Sectio 1. Indices,--Sectio 2. Concordantia prima,.

L’agence d’expertise indépendante INDEX, constituée d’architectes, d’artistes et de chercheurs, enquête sur les violences d’État en France et depuis la France. Dans cet entretien, iels expliquent comment iels réinvestissent politiquement la notion d’expertise dans les enquêtes policières, racontent leurs liens avec le collectif Forensic Architecture, explicitent ce qu’iels entendent par « vérité » dans les enquêtes en sources ouvertes et ce qu’iels mettent en place pour permettre une plus grande dissémination des outils de l’OSINT.

Fr. Roberto Busa was an Italian Jesuit. In this article his biography will briefly be presented, and some issues raised by his philosophy analyzed. Busa was known as a pioneer of computerized research in the humanities. With the support of IBM he constructed the Index Thomisticus, containing all the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. He believed that expressions of the human can be mathematically modeled. He was the originator of a specific conception of hypertext, in which logically structured (...) programs are able to challenge the general linguistic mode of thinking, in order to make better communication and understanding possible. However, Busa was also con- scious of the general ethical problems involved (Babel), and he hoped that the basic logic of objects could progress towards the truth of being. (shrink)

A review of the achievements of Fr. Busa over the course of his 60 years of work in the area of computational linguistics: internal hypertexts, the systematization of allographs, lemmatization, homographs and typologies; the lexical system; the laws of economy for graphemes, for semantic typology, for heterogeneity among terms, and of the two lexical hemispheres. Finally, the project of disciplined languages is mentioned, a response to the linguistic challenge resulting from informational globalization.

The Corpus Thomisticum proyect aims to provide scholars with a set of instruments of research on Thomas Aquinas, freely available via Internet. Among the contents already published are an edition of Aquina's Opera omnia, a bibliography presently covering some 6.000 references, and two collections of historical sources. In the next months a new edition of the Index Thomisticus, the digital edition of the Parisian exemplar manuscript of Super III Sent., and other tools and documents will be published.

This paper reports a procedure which I employed with two computational research instruments, the Index Thomisticus and its companion St. Thomas CD-ROM, in order to research the Thomistic axiom, ‘whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.’ My procedure extends to the lexicological methods developed by the pioneering creator of the Index, Roberto Busa, from single terms to a proposition. More importantly, the paper shows how the emerging results of the lexicological searches guided (...) my formation of a philosophical thesis about the axiom’s import for Aquinas’s existential metaphysics. (shrink)

In Summa theologiae, Ia, 75.5, Aquinas writes, "It is evident that all that is received in anything is received in it according to the mode of the receiver." Aquinas employs this principle throughout his career and across the full range of philosophical topics. Beginning with Quaestianes de veritate 2.5, he employs a more universal formulation which he applies even to divine being: "All that is in anything is in it according to the mode of that in which it is." As (...) modus is the term common to the principle's two formulations, I call it the modus principle. ;The dissertation is a comprehensive study of Thomas's use of the principle, based on computer research done with the Index Thomisticus and the St. Thomas CD-ROM. The 200 texts located are considered according to applications in the order of knowing, the order of being, and the order of predicating. In brief, Aquinas employs the modus principle and the term modus to give account of the intelligible coenactment in knowledge of the knower and the known; to give account of the entitative contrariety evident among beings; and to frame an analogy of being based on a primacy of existence. The principal conclusions drawn from the textual survey are that the modus principle belongs among the most basic axioms of Thomas's metaphysics, that it pertains directly to the metaphysical ultimate of his thought, namely esse, and that at the heart of the principle is a concept central to his metaphysics, namely modes of existence. ;When Aquinas subordinates formal contrariety to an actuality more ultimate than form, namely existence, a new concept of existential distinction emerges. Modus is a term of entitative contrariety that becomes necessary when a real duality of essence and existence is seen as necessary to all finite being. As Thomas traces this entitative composition to a participation in ipsum esse commune, and ultimately to a participation in ipsum esse per se subsistens, the term modus and the modus principle are seen to be in the service of his creationist metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first-person indexical. It is argued that the private nature of our access to our own sensations forces, in our talking about them, an indexical reference to the inner states of the speaker in lieu of publicly accessible properties by which reference is usually fixed. Indexicals, such as ‘here’, can be understood despite ignorance of their referent. Such is the case with sensory terms. Furthermore, the thesis that (...) sensory terms are indexical has considerable explanatory power. I give two examples: firstly, I argue that clashes of intuition over Block's ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment can be explained by appeal to semantic properties of indexicals. Secondly, I argue that multiple realisability intuitions can be shown to be consistent with the view that sensations are type-identical with brain states. (shrink)

This paper is about time preferences, the phenomenon that the very same things are usually considered the less valuable the farther in the future they are obtained. The utilities of those things are discounted at a certain rate. The paper presents a novel normative argument for exponential discount rates, whatever their empirical adequacy. It proposes to take indexical utility seriously, i.e. utilities referring to indexical propositions (that speak of ‘I’, ‘now’, etc.) as opposed to non-indexical propositions. Economic focus is only (...) on the latter, while the former are neglected. The potential ignorance of when is now generates a difference between indexical and non-indexical utility that can be exploited for a novel argument in favour of exponential discount rates. (shrink)

Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context: some paradigm examples are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’,‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. Two speakers who utter a single sentence that contains an indexical may say different things. For instance, Fred and Wilma say different things when they utter the sentence ‘I am female’. Many philosophers (following David Kaplan 1989a) hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of meaning is often called ‘character’ or ‘linguistic meaning’; the second (...) sort is often called ‘content’. Using this terminology, we can say that the word ‘I’ has a single character (or linguistic meaning), but has different contents in different contexts. (shrink)

Index to Mīmāṃsābhāṣya, by Śabarasvāmi, classical commentary on Mīmāṃsāsūtra, basic work of the Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy, by Jaimini.

This paper offers a theory of spatial indexicals like _here_ and _there_ on which such expressions are variables associated with presuppositional constraints on their values. I show how this view handles both referential and bound uses of these indexicals, and I propose an account of what counts as the location of the context on a given occasion. The latter is seen to explain a wide range of facts about what the spatial indexicals can refer to.

Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...) approaches on different counts, the most damaging of which is that they make impossible a "logic of demonstratives". The reason for this is that the token-reflexive approach entails that not two tokens of the same sentential type including indexicals are guaranteed to have the same truth-conditions. In this paper I rebut this and other criticisms of the Reichenbachian approach. Additionally, I point out that Kaplan's original theory of "true demonstratives" is empirically inadequate, and claim that any modification capable of accurately handling the linguistic data would have similar problems to those attributed to the Reichenbachian approach. This is intended to show that the difficulties, no matter how real, are not caused by idiosincracies of the "token-reflexive" view, but by deep facts about indexicality. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that the references of indexical expressions are fixed partly by their relations to contextual parameters such as the author, time, and place of the utterance. Because of this, indexicals are sometimes described as token-reflexive or utterance-reflexive in their semantics. But when we inquire into how indexicals help us to identify items within experience, we find that while utterance-reflexivity is essential to an interpretation of indexical tokens, it is not a factor in a speaker's identificatory use of (...) indexicals. Tokens cannot be interpreted unless they are first produced, and obviously the speaker who produces them does not depend upon utterance parameters in order to identify their referents in the way that hearers do. Consequently, the standard reflexive accounts of indexicals are of little use in explaining the speaker's identificatory use of indexicals, and must be either replaced or complemented by a further theory of the role of indexicals in thought. This paper provides an account of indexical identification that is attentive to a speaker's as well as a hearer's identification and reveals how indexicals are inextricably perspectival. (shrink)

Vol. 1. Ars logica seu de forma et materia ratiocinandi -- v. 2. Naturalis philosophiae I. pars. De ente mobili in communi. III. pars. De ente mobili corruptibili -- v. 3. Naturalis philosophiae IV. pars. De ente mobili animato.

What characterizes indexical thinking is the fact that the modes of presentation through which one thinks of objects are context-bound and perspectival. Such modes of presentation, I claim, are mental files presupposing that we stand in certain relations to the reference : the role of the file is to store information one can gain in virtue of standing in that relation to the object. This raises the communication problem, first raised by Frege : if indexical thoughts are context-bound and relation-based, (...) how is it possible to communicate them to those who are not in the same context and do not stand in the right relations to the object? Following Frege, I argue that the solution comes from an important distinction between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation. Psychological modes of presentation are mental files. They are perspectival and context-bound. But linguistic modes of presentation are fixed by the conventions of the language and they are shared by the language users. They are public and serve to coordinate mental files in communication by constraining them to contain the piece of information they encode. In this way communication takes place even though the indexical thoughts entertained by the speaker are, in some sense, private and cannot be shared by the audience. (shrink)

An Indexed Synopsis of the Grammar of Assent by John J. Toohey. This book is a reproduction of the original book published in 1906 and may have some imperfections such as marks or hand-written notes.

Charles Travis influentially argued in “The Silence of the Senses” that the representational theory of perceptual experience is false. According to Travis, the way that things look cannot index the content of experience as the subject of the experience cannot read the content off from the way things look. This looks indexing is a central commitment of representationalism. The main thrust of Travis’ argument is that the way things look is fundamentally comparative, and this prevents the subject from reading (...) a single content off from the way things look. If content were looks indexed, the subject would be able to do this. I argue that Travis’ argument rests on an illicit transition from an argument about the way objects look in themselves—i.e. an argument about the visible properties that they have—to a conclusion about the way that objects look to subjects in experience. (shrink)