animals has on our sympathetic emotions—which greatly help us treat other rational beings appropriately—that we have duties not to be cruel to animals. Yet cruelty and callousness toward animals are not problematic only because they may weaken some of our morally useful emotions. Cruelty and callousness toward animals are problematic also because they oppose our morally useful emotions; these emotions, as part of the perfection of our nature, should be honored, supported, and furthered, unless there are compelling reasons not to do so in particular cases. (shrink)

On one predominant conception of virtue, the virtuous agent is, among other things, wholehearted in doing what she believes best. I challenge this condition of wholeheartedness by making explicit the connections between the emotion of boredom and the states of continence and akrasia. An easily bored person is more susceptible to these forms of disharmony because of two familiar characteristics of boredom. First, that we can be – and often are – bored by what it is that we know would (...) be best to do, and second, that occurrent states of boredom tend to give rise to positive interest in performing actions that we know are bad to perform. Moreover, while a person’s susceptibility to boredom can indicate a lack of attentiveness or acuity, or be evidence of a vice such as ingratitude or shallowness, it can in others indicate positive qualities of character, such as perspicacity, liveliness, and certain forms of intelligence. Upon imagining certain bored akratics without the psychological qualities that give rise to their boredom, we will either imagine them without these positive qualities, or with others that – though perhaps psychologically possible – are not clearly better. This yields the result that a person who is continent or even akratic because of her susceptibility to boredom may have a character no less excellent than that of the wholehearted agent. (shrink)

Spinoza, according to common opinion, could only have written lamentable platitudes on sexual love, narrowly inspired by the prejudices of his time and without serious philosophical foundation: that for which, in the past, he has been congratulated,1 he is now reproached; or, at best, excused. He would even have, some believe to be able to add, increased the pervading puritanism: sexuality, as such, would give rise in him to a deep repulsion and women would horrify him. The second of these (...) two assertions, if one sticks to the manifest content of the texts, actually rests on nothing; if one calls upon their latent content, it would require, to be established with a minimum of rigor, a study of which we will not dispute the theoretical possibility, but which, in fact, has not yet been undertaken. The first, on the other hand, has all the appearance of the obvious: that men love women for their beauty and do not support their attachment to someone else,2 that they desire them more the more admirers they have,3 that the jealousy of the male is exacerbated by the representation of the pudenda and of the excrementa of his rival,4 that sensual attachment is unstable and conflictual,5 that it often turns to obsession,6 that Adam loved Eve because of their similarity of nature,7 that he who remains insensitive to the generosity of a courtesan does not offend by ingratitude,8 that only free men and free women can marry one another and only if they want children,9 well, it seems, that isn’t anything sensational; now these eight passages, if the two definitions of the libido are added to them,10 are the only, if I’m not mistaken, that Spinoza expressly devoted to the question! He would therefore, apparently, only have drawn up a report of deficiency. (shrink)

In this study, the term of ‘blessing’, which is a basic Qurʾānic concept, is analyzed. In this regard, the study focuses on the definition of ‘blessing’, its different meanings in the various contexts, synonyms and antonyms and its leading individuals to the dimensions of faith, worship and morality. These subject matters are studied by taking into consideration of the meanings of ‘blessing’ in the Qurʾān and commentators’ explanations about the word. The expression of the ‘blessing’ in the Qurʾān indicates that (...) the word has an extensive and constructive meaning. The fact that having an extensive meaning demonstrates that the points the word encompasses can be determined to some extent. It is exemplified in the Qurʾān what can be regarded as ‘blessing’. Furthermore, the commentators determine various meanings to the word by considering the contexts in which the word is used. It is understood that the aim of using the word in the Qurʾān is to lead the individuals to the dimensions of the faith, worship and morality. It is possible for people to be grateful to God by making this aim more visible in their lives. -/- SUMMARY The word blessing mentioned in the Qurʾān has a general meaning. This type of words contains more than one subject inside them. The fact that the blessing contains more than one subject may be seen in the Qurʾānic attributions of it as well as seen in its dictionary and term meaning. Also, the way of explaining a part of subjects, which are in its content, points out this aspect. Thus, in the Qurʾān, the new ones are being added in another place to things referred as blessing in one place. Also, sometimes the blessings with entirely different contents are included. For example, the blessing of God upon Muslims is His support on a battle. In another place rendering them as brothers is a blessing. This is also an example that blessing was partially explained in the Qurʾān. The explanation of the word is sometimes in the same context and sometimes in different contexts. For example, in the verse 47 of the Surah al-Baqara, the blessing given to Jews in the time of Moses is mentioned. Starting from the next verse, between the verses 49-61, these blessings are aligned. Moreover, the blessing that was given to prophets, martyrs and righteous (siddiq) can be an example for the explanation of blessing in the different verses of the Qurʾān. These people who have been given blessing are mentioned side by side in the verse 69 of al-Nisā’. However, it is not explained that what the blessing given to them is. Each blessing mentioned is explained in different places in the Qurʾān. While some part of blessing is determined by the Qurʾān itself, the other part is attempted to be determined by commentators. Given that the explanations in the Qurʾān and commentaries, the subjects that affected by blessing can be divided into two as tangible and intangible blessings. The resources offered for humans to maintain their lives, emancipation a slave, the wind that helps the ship to move forward and Muhammad himself as a prophet are the tangible ones. Faith, miracle, mercy, reward, retrieving safety, the place where all kind of resources and ease, peace and happiness exist (Heaven) can be commentated as intangible blessings. The subjects included in the concept of blessing in the Qurʾān are changing according to the context. The blessing from God upon believers is “the faith granted by God on the earth” in one place, and “the Heaven bestowed in the afterlife” in another place. When determining the close and opposite meanings of the word, it should not be ignored this aspect of the blessing. In other words, it changes according to the context. For example, if the content of blessing is “the resource presented to human beings”, the close meaning of it in the Qurʾān is “compassion”, the opposite meaning of it is “harm”. However, if the thing that fell within blessing is “reward”, the close meaning will be “good deed”, opposite meaning will be “torment”. The blessing changes according to the addressed person as well. It is the all kind of resource that God presents to humans if the human kind is in question. If it is for a believer, it means moral support and every kind of reward as well as the resources offered. However, if it is relevant to a prophet, the prior meaning is prophethood as well as the meanings above. The expression of blessing in the Qurʾān helps us to have more opinion about it. For example, blessing has a positive meaning according to the Qurʾān. The word’s positive aspect is emphasized by comparing things that cannot be blessing to negative person types. The perception of blessing of Pharaoh and a hypocrite that is expressed in the Qurʾān can be evaluated in this content. According to the Qurʾān, the blessing they qualify is not in the context of blessing. Another aspect that draws attention in the expression of blessing in the Qurʾān is the relationship between the blessing giver and receiver. This relationship between God and servants takes place both in the earth and the afterlife. First, God has presented blessing to humans by considering that he/she is worth creating. Human beings show ingratitude or gratitude for being created and all other blessings. Here, the blessing is a test tool for humans. God responds according to the behaviors of human beings in test. He gives this response either only in the afterlife or both in the afterlife and the earth. If the humans respond the blessing with gratitude, God puts him/her to the heaven full of blessings in the afterlife. The blessing here is the result of the test on the earth. So the purpose of expression of blessing in the Qurʾān is to direct the humans to exhibit the behavior with that God is pleased, gain His contentment, deserve His heaven full of blessings. This is the reason that prophets remind the blessings of God to humans while they invite them to religion. Prophets invite people to believe, worship and be moral toward God as a response to these blessings. -/- Even though the content of blessing changes according to addressed person and time, the principle of the relationship between God and His servants does not change. Blessing and gratitude or blasphemy shall continue to exist as long as mankind exists. Here, the principle of “Every blessing’s gratitude is its own type” can be remembered. This principle recommends that giving thanks to God by tongue only for blessings will not be enough. Because of that, how should be grateful for different blessings should be exemplified. These definitions containing examples help us to understand better the purpose of expression of blessing in the Qurʾān. For example, the gratitude for humans’ own equipment can be through remembering always Him who gave that equipment, obey and worship Him constantly. Gratitude for children and good fortune happens by directing them towards God’s sake. As for the gratitude for the blessing of the universe, that contains signs of the existence of God, can be through recognizing his/her Creator and maintaining its existing order. If human beings break this order, he/she would be ungrateful because this would be an attitude against the one who created this order. Just as a servant might be ungrateful to God when he/she does not appreciate the blessing of prophet that reminds us God, exhibiting negative attitude against the universe that points out the existence of God is a kind of ungratefulness against God as well. So that, the blessing carries humans to faith and worship dimensions and also to moral dimension in terms of relationship between himself/herself and other things. The modern-day people need this Qurʾānic perspective. A human being should review his/her relationship between himself/herself, God, other people and the nature, then he/she should try to reach the Qurʾānic dimension by being grateful properly for blessings that he/she has. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la poesía de Edith Stein a partir del tópico de la Revelación. Entendida como «la buena nueva» de la venida y la resurrección de Cristo, la Revelación se relaciona con el mandato del amor al prójimo, cuya sola posibilidad radica en el amor a Dios, pues «quiere que le amemos, cuando manda que amemos al prójimo», como explica sor Juana. Y así, se relaciona también con la mayor «fineza» de Jesús hacia a los hombres, según la carta (...) Atenagórica, que consiste en «los beneficios que nos deja de hacer» para contener nuestra ingratitud; en el amor al prójimo, la correspondencia del amor es para Él, pero la utilidad es nuestra. En la poesía de Edith Stein, la Revelación se corresponde con la revelación del lector, con lo que se consuma la representación de la mayor fineza: para el lector, y para él solo, es la utilidad de la lectura. (shrink)

Iamblichus is the only Platonist philosopher whose philosophical letters have survived from the ancient world. These nineteen letters, which are translated into English here for the first time, address such topics as providence, fate, concord, marriage, bringing up children, ingratitude, music, and the cardinal virtues, with some letters addressed to students and others to prominent members of Syrian society and the imperial administration. The letters reflect the concerns of popular moral philosophy and illustrate the more public aspects of Iamblichus (...) s philosophy. This volume provides a useful complement to Iamblichus: On the Mysteries, and On the Pythagorean Way of Life, both published by the Society of Biblical Literature, and will be of interest to students of late antiquity, of Neoplatonic philosophy, and of early Christianity. (shrink)

FOR hundreds or even thousands of years posterity saw in Aristotle only the impersonal intellectual majesty of the philosophical system. When awakening humanism began everywhere to seek in the works of the classic writers the impress of their personality, this new interest met in Aristotle with the most stubborn resistance. His was a very different case from that of Plato or Demosthenes. The few notices preserved of his life and person remained in merely external relation to the body of his (...) works. In recent times we have begun, however, to discern the intellectual history of the man Aristotle, and in this regard his relations to Plato naturally acquire special significance. In the various phases of his life these relations took various forms; but in view of late gossip about the pupil's ingratitude to the master, it is as well to say that never was Aristotle^s attitude to Plato other than one of the deepest possible veneration. It has a special psychological fascination to see how this veneration expressed itself at the time when Aristotle found himself committed to philosophical opposition to his master; and it is significant that the only documentary proofs of Aristotle's attitude that we possess belong to these years. Evidently his veneration found this compensating expression when he was forced to publish his philosophical critisma. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMany texts in the Epicurean tradition mention gratitude but do not explicitly explain its function in Epicurean ethics. I review passages that mention or discuss gratitude and ingratitude a...

This paper puts two propositions to the test: First, gratitude and active ingratitude are in one sense opposed, yet in another sense they bear a striking resemblance. Second, mature morality sometimes expects us to transcend the quid pro quo structure implied by common gratitude.

Thomas Hobbes was the first great English political philosopher. His work excited intense controversy among his contemporaries and continues to do so in our own time. In this masterly introduction to his work, Bernard Gert provides the first account of Hobbes’s political and moral philosophy that makes it clear why he is regarded as one of the best philosophers of all time in both of these fields. In a succinct and engaging analysis the book illustrates that the commonly accepted view (...) of Hobbes as holding psychological egoism is not only incompatible with his account of human nature but is also incompatible with the moral and political theories that he puts forward. It also explains why Hobbes’s contemporaries did not accept his explicit claim to be providing a natural law account of morality. Gert shows that for Hobbes, civil society is established by a free-gift of their right of nature by the citizens; it does not involve a mutual contract between citizens and sovereign. As injustice involves breaking a contract, the sovereign cannot be unjust; however, the sovereign can be guilty of ingratitude, which is immoral. This distinction between injustice and immorality is part of a sophisticated and nuanced political theory that is in stark contrast to the reading often incorrectly attributed to Hobbes that “might makes right”. It illustrates how Hobbes’s goal of avoiding civil war provides the key to understanding his moral and political philosophy. _Hobbes: Prince of Peace_ is likely to become the classic introduction to the work of Thomas Hobbes and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of his work today. (shrink)

In his published texts and lectures on moral philosophy, Kant repeatedly singles out gratitude for discussion. Nevertheless, puzzles about the derivation, content, and nature of this duty remain. This paper seeks to solve some of these puzzles. Centrally, I argue that it is essential to attend to a distinction that Kant makes between well-wishing benevolence (Wohlwollen) and active beneficence (Wohlthun) on the part of a benefactor. On the Kantian account, I argue, a different type of gratitude is owed in response (...) to each. With this distinction in place, I argue further that we can construct what many have thought to be missing from Kant’s discussion of gratitude – an argument explicating the precise contradiction generated by a maxim of ingratitude. (shrink)

Hieron of Syracuse was the most powerful Greek of his day. He was also, and the two facts are not unrelated, the most frequent of Pindar's patrons. A singular feature of the four poems for this Sicilian prince is their obsession with sin and punishment: Tantalus in the First Olympian, Typhoeus, Ixion, and Coronis in the first three Pythians – all offend divinity and suffer terribly. But even in this company, where glory comes trailing clouds of pain, the Third Pythian (...) stands out. The other three odes are manifestly epinician and celebrate success, both athletic and military. The Second Pythian, for instance, is a sombre canvas, and a motif of ingratitude dominates the myth. Yet it rings at the outset with praise of Syracuse and of Hieron's victory. The Third Pythian, by comparison, is not obviously a victory ode. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes was the first great English political philosopher. His work excited intense controversy among his contemporaries and continues to do so in our own time. In this masterly introduction to his work, Bernard Gert provides the first account of Hobbes’s political and moral philosophy that makes it clear why he is regarded as one of the best philosophers of all time in both of these fields. In a succinct and engaging analysis the book illustrates that the commonly accepted view (...) of Hobbes as holding psychological egoism is not only incompatible with his account of human nature but is also incompatible with the moral and political theories that he puts forward. It also explains why Hobbes’s contemporaries did not accept his explicit claim to be providing a natural law account of morality. Gert shows that for Hobbes, civil society is established by a free-gift of their right of nature by the citizens; it does not involve a mutual contract between citizens and sovereign. As injustice involves breaking a contract, the sovereign cannot be unjust; however, the sovereign can be guilty of ingratitude, which is immoral. This distinction between injustice and immorality is part of a sophisticated and nuanced political theory that is in stark contrast to the reading often incorrectly attributed to Hobbes that “might makes right”. It illustrates how Hobbes’s goal of avoiding civil war provides the key to understanding his moral and political philosophy. _Hobbes: Prince of Peace_ is likely to become the classic introduction to the work of Thomas Hobbes and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of his work today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions ARISTOTLE'S ALLEGED "REVOLT" AGAINST PLATO Hermippus' most conspicuous contribution to Aristotle's biography probably was his determined effort to depict Aristotle as the founder of an original school of philosophy which was wholly independent of Plato and Platonic teachings. Among the several and, in all likelihood, fanciful stories about Aristotle he invented or propagated, the most startling was the account, subsequently widely accepted (and widely exploited by (...) the detractors of Aristotle), that after having been a disciple of Plato for a while, he seceded from the Academy and from Plato's philosophic teachings while Plato was still alive. 1 Accordingly, he owed little to Plato and to the Academy. This story, invented and propagated by an inveterate Peripatetic (Hermippus), was intended to demonstrate the original philosophic genius of Aristotle which developed in complete independence of Plato and necessitated a break with the master's teachings. In devising his argument, Hermippus might have made use of a report, found in some of Aristotle's ancient biographers, that a few brash young men (members of the Academy?) revolted against Plato and, in a spirit of independence, defiance and antagonism, attempted to start a school of their own which would rival the intellectual standing of the Academy. 2 Hermippus, it appears, subsequently identified these young "rebels" with Aristotle, a substitution convenient to Hermippus" aim to depict Aristotle as a wholly independent and totally original philosopher who owed nothing whatever to Plato and his teachings. In all likelihood, Diogenes Laertius' statement that Aristotle "seceded from the Academy while Plato was still alive," a is just an echo either of a statement made by Hermippus himself or is a conclusion drawn from the several unpleasant stories about Aristotle invented and reported by some of Aristotle's detractors. According to these derogatory stories, there existed many serious personal as well as doctrinal 4 disagreements or rifts between Plato and the Stagirite--disagreeDiogenes Laertius, V. 2. See also Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XV. 2. 3, and ibid., XV. 2. 13 (Aristoxenus); Aelian, Varia Historia, IV. 9; Theodoretus, Graecorum Affectionum Curatio, IV. 46; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII. 12; Philoponus, Comment. in Aristotelis Analytica Posteriora, CIAG, vol. XIII, part 3, pp. 133, 30 ft. 2 See Aelius Aristides, Oratio XLVI, 249. 10. See also note 1, supra. s Diogenes Laertius, V. 2. See also Vita Aristotelis Marciana 9; Vita Aristotelis Latina 9. 9 See, for instance, Plutarch, Adversus Coloten 14 (Moralia, III5A); Cicero, Academica I. 9. 33; Eusebius, op. cir., XV. 2, passim; Diogenes Laertius III. 37; Justin Martyr, Cohortatio ad Graecos 5 (Migne, PG. vol. VI. p. 247); Cyrillus, Contra Julianum II. 47; Proclus, [91] 92 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ments whichmarred the relations between these two men and which were indicative of Aristotle's ingratitude, bad taste and unwarranted conceit. The report of Diogenes Laertius, in an oblique manner, may also refer to the fact that already during his active association with the Platonic Academy (367-348 B.c.), that is, in his On (the) Ideas and On the Good, Aristotle had begun to disagree with, and criticize, some of Plato's fundamental teachings. It may also, in a distorted form, refer to the following specific incident which, however, cannot be verified: According to Aristoxenus, during the absence of Plato in Syracuse (and while Heracleides of Pontus was the "acting scholarch" of the Academy),5 some unnamed young members of the Academy, or "students" or, perhaps, some "outsiders " attempted to start a rival school (within the Academy?).6 As a matter of fact, Aelian, who apparently dramatizes this incident, reports that during Plato's last years, that is, some time after Plato's return from his third and last voyage to Syracuse, a serious conflict or confrontation arose within the Academy. Aristotle, together with some of his friends, or "conspirators," we are told, harrassed and molested the aging Plato by constantly putting questions to him, by arguing with him in an insolent manner, by contradicting him on every point, and by attempting to involve him in hair-splitting dialectics. At the time Xenocrates was in Chalcedon, and Speusippus was gravely ill. Hence, neither of them could come to the succor of Plato. In... (shrink)

A famous portrait of Erasmus by Hans Holbein depicts the scholar with his hands resting on a volume identified as his ‘Herculean Labours’. Erasmus associated this adage with the effort expended and ingratitude encountered by the philologist, and made it central to his self-presentation. In this article, its origins are traced to Erasmus’s encounter with Aldus Manutius, the venetian printer-humanist who published his Adagia in 1508. The impact of Aldus on Erasmus is shown to be significant, affecting his entire (...) ideology of humanism, including its relationship to print and its religious purpose. This article challenges distinctions between the Italian and the Northern Renaissance that are unhelpful for understanding Erasmus’s development. In light of its findings, it also proposes a new interpretation of Holbein’s painting. (shrink)

This article makes use of the thinking of both Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand in attempting properly to understand the nature of humility. The article examines how gratitude and truthfulness are both present, in an essentially integrated fashion, when a person exists in a humble state. Also addressed is the converse proposition, namely, that gratitude and truthfulness are absent in theperson who exists in a proud state and are replaced in that person by their respective opposites, ingratitude and (...) mendacity. The article begins with a discussion of Scheler’s view of humility as gratitude, then investigates von Hildebrand’s notion that humility is truth. In presenting their ideas, the article identifies three distinct ways in which von Hildebrand’s analysis of humility in terms of truthfulnesscomplements and expands upon Scheler’s analysis of humility in terms of gratitude. These three distinct yet complementary ways are, respectively, ontological, psychological, and ethical in nature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NEWMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: THE ILLATIVE SENSE (V. Continued) 15. The Universals. A long and vehement dispute once raged about the reality of universals. Are they only mental creations, forged by the human brain, without any reality outside them, or have they some independent existence apart from their mental reality? Anyhow, there was an apparent contradiction between die universal character of our ideas and the individual character of concrete things. (...) The Scholastics solved this problem by drawing clear distinctions. An idea is an abstraction; as soon as it becomes applicable to a number of objects or things in the same sense, it is a universal idea. The "direct universal" (universale directum seu metaphysicum) as such has no existence apart from our minds, because an existing thing is always bound up with concrete, determining, individualizing notes, and it is these very circumstances or accidents which are ignored by the mind as it strips the thing of its individual characteristics. When the mind reflects on this "direct universal," i.e., on the abstract essence of the thing, it sees that this is to be found in many more things and that it is identical in all those things, and in this way the "reflex or logical universal" is formed (universale reflexum seu logicum). This same essence or quiddity is not really different from the thing itself, but the mind makes abstraction of all accidents, and this foundation makes it possible to apply this idea in die same sense to all other beings of the same kind, whether they are actually existing or not. In other words the universal as a universal has only reality in the mind but it has a foundation or a ground in the thing itself. Newman was not so well acquainted with Scholasticism that he knew and mastered the solution of the problem. As a matter of fact he approached it from quite another angle. Hence when scholastically trained minds read some of his statements on universals, they may feel shocked. They sound very curious, they seem incon418 DR. ZENO, O.F.M. CAP.419 sistent with each other, they apparenüy imply a negation of the objective reality of universals. This makes it necessary to compare the texts and to explain his meaning. a. Newman Inconsistent. We should never lose sight of the fact that Newman had no intention at all to enter the province of philosophy in the restricted sense of the word. "I am only contemplating the mind as it moves in fact, by whatever hidden mechanism,"1 that is what could be put as a heading to every page of the Grammar of Assent. And when he virtually deals with metaphysics, he wants us to consider his statements as hypotheses, or as propositions stated only by the way, and in this department he always wishes "to speak under correction." This explains how he could refer to the universale metaphy sicum and the universale directum in a very correct way without realizing he was teaching Scholastic doctrine. As far as I know, it is Professor Walgrave who has first drawn attention to this fact,2 when he dealt with Newman's alleged conceptualism. Newman states that "even one act of cruelty, ingratitude, generosity or justice reveals to us at once intensive the immutable distinction between those qualities and their contraries; that is, in that particular instance and pro bac vice."3 The same holds for the opposites: right and wrong, true and false, just and unjust, beautiful and deformed.4 In one experience, therefore, he sees a thing as an immutable, absolute quiddity, which objectively and in the same sense belongs to all possible things of the same kind, although the mind does not yet explicidy confirm this universal applicability. The contemplated quality remains limited to the particular case; but in its absoluteness it is stripped of all individual, changeable and concrete characteristics. This is the metaphysical universal of the Scholastics. But Newman also mentions the logical universal when he says: "As we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight of snow, a lily or a cloud, so, after experiencing the sentiment of approbation which arises in us on the sight of certain... (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes was the first great English political philosopher. His work excited intense controversy among his contemporaries and continues to do so in our own time. In this masterly introduction to his work, Bernard Gert provides the first account of Hobbes’s political and moral philosophy that makes it clear why he is regarded as one of the best philosophers of all time in both of these fields. In a succinct and engaging analysis the book illustrates that the commonly accepted view (...) of Hobbes as holding psychological egoism is not only incompatible with his account of human nature but is also incompatible with the moral and political theories that he puts forward. It also explains why Hobbes’s contemporaries did not accept his explicit claim to be providing a natural law account of morality. Gert shows that for Hobbes, civil society is established by a free-gift of their right of nature by the citizens; it does not involve a mutual contract between citizens and sovereign. As injustice involves breaking a contract, the sovereign cannot be unjust; however, the sovereign can be guilty of ingratitude, which is immoral. This distinction between injustice and immorality is part of a sophisticated and nuanced political theory that is in stark contrast to the reading often incorrectly attributed to Hobbes that “might makes right”. It illustrates how Hobbes’s goal of avoiding civil war provides the key to understanding his moral and political philosophy. _Hobbes: Prince of Peace_ is likely to become the classic introduction to the work of Thomas Hobbes and will be a valuable resource for scholars and students seeking to understand the importance and relevance of his work today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Senecan Moment:Patronage and Philosophy in the Eighteenth CenturyEdward AndrewThis piece examines the place of patronage in eighteenth-century thought and specifically Diderot's analysis of Seneca's philosophy of the art of graceful giving and grateful receiving.1 Patronage, in Burke's definition, is "the tribute which opulence owes to genius."2 However, the patronage of thought has been rarely discussed by political theorists, and when mentioned favorably by thinkers such as Rousseau or (...) Burke, their accounts were not a central theme of their work. When patronage was a central theme, such as Johnson's letter to Lord Chesterfield or D'Alembert's Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands, the practice is deprecated as obsolete.3 Thinkers who pride themselves on their independence of thought have usually been reluctant to declare their dependence upon patrons. However, most of the thinkers of the eighteenth century who preached intellectual independence depended upon royal or aristocratic patronage.4 Indeed, one might say that the ideal of intellectual [End Page 277] autonomy was forged in conditions of intellectual dependence on royal or aristocratic patrons.Francis Bacon wrote that "books, such as are worthy of the name of books, ought to have no other patrons but truth and reason." Yet Bacon's Advancement of Learning, dedicated to James I, is forthright in admitting that most scholars are not independently wealthy and thus must court the rich and must submit to the powerful. In the same work Bacon denounced Seneca as a "Trencher Philosopher" who served and supped well at a royal court.5 Seneca's De Benefiis, the classic text on patronage, was often translated into English and French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries6 ; and it was highly regarded by eighteenth-century thinkers, such as La Mettrie, Lagrange, Rousseau, D'Holbach, Hume, Smith, and Diderot.7 Since Rousseau shared Hume's admiration for Seneca, Hume concluded his account of Rousseau's ingratitude for Hume's patronage, Exposé succinct de la contestation que s'est élevée entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau, with a quotation from Seneca's De Beneficiis.8 Diderot's Essai sur la vie de Sénèque le philosophe, sur ses écrits, et sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron and Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron et sur les Moeurs et les Écrits de Sénèque were unique among eighteenth-century thinkers in providing an extended defense of patronage. Diderot's work is a sustained analysis of Seneca's important treatise on the arts of graceful giving, graceful receiving, and graceful requiting, the three graces that made the world go around.In Rameau's Nephew Diderot and Rameau agreed that everyone has to get into unnatural postures and jump through hoops to please their patrons. But, Diderot added, "there is one human being who is exempted from this pantomime. That is the philosopher who has nothing and asks for nothing."9 Diderot seems to celebrate the self-sufficient Cynic Diogenes who lived from nature: "Whom does the savage beg from? The earth, the animals and fishes, the trees and plants and roots and streams." But Diderot knew that Diogenes was not [End Page 278] one of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's self-sufficient savages; Diogenes lived by begging from his fellow citizens and taking what he needed from others—for all property is common for the wise man. Indeed, the honest Diogenes lived much as did the truth-telling sponge, Rameau. Moreover, Diderot agreed with Rameau's form of Epicureanism—not that money is the chief good but that money is essential for life's vital pleasures. Diderot wrote: "I am far from despising sensual pleasures. I have a palate too and it is tickled by a delicate wine or dish" as well as by beautiful women and drunken parties with his friends.10In short, Diogenes's life would not have satisfied Diderot. The more useful model of the philosophic life was the immensely rich Stoic, Seneca. Diderot devoted two of his last and longest works to a justification of the life of Seneca, and the place of patronage... (shrink)

The paper by Hans-Christian Lucas on “The ‘Sovereign Ingratitude’ of Spirit toward Nature” in The Owl of Minerva, 23, 2 : 131-150, is of special interest, if only because, as Lucas says, the transition from nature to spirit is as important for Hegel as is the much criticized transition from the logic to nature. Moreover, the section on anthropology in the Geistesphilosophie is unique, difficult, and much neglected by commentators. My own interest in it dates back longer than I (...) can remember, but Lucas does not seem to be aware of my paper on the subject. He, however, has had access to more recent texts than were at that time at my disposal, from which he cites helpful passages. On these sources I am not in a position to comment, but I should like here to address afresh some of the points bearing on complaints Lucas makes against Hegel’s lack of argument and failure to demonstrate the links between the stages of the dialectic. (shrink)

The paper by Hans-Christian Lucas on “The ‘Sovereign Ingratitude’ of Spirit toward Nature” in The Owl of Minerva, 23, 2 : 131-150, is of special interest, if only because, as Lucas says, the transition from nature to spirit is as important for Hegel as is the much criticized transition from the logic to nature. Moreover, the section on anthropology in the Geistesphilosophie is unique, difficult, and much neglected by commentators. My own interest in it dates back longer than I (...) can remember, but Lucas does not seem to be aware of my paper on the subject. He, however, has had access to more recent texts than were at that time at my disposal, from which he cites helpful passages. On these sources I am not in a position to comment, but I should like here to address afresh some of the points bearing on complaints Lucas makes against Hegel’s lack of argument and failure to demonstrate the links between the stages of the dialectic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:94 Feminist Studies 45, no. 1. © 2019 by Hannah Baker Saltmarsh Hannah Baker Saltmarsh This Girl I Lost Touch With This girl, who was afraid to enter a room— a girl born in the woods, on moss, whose family dreamt under quilts, who wore dresses that matched anything fabric in the house, even the dresses without loneliness— I held her hand in the corridor-dark until the speaking-in-tongues at (...) the community college dispersed into prayers with too many gerunds and too much fervor that wouldn’t adjust if you got a thousand dollars in the mail or jury duty, faith subtle as a crucifix the size of God on the highway. I waited with her until it was over, although the prayer group was never really over. Over rooms of crowded, faith-based humidity, she loved corridors of woods, the rushes of running away. This girl and I, we were cult-lured, but then the leader stepped down—was it porn, alcohol? He drove us around in a red jeep without doors— the first time I drove in a man’s car, I was eighteen so I fell in love: looking straight ahead together, arm hair touching, the cathedral of autumn anticipating a shape to hold you, the wind that you sometimes hollered over. What happened I can’t see, but when he left the group, I left: the death of visions. Hannah Baker Saltmarsh 95 This girl could long for a man in her fingernails, and, without talking, take a man from his pregnant wife’s side, have his even newer children, this girl who wouldn’t go in a room all alone, walked right in, somewhere we’ve not been, and never left. Monostich in Praise of Four Missed Foul Shots in a Row, Ending with a Line by Shaquille O’Neal —Orlando Magic vs. Houston Rockets, Game 1, NBA Final, 1995 Each mistake at the foul line longs to be its own distinct trip-up, divorced from the tragic-comic failure automatic-reflex of a protagonist on a shame-rampage; each delicate flaw of glass, net, rim wants to be denied once at the charity line, once and only once of red-lipsticked points, the naive purity of one aberrant error in calculation—not bring bleacher-crowds to their feet, posterless hands in the vaulted air before tallying Nick Anderson up as Brick Anderson, most hated NBA player of all time, and by his own fans not believing their own eyes as a series of empty arcs toward scoring dovetails into quadruple humiliations and a goofy smile of gutted hopes and boyish fear-tangled awe that any brain so practiced (for this and what else?) could fail so many times in a row, each fail better and Beckett-harder until the last exit out of obliterating loss is part of the abyss too, unless you are quick on your feet for sports broadcasting... but there is no end to swindled championships if you are a man who’s never had to face the extinction of his early twenties or suck the aftertaste of multi-millionaire juice cocktails poured with a legend’s touch, but in the soapy-sweet glass of your Dixie cup liquor, however close to the sound of Shaq’s name spoken in every language, stares your same lovesick reflection in the welt of that shot-glass mirror, mouthing the bitters of paranoid distraction, unripe manhood, aged ingratitude, and a starless Orlando Magic blue diamond broomed over by nursery-rhyme witches brushing out the cobweb-haze because the crowd is always the same crowd calling you swept... each fumbling error of pressure you let get to you, if only it could be a plotless, lyric monostich without arc, not driven to the plot that is your grave, where the unfaithful, the murderers, liars, and cheaters are defined by threads, no, snapped pieces, of seconds and, as Dante would have it, sorted in hell by a singular thought or deed so 96 Hannah Baker Saltmarsh transformative as to name you; the blue and white jersey on the floor, fists and feet, knees and elbows vacuumed in tantrum, hyped up in the court glare and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Sources for Hume's Opening Remarks to Treatise LIVJII Graham Solomon Hume opens Book I, Part IV, Section III of the Treatise with these remarks: Several moralists have recommended it as an excellent method ofbecoming acquainted with our own hearts, and knowing our progress in virtue, to recollect our dreams in a morning, and examine them with the same rigour, that we wou'd our most serious and deliberate actions. (...) Our character is the same throughout, say they, and appears best where artifice, fear, and policy have no place, and men can neither be hypocrites with themselves nor others. The generosity, or baseness of our temper, our meekness or cruelty, our courage or pusilanimity, influence the fictions of the imagination with the most unbounded liberty, and discover themselves in the mostglaring colours. Who were these moralists? One looks in vain in the work of Malebranche, Locke, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson for such a recommendation. Did anyone make that recommendation? One moralist who did was "John Shadow," in a letter to Joseph Addison published in The Spectator, no. 586, 27 August 1714. Addison introduces Shadow's letter with the remark that it "is built upon a thought that is new, and very well carried on; for which Reasons I shall give it to the Publick without Alteration, Addition, or Amendment." I quote at length, for easy comparison with Hume: Sir, It was a good Piece of Advice which Pythagoras gave to his Scholars. That every Night before they slept they should examine what theyhad been a doing that Day, and so discover what Actions were worthy of Pursuit to Morrow, and what little Vices were to be prevented from slipping unawares into a Habit. If I might second the Philosopher's Advice, it should be mine, That in a morning before my Scholar rose, he should consider what he had been about that Night, and with the Volume XVI Number 1 57 GRAHAM SOLOMON same Strictness, as if the Condition, he has believed himself to be in, was real. Such a Scrutiny into the Actions ofhis Fancy must be of considerable Advantage, for this Reason, Because the Circumstances which a Man imagines himself in during Sleep, are generally such as entirely favour his Inclinations good or bad, and give him imaginary Opportunities of pursuingthem to the utmost; so thathis Temper will lye fairly open to his View, while he considers howitis moved when free from those Constraints which the Accidents ofreal Life put it under. Dreams are certainly the Result of our waking Thoughts, and our daily Hopes and Fears are what give the mind such nimble Relishes of Pleasure, and such severe Touches ofPain, in its Midnight Rambles. AMan that murders his Enemy, or deserts his Friend in a Dream, had need to guard his Temper against Revenge and Ingratitude, and take heed that he be not tempted to do a vile thing in Pursuit of false, or the Neglect of true Honour... I think it has been observed in the Course of your Papers, how much one's Happiness or Misery may depend upon the Imagination: ofwhich Truth those strange Workings ofFancy in Sleep are no inconsiderable Instances; so that not only the Advantage a Man has ofmaking Discoveries ofhimself, but a Regard to his own Ease or Disquiet, may induce him to accept ofmy Advice... Shadow has been identified as the poet John Byrom by various of the later editors of The Spectator? Of these, D. F. Bond footnotes Byrom's reference to Pythagoras, noting the publication in English of André Dacier's The Life ofPythagoras, with his Symbolism and Golden Verses; together with the Life ofHierocles, and his Commentaries upon the Verses. Bond notes Hierodes' comments on the following Verses: Never suffer Sleep to close thy Eye-lids, after thy going to Bed, Till thou hast examin'd by thy Reason all thy Actions of the Day Wherein have I done amiss? What have I done? What have I omitted that I ought to have done? If in this Examination, thou find that thou hast done amiss, reprimand thy self severely for it: And if thou has done any Good, rejoice. Dacier cites Porphyry and Marcus Aurelius... (shrink)

This topic was first put on a proper scholarly footing by the late Werner Jaeger and by Charles H. Kahn; earlier scholars tended either to refrain from speculating on the relation to Anaximander of Aristotle's Physics arguments on the infinite, or to deduce the Milesian provenance of one of them simply from its inclusion of a mention of Anaximander's name. It way my original intention in this paper to execute a tidying-up operation after the two well-planned attacks on Anaximander's argument (...) by Jaeger and Kahn. I said some time ago in a footnote that I hoped to strengthen Professor Kahn's case for the unity of the argument concerning the infinite at Physics 203b4-15. If the following remarks achieve anything, it will be the half-fulfilment of that half-promise: instead of strengthening Kahn's reasoning for the unity of Aristotle's argument, what follows will tend to weaken it. But without the materials and the example of Jaeger and Kahn this present operation could never have been mounted, and disagreement with their strategy or tactics indicates no ingratitude and no narrowly polemical intention. (shrink)

Although Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness , cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness . The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, , civility, humility, , modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming (...) up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Happy as an Oyster His Wealth is No Use to Him All in One Night Keeping Christmas.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas on FriendshipJennifer Hart WeedDaniel Schwartz. Aquinas on Friendship. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xviii + 189. Cloth, $55.00.In the introduction to Aquinas on Friendship, Daniel Schwartz admits that his treatment of Aquinas’s theory of friendship is not exhaustive. His central argument is that Aquinas reworks several elements of Aristotle’s view of friendship in accordance with his Christian commitment to the ideal of friendship with God (...) and to the theological virtue of charity (viii). Schwartz develops this argument through a detailed description of some of the elements of Aquinas’s theory, most notably the concept of concordia, along with responses to the challenges posed by those elements, drawn from such luminaries as John Duns Scotus, Cicero, and St. Paul.According to Schwartz, Aquinas identifies three acts of friendship: concordia, benevolentia, and beneficentia. While he claims that these three acts represent the larger themes of the volume, its content and subject index suggest otherwise. Chapters two through four address the nature of concordia and the possible impediments to it, such as heresy, disparity of circumstances, and pride. Missing, however, are similarly detailed treatments of benevolentia and beneficentia. Chapters five and six describe the importance of hope for friendship and the relationship between friendship and justice. More surprisingly, chapter seven considers the satisfaction account of justice (as in the doctrine of the Atonement) and how this might affect Aquinas’s understanding of the restoration of friendship.According to Schwartz, “Faith, hope, and charity, the three theological virtues, are conceived of by Aquinas as stages in a process reaching its fulfillment in friendship with God” (14). Despite this admission and its importance for Aquinas’s theory of friendship, the link between friendship and the theological virtues is not discussed at length. In fact, the theological virtue of faith is not given much attention at all, although Schwartz references sacramental satisfaction and Christ’s atonement. Given Schwartz’s central argument, one would expect him to focus more on the three theological virtues, rather than concordia, which emerges as the theme of the volume. Additionally, there is an abrupt shift from philosophical and political concerns to theology in subsequent chapters, which are structured around the concepts of hope, satisfaction, and charity.Schwartz also includes more than one puzzling theological claim. For example, in reference to the theological virtues, he writes, “Human beings, however, must make themselves worthy of these goods in the eyes of God. For Aquinas, the process leading to friendship with God begins with the pursuit of these spiritual goods” (14). Those familiar with Aquinas’s commitment to the doctrine of original sin and his repudiation of Pelagianism will wonder how such a characterization of Aquinas’s theology is possible. Again, Schwartz also claims, regarding the Atonement, that “merit and satisfaction is made by voluntary actions. Yet, individual participation in Christ’s Passion is not always voluntary—infant baptism being a case in point” (159). Perhaps it is theological quibbling to point out that Aquinas condemns the forced conversions of unbelievers, or that he believes infants whose parents willingly bring them forward for baptism are not baptized involuntarily (Summa theologiae III.68.9 ad. 1). But the book invites such quibbles.There is also no discussion of the difference between Aristotle and Aquinas on friendship, particularly on the possibility of friendship between humans and God. Certainly, Aquinas’s [End Page 136] willingness to accept this possibility is innovative. But Schwartz simply offers Aquinas’s account of how friendship between humans and God is possible and then defends Aquinas from various objections (45–46). A more detailed comparison between the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas is found on the topic of concordia.In summary, Schwartz’s aim is ambitious for a volume of less than two hundred pages, but there is much to enjoy in the book. There is an interesting discussion of Aquinas’s endorsement of Seneca rather than Aristotle on gratitude and ingratitude in his brief discussion of beneficentia (16–19), and Schwartz’s treatment of the tension among justice, friendship, and charity is also illuminating. Finally, Schwartz is to be commended for his extensive use of almost the entire corpus of... (shrink)

In his 1641 biography of Nicolaus‐Claude Fabri de Peiresc , Pierre Gassendi declared that all learned men acknowledged that the most noble Peiresc “had seized the glory of kings” . For Gassendi and his circle of savants, Peiresc, in his public life a member of the Parlement of Provence, was the pattern of beneficence and learning, heroic in his virtue, his magnificent mind, and his care for scholars and scholarship. Peter N. Miller, in his profound and riveting study of what (...) might be called the Peirescian moment of European intellectual life, asks why this grand figure, the hero of his age, was subsequently almost entirely forgotten—or at best considered the model pedant.Peiresc was an antiquarian who investigated the physical remains of the past with delight and perspicacity. He felt that the past offered lessons to the present and that the constitution of the contemporary state could not be understood without a comparative and comprehensive survey of former times and places. Through a far‐flung network of correspondents and friends Peiresc collected his observations, although most of his resulting work remained unpublished. Peiresc, Miller observes, was engaged not only in a prodigious intellectual feat but in a moral discipline teaching “the virtues of constancy, conversation, friendship and beneficence” .Among Peiresc's friends were Galileo, Hugo Grotius, Peter Paul Rubens, Marin Mersenne, Italian humanists, Catholic prelates, Protestants, and Jews. He subscribed, according to Miller, to an irenic religiosity in which reason revealed basic religious truths that could be accommodated to all other belief systems. Miller credits neo‐Stoicism as the animating force behind this religious minimalism that flourished briefly in the middle of the sectarian excesses of the Wars of Religion. Broadly speaking, Stoicism taught and confirmed the virtues of constancy, duty, generosity, and friendship and provided the moral economy for a learned and tolerant civil society.Miller uses Peiresc as a touchstone for his time but also as the point of departure for discussing the thought of others, both before and after Peiresc, who held similar beliefs and pursued similar interests. It is only here that Miller's analysis falters. Disembodied minds require some social context, and Miller's traditional intellectual history does not provide enough.This limited approach is particularly true of his analysis of friendship, gratitude, and ingratitude—terms with important seventeenth‐century social meanings as well as Stoic connotations. Peiresc was not simply a disinterested Maecenas of learning; he was also the center of a patronage network bringing him honor and power within the intellectual community.Neo‐Stoicism as a category also needs to be problematized, a fact Miller acknowledges in his footnotes but rarely addresses in the text. Other ancient traditions informed the thought of the early seventeenth century, most notably skepticism and Epicureanism—which was rehabilitated by Gassendi at the same time he wrote his Life of Peiresc. The most recent historiography of these movements is largely absent from Miller's study. Thus his analysis would have benefited from a broader investigation of both the social and the intellectual context of the Peirescian world.Nevertheless, one can only be awed by Miller's vast if somewhat idiosyncratic erudition. His mastery of the sixteenth‐ and seventeenth‐century neo‐Stoic sources is immense and his integration of echoes of these themes into later centuries is provocative. His conclusion that the polymath Peiresc could seem only a pedant to Enlightenment figures who idolized the practitioners of the New Science, or who valued the polite gentleman over the learned scholar, is perhaps too sweeping. Nonetheless, Miller shares the attributes of his seventeenth‐century subject: learning, curiosity, and the ability to penetrate and befriend the minds of those both past and present. (shrink)

Apresentam-se resultados de um estudo que examinou o juízo moral das crianças sobre a ingratidão. Participaram 77 crianças (49% do sexo feminino), distribuídas em três grupos (5-6, 8-9 e 11-12 anos). Utilizaram-se duas histórias protagonizadas por um(a) benfeitor(a) e um(a) ingrato(a). Após cada his..