In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.

This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.

If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a premise (...) of such disagreement among evolutionary counterparts. -/- In this paper, I resist the threat from disagreement by showing that, on some of the most influential and most attractive theories of content determination, the premise of moral disagreement cannot serve any skeptical or revisionary purposes. I examine and criticize attempts, made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street, to argue from disagreement to relativism by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that, within certain constraints, maximizes the attribution to us of true beliefs. And I examine and criticize Robert Williams’s attempt to show there is moral disagreement by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that instead maximizes the attribution to us of rationality. My overall aim is to defend commonsense moral realism via a careful look at the theory of content and concepts. (shrink)

[The Mechanics of Sorcery in the Context of Deceptive-Imitative Poetry] When we inquire as to how people could have a perverted preference for ignorance over knowledge, Plato’s statement that people are deprived of true opinions only against their will provides us with an essential clue for starting out: Depriving a person of something against their will is only possible by theft, by spells of sorcery, or by force. Victims of sorcery alter their opinions under the spell of pleasure or are (...) terrified by fear. However, the “sorcery” mentioned here is not a mysterious effect, but rather the deterioration of the harmony established between the three aspects of the soul in favor of appetite. The measure and harmony in the cosmos apply to the fundamental principles of the human soul, and rhythm is engraved on the soul as the protector of measure and harmony. Rhythmic speech is the reflection of “divine language” in the human world; the poet of the ancient period was the interpreter of the “sacred language” through which the divine word appeared. When the poet and the poetry both degenerate, the poet is reduced to nothing more than a common diviner or sorcerer. Since he knows nothing but how to imitate, he embellishes his work with colors from ancient arts. He speaks his words in rhythm, measure, and harmony in order to deceive reason, which is the aspect of our soul that is most prone to measurement and calculation. This is how the poet paralyzes it. Therefore, imitative poetry vitiates our soul “without even our souls hearing it”. (shrink)

White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...) is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness. (shrink)

Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.

It can easily look like evolution is in a better position to explain the reliability of our perceptual beliefs than the reliability of our moral beliefs. This paper takes a closer look at the issue and argues that there’s no reason—no reason which armchair philosophers could uncover—to think evolution can better explain perceptual reliability than moral reliability. It also offers a diagnosis of why it seemed otherwise. The diagnosis concerns our need to use the truth predicate as a generalizing logical (...) device in the perceptual case but not in the moral case. (shrink)

Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.

In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...) the paper, I then argue, on the basis of epistemic communism, for a view about rationality itself. I set up the argument in section 2 by saying what a theory of rational deduction is supposed to do. I claim that such a theory would provide a necessary, sufficient, and explanatorily unifying condition for being a rational rule for inferring deductive consequences. I argue in section 3 that, given epistemic communism and the conventionality that it entails, there is no such theory. Nothing explains why certain rules for deductive reasoning are rational. (shrink)

This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation (...) of this approach that lifts the requirement of certainty in all logical truths, the view becomes vacuous, issuing no requirements on rational believers at all. Finally, I develop and endorse a new solution to the problem. This view proposes dynamic norms for reasoning with credences. The solution is based on an old proposal of Ian Hacking’s that says you’re required to be sensitive to logical facts only when you know they are logical facts. (shrink)

A Boltzmann Brain, haphazardly formed through the unlikely but still possible random assembly of physical particles, is a conscious brain having experiences just like an ordinary person. The skeptical possibility of being a Boltzmann Brain is an especially gripping one: scientific evidence suggests our actual universe’s full history may ultimately contain countless short-lived Boltzmann Brains with experiences just like yours or mine. I propose a solution to the skeptical challenge posed by these countless actual Boltzmann Brains. My key idea is (...) roughly this: the skeptical argument that you’re one of the Boltzmann Brains requires you to make a statistical inference, but the Principle of Total Evidence blocks us from making the inference. I discuss how my solution contrasts with a recent suggestion, made by Sean Carroll and David Chalmers, for how to address the skeptical challenge posed by Boltzmann Brains. And I discuss how my solution handles certain relevant concerns about what to do when we have higher-order evidence indicating that our first-order evidence is misleading. (shrink)

I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...) belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it. (shrink)

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of (...) reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. (shrink)

True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...) in terms of interpretations or models, a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference. (shrink)

Abu Hanifa's theological ideas were not represented at the same level in every region where Hanafism spread. Although Iraq is the region where Abu Hanifa's jurisprudence views were systematized, Abu Hanifa's theological views were largely developed in the Transoxiana region. However, followers of Abu Hanifa in different regions adopted and defended the distinctive views of Hanafism. However, while in some regions these views were limited to basic theological ideas, in others a systematization was made based on this and thus a (...) comprehensive theological structure was formed. The followers of Abu Hanifa in the Transoxiana region are among the leading Hanafis who established a traditional theological structure around his views. This theological structure, which was called Maturidism in the process, was limited to the region where it was born for a long time and was spread to the west from the 11th century. When the Maturidis, who had a rich literature, came to the west, they encountered small and scattered Hanafi masses who regarded the theological views of the sect as consisting of basic theological ideas. Although they belong to the same fiqh tradition, this theological difference between them has created a new ground on which the two Hanafi factions will interact. With the power of their theological knowledge, the Maturidis tried to include the Hanafis in Iraq and Syria in their theological traditions with the texts they wrote as well as their teaching activities. Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Ghaznawi (d. after 593/1197), one of the Maturidis who migrated to the west, draws attention as one of the names that took part in this effort. His works called Usul al-din and al-Hawi al-qudsi are the first examples where this effort is clearly reflected in the texts. In these works, al-Ghaznawi uses the phrases of al-Aqīdah al-Tahawiyyah either exactly or with some minor changes, and adds Maturidi-specific views, especially the attribute of takwin. With this, al-Ghaznawi, on the one hand, reveals the compatibility of al-Aqīdah, which is the main text of non-Maturidi Hanafis, with Maturidi views, on the other hand, carries the Maturidi views to them with the expressions he added to the text. In this study, this activity of Ghaznawi, which can be described as a synthesis of al-Aqīdah al-Tahawiyyah and Maturidism, will be tried to be revealed in detail through the mentioned works. (shrink)

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive (...) reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning. (shrink)

David Lewis (1974, 1994/1999) proposed to reduce the facts about mental representation to facts about sensory evidence, dispositions to act, and rationality. Recently, Robert Williams (2020) and Adam Pautz (2021) have taken up and developed Lewis’s project in sophisticated and novel ways. In this paper, we aim to present, clarify, and ultimately object to the core thesis that they all build their own views around. The different sophisticated developments and defenses notwithstanding, we think the core thesis is vulnerable. We pose (...) a dilemma by considering the two sides of a current epistemological controversy over the relation between evidence and rational belief: permissivism vs. uniqueness. As we argue, the prospects for the Lewisian project look dim when either supposition is clearly made. (shrink)

We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem (...) of forgotten evidence. (shrink)

I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.

Nūr Muḥammad is one of the teachings in Sufism that studies the beginning of the creation of the universe. The Sufis discussed Nūr Muḥammad through God's tajallī (manifestation), and they believed that only Insan Kamil (Perfect Humans) possessed the perfection of His tajallī. This Sufi theory can be comprehended through the dhawqi approach. This research will deal with Nūr Muḥammad's theory of Sufism through the perspective of Tijaniyah Tarekat. The data for this study was obtained through library research utilizing a (...) documentary technique. The collected data will be analyzed using the descriptive analysis method. This study finds that the Tijaniyah Tarekat is a Sufism institution that bases its teachings and practices on the concept of Nūr Muḥammad in the form of ṣalawāt al-fātiḥ and ṣalawāt jawharah al-kamāl. This Tarekat's elucidation of Nūr Muḥammad is also built on and consistent with the explication of authoritative Sufis in Islam's intellectual and spiritual tradition. (shrink)

After briefly expositing some fundamental issues in current debates about apriority, I go on to critically examine meaning-based explanations of how we acquire apriori justification.

Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...) senses are reliably veridical, where that warrant is one we enjoy by default, that is, without relying on any evidence or engaging in any positive argument. The problem with this form of Rationalism is that, even if you have default knowledge that your senses are reliable, this is not adequate to rule out every kind of skeptical scenario. The problem is created by one-off skeptical scenarios, scenarios that involve a highly reliable perceiver who, by a pure fluke, has a one-off, non-veridical experience. I claim you cannot infer that your present perceptual experience is veridical just on the basis of knowledge of your general reliability. More generally, if you infer that the present F is G, just on the basis of your knowledge that most Fs are Gs, this is what I call statistical inference, and, as I argue, statistical inference by itself does not generate knowledge. I defend this view of statistical inference against objections, including the objection that radical skepticism about our ordinary inductive knowledge will follow unless statistical inference generates knowledge. (shrink)

This paper aims to accessibly present, and then critique, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber's recent proposals for the evolutionary function of human reasoning. I take a critical look at the main source of experimental evidence that they claim as support for their view, namely the confirmation or “myside” bias in reasoning. I object that Mercier and Sperber did not adequately argue for a claim that their case rests on, namely that it is evolutionarily advantageous for you to get other people (...) to believe whatever you antecedently believe. And I give my own argument that this claim is false. I also critically look at their suggestion that reasoning has a justificatory function, functioning as a kind of reputation management tool. I argue this suggestion does not amount to a plausible evolutionary function. (shrink)

We debate whether permissivism is true. We start off by assuming an accuracy-oriented framework, and then discuss metaepistemological questions about how our epistemic evaluations promote accuracy.

This paper argues that the Qur’an must be understood as an anti-capitalist text. The Qur’an contains many verses that declare unequivocally the accumulation of wealth and monopoly ownership, either by the one person or one group, to be highly problematic ethically and socially. Qur’anic verses attend frequently to the issues of ownership and the accumulation of wealth. In the first years of the revelation and particularly before the Prophet’s migration to Mecca, the Qur’an discusses frequently the issue of ownership. Before (...) the migration, the Qur’an taught mainly about the exploitative nature of the existing economic system while, in the post-migration era, the Qur’an laid the foundation of a new system in which the accumulation of wealth and ownership monopoly are central causes of ethical and social degeneration. The Qur’an regards the redistribution of wealth to be both a religious duty and an ethical obligation. (shrink)

Visual cryptography is a cryptographic technique that allows visual information to be encrypted so that the human optical system can perform the decryption without any cryptographic computation. The halftone visual cryptography scheme (HVCS) is a type of visual cryptography (VC) that encodes the secret image into halftone images to produce secure and meaningful shares. However, the HVC scheme has many unsolved problems, such as pixel expansion, low contrast, cross-interference problem, and difficulty in managing share images. This article aims to enhance (...) the visual quality and avoid the problems of cross-interference and pixel expansion of the share images. It introduces a novel optimization of color halftone visual cryptography (OCHVC) scheme by using two proposed techniques: hash codebook and construction techniques. The new techniques distribute the information pixels of a secret image into a halftone cover image randomly based on a bat optimization algorithm. The results show that these techniques have enhanced security levels and make the proposed OCHVC scheme more robust against different attacks. The OCHVC scheme achieves mean squared error (MSE) of 95.0%, peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of 28.3%, normalized cross correlation (NCC) of 99.4%, and universal quality index (UQI) of 99.3% on average for the six shares. Subsequently, the experiment results based on image quality metrics show improvement in size, visual quality, and security for retrieved secret images and meaningful share images of the OCHVC scheme. Comparing the proposed OCHVC with some related works shows that the OCHVC scheme is more effective and secure. (shrink)

Based on the Lotka–Volterra system, a pest-natural enemy model with nonlinear feedback control as well as nonlinear action threshold is introduced. The model characterizes the implementation of comprehensive prevention and control measures when the pest density reaches the nonlinear action threshold level depending on the pest density and its change rate. The mortality rate of the pest is a saturation function that strictly depends on their density while the release of natural enemies is also a nonlinear pulse term depending on (...) the density of real-time natural enemies. The exact impulsive and phase sets are given. The definition and properties of the Poincaré map corresponding to the pulse points on the phase set are provided. We investigate the existence and stability of boundary and interior order-1 periodic solution. The theoretical analysis developed in the present paper combined with nonlinear controlling measures as well as nonlinear action threshold methods and techniques laid the foundation for the establishment and analysis of other state-dependent feedback control models. (shrink)

Although a growing body of research has shown the positive impact of ethical leadership on workplace deviance, questions remain as to whether its benefits are consistent across all situations. In this investigation, we explore an important boundary condition of ethical leadership by exploring how employees’ moral awareness may lessen the need for ethical leadership. Drawing on substitutes for leadership theory, we suggest that when individuals already possess a heightened level of moral awareness, ethical leadership’s role in reducing deviant actions may (...) be reduced. However, when individuals lack this strong moral disposition, ethical leadership may be instrumental in inspiring them to reduce their deviant actions. To enhance the external validity and generalizability of our findings, the current research used two large field samples of working professionals in both Turkey and the USA. Results suggest that ethical leadership’s positive influence on workplace deviance is dependent upon the individual’s moral awareness—helpful for those employees whose moral awareness is low, but not high. Thus, our investigation helps to build theory around the contingencies of ethical leadership and the specific audience for whom it may be more influential. (shrink)

The efficiency of distribution networks is hugely affected by active and reactive power flows in distribution electric power systems. Currently, distributed generators (DGs) of energy are extensively applied to minimize power loss and improve voltage deviancies on power distribution systems. The best position and volume of DGs produce better power outcomes. This work prepares a new hybrid SSA–GWO metaheuristic optimization algorithm that combines the salp swarm algorithm (SSA) and the gray wolf optimizer (GWO) algorithm. The SSA–GWO algorithm ensures generating the (...) best size and site of one and multi-DGs on the radial distribution network to decrease real power losses (RPL) (kW) on lines and resolve voltage deviancies. Our novel algorithm is executed on IEEE 123-bus radial distribution test systems. The results confirm the success of the suggested hybrid SSA–GWO algorithm compared with implementing the SSA and GWO individually. Through the proposed SSA–GWO algorithm, the study decreases the RPL and improves the voltage profile on distribution networks with multiple DGs units. (shrink)

The foremost aim of this research was to forecast the performance of three stock market indices using the multilayer perceptron, recurrent neural network, and autoregressive integrated moving average on historical data. Moreover, we compared the extrapolative abilities of a hybrid of ARIMA with MLP and RNN models, which are called ARIMA-MLP and ARIMA-RNN. Because of the complicated and noisy nature of financial data, we combine novel machine-learning techniques such as MLP and RNN with ARIMA model to predict the three stock (...) market data. The data used in this study are taken from the Pakistan Stock Exchange, National Stock Exchange India, and Sri Lanka Stock Exchange. In the case of Pakistan, the findings show that the ARIMA-MLP and ARIMA-RNN beat the individual ARIMA, MLP, and RNN models in terms of accuracy. Similarly, in the case of Sri Lanka and India, the hybrid models show more robustness in terms of forecasting than individual ARIMA, MLP, and RNN models based on root-mean-square error and mean absolute error. Apart from this, ARIMA-MLP outperformed the ARIMA-RNN in the case of Pakistan and India, while in the context of Sri Lanka, ARIMA-RNN beat the ARIMA-MLP in forecasting. Our findings reveal that the hybrid models can be regarded as a suitable option for financial time-series forecasting. (shrink)

Diabetes is one of the most common metabolic diseases that cause high blood sugar. Early diagnosis of such a condition is challenging due to its complex interdependence on various factors. There is a need to develop critical decision support systems to assist medical practitioners in the diagnosis process. This research proposes developing a predictive model that can achieve a high classification accuracy of type 2 diabetes. The study consisted of two fundamental parts. Firstly, the study investigated handling missing data adopting (...) data imputation, namely, median value imputation, K-nearest neighbor imputation, and iterative imputation. Consequently, the study validated the implications of these imputations using various classification algorithms, i.e., linear, tree-based, and ensemble algorithms, to see how each method affected classification accuracy. Secondly, Artificial Neural Network was employed to model the best performing imputed data, balanced with SMOTETomek ensuring each class is represented fairly. This approach provided the best accuracy of 98% on the test data, outperforming accuracies achieved in prior studies using the same dataset. The dataset used in this study is concerned with gender and population. As a prospect, the study recommends adopting a larger population sample without geographic boundaries. Additionally, as the developed Artificial Neural Network model did not undergo any specific hyperparameter tuning, it would be interesting to explore tuning on top of normalized data to optimize accuracy further. (shrink)

Organizational sustainability in the form of environmental management and sustainable production is becoming more important for small and medium-sized enterprises throughout the world. This research evaluates the factors affecting the understanding of the CEO's and managers' intention to adopt practices of green supply chain management and clean innovation technology in the manufacturing SMEs of Pakistan. This empirical research identifies key determinants influencing the adoption of GSCM practices. Using structural equation modeling, we selected a sample size of 350 different manufacturing firms (...) in Pakistan. The results of the study revealed that six factors, namely, environmental, government, organization, suppliers, market, and operational factors, significantly influence the intention to adopt GSCM and positively impact sustainable production. The study's findings reveal that market and operational factors are highly significant for adopting GSCM practices at a p-value of 0.05. Environmental and organizational factors are equally significant to adopt GSCM practices at a p-value of 0.10. This research also analyzed CIT as a moderator between environmental, government, organization, customer, supplier, economic, market, and operational factors in the context of Pakistan. Hypotheses H9a, H9b, H9f, and H9g were validated and support the use of CIT to boost enterprise production and consumption. The research findings would help policymakers understand how to implement GSCM practices and guide enterprises to implement GSCM and CIT practices for enhancing enterprise performance and environmental sustainability. (shrink)

Se ha dicho que para entender una literatura lo mejor es leer sus obras, y no lo que sobre ella se ha dicho o escrito. Este artículo, en cuatro partes, es un intento de estudiar las nuwashshahat y sus kharjas, basado solamente, dentro de lo posible, en los textos con los que contamos. El artículo llega a tres conclusiones, no del todo nuevas para mis lectores: 1. Si bien las nuwashshahat fueron producto de la tradición literaria clásica árabe, su desarrollo (...) se enlaza inevitablemente con factores específicos, políticos y sociales, del medio andalusí. 2. La kharja es una salida de 'ingenio' o 'ingeniosa', zarf o hazl, al final de la nuwashshahat. Sea cual fuere su propósito de haber existido antes de las nuwashshahat, las kharjas de voz femenina en lengua romance, al igual que sus equivalentes árabes, tenían como función suministrar el mismo requisito de zarf al final de la nuwashshahat la. 3. La reacción de Ibn Saná al-Mulk bacía la kharja fue en gran medida una reacción psicológica, y no una respuesta literaria bien ponderada. La mejor manera de saber lo que Ibn Saná al-Mulk pensaba de las nuwashshahat es leer las que él mismo compuso, y no lo que opinó sobre la kharja. (shrink)

The integration of cellular networks and vehicular networks is complex and heterogeneous. Synchronization among vehicles in heterogeneous vehicular clusters plays an important role in effective data sharing and the stability of the cluster. This synchronization depends on the smooth exchange of information between vehicles and remote servers over the Internet. The remote servers predict road traffic patterns by adopting deep learning methods to help drivers on the roads. At the same time, local data processing at the vehicular cluster level may (...) increase the capabilities of remote servers. However, global positioning system signal interruption, especially in the urban environment, plays a big part in the detritions of synchronization among the vehicles that lead to the instability of the cluster. Instability of connections is a major hurdle in developing cost-effective solutions for deriving assistance and route planning applications. To solve this problem, a self-localization scheme within the vehicular cluster is proposed. The proposed self-localization scheme handles GPS signal interruption to the vehicle within the cluster. A unique clustering criterion and a synchronization mechanism for sharing traffic information system data among multiple vehicles are developed. The developed scheme is simulated and compared with existing known approaches. The results show the better performance of our proposed scheme over others. (shrink)

Data center technology changes the mode of computing. Traditional DCs consist of a single layer and only have Ethernet connections among switches. Those old-fashioned DCs cannot fulfill the high resource demand compared with today’s DCs. The architectural design of the DCs is getting substantial importance and acting as the backbone of the network because of its essential feature of supporting and maintaining the rapidly increasing Internet-based applications which include search engines and social networking applications. Every application has its parameters, like (...) latency and blocking in the DC network. Every data center network has its specialized architecture. It has a specific arrangement of layers and switches, which increase or decrease the DC network’s efficiency. We develop a simulation tool that comprises two different DC architectures: basic tree architecture and c-Through architecture. Using this simulation, we analyze the traffic behavior and the performance of the simulated DCN. Our main purpose is to focus on mean waiting time, load, and blocking with respect to the traffic within the DCN. (shrink)

Just as Quine and others have argued for a deflationism about the property of truth, Sinan Dogramaci has argued for a deflationism about rationality. Specifically, Dogramaci claims that we have no reason to think that the basic, deductive, epistemic rules we call “rational” have any sort of “unifying property.” A “unifying property” is a property that is necessary, sufficient, and explanatorily illuminating. My goal in this paper is to undermine Dogramaci’s argument for this radical position. I do (...) this by first outlining Dogramaci’s distinctive view on the function of our epistemically evaluative terms. This view, called epistemic communism, has it that the function of terms like “rational” is to support the coordination of our community on a single set of epistemic rules. I offer a reconstruction of Dogramaci’s argument from epistemic communism to deflationism about rationality. I next raise an objection to Dogramaci’s argument: different sets of epistemic rules do not equally support the coordinative function. Dogramaci has a response to this objection, but I argue that this response is less than satisfactory. I illustrate that this response is unsatisfactory by employing work by David Enoch and Joshua Schechter. After pushing my objection to Dogramaci’s argument, I develop, on Dogramaci’s behalf, an objection to my non-deflationary attempt to undermine his argument. In the final section of the paper, I reply to this objection offered on Dogramaci’s behalf and conclude that whether we are epistemic communists or not, we need not accept deflationism. (shrink)

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the most (...) comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

Sinan Dogramaci has recently developed a view according to which the function of epistemic evaluations—like calling someone’s behavior “rational” or “irrational”—is to encourage or discourage the behavior evaluated. This view promises to explain the rational authority of testimony, by describing a social practice that promotes the coordination of epistemic procedures across a community. We argue that Dogramaci’s view is unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First, the social practice at its heart is vulnerable to free riders. Second, even if the (...) problem of free riders can be solved, it “alienates” epistemic agents from the testimony that they receive, in that, though they will accept testimony from their fellows, they will have no reason to do so. We argue that a more satisfactory view can be had if we couple the genuine insights that are to be found in Dogramaci’s proposal with the recognition that testimony is an excludible good that is often distributed according to market forces. It is this fact about test.. (shrink)