Discusses the different ways in which the concept of imagination has been construed, and provides fascinating glimpses of the role of imagination in the creation and management of Modernity.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.4 (2002) 345-367 [Access article in PDF] Imagining in the Public Sphere Robert Asen Contemporary public sphere scholarship has been motivated significantly by a concern to overcome historical and conceptual exclusions in public spheres. Recent theory and criticism has investigated direct and indirect exclusions. Direct exclusions expressly prevent the participation of particular individuals and groups in public discussions and debates. Prohibitions against women speaking in (...) public, for example, have served historically to inhibit women's participation in various forums (see, e.g., Landes 1998). Indirect exclusions function tacitly through discursive norms and practices that prescribe particular ways of interacting in public forums. Indirect exclusions compel participants to conform to established modes of discourse that effectively negate the perspectives and contributions of previously directly excluded individuals and groups. Calls for "objective" and "dispassionate" debate, for instance, sometimes have restricted public agendas by portraying culturally specific forms of address as universally practiced (see, e.g., Warner 1993). Indirect exclusions may regulate discourse in various forums even when direct exclusions have been counteracted. Scholarship seeking to overcome these exclusions has proceeded on two levels. On one level, scholars have recounted the efforts of excluded persons to participate in public life despite restrictions by developing alternative modes of publicity (see, e.g., Ryan 1990; Zaeske 2002). On a second level, theorists have proposed more inclusive conceptual models of the public sphere that may overcome historical exclusions of the bourgeois public sphere while retaining a commitment to critical publicity (see, e.g., Asen 1999; Benhabib 1996; Hauser 1999; Mouffe 2000).Practicing democratic discourse fairly and justly depends indispensably on enabling inclusion. Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that political legitimacy arises from processes of inclusive public debate. Seyla Benhabib asserts that "legitimacy in complex societies must be [End Page 345] thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern" (1996, 68). Others regard inclusive public discourse as crucial for the formation of affirmative individual and collective identities. Craig Calhoun faults bourgeois notions of publicity for treating "identity formation as essentially private and prior to participation in the idealized public sphere of rational-critical discourse" (1993, 274). Identity formation entails mutual recognition among members of diverse cultures, yet theorists have observed that truncated discursive processes may inhibit mutual recognition. Charles Taylor writes that practicing a politics of recognition requires an openness toward other cultures—a presumption of value tested through sustained engagement so that "what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the background of the formerly unfamiliar culture" (1994, 67). Inclusiveness is also important for individuals and groups seeking to advance self-fashioned interpretations of their interests and needs against interpretations imposed by others. Nancy Fraser explains that self-fashioning is necessary because in public debates and controversies "who gets to establish authoritative thick definitions of people's needs is itself a political stake" (1989, 164).Although inclusion is indispensable, exclusion is never total. Sometimes, people force their way into public forums and agendas. For example, participation by activists in discussions of AIDS research and treatment often has been limited by researchers' assertions of expert privilege in investigating scientific matters. Valeria Fabj and Matthew J. Sobnosky (1995) detail how AIDS activists have responded by engaging in discursive acts of redefinition and translation to gain entry into previously circumscribed forums. At other times, people surreptitiously access public arenas. Prison writing is one way that those officially banished from public view nevertheless continue to participate in oppositional discourses and movements. Gerard A. Hauser (2001) considers how dissident Adam Michnik remained a vibrant voice in Polish civil society through his writings even after his imprisonment in the 1980s by an authoritarian regime. At still other times, typically excluded people may be invited to participate in public discussions. Members of the AIDS activist group ACT UP occasionally have testified in the traditional setting of the congressional committee hearing as invited witnesses. Daniel C. Brouwer (2001) maintains that politically sympathetic committee chairs facilitated ACT UP's "official" appearances before members of Congress. Whether invited or... (shrink)

If I want to imagine myself to be someone else, say, Napoleon, a problem arises concerning the protagonist of the imagined scenario: One has to attribute two conflicting personal identities to this protagonist, my own (the imaginer’s) and Napoleon’s (the target subject) – hence, a metaphysical impossibility arises. The metaphysically impossible is generally deemed inconceivable and hence unimaginable – however, we generally take ourselves capable of imagining being someone else. Williams (1966), who first raised the issue, proposes a way to (...) overcome the philosophical obstacle posed by such so‐called transferenceimagination, namely one in which only Napoleon (the target subject) figures in the content of the imaginer. Over the years, a number of arguments have been proposed in support of this approach. My contribution disputes Williams’ approach by (1) refuting the arguments in its favour, (2) advancing some independent considerations against its plausibility, and (3) proposing a new and more intuitively appealing way of thinking about transference imagination. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a set of moral questions about the portrayal of evil characters in fiction: might the portrayal of evil in fiction ever be morally wrong? If so, under what circumstances and for what reasons? What kinds of portrayals are morally wrong and what kinds are not? I argue that whether or not imagining evil is morally wrong depends on the formal and structural properties of the work.

In this paper, I explore a set of moral questions about the portrayal of evil characters in fiction: might the portrayal of evil in fiction ever be morally wrong? If so, under what circumstances and for what reasons? What kinds of portrayals are morally wrong and what kinds are not? I argue that whether or not imagining evil is morally wrong depends on the formal and structural properties of the work.

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of imagination in environmental ethics and introduce an imaginative dimension as an essential part of environmental ethics. Imagination constitutes a basic condition for ethical thinking and action. Matters of environmental ethics have revealed the indispensable role of imagination in ethics. I’ll advance an imagination-based environmental ethics by developing Hans Jonas’ ethical thought. From his viewpoint, various effects of our action on nature and future generations, generally out (...) of our sight, have become an ethical concern. This necessitates the exercise of imagination because we must “imagine” those distant effects to act in an environmentally responsible way. Jonas’ “heuristics of fear” is an imaginative approach necessary for responsible action. Further, I reinterpret the role of imagination as motivating our “will to know.” In conclusion, I suggest the importance of environmental education as cultivating ecological imagination from the standpoint of environmental ethics. (shrink)

This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section (...) two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself. (shrink)

This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section (...) two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself. (shrink)

Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" (...) Philosophers have suggested different alternatives -- some think that consciousness should be altogether eliminated from science because it is not a real phenomenon, others that consciousness is a real, higher-level physical or neurobiological phenomenon, and still others that consciousness is fundamentally mysterious and beyond the reach of science. At the same time, however, several models or theories of the role of conscious processing in the brain have been developed in the more empirical cognitive sciences. It has been suggested that non-conscious processes must be sharply separated from conscious ones, and that the necessity of this distinction is manifested in the curious behavior of certain brain-damaged patients. This book demonstrates the dialogue between philosophical and empirical points of view. The writers present alternative solutions to the brain-consciousness problem and they discuss how the unification of biological and psychological sciences could thus become feasible. Covering a large ground, this book shows how the philosophical and empirical problems are closely interconnected. From this interdisciplinary exploration emerges the conviction that consciousness can and should be a natural part of our scientific world view. (shrink)

Giambatista Vico is a thinker whom, some seem to believe, no one is supposed to understand. Nevertheless, his work has attracted a great deal of interest in the last decade or so, mainly through the organization of congresses and the devotion of a small but enthusiastic group of international commentators. From their efforts there begins to emerge a picture of Vico as a key figure in an alternative philosophical tradition, one that opposes the currently dominant modes of critical and (...) positivistic thought. Verene, who is one of the principal American Viconians, evokes this alternative strain in his title. It suggests in a kind of oxymoronic fashion that there is a way to speak of nonrational thought with systematic precision. Thus Vico is given an attention he is not often accorded; here he is taken as seriously as a Kant or a Heidegger. (shrink)

In this paper I want to discuss the implications of adopting different general philosophical approaches for assessing the relation between perception and imagination. In particular, I am interested in different views resulting from ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches to cognition. By ‘top down’ approaches I meanapproaches that conceive of cognition as a process or activity that is guided by intellectual or conceptual (‘top’) elements. (I consider broadly speaking Kantian accounts typical.) By ‘bottom up’ approaches I mean approaches that (...) conceive of cognition as a process that emerges from perceptual or embodied (‘bottom’)elements of cognition. (I consider phenomenological and situated cognition accounts typical.) My considerations are framed by a particular interest in the ensuing consequences of assuming different general frameworks for integrating the issue of imagination within a theory of situated cognition. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida est l’un des philosophes qui a continué à remettre en cause sérieusement les rapports théoriques et pratiques entre la philosophie et l’éducation, tout en restant hors des institutions universitaires traditionnelles en France. Dans les années 1970, il organise le GREPH (Groupe de recherches surl’enseignement philosophique) avec des enseignants et des étudiants contre la réduction de l’enseignment philosophique au lycée par le gouvernement français, et pour faire les recherches théoriques sur le lien essentiel de la philosophie à l’enseignement en (...) général. Puis, en 1983, Derrida a déployé tous ses efforts pour créer le Collège internatinal de Philosophie, institution tendant à ouvrir la nouvelle possibilité de la philosophie. Enfin, dans ses dernières années, ilintérroge l’avenir de l’université ou des Humanités à cette époque de mondialisation dans les textes comme L’Université sans condition, etc. Pour Derrida qui n’a cessé de donner ses séminaires depuis 1964, la question de l’éducation est important pour l’élaboration de sa propre philosophie. Selon lui, « je n’imagine pas de philosophie ni de recherche dissociée de son enseignement. J’ai essayé d’introduire dans cet enseignemtn de nouvelles pédagogie, de nouvelles mises en scènes, de changer la politique de l’enseignement et son rapport à la société » (Sur parole : instantanés philosophiques, Aube, 1999, p. 36). L’enseignement n’est pas un thème secondaire, mais plutôt un des questions centrales pour ses recherches philosophiques. Dans cette communication, nous allons mettre en lumière la théorie et la pratique de Derrida sur la philosphie et l’éducation, comme l’exemple le plus effectif et concret de sa conception de déconstruction. (shrink)

Dewey blurs the distinction between poetry and philosophy. This is clearest in his aesthetics where he affirms Matthew Arnold’s dictum that “poetry is criticism of life.” The maxim, though, fails to say “how poetry is a criticism.” The role of art in general is imagining and creating images of the actual beyond the possible that (from a moral perspective) ought to exist. One can derive an ought from an is if one understands the is of poetic possibility. Dewey asserts (...) that “poetry teaches us as friends and life teach, by being, and not by express intent.” He affirms that it is “by way of communication that art becomes the incomparable organ of instruction.” Blurring the distinction between poetry and philosophy requires reconsidering the character—especially the moral character—of education as cultural criticism. (shrink)

In the past few decades, ‘postmodern philosophers’ have leveled severe and sustained criticisms against “the Tradition.” They have radically put in question and undermined our traditional conceptions of Philosophy, its tasks and goals, claims and pretensions, methods and methodologies, its public image and selfimage.In short, everything that Philosophers once held dear, and that some still hold dear today, moved as they are by a quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute. As a result, many have come to view (...) these radical, postmodern criticisms as having brought on the “End of Philosophy.” If this is so, what is to be done? Where do we go from here? What are our real options? What is there left for Philosophers to do, if anything, that is worthwhile and meaningful? Do we simply accept ‘the postmodernists’ verdict,’ and simply take up whatever they have proposed to replace Philosophy? Or do we boldly and imaginatively consider an alternative? In my essay, I sketch out a 10-points proposal for a ‘philosophy’ –after the end of Philosophy—which, I contend, can only be a new kind of CriticalTheory. (shrink)

Contemporary Greeks and Arabs are heirs of a common empire which ruled the lives of their ancestors for long centuries before it ended at the beginning of the twentieth century. These heirs imagined, constructed and experienced their post-Ottoman nations in connection with the existential crises of the empire. Their national selves emerged from political and military struggles, and were fashioned by ideas about enlightenment, modernization, selfhood and emancipation. Their journeys to national statehood were shaped by the different positions they held (...) in the empire; they were marked by different givens and different circumstances. Their post-independence eras witnessed numerous challenges and faced dramatic crises. They were often internally disenchanting and externally checked by geo-political pressures. But they were experienced in total isolation from each other’s situations. Today these journeys are critically reflected upon by the intellectuals of these nation-states but almost never in conjunction with the other’s experiences, despite their geographical contiguity, significant common historical past, and many shared social mores. This study looks at how these two estranged neighbors fared after they parted ways on their independence journeys in their definitions of cultural identity and practices of cultural critique, and compares these journeys, by establishing links that were rarely, if ever, made hitherto. It focuses on the respective contemporary debates on enlightenment and emancipation that look at the early ideas of independence and progress and assess their fate in the post-independence era to our present day. The study aims at revealing the commonalities and specificities of the struggles of these nation-states for enlightenment, emancipation, progress and modernization. It helps us raise a number of questions about the meaning of enlightenment in these post-Ottoman contexts. (shrink)

The philosophers of the Hellenistic schools in ancient Greece and Rome (Epicureans, Stoics, Sceptics, Academics, Cyrenaics) made important contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology. This volume, which contains the proceedings of the Fifth Symposium Hellenisticum, describes and analyses their contributions on issues such as: the nature of perception, imagination and belief; the nature of the passions and their role in action; the relationship between mind and body; freedom and determinism; the role of (...) pleasure as a goal; the effects of poetry on belief and passion. Written with a high level of historical and philosophical scholarship, the essays are intended both for classicists and for specialists interested in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

According to Yoga Philosophy though the right knowledge of any phenomena is based on direct cognition, inference or testimony but the cognizance conjured up by words without any substance is devoid of objectivity. The consciousness is an aspect of the ultimate reality or substance, which is functioning, and manifesting itself in five progressive stages at five levels. What we experience or sense as consciousness is the first to five level experiences and the phenomenal cognizance in these stages, which can (...) be described in words, is instrumental one and modification of our mind. Therefore the state of consciousness as we experience is an out come of the five mental modes, viz. valid knowledge, error, imagination, deep sleep and recollection. So cognizance conforming to a word/language is devoid of a phenomenal object. Since we may speak of the unicorn though there is no real phenomenal object as such and thus the word/words may produce cognition, even though its object is nonexistent. The real consciousness and the study of consciousness cannot be instrumental one. The Yoga Sūtra suggests that the direct and unwavering awareness is required and that pure consciousness is devoid of any thing known by way of perception, memory, imagination, reasoning and intuition. The Consciousness in Yoga Sūtra is characterized as one of the four states of consciousness namely Vitarka accompanied by reasoning, Vicāra accompanied by reflection, Ānanda accompanied by bliss and Asmitā accompanied by sense of pure being. And then, after transcending these states of consciousness the one enters into the realm of real consciousness, that is the purest and non-intentional state of the self or the Knower or the Consciousness itself. (shrink)

This book celebrates the investigative power of phenomenology to explore the phenomenological sense of space and time in conjunction with the phenomenology of intentionality, the invisible, the sacred, and the mystical. It examines the course of life through its ontopoietic genesis, opening the cosmic sphere to logos. The work also explores, on the one hand, the intellectual drive to locate our cosmic position in the universe and, on the other, the pull toward the infinite. It intertwines science and its grounding (...) principles with imagination in order to make sense of the infinite. This work is the first of a two-part work that contains papers presented at the 62nd International Congress of Phenomenology, The Forces of the Cosmos and the Ontopoietic Genesis of Life, held in Paris, France, August 2012. It features the work of scholars in such diverse disciplines as biology, anthropology, pedagogy, and psychology who philosophically investigate the cosmic origins of beingness. Coverage in this first part includes: Toward a New Enlightenment: Metaphysics as Philosophy of Life, Transformation in Phenomenology: Husserl and Tymieniecka, Biologically Organized Quantum Vacuum and the Cosmic Origin of Cellular Life, Plotinus "Enneads" and Self-Creation, The Creative Potential of Humor, Transcendental Morphology - A Phenomenological Interpretation of Human and Non-Human Cosmos, and Cognition and Emotion: From Dichotomy to Ambiguity.. (shrink)

This work celebrates the investigative power of phenomenology to explore the phenomenological sense of space and time in conjunction with the phenomenology of intentionality, the invisible, the sacred, and the mystical. It examines the course of life through its ontopoietic genesis, opening the cosmic sphere to logos. The work also explores, on the one hand, the intellectual drive to locate our cosmic position in the universe and, on the other, the pull toward the infinite. It intertwines science and its grounding (...) principles with imagination in order to make sense of the infinite. This book is the second of a two-part work that contains papers presented at the 62nd International Congress of Phenomenology, The Forces of the Cosmos and the Ontopoietic Genesis of Life, held in Paris, France, August 2012. It features the work of scholars in such diverse disciplines as biology, anthropology, pedagogy, and psychology who philosophically investigate the cosmic origins of beingness. Coverage in this second part includes: Communicative Virtues of A-T. Tymieniecka’s Phenomenology of Life, Intentionality of Time and Quantum – Phenomenological Sense of Space, Consciousness of the Cosmos: A Thought Experiment Through Philosophy and Science Fiction, The Cosmos and Bodily Life on Earth Elucidated within the Historicity of Human Existence, Novel as Path - Mamardashvili's Lectures on Proust, and Comments on Max Scheler's Thought and Philosophical Counseling. (shrink)

This book treats ancient logic: the logic that originated in Greece by Aristotle and the Stoics, mainly in the hundred year period beginning about 350 BCE. Ancient logic was never completely ignored by modern logic from its Boolean origin in the middle 1800s: it was prominent in Boole’s writings and it was mentioned by Frege and by Hilbert. Nevertheless, the first century of mathematical logic did not take it seriously enough to study the ancient logic texts. A renaissance in ancient (...) logic studies occurred in the early 1950s with the publication of the landmark Aristotle’s Syllogistic by Jan Łukasiewicz, Oxford UP 1951, 2nd ed. 1957. Despite its title, it treats the logic of the Stoics as well as that of Aristotle. Łukasiewicz was a distinguished mathematical logician. He had created many-valued logic and the parenthesis-free prefix notation known as Polish notation. He co-authored with Alfred Tarski’s an important paper on metatheory of propositional logic and he was one of Tarski’s the three main teachers at the University of Warsaw. Łukasiewicz’s stature was just short of that of the giants: Aristotle, Boole, Frege, Tarski and Gödel. No mathematical logician of his caliber had ever before quoted the actual teachings of ancient logicians. -/- Not only did Łukasiewicz inject fresh hypotheses, new concepts, and imaginative modern perspectives into the field, his enormous prestige and that of the Warsaw School of Logic reflected on the whole field of ancient logic studies. Suddenly, this previously somewhat dormant and obscure field became active and gained in respectability and importance in the eyes of logicians, mathematicians, linguists, analytic philosophers, and historians. Next to Aristotle himself and perhaps the Stoic logician Chrysippus, Łukasiewicz is the most prominent figure in ancient logic studies. A huge literature traces its origins to Łukasiewicz. -/- This Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, is based on the 1973 Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, the first conference devoted entirely to critical assessment of the state of ancient logic studies. (shrink)

In this Monograph, Eva Bonda proposes a new theory of the sense of ‘touch’ in Aristotle’s foundational treatise ‘Περὶ Ψυχῆς’ (On the Soul). The author argues that a delve into the aristoteleian lexicon reveals an intrinsically dialectical theory of the senses, that of all senses being reduced to ‘touch’ either as an experience of polysensoriality or synaeshthesia or of remote sensing touch. ‘Touch’ becomes in Aristotle the thread connecting the matter to its transmutation into the abstract mind. On the basis (...) of neuroimaging results, Eva Bonda describes how the human brain codes, as intangible cognitive phenomena, the body image and the memory through touch. The Monograph is based in Author’s participation at the 2016 World Conference ‘Aristotle 2400 years from his birth’, organized by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki in Greece on 23-28 May 2016. The Congress, in celebration of the 2400th anniversary from Aristotle’s birth, was held in ancient Stageira, the birthplace of Aristotle (born c. 384 BCE) and in ancient Mieza, the place where Aristotle taught Alexander the Great. //Evangelia-Eva Bonda, PhD is Founder and CEO of Neuroaisthesis, a Cognitive Neuroscience Research Company based in Paris since 2005. She has expertise in Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging, Primate Neuroanatomy, and Clinical Psychotherapy. She studied and conducted research at McGill University in Canada, Université Pierre & Marie Curie in Paris, University of California at Davis and Washingthon University in Saint-Louis in USA, and at Psychology UCL and Crystallography Birkbeck College, University of London, UK. She pioneered neuroimaging experiments in the human brain. Peer-reviewed, 21 illustrations. Available on AMAZON. (shrink)

Imagine, if you can, St. Augustine convening a council in the year 430 and announcing, "Sorry, the eschaton has been cancelled. Moreover, the City of Man, with a little time and effort, will gradually transform itself into the City of God." Now imagine the dismay of certain French communists in 1976 when their party’s 22nd Congress dropped the goal of the dictatorship of the proletariat and proclaimed its dedication to a "democratic road to socialism." This imperfect analogy may allow us (...) to sense the passion that motivates Etienne Balibar’s attack on the PCF’s decision and his defense of an orthodox reading of Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Franz Brentano and Intentional Inexistence LINDA L. McALISTER FRANZBRnrCrXr~O,in his important early work Psychologie vom empirischen Stand, punkt (1874), maintains that all human experience is divided into two classes: mental phenomena and physical phenomena,x It is then incumbent upon him to show how these two classes of phenomena are to be distinguished one from another. In Book II, Chapter 1, of the Psychologie, he devotes him.self to this task, (...) and in the course of the chapter he surveys several different ways of making out the distinction. After enumerating examples of men~l phenomena and of physical phenomena, he searches for defining characteristics of mental phenomena. He finds several charac, teristics which he thinks all mental phenomena have and all physical phenomena lack or vice versa, but far and away the most important of these, in Brentano's estimation, and the one whdch has aroused the most interest on the part of later philosophers, is what he calls "intentional inexistence," 2 (or merely "intentional existence"; the prefix "in-" does not indicate negation but rathor location, indicating existence in the mind). As examples of mental phenomena Brentano lists first ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen), whether sensory or issuing from the imagination, and by this he meam not the objects which are presented or which one has before one's mind, but rather the condition or, what Brentano; broadly speaking, calls the act of having such an idea or presentation.3 Thus the acts of hearing something, or seeing or perceiving something would be mental phenomena regardless of whether the object which is, e. g., seen, ds perceived through the visual organs or seen in the mind's eye, so to speak. Other examples are acts of judgment, amongwhich Brentano includes ~:emembering, inferring, believing, doubting; and emotions.such as being happy or sad, lovi~,g and hating, along with which Brentano includes such things as willing, intending, choosing, etc.4 i Oskar Kraus, e.d.,2nd ed. (Leipzig,1924),I, 109. Psych. I, 137. Psych. I, 111. " Psych. I, 112. [423] 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ExamFles of physical phenomena which Brentano mentions are "a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I perceive; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination." s It appears from the examFles, then, that mental phenomena are all mental acts, in a broad sense, while physical phenomena are, strictly speaking, all instances of sensible qualities, the inclusion of "a landscape" being, apparently, a slip on Brentano's part, as his student, friend and editor Oskar Kraus points out. 6 As mentioned above, Brentano thought that there is one partieula~ mark of mental phenomena which characterizes them better than any other: Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (by which you should not take me to mean a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something in itself as an object, though they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affmned or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.7 Commentators, perhaps not surprisingly, have disagreed as to the precise nature of the view which Brentano is enunciating in this passage,s Some have supposed that since you can think of, hate, or judge, etc., things which do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, then the immanent object of which Brentano speaks i,s not Pegasus but a "thoughtof Pegasus" (gedachtes Pegasus) which exists in one's mind whenever someone th'mks of Pegasus. Apparently H6fler interpreted the doctrine in this way in a paper which he presented to the Fifth International Psychology Congress in 1905.9.In the light of some passages from Brentano's early writings it appears to be a plausible interpretation. Consider, for example, the following passage: There cannot be anyone who contemplates an A unless there is a contemplated A; and conversely.... The two concepts are not identical but they... (shrink)

The eighth Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophic de Langue Française at Toulouse, which, I should perhaps explain, was the first gathering of its sort to which I have been, was just about as unlike a Joint Session as an English philosopher might well have imagined it to be. Many of the differences arose naturally from the simple facts that French philosophy is very unlike British and that philosophers in France are greeted with banquets, civic receptions, concerts and other hospitable (...) entertainments when they meet together in congress. But there are other differences too. For one thing, the contributions are not only as a rule very different in content; they are also different in form. A general theme is set with a certain number of sub–headings. Then anybody who wishes may submit a “communication,” having if possible at least some appearance of relevance to the titular theme–though if this is not possible, it doesn't seem to matter very much as it may be included all the same. Obviously enough, if some share of the available space and time is to be given to every philosopher who wants it, , nobody is going to get very much. The result of all this is to be seen for this year in the Acts of the Congress L'Homme et son prochain , where hardly any of the no less than 76 contributors has more than four pages to himself. In the circumstances it would have been wholly surprising if such Acts had turned out to be anything other than a mainly tedious assortment of mostly undistinguished fragments, which is not, I fear, likely to prove of much interest to any reader of this Survey; which is a pity, as it is not only the receptions and the outings that make this Congress worth attending. (shrink)

The latest philosophy of P. Ricoeur offers us the opportunity to articulate an ethic applied responsive to the challenges of our time. This proposal is basically collected in his book The fair 2, a compilation of work and consolidating core issues of practical philosophy. Part of an original sense of justice where "the rightthing" does not arise as a name or abstract category, but as a sustantivated adjective. This is not an abstract value but a value whose scope, (...) accuracy and meaning depends on its realization in the unity of human life. Retrieving the original sense already appeared in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, as just described, defines and conducts the practice of justice. This analysis is productive in applied ethics because it raises the "implementation" of an original and original is not a post or outside the foundation, but an exercise in interpretation and philosophical creativity morality. By understanding and applied ethics, through what we find just the issues central to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: an anthropology of the human being capable, a hermeneutics of action and imagination, a reconstruction of the history of practical philosophy, and also an ethic of fair distance. (shrink)

The latest philosophy of P. Ricoeur offers us the opportunity to articulate an ethic applied responsive to the challenges of our time. This proposal is basically collected in his book The fair 2, a compilation of work and consolidating core issues of practical philosophy. Part of an original sense of justice where "the rightthing" does not arise as a name or abstract category, but as a sustantivated adjective. This is not an abstract value but a value whose scope, (...) accuracy and meaning depends on its realization in the unity of human life. Retrieving the original sense already appeared in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, as just described, defines and conducts the practice of justice. This analysis is productive in applied ethics because it raises the "implementation" of an original and original is not a post or outside the foundation, but an exercise in interpretation and philosophical creativity morality. By understanding and applied ethics, through what we find just the issues central to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: an anthropology of the human being capable, a hermeneutics of action and imagination, a reconstruction of the history of practical philosophy, and also an ethic of fair distance. (shrink)

Developed from two reports to seminars organized by the Congress of Cultural Freedom, in 1962 and 1963, The Art of Conjecture constitues a programmatic document for the work of Futuribles, a team of intellectuals collecting materials on the role of the social sciences. The intellectual fabric of this work are woven with a fine mixture of hard-nosed mathematical analysis, derived from demographic and economic forecast, and less accurate, more imaginative, modelings for short and long term social forecast. Much of the (...) book is devoted to an analysis of common and special conceptions of the future. Here lies the greatest philosophical interest of this work. The method pivots around techniques of long term economic forecasting. The political and human aspects are ever present in the course of the study. Toward the end the author asks himself, and us, the question: should forecast be based on technological sources alone? The question has already been answered in such brilliant chapters as, "The Conditions of Political Foreseeability," "The Ecology of Social Ideas," "The Social Career of Ideas," "The Force of Moral Ideas," and "Empirical Relations between Ideas."—A. M. (shrink)

The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty (...) with accepting the existence of an explanation for an immoral action is based on the difficulty we have identifying with the immoral person. Fiction gives us the narrative required to engage in this imagination, and thus facilitates the construction of explanations. I conclude that rather than being immoral to construct an explanation for the terrorist attacks, it is the first step toward fighting terrorism. (shrink)

The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty (...) with accepting the existence of an explanation for an immoral action is based on the difficulty we have identifying with the immoral person. Fiction gives us the narrative required to engage in this imagination, and thus facilitates the construction of explanations. I conclude that rather than being immoral to construct an explanation for the terrorist attacks, it is the first step toward fighting terrorism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the central theme of this conference and discusses how higher education can help us in accomplishing our humanization. It looks at the critical educational theory of Herbert Marcuse, and examines his notion of the dis-alienating power of the aesthetic imagination. In his view, aesthetic education can become the foundation of a re-humanizing critical theory. I question the epistemological underpinnings of Marcuse's educational philosophy and suggest an alternative intellectual framework for interpreting and releasing the emancipatory (...) power of education. (shrink)

In this paper I will present Arendt’s concept of judging as related to imagination. Her concept of judging is rooted in Kant’s philosophy, yet bears the potential for the political account of the particular. Inserted in the ongoing debate in intercultural philosophy, as of how to take into account particular circumstances, this paper offers an insight into moral judgment as a possible corrective to normative politics. Reflecting on lived politics through moral judgment in particular situations, this paper (...) highlights the importance of imagination and experience for individual decisions. Bearing as a horizon the intercultural debates it refers only to the question as of how particulars can be taken into account in a political intercultural debate. (shrink)

Anti-essentialism, antiuniversalism, anti-foundationalism, fragmentation of subjectivity, pluralization of truths are feared to entail the danger of forfeiture of possibilities for critical counter discourses. But the deconstruction of categories is not inevitably the death of politics; rather, the postmodernist intervention of canonical power /knowledge alliances facilitates the recovery of "other" strategies of resistance concerning world problems from "nonconventional" sources that have hitherto been invalidated by mainstream discourses. Thus the crisis triggered by postmodern critique could hold immense opportunities for new configurations of (...) politics to emerge through micro-politics of permanent resistance and diversification of discourses of subversion. Political activism today stands in a complicated parasitical relationship of debt and defiance vis-ä-vis the postmodernist discourse, which, despite many shortcomings, does offer possibilities of thinking the "Other". To this end, I seek to go back into the history of philosophy and reclaim tools of resistance from "different" cultural contexts to revitalize and re-imagine our oppositional practices in the present. This paper attempts to experiment with the concept of non-violence [Ahimsa) as conceptualized within the Indian philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In the poetics of Gaston Bachelard, the natural images, especially the four elements (fire, water, air, earth), occupy the eminent place for literary imagination. Under this main frame, this paper tries to present the relation of ethics and aesthetics in focusing on the ethical image as a synthetic concept. It also argues that the poetic imagination in Bachelard presupposes a metaphysical base managing the being, the force, the will, and the action. There is a dynamic structure in this (...) metaphysics of imagination. Notwithstanding the usual separation of different spheres in philosophy, Bachelard urges a primary fusion in the cosmic scale, i.e.the world and the human are communicative and correspondent. Taking these principles into consideration, this paper explores the topological dimension in those poetic images of elements and space. The ontological sense of being-there is evaluated by the dynamic function of “there” in restoring its ethical meaning. Likewise, the terms “in front of the fire”, “before the water”, “in the water” are given the topological accents. The verticality indicating the dynamic function of the flight, of the falling, and of standing upright is topologically effective. In accordance to the verticality, the concept of survival contains an effect of surpassing the existential conditions, the prefix “sur-“ means that tentative of the higher degree. In sum, the cosmicity as the very place of ethical and ontological unificationreveals Bachelard’s concern on the imaginative transformation of the personality, the appropriation in the cosmos. (shrink)

En regardant en arriere ä l'itineraire philosophique de Ricceur, nous sommes tentes d'y saisir une logique de developpement qui semble decrire un mouvement en Spirale. C'est pourquoi dans des ouvrages les plus tardifs nous trouvons un retour de cette recherche sur la volonte - inscrite en fait dans le cadre d'une anthropologic philosophique - qui avait inspire son projet de jeunesse. Appelons-le 'mouvement en Spirale' et non : retour circulaire aux origines, car entre le debut et la fin i l (...) n'y a pas de coincidence mais enrichissement apres un long detour ä travers l'univers du langage et de la textualite. II ne s'agit pas pour autant d'imaginer une suite du genre : Philosophie de la volonte, hermeneutique, ä nouveau Philosophie de la volonte ou de Taction. Le terrain de l'hermeneutique, une fois conquis, n'est en realite jamais abandonne, dans la mesure oü i l est impossible de se passer de la mediation du langage. Le phenomene se donnant grace au pouvoir revelatif du langage nous permet de saisir les multiples aspects de l'homme agissant et souffrant. La Philosophie de Ricceur, est, plus qu'une "Philosophie du langage", une "philosophie ä travers le langage", c'est-ä-dire qu'elle traverse le phenomene du langage dans toute sa richesse sans jamais oublier qu'ä travers le langage nous parlons de quelque chose et que le langage ne doit pas devenir - si non pour une abstraction deliberee et consciente - un Systeme clos en lui-meme sans reference au monde et aux interlocuteurs du discours : cette consideration reste valable meme par rapport au dernier ouvrage oü la dialectique entre memoire et histoire est toujours liee ä la dialectique entre discours oral et discours ecrit et done au double travail de l'ecriture et de la lecture. Notre hypothese de travail est qu'on pourrait retrouver dans cette traversee du langage une sequence ä la fois historique (selon l'ordre de la decouverte) et theorique (selon un certain ordre hermeneutique) de trois paradigmes : Symbole, texte, traduction, qui nous donnent une sorte de boussole pour nous orienter au cours du long voyage. (shrink)

En regardant en arriere ä l'itineraire philosophique de Ricceur, nous sommes tentes d'y saisir une logique de developpement qui semble decrire un mouvement en Spirale. C'est pourquoi dans des ouvrages les plus tardifs nous trouvons un retour de cette recherche sur la volonte - inscrite en fait dans le cadre d'une anthropologic philosophique - qui avait inspire son projet de jeunesse. Appelons-le 'mouvement en Spirale' et non : retour circulaire aux origines, car entre le debut et la fin i l (...) n'y a pas de coincidence mais enrichissement apres un long detour ä travers l'univers du langage et de la textualite. II ne s'agit pas pour autant d'imaginer une suite du genre : Philosophie de la volonte, hermeneutique, ä nouveau Philosophie de la volonte ou de Taction. Le terrain de l'hermeneutique, une fois conquis, n'est en realite jamais abandonne, dans la mesure oü i l est impossible de se passer de la mediation du langage. Le phenomene se donnant grace au pouvoir revelatif du langage nous permet de saisir les multiples aspects de l'homme agissant et souffrant. La Philosophie de Ricceur, est, plus qu'une "Philosophie du langage", une "philosophie ä travers le langage", c'est-ä-dire qu'elle traverse le phenomene du langage dans toute sa richesse sans jamais oublier qu'ä travers le langage nous parlons de quelque chose et que le langage ne doit pas devenir - si non pour une abstraction deliberee et consciente - un Systeme clos en lui-meme sans reference au monde et aux interlocuteurs du discours : cette consideration reste valable meme par rapport au dernier ouvrage oü la dialectique entre memoire et histoire est toujours liee ä la dialectique entre discours oral et discours ecrit et done au double travail de l'ecriture et de la lecture. Notre hypothese de travail est qu'on pourrait retrouver dans cette traversee du langage une sequence ä la fois historique (selon l'ordre de la decouverte) et theorique (selon un certain ordre hermeneutique) de trois paradigmes : Symbole, texte, traduction, qui nous donnent une sorte de boussole pour nous orienter au cours du long voyage. (shrink)

With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors. Specifically, only certain kinds of metaphors can (...) be accommodated in the antecedents of conditionals, and even then only within a restricted class of conditionals. This paper focuses on the linguistic tension between metaphors and conditionals. I argue that this echoes a tension at the heart of philosophy between two modes of philosophizing: a speculative-revisionary mode that is metaphorical and an analytic-explanatory mode that is conditional. The tasks are generally complementary so that the difference can be ignored with impunity. However, if we do not respect that difference, we may find ourselves analyzing metaphors and seeing logical analyses as metaphorical, and thus missing the point on both fronts. (shrink)

The purpose of the present essay is to explain how the basic notions of Modern philosophy, forming Descartes’ optimistic attitude towards knowledge and human relations, were altered in order to be critically implemented into Vico’s more sober teaching. Several decades after Descartes took up the fight against skepticism, an Italian thinker, Giambattista Vico, critically approached the Cartesian project of Modernity. While Descartes believed that the essence of a human being consists in applying reason properly and using free will according (...) to its guidance in order to achieve the greatest success in science, mathematics, and philosophy, Vico insisted that human imagination and ingenuity ought to be directed to the humanities and legal studies and should aim at practical results. This was the eighteenth century Humanistic reply to Descartes. (shrink)

The division of the soul and its perceptions are of the most important problems that attracted Ibn Sina`s interest. Ibn Sina held that there are three kinds of the soul: vegeterian, animal, and rational soul, among which only the rational one is immaterial. The main reason of its immateriality is its perception of the inteligibles. Other perceptions are somehow immaterial, that is, perception at the stage of the sense is not abstracted from the mater and its appendixes and at the (...) stage of imagination is abstracted from the mater and not from its appendixes and at the stage of intelligence it is abstracted from both mater and itsappendixes. And so this kind of perception is completely abstracted. Among philosophers who have discussed the problem of mind body distinction, there have been few philosophers who have presented certain proofs for the abstraction of the soul. But this issue was treated in Islamic philosophy. Moslim philosophers have extended the proofs of Plato's Phaedo and the best proof theirs proofs was the simplicity of perception that has been mentioned in Ibn Sina`s works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Professional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political ChangeWilliam WalkerProfessional Correctness: Literary Studies and Political Change, by Stanley Fish; xi & 146 pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, $22.00 paper.Our greatest living Miltonist, Professor Fish, continues to address the most hotly contested issues of the profession of literary criticism in prose which, if perhaps not quite the best in Anglo-American literary studies as he once judged it to be, is certainly (...) distinguished by coherence, power, and wit. In this version of material he presented in a workshop at the Folger Library in 1990 and as the Clarendon Lectures at Oxford University in 1993, Fish analyzes the relationship between literary criticism and political change. By literary criticism, he means the activity of determining what a literary text means. According to Fish, while in the eighteenth century just about any kind of commentary on literature counted as literary criticism, the determination of the meaning of literature is the essential job of literary criticism in the twentieth century. By political change, Fish means changes in things such as the way governments spend money, treat their citizens and foreign governments, establish the civil law, and appoint people to office. The major claim of the book is that doing literary criticism in the United States today rarely causes political change. The counsel he offers to all those literary critics who want to bring about political change through their literary work is thus to find a new job: “if you want to send a message that will be heard beyond the academy, get out of it” (p. 2).But why can’t observing that Lycidas means that Milton is afraid of women help to overthrow patriarchy and the legal/cultural system which continues to perpetuate it? Because, Fish claims, “there are, at present, no well-established routes by which literary criticism is first brought to the attention of those who inhabit the centers of power and then presented to them in a way that ties it to their concerns” (p. 52). That is to say that it is because American society is structured in a particular way that literary interpretive acts are politically inconsequential. Though he does not provide much evidence for this big claim about the structure of American society and its relation to literary criticism, Fish does support it by asking us to see the absurdity of imagining otherwise: “think about it. You are about to open a new business or introduce a bill in Congress or initiate an advertising campaign, but you pause to ask yourself, ‘What would the readers of Diacritics say?’” (p. 91). This is not to say that the segregation of literary work from political work is a given of the human condition. Fish cites Renaissance England and contemporary Israel as cases of societies structured in such a way that literary acts have immediate and important political consequences (though literary acts and political acts in these societies are still clearly distinct because their purposes are still different). The point is just that, because American society is currently structured as it is, the activity of identifying the meaning of works of literature is rarely [End Page 544] relevant to political change. The point holds even when one shifts the center of literary work from determining the meaning of literature to (i) observing how literature and the act of professing it are deeply implicated in society-wide structures of power and legitimization, or (ii) observing and “transcending” the boundaries between literary criticism and other disciplines. That is to say that even if one were to transform literary criticism in the way new historicists and several proponents of cultural studies whom Fish cites propose, work in this discipline would still rarely cause significant political change. For the contingent fact is that, regardless of what academics do, think they do, and intend to do, “no one cares very much about literary criticism outside the confines of its professional practice” (p. 55).But if literary criticism cannot, at least for the moment in the U.S., do significant political work, and if, as Fish also claims, it cannot do significant moral, cultural work (making people better, preserving the best that is said... (shrink)

Rawls' original position is a thought experiment by which we are asked to imagine ourselves as rational agents choosing the principles of justice under specific informational and motivational constraints. In this paper, I am concerned only with the informational constraints and I shall argue that the way Rawls designed them reveals an implausible conception of mind and knowledge. This conception, of a mind separable from knowledge, as well as one of its correlates which I will call epistemic egalitarianism, is not (...) an objection one may address uniquely to the original position. However, the failure to construct the original position as a one-solution problem renders its epistemology not only implausible but of no use for moral reasoning. (shrink)