The article analyzes how American philosopher Charles Peirce understands the concept of reality. He identifies the real as that which is independent of what any individual thinks about it and as a type of cognition and as the object of inquiry. Obtrusive realism and projective realism are the two central elements in Peirce's thoughts on reality. A set of problems relating to Peirce's assumption that inquiry must ultimately focus on true beliefs about reality is also presented.

A frequent criticism of the neuroscientific approach to consciousness is that its theories describe only 'correlates' or 'analogues' of consciousness, and so fail to address the nature of consciousness itself. Despite its apparent logical simplicity, this criticism in fact relies on some substantive assumptions about the nature and evolution of scientific explanations. In particular, it is usually assumed that, in expressing correlations, neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) theories must fail to capture the causal structure relating brain and mind. Drawing on (...) work in the history and philosophy of science, I argue that this assumption - along with the related claim that even a correct NCC theory would fail to explain consciousness - is grounded in an inadequate conception of the way in which scientific explanations develop. Examination of parallel developments in 20th century biology reveals that, under the right circumstances, seemingly crude correspondences can play an essential role in scientific discovery and can sometimes become central to our everyday understanding of the phenomena in question. A proper understanding of this process clarifies the value of NCC theories and sheds light on the standards by which they should be evaluated. In closing, I describe two specific criteria for evaluating NCC proposals: intertheoretic bridge potential and detailed mapping. (shrink)

Three questions motivate this project: How does science come to explain elusive, abstract concepts such as 'life' and 'mind'? From the failure of vitalist theories in the early 20th century, can anything be inferred about modern dualist theories of mind? And can the history of the life sciences provide any positive methodological guidance for approaching the problem of consciousness? ;The sciences of life and mind span many levels of analysis, and thus raise philosophical questions about inter-level explanation and integration. I (...) argue that the usual way of framing such questions is inadequate, and propose an alternative: the Domain Integration model, which places a greater emphasis on the structure and dynamics of scientific inquiry rather than on the relations among scientific theories . I then put the model to use in an extended investigation of historical advances in the sciences of life and mind, with a special focus on the interplay of mechanist and holist research strategies. This investigation is structured by an analogy between vitalism and dualism, and one of its goals is to illustrate the process whereby seemingly insurmountable conceptual barriers to scientific explanation are eventually surmounted. ;Turning to more theoretical issues, I argue that 'reducibility' is an implausible and unuseful standard of inter-level connectivity, and that Domain Integration is better suited to the task of describing the actual structure of evolving, multi-level sciences. In a related analysis I demonstrate that materialism and dualism, traditionally construed as claims about the ultimate structure of reality, become more coherent and useful when reinterpreted as methodological commitments to integrationist or anti-integrationist research strategies. Both positions remain tenable on this reinterpretation, but methodological materialism is substantially easier to justify. Finally, I apply this framework to the problem of consciousness, arguing that the goal of inquiry should be to close the conceptual gap between mental and physical, and that views which urge us to take consciousness as "basic" or "fundamental" are therefore deeply misguided. Drawing again on the historical analogy with biology, I conclude that a methodology of incremental, multifactorial, integrationist explanation of consciousness is possible, desirable---and underway. (shrink)

Short commentary on Christian de Quincey' paper.

What are dreams for? Why do we spend part of every night experiencing crazy stories, which we remember only dimly upon awakening? Where do these stories come from, and what do they mean? Most traditional answers assume dreams are really stories, in the sense that they have a meaning and are told for a reason.

Reviews the book 'The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness', edited by Stanislas Dehaene.