Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...) of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate ‘facts’ of ‘unjustified violence’. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latters’ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: ‘Why do norms emerge?’ and ‘Why do they have their specific forms?’ In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...) de pouvoirs déontiques qui donnent aux membres l’autorité de légitimement punir et expulser les transgresseurs. Mais d’où viennent ces règles ? On peut penser qu’elles émergent des émotions éprouvées par les membres envers les transgresseurs. Je le démontre à l’aide d’une étude de cas qui établit que, dans le collectif Occupy Geneva, l’institutionnalisation de normes pour punir, exclure et réintégrer les déviants s’ancraient respectivement dans l’indignation, le mépris et le pardon. -/- This article focuses on the problem of maintenance; that is the moment when the members of a social collective attempt to ensure the existence of their collective over time by instituting rules to regulate their behavior. This problem becomes critical when certain members do not respect the common rules. To maintain social cooperation, members can decide to institute secondary rules aimed at sanctioning the transgressions of the already established primary rules. The maintenance of a collective can thus rely on the emergence of deontic powers that give members the authority to legitimately punish and expel transgressors. But where do these rules come from? The hypothesis is that they emerge from the emotions felt by the members towards the transgressors. I show this with the help of a case study, which establishes that the institutionalization of norms allowing the punishment, the exclusion, and the reintegration of deviants within the “Occupy Geneva” collective, was grounded in indignation, contempt, and forgiveness respectively. (shrink)

This article examines the nature of human dignity against the background of old age and introduces the novel idea of treating human dignity as a formal principle related to the more foundational notion of indignity. The discussion starts with the objection that the notion of human dignity can be used to justify contrary positions and is therefore inconclusive. This pitfall can be averted by appealing to the notion of indignity rather than dignity in one's moral reasoning and decision‐making. Cases of (...) indignity are more primary and indicate the violation of the very core of a human being. The verifiable property of vulnerability is central to this identification of indignity, as is illustrated by reference to the experiences of elderly people. The article argues for applying the concept of human dignity to reverse the conditions that existed before a particular indignity emerged, rather than trying to define positively the notion of human dignity in the first place. (shrink)

In recent years sociological research on social movements has identified emotional dynamics in all the basic processes and phases of protest, and we are only beginning to understand their causal impacts. These include the solidarities of groups, motivations for action, the role of morality in political action, and the gendered division of labor in social movements. Anger turns out to be at the core of many of these causal mechanisms.

Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral emotions which in fact exhibit significant unity.

Righteous Indignation explores the philosophy of Christian anger—for example what anger is, what it means for God to be angry, and when anger is morally appropriate. The contributors examine several dimensions of the topic, including divine wrath, imprecatory psalms, and the proper place of anger in the life of Christians today.

Qu’est-ce que l’indignation ? Cette émotion est souvent conçue comme une émotion morale qu’une tierce-partie éprouve vis-à-vis des injustices qu’un agent inflige à un patient. L’indignation aurait ainsi trait aux injustices et serait éprouvée par des individus qui n’en seraient eux-mêmes pas victimes. Cette émotion motiverait la tierce-partie indignée à tenter de réguler l’injustice en l’annulant et en punissant son auteur. Cet article entreprend de montrer que cette conception de l’indignation n’est que partielle. En effet, l’indignation (...) ne porte pas que sur les injustices, mais plus généralement sur les torts injustifiés. Ce faisant, l’indignation peut être une émotion morale, mais aussi une émotion conventionnelle ou esthétique. De plus, elle peut être éprouvée par les individus victime des torts : elle n’est pas uniquement éprouvée par des tierces-parties. De la sorte, les individus indignés qui subissent les torts peuvent eux-mêmes chercher à les annuler et à punir leurs auteurs. Puisqu’elle peut être éprouvée tant par des spectateurs que par les personnes qui subissent les torts et qu’elle incline ceux qui l’éprouvent à faire appel à d’autres personnes pour réguler ces torts, l’indignation vécue individuellement est partageable : elle peut devenir une émotion collective jouant un rôle fondamental dans la régulation sociale en contribuant au renforcement de normes sociales existantes ou à l’émergence de nouvelles normes sociales associées aux idées du juste prévalant dans la société considérée. (shrink)

This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement, as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end rational agreement among agents; (...) from that perspective, expressing indignation would just amount to an irrational way of trying to get rid of the burdens put upon the agent's shoulders in the context of a moral discussion. Against that widespread viewIwill defend a Cavellian version of moral perfectionism, which takes rational disagreement as a legitimate outcomeof moral arguments. That view, as we shall see, will be predicated upon a distinctive understanding of practical rationality, hence the importance of comparing moral discussion to other forms of rational engagement. (shrink)

T. H. Macho defended the claim that politics is a system for organizing attention and for arranging relationships of visibility. One way of attracting and holding the attention of others and maintaining one’s visibility is the instrumentalization of indignation. Another way is to instigate and maintain social stress and unrest. The article explores the concepts of indignation and social stress as introduced by P. Sloterdijk. These concepts are part of a model of political dynamics that describes 1) the (...) relationship between indignation and stress in political super-units and 2) the fact that they are compensated for by means of a specific conception of individual freedom (eleuthería, J.-J. Rousseau) and a liberal social order. The article defends the claim that there is a relationship between Macho’s claim about the organization of attention, Sloterdijk’s analyses of the concept of freedom and the method whereby individuals are immunized against generated social stress, which maintains social cohesion. (shrink)

À partir d’une étude de cas portant sur le « scandale des fiches », qui mit en cause les pratiques de surveillance de la police politique suisse, nous montrons que, contrairement à ce qu’affirment nombre de travaux, l’ampleur du scandale ne peut-être déduite de celle de l’indignation pas plus que cette dernière ne peut être rapportée à la gravité supposée de transgressions. Un scandale n’émerge que si des acteurs, à partir de leur évaluation de la situation et de leurs (...) perceptions du possible, s’autorisent à exprimer publiquement une indignation, qu’elle soit feinte ou sincère, et parviennent à imposer une qualification déviante des pratiques concernées entraînant des mobilisations dans plusieurs espaces sociaux. En déplaçant la focale sur la dynamique émergente de mobilisations multisectorielles, nous plaidons pour une approche relationnelle et processuelle de la dimension émotionnelle du scandale, inséparable de sa dimension cognitive. (shrink)

This essay argues that black Americans writing from outside or at the margins of the democratic polity shed important light on the nature of human dignity and on the political emotion that offers—to oneself and to others—the surest proof of the existence of such dignity: indignation. I focus in particular on four insights of this body of black American political thought: that the presumption of dignity is the basis on which citizenship is conferred, while its denial is the justification (...) by which citizenship is withheld; that dignity’s existence within a person is vouchsafed most effectively by indignation, a flash of emotion that arises in response to the insult of its denial; that even though dignity feels woven into one’s innermost being, it is always vulnerable to social denial and therefore stands in need of social confirmation; that indignation can and should be transformed into a self-opposing disposition that resists complacency and seeks continual reconfiguration, or enlargement, of the demos and of its democratic theory. (shrink)

Luego de señalar algunos momentos específicos en la obra de Arendt, en los que la cuestión de la sentimentalidad aparece, sobre todo de manera crítica, nos centraremos en un aspecto específico de esta, de especial interés para nosotros: el lugar de la indignación a la hora de narrar, contar, construir la historia de una comunidad y a la hora de abrir e instaurar el espacio público, caracterizado por Arendt como el espacio de aparición más elemental, donde los otros aparecen ante (...) mí y yo aparezco ante los otros , haciendo surgir lo político. Esta perspectiva nos permitirá reconstruir la posible relación entre indignación y política, en el pensamiento de la autora alemana. Starting from highlighting some specific moments in Arendt’s works critically dealing with sentimentality matters, we will focus on a specific aspect: the place of indignation when narrating, telling, and constructing the history of a community and, at the same time, opening a public space. This is characterized by Arendt as an elementary space, where others appear to me and I appear before them. , originating the political aspect. This view allows us to rebuild the possible relationship between indignation and politics in this German author’s views. (shrink)

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. An understanding of (...) class='Hi'>indignation helps to explain the operation of the many phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of reference states, moral framing, and the act-omission distinction. Because of the operation of indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions. Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention to System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling demands. (shrink)

Résumé L’article établit le récit du mouvement d’occupation de la place Syntagme à Athènes par les Indignés grecs au printemps 2011 suite aux annonces de différents plans d’austérité. Il décrit précisément les motivations des occupants, les différents publics qui se rassemblent sur la place, leur argumentation concernant le refus des différentes mesures économiques et la demande de démocratie directe. Différentes temporalités et espaces traversent le mouvement : des rassemblements massifs populaires à son épuisement au printemps 2012, en raison notamment d’un (...) système politique peu favorable aux manifestants. L’article tire donc un bilan de cette action politique éphémère. (shrink)

À partir d’une étude de cas portant sur le « scandale des fiches », qui mit en cause les pratiques de surveillance de la police politique suisse, nous montrons que, contrairement à ce qu’affirment nombre de travaux, l’ampleur du scandale ne peut-être déduite de celle de l’indignation pas plus que cette dernière ne peut être rapportée à la gravité supposée de transgressions. Un scandale n’émerge que si des acteurs, à partir de leur évaluation de la situation et de leurs (...) perceptions du possible, s’autorisent à exprimer publiquement une indignation, qu’elle soit feinte ou sincère, et parviennent à imposer une qualification déviante des pratiques concernées entraînant des mobilisations dans plusieurs espaces sociaux. En déplaçant la focale sur la dynamique émergente de mobilisations multisectorielles, nous plaidons pour une approche relationnelle et processuelle de la dimension émotionnelle du scandale, inséparable de sa dimension cognitive. (shrink)

This paper offers a grammatical investigation of some important aspects of our moral life taking a scene from the movie Mr. Deeds Goes to Town as a test case. The main question I try to answer is whether there are situations in our moral discussions in which the proper and rational attitude is to show disagreement(e.g. by expressing indignation), as opposed to continuing the dialogue. Many philosophers seem committed to a conception of moral reasoning that takes as its end (...) rational agreement among agents; from that perspective, expressing indignation would just amount to an irrational way of trying to get rid of the burdens put upon the agent's shoulders in the context of a moral discussion. Against that widespread viewIwill defend a Cavellian version of moral perfectionism, which takes rational disagreement as a legitimate (and even productive) outcomeof moral arguments. That view, as we shall see, will be predicated upon a distinctive understanding of practical rationality, hence the importance of comparing moral discussion to other forms of rational engagement (e.g., aesthetic, scientific and mathematical). (shrink)

Can we ever have politics without the noble lie? Can we have a collective political identity that does not exclude or define ‘us’ as ‘not them’? In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that individual human emotions and imagination shape the social world. This world, he argues, can in turn be shaped by political institutions to be more or less hopeful, more or less rational, or more or less angry and indignant. In his political works, Spinoza offered suggestions for how to shape (...) a political imaginary and create collective identities that are more guided by hope than by fear or anger. In this talk, using the framework of Spinoza's theory of emotions, I will investigate how Barack Obama's promise of 'hope' was translated into Donald Trump's rhetoric of hate. Such a transition, from hope to fear is one that would be unsurprising to Spinoza. Spinoza worried about the political and personal effectiveness of hope. He argued that hope can easily be turned into what he called ‘indignatio’ or indignation – an emotion that he believed eroded trust in political institutions and was the limit of state power. Spinoza warned about the danger of governance that relies upon the emotions of anger and hatred. In the Ethics, Spinoza painstakingly reconstructs the way in which individual emotions, ideas and motivations are shaped within social worlds. He argued that emotions based on pain, including hatred and indignation, diminish the power of the individuals who experience them and the political collective in which those individuals reside. Anger, fear and indignation weaken the state. In the second section of the paper, I will set out how the Trump administration’s reliance on the motivational forces of hate and anger risk what Spinoza called indignation. Trump's reliance on exclusionary conceptions of American identity have fanned the flames of racial, ethnic and religious hatred to motivate his base have had widespread social and political effects. I will offer arguments and examples which bear out the Spinozan worries about the effects of anger and indignation on the political and the social. Spinoza’s political works were written not just to explain the worries about an angry and indignant multitude, but also to show how to turn political indignation and anger into a chastened, and perhaps more rational, hope. Finally, I will propose that we may derive from Spinoza participatory, democratic institutions and collective identities that can overcome this indignation. (shrink)

In this article, the author reviews the ways that the microaggressions framework has been taken up with regard to weight stigma by academics and activists and offers insight into its value for conceptualizing and challenging weight stigma.

In the Ethics, Spinoza argues that individual human emotions and imagination shape the social world. This world, he argues, can in turn be shaped by political institutions to be more or less hopeful, more or less rational, or more or less angry and indignant. In his political works, Spinoza offered suggestions for how to shape a political imaginary that is more guided by hope than by fear or anger. In this chapter, using the framework of Spinoza’s theory of emotions, I (...) will investigate how Barack Obama’s promise of ‘hope’ was translated into Donald Trump’s rhetoric of hate. Such a transition, from hope to fear is one that would be unsurprising to Spinoza. Spinoza worried about the political and personal effectiveness of hope. He argued that hope can easily be turned into what he called ‘indignatio’ or indignation—an emotion that he believed eroded trust in political institutions. Spinoza warned about the danger of governance that relies upon the emotions of anger and hatred. I will set out how the Trump administration’s reliance on the motivational forces of hate and anger risk what Spinoza called indignation. Spinoza’s political works were written to show how to turn political indignation and anger into a chastened, and perhaps more rational, hope. Finally, I will propose that we may derive from Spinoza participatory, democratic institutions that can overcome this indignation. (shrink)

The overall purpose of this cross-country Nordic study was to gain further knowledge about maintaining and promoting dignity in nursing home residents. The purpose of this article is to present results pertaining to the following question: How is nursing home residents’ dignity maintained, promoted or deprived from the perspective of family caregivers? In this article, we focus only on indignity in care. This study took place at six different nursing home residences in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Data collection methods in (...) this part of this study consisted of individual research interviews. Altogether, the sample consisted of 28 family caregivers of nursing home residents. The empirical material was interpreted using a hermeneutical approach. The overall theme that emerged was as follows: ‘A feeling of being abandoned’. The sub-themes are designated as follows: deprived of the feeling of belonging, deprived of dignity due to acts of omission, deprived of confirmation, deprived of dignity due to physical humiliation, deprived of dignity due to psychological humiliation and deprived of parts of life. (shrink)

Recent discussion on the ethics of killer robots has focused on the supposed lack of respect their deployment would show to combatants targeted, thereby causing their undignified deaths. I present two rebuttals of this argument. The weak rebuttal maintains that while deploying killer robots is an affront to the dignity of combatants, their use should nevertheless be thought of as a pro tanto wrong, making deployment permissible if the affront is outweighed by some right-making feature. This rebuttal is, however, vulnerable (...) to the charge that killer robots would cause unnecessary suffering. The strong rebuttal, in contrast, argues that the use of killer robots would not disrespect the dignity of combatants, for reasons discussed. I also argue that, irrespective of whether killer robots disrespect the dignity of combatants, they would not necessarily bring about their undignified deaths: for one can maintain dignity in the face of indignity. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has fuelled indignation. People have been indignant about the breaking of lockdown rules, about the mistakes and deficiencies of government pandemic policies, about enforced mask-wearing, about vaccination programmes (or lack thereof), about lack of care with regards vulnerable individuals, and more. Indeed, indignation seems to have been particularly prevalent on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where indignant remarks are often accompanied by variations on the hashtag #WTF?! In this paper, I explore (...) class='Hi'>indignation’s distinctive character as a form of moral anger, in particular suggesting that what is characteristic of indignation is not only that it discloses moral injustices but betrays our disbelief at the very occurrence of the offence. Having outlined the character of indignation, I consider how the structure of indignation impacts how we do, respond to, and receive indignation. I explore indignation in action, so to speak, in the context of Covid-19, with a particular emphasis on how indignation occurs ‘on the internet’. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to flesh out a new distinction between moral responsibility, as it is understood in light of Strawson’s “reactive attitudes,” and an institutional form of responsibility—a responsibility that employees bear for their work to their superiors. I show that Strawson’s view of responsibility is separate from organizational responsibility, and hence the responsibility of employees to their managers cannot be understood in terms of indignation or resentment, both of which are key Strawsonian concepts. The latter (...) type of responsibility can be understood in terms of objective attitudes, managerial demands, organizational standards, and related expectations. Based on a Cartesian and a Wittgensteinian notions of asymmetry between first- and third-person uses of psychological concepts, Strawson developed a view of responsibility that dissolves the above asymmetry. In contrast with the latter asymmetry, which focuses on those who ascribe psychological concepts to themselves and to others, Strawson’s view is centered on the recipients of reactive attitudes. According to his view, resentment and indignation differ because they are aimed at different recipients, something that cannot be applied in cases of organizational responsibility. (shrink)

Le mouvement des indignés s’inscrit dans la continuité des luttes contre le néolibéralisme, qui se manifestent partout sur la planète depuis plus de trente ans. Fruit de la mondialisation de la résistance, il constitue une nouvelle composante dans la mouvance altermondialiste qui renouvelle son registre d’action. Dénonçant explicitement les oligarchies, il milite pour un renouvellement du politique et un approfondissement de la démocratie.

In 2010, two years after the global financial collapse that triggered the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the best-selling publication in France was not that year’s Prix Goncourt,1 Michel Houellebecq’s La carte et le territoire (The Map and the Territory), a novel published by Flammarion, one of Paris’s leading publishing houses. That honor went to Indignez-vous! (Time for Outrage!), a 32-page pamphlet authored by 93-year-old Stéphane Hessel, a former hero of the French Resistance, a concentration (...) camp survivor and career diplomat. Hessel’s booklet, issued by Indigène Editions, a small provincial publisher, has since sold over 2 million copies, reaching an estimated 10 million .. (shrink)

The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignity. I situate the argument in the context of Martha Nussbaum's recent work against anger and resentment. Drawing on Enlightenment thinkers, I show the importance of resentment in deterring injury, in creating greater solidarity and humanity, and in preserving human dignity. The paper also offers a preliminary analysis of the norms that help to ensure appropriately expressed resentment.

When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related (...) but importantly different answer: What is required for fitting guilt and indignation is that the agent is relevantly implicated in that outcome: that the agent’s morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, it is further argued, makes sense because when an agent’s substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation. (shrink)

Over the past twenty years, in France, as elsewhere in Europe, cinema has produced an increasing number of films that engage with the thematics of immigration (both legal and illegal) and represent the living and working conditions of first-generation immigrants. In France, such films have also tended to focus on questions of citizenship and nationality as they pertain to the French-born descendants of immigrants, whose presence within the nation demands a reconsideration of previously fixed notions of community, origins and national (...) identity. Though certainly not limited to the perspective of one ethnic minority, the majority of these French films, from militant immigrant cinema in the 1970s, to so-called beur .. (shrink)

Au cours des dernières années, le Parti des Travailleurs brésilien ne s’est intéressé au mouvement social qu’en tant que menace pour son pouvoir parce que le mouvement s’échappait du traditionnel clivage droite-gauche. Les dernières élections ont vu se mettre en place des manipulations invraisemblables pour emprisonner les électeurs dans ce clivage. La politique économique et sécuritaire poursuivie par le gouvernement de Lula et Dilma atteste les conséquences funestes de ces processus. C’est à casser ce clivage que doit viser aujourd’hui une (...) politique émancipatrice. (shrink)