This is the continuation of the paper :417–446, 2010). We continue the abstract study of non-classical logics based on the kind of generalized implication connectives they possess and we focus on semilinear logics, i.e. those that are complete with respect to the class of models where the implication defines a linear order. We obtain general characterizations of semilinearity in terms of the intersection-prime extension property, the syntactical semilinearity metarule and the class of finitely subdirectly irreducible models. Moreover, we (...) consider extensions of the language with lattice connectives and generalized disjunctions, study their interplay with implication and obtain axiomatizations and further descriptions of semilinear logics in terms of disjunctions and the proof by cases property. (shrink)

We introduce several restricted versions of the structural rules in the implicational fragment of Gentzen's sequent calculus LJ. For example, we permit the applications of a structural rule only if its principal formula is an implication. We investigate cut-eliminability and theorem-equivalence among various combinations of them. The results include new cut-elimination theorems for the implicational fragments of the following logics: relevant logic E, strict implication S4, and their neighbors (e.g., E-W and S4-W); BCI-logic, BCK-logic, relevant (...) logic R, and the intuitionistic logic. (shrink)

This paper presents an abstract study of completeness properties of non-classical logics with respect to matricial semantics. Given a class of reduced matrix models we define three completeness properties of increasing strength and characterize them in several useful ways. Some of these characterizations hold in absolute generality and others are for logics with generalized implication or disjunction connectives, as considered in the previous papers. Finally, we consider completeness with respect to matrices with a linear dense order and characterize it (...) in terms of an extension property and a syntactical metarule. This is the final part of the investigation started and developed in the papers :417–446, 2010; Arch Math Logic 53:353–372, 2016). (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to analyse Implicational Relevance Logic from the point of view of refutability. We also correct an inaccuracy in our paper “The RM paraconsistent refutation system”.

Consider the problem which set V of propositional variables suffices for whenever, where, and ⊢c and ⊢i denote derivability in classical and intuitionistic implicational logic, respectively. We give a direct proof that stability for the final propositional variable of the (implicational) formula A is sufficient; as a corollary one obtains Glivenko's theorem. Conversely, using Glivenko's theorem one can give an alternative proof of our result. As an alternative to stability we then consider the Peirce formula. It is an easy (...) consequence of the result above that adding a single instance of the Peirce formula suffices to move from classical to intuitionistic derivability. Finally we consider the question whether one could do the same for minimal logic. Given a classical derivation of a propositional formula not involving ⊥, which instances of the Peirce formula suffice as additional premises to ensure derivability in minimal logic? We define a set of such Peirce formulas, and show that in general an unbounded number of them is necessary. (shrink)

The standard deduction theorem or introduction rule for implication, for classical logic is also valid for intuitionistic logic, but just as with predicate logic, other rules of inference have to be restricted if the theorem is to hold for weaker implicational logics.In this paper we look in detail at special cases of the Gentzen rule for and show that various subsets of these in effect constitute deduction theorems determining all the theorems of many well known as (...) well as not well known implicational logics. In particular systems of rules are given which are equivalent to the relevance logics E,R, T, P-W and P-W-I. (shrink)

We establish the “contraction-elimination theorem” which means that if a sequent Γ A is provable in the implicational fragment of the Gentzen's sequent calculus LK and if it satisfies a certain condition on the number of the occurrences of propositional variables, then it is provable without the right contraction rule. By this theorem, we get the following.1. If an implicational formula A is a theorem of classical logic and is not a theorem of intuitionistic logic, then there is (...) a propositional variable which occurs at least once positively and at least twice negatively in A → a) → a).2. If an implicational formula A is a theorem of intuitionistic logic and is not a theorem of BCK-logic, then there is a propositional variable which occurs at least twice positively and at least once negatively in A → a → b).We prove the contraction-elimination theorem by a fully syntactical method, which has some analogy with Gentzen's cut-elimination. (shrink)

We consider the notion of structural completeness with respect to arbitrary (finitary and/or infinitary) inferential rules. Our main task is to characterize structurally complete intermediate logics. We prove that the structurally complete extension of any pure implicational in termediate logic C can be given as an extension of C with a certain family of schematically denned infinitary rules; the same rules are used for each C. The cardinality of the family is continuum and, in the case of (the pure (...) implicational fragment of) intuitionistic logic, the family cannot be reduced to a countable one. It means that the structurally complete extension of the intuitionistic logic is not countably axiomatizable by schematic rules. (shrink)

I present a new syntactical method for proving the Interpolation Theorem for the implicational fragment of intuitionistic logic and its substructural subsystems. This method, like Prawitz’s, works on natural deductions rather than sequent derivations, and, unlike existing methods, always finds a ‘strongest’ interpolant under a certain restricted but reasonable notion of what counts as an ‘interpolant’.

This article provides a transcultural, “transversal” investigation. It starts from the philosophical problem of knowing non-knowing. In chapters 1 and 2, the first expressions of this problem by Confucius and Socrates are considered. Against this background, new transcultural working concepts are developed. A new key term to be established here is that of an “implicate logic”. It refers to the reflection of unity of unity and difference and therefore to the very condition of the possibility of (differentiating) thinking as (...) such. In chapters 3 and 4, this train of thought is further developed under the influence of Nico- laus Cusanus, by reflecting on the first chapter of the Daodejing, and in view of important remarks by Niklas Luhmann. In chapter 5, the outcome is related to the idea of transversal reason in the philosophy of Wolfgang Welsch. As the most basic principle of (self-referential) thinking, implicate logic is to be discerned from Aristotelian (or similar traditions of ) logic and Hegelian dialectics—albeit both are being tied to the former’s principle in one way or the other. In the end, an introductory outlook of a comprehensive work by the present author provides the starting point to validate the logical foundations of knowing non-knowing as a methodological foundation to further develop the fields of transcultural-comparative, trans-comparative, and global philosophy. (shrink)

In this work we develop goal-directed deduction methods for the implicational fragment of several modal logics. We give sound and complete procedures for strict implication of K, T, K4, S4, K5, K45, KB, KTB, S5, G and for some intuitionistic variants. In order to achieve a uniform and concise presentation, we first develop our methods in the framework of Labelled Deductive Systems [Gabbay 96]. The proof systems we present are strongly analytical and satisfy a basic property of cut admissibility. (...) We then show that for most of the systems under consideration the labelling mechanism can be avoided by choosing an appropriate way of structuring theories. One peculiar feature of our proof systems is the use of restart rules which allow to re-ask the original goal of a deduction. In case of K, K4, S4 and G, we can eliminate such a rule, without loosing completeness. In all the other cases, by dropping such a rule, we get an intuitionistic variant of each system. The present results are part of a larger project of a goal directed proof theory for non-classical logics; the purpose of this project is to show that most implicational logics stem from slight variations of a unique deduction method, and from different ways of structuring theories. Moreover, the proof systems we present follow the logic programming style of deduction and seem promising for proof search [Gabbay and Reyle 84, Miller et al. 91]. (shrink)

This paper combines two classes of generalized logics, one of which is the class of weakly implicative logics introduced by Cintula and the other of which is the class of gaggle logics introduced by Dunn. For this purpose we introduce implicational tonoid logics. More precisely, we first define implicational tonoid logics in general and examine their relation to weakly implicative logics. We then provide algebraic semantics for implicational tonoid logics. Finally, we consider relational semantics, called Routley–Meyer–style semantics, for finitary those (...) logics. (shrink)

I take 'informal logic' to be the (descriptive and normative) study of 'real arguments'-arguments which are or have been used with the aim of convincing others of a point of view. I argue that the informal logic tradition thus conceived (i) lends strong support to something like Quine's view that our beliefs really support one another like the filaments in a spider's web--and thus that the traditional view that implication is an asymmetric relation is false; (ii) suggests (...) that the classic division of arguments into deductive and inductive has distorted our thinking about the evaluation of real arguments; and (iii) implies that naturalised epistemology is on the right track. (shrink)

This monograph presents a general theory of weakly implicative logics, a family covering a vast number of non-classical logics studied in the literature, concentrating mainly on the abstract study of the relationship between logics and their algebraic semantics. It can also serve as an introduction to algebraic logic, both propositional and first-order, with special attention paid to the role of implication, lattice and residuated connectives, and generalized disjunctions. Based on their recent work, the authors develop a powerful uniform (...) framework for the study of non-classical logics. In a self-contained and didactic style, starting from very elementary notions, they build a general theory with a substantial number of abstract results. The theory is then applied to obtain numerous results for prominent families of logics and their algebraic counterparts, in particular for superintuitionistic, modal, substructural, fuzzy, and relevant logics. The book may be of interest to a wide audience, especially students and scholars in the fields of mathematics, philosophy, computer science, or related areas, looking for an introduction to a general theory of non-classical logics and their algebraic semantics. (shrink)

This paper presents two classes of propositional logics (understood as a consequence relation). First we generalize the well-known class of implicative logics of Rasiowa and introduce the class of weakly implicative logics. This class is broad enough to contain many “usual” logics, yet easily manageable with nice logical properties. Then we introduce its subclass–the class of weakly implicative fuzzy logics. It contains the majority of logics studied in the literature under the name fuzzy logic. We present many general theorems (...) for both classes, demonstrating their usefulness and importance. (shrink)

I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.

We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine (...) the semantics of propositional intuitionistic logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the investigation of term-definable connexive implications in substructural logics with exchange and, on the semantical perspective, in sub-varieties of commutative residuated lattices (FL ${}_{\scriptsize\mbox{e}}$ -algebras). In particular, we inquire into sufficient and necessary conditions under which generalizations of the connexive implication-like operation defined in [6] for Heyting algebras still satisfy connexive theses. It will turn out that, in most cases, connexive principles are equivalent to the equational Glivenko property with respect to Boolean algebras. Furthermore, (...) we provide some philosophical upshots like, e.g., a discussion on the relevance of the above operation in relationship with G. Polya’s logic of plausible inference, and some characterization results on weak and strong connexivity. (shrink)

In abstract algebraic logic, the general study of propositional non-classical logics has been traditionally based on the abstraction of the Lindenbaum-Tarski process. In this process one considers the Leibniz relation of indiscernible formulae. Such approach has resulted in a classification of logics partly based on generalizations of equivalence connectives: the Leibniz hierarchy. This paper performs an analogous abstract study of non-classical logics based on the kind of generalized implication connectives they possess. It yields a new classification of logics (...) expanding Leibniz hierarchy: the hierarchy of implicational logics. In this framework the notion of implicational semilinear logic can be naturally introduced as a property of the implication, namely a logic L is an implicational semilinear logic iff it has an implication such that L is complete w.r.t. the matrices where the implication induces a linear order, a property which is typically satisfied by well-known systems of fuzzy logic. The hierarchy of implicational logics is then restricted to the semilinear case obtaining a classification of implicational semilinear logics that encompasses almost all the known examples of fuzzy logics and suggests new directions for research in the field. (shrink)

We collect together some misgivings about the logic R of relevant inplication, and then give support to a weak entailment logic $DJ^{d}$ . The misgivings centre on some recent negative results concerning R, the conceptual vacuousness of relevant implication, and the treatment of classical logic. We then rectify this situation by introducing an entailment logic based on meaning containment, rather than meaning connection, which has a better relationship with classical logic. Soundness and completeness results (...) are proved for $DJ^{d}$ with respect to a content semantics, which embraces the concept of meaning containment. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Paradoxes Stimulate Theory Development An Analogy with Perceptual Illusions Do Logical Paradoxes Exist? Imagination Overflows Logical Possibility Paradoxes Evoke Logical Analogies An Implication about the Nature of Paradox.

The Komori–Kashima problem, that asks whether the implicational intermediate logics axiomatizable by formulas minimal in classical logic are only intuitionistic logic and classical logic, has stood for over a decade. In this paper, we give a counter-example to this problem. Additionally, we also give some open problems derived from this result.

Implicational tonoid logics and their relational semantics have been introduced by Yang and Dunn. This paper extends this investigation to implicational partial Galois logics. For this, we first define some implicational partial gaggle logics as special kinds of implicational tonoid logics called “implicational partial Galois logics.” Next, we provide Routley–Meyer-style relational semantics for finitary those logics.

First and foremost, this paper concerns the combination of classical propositional logic with a relevant implication. The proposed combination is simple and transparent from a proof theoretic point of view and at the same time extremely useful for relating formal logic to natural language sentences. A specific system will be presented and studied, also from a semantic point of view. The last sections of the paper contain more general considerations on combining classical propositional logic with a (...) relevant logic that has all classical theorems as theorems. (shrink)

We provide a logical matrix semantics and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the first-degree entailments valid in W. T. Parry’s logic of Analytic Implication. We achieve the former by introducing a logical matrix closely related to that inducing paracomplete weak Kleene logic, and the latter by presenting a calculus where the initial sequents and the left and right rules for negation are subject to linguistic constraints.

Let us assume that you are entrusted by UNESCO with an important task. You are asked to devise a universal logical language, a Begriffsschrift in Frege's sense, which is to serve the purposes of science, business and everyday life. What requirements should such a “conceptual notation” satisfy? There are undoubtedly many relevant desiderata, but here I am focusing on one unmistakable one. In order to be a viable lingua universalis, your language must in any case be capable of representing any (...) possible configuration of dependence and independence between different variables. For if such a configuration is possible in principle, there is no guarantee that it might not one day show up among the natural, human or social phenomena we have to study.But how are dependencies and independencies between variables expressed in our familiar logical notation? Every logician worth his or her truth-table knows the answer. Dependencies between two variables are expressed by dependencies between the quantifiers to which they are bound. For instance, inthe variable y depends on x, while inz depends on x but not on y, while u depends on both x and y.But how is the dependence of a quantifier on another one expressed in familiar logical languages? Obviously by occurring in its scope, indicated by the pair of parentheses following it. But the nesting of scopes is a transitive and antisymmetrical relation which allows branching only in one direction. Hence other kinds of structures of dependence and independence between variables are not representable in the received logical notation. Such previously inexpressible structures form the subject matter of what has been referred to as independence-friendly logic. (shrink)

We describe a method for obtaining classical logic from intuitionistic logic which does not depend on any proof system, and show that by applying it to the most important implicational relevance logics we get relevance logics with nice semantical and proof-theoretical properties. Semantically all these logics are sound and strongly complete relative to classes of structures in which all elements except one are designated. Proof-theoretically they correspond to cut-free hypersequential Gentzen-type calculi. Another major property of all these (...) class='Hi'>logic is that the classical implication can faithfully be translated into them. (shrink)

We show that provability in the implicational fragment of relevance logic is complete for doubly exponential time, using reductions to and from coverability in branching vector addition systems.

A non-classical subsystem of orthomodular quantum logic is proposed. This system employs two basic operations: the Sasaki hook as implication and the _and-then_ operation as conjunction. These operations successfully satisfy modus ponens and the deduction theorem. In other words, they form an adjunction in terms of category theory. Two types of semantics are presented for this logic: one algebraic and one physical. The algebraic semantics deals with orthomodular lattices, as in traditional quantum logic. The physical semantics (...) is given as a procedure for deriving a final segment of a series of yes-no experiments. (shrink)