Descartes and al-Ghazâlî were led to inquire into the nature of certainty by their experiences of a fragmented world into which they were nurtured. Though theylived five hundred years apart, their searches were similar, to the extent that some have asked whether Descartes was more indebted to al-Ghazâlî than he would have been willing to admit. But despite striking similarities there are significant differences. Descartes found certainty in any experience or concept that overwhelmed him by its clarity and distinctness. Such (...) certainty was achieved in intuition, which is a direct, experiential knowing. God guarantees thatwe shall not be deceived in this. On the other hand, al-Ghazâlî found certainty in a direct experience (dhawq) of God in whom all knowledge resides. For Descartes, God was an outside guarantor; for al-Ghazâlî, God was the very truth experienced inwardly in such a way that it could not be doubted. (shrink)
This book presents the thesis that happiness does not mean just one thing but many, and that these many meanings have been studied, described, argued, and practiced throughout the centuries in many climes and places. This book explores many views of happiness as espoused by their original founders and developers.
The author has constructed a concept of conditionals by synthetizing and developing unconnected insights scattered through the literature. The result is incorporated in a formal deductive system, based on a series of "paradox-free" systems initiated by Alonzo Church and interpreted according to principles suggested chiefly by Everett Nelson and by Anderson and Belnap. The basic concept is the sufficiency relation holding between clauses of a conditional, or rather between the relevant states of affairs asserted by the clauses. The logic of (...) sufficiency is developed by using a phenomenological method, much like that of the ordinary-language linguists, to place restrictions on truth-functional logic. For example, conjunction is replaced by adjunction [ = df. ~ ] and this concept is used to modify modus ponens and simplification. Relevance requirements avoid the paradoxes of material implication. These principles, together with a number of physical modalities and some modifications of the concept of induction, are used to attack Goodman's paradox and the paradoxes of confirmation, and to form a concept of cause. The formal system incorporates the principles judged desirable by the analysis of how conditionals are used in discourse. Mr. Barker is modest in his claims, emphasizing that his material is not original and saying only that some of the famous paradoxes "show signs of yielding." Interested students will be grateful for this monograph. It is a valuable compendium of widely scattered work of a difficult and complicated subject, and should be both helpful and stimulating. Moreover, it is particularly clear and readable.--L. G. (shrink)
Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...) fields get up to speed on open research-level problems. (shrink)
A particle of molecular dimensions which can exist in two states is associated with a membrane pore through which molecules of a gas can pass. The gas molecules from two identical phases on either side of the membrane may pass only when the particle is in one particular state. If certain restrictions are imposed on the system, then the particle appears to act like a Maxwell's Demon(1) which “handles” the gas molecules during their passage through the pore.
An extension of the hypothetical experiment of Szilard, which involved the action of a one-molecule gas in an isolated isothermal system, is developed to illustrate how irreversibility may arise out of Brownian motion. As this development requires a consideration of nonmolecular components such as wheels and pistons, the thought-experiment is remodeled in molecular terms and appears to function as a perpetuum mobile.
A new proof of the impossibility of reconciling realism and locality in quantum mechanics is given. Unlike proofs based on Bell's inequality, the present work makes minimal and transparent use of probability theory and proceeds by demonstrating a Kochen-Specker type of paradox based on the value assignments to the spin components of two spatially separated spin-1 systems in the singlet state of their total spin. An essential part of the argument is to distinguish carefully two commonly confused types of contextuality; (...) we call them ontological and environmental contextuality. These in turn are associated with two quite distinct senses of nonlocality. We indicate the relevance of our treatment to other related discussions in recent literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. (shrink)
This book presents an exposition and criticism of Husserl's essential ideas, explaining what is defective and what meritorious in them and offering a philosophical program based on the merit. The author's aim is to provide a point of entry for the study of phenomenology. In the opening section he states the key concepts of The Idea, following Husserl's summary. These are: the contrasting notions of natural thinking and philosophical thinking; intentional immanence; the "pure seeing" of reflective cognition; and eidetic abstraction. (...) He proceeds to a developmental reconstruction showing how these concepts grow out of one another. Intentionality, the active relatedness of consciousness to its object, is the foundation concept. By being aware of one's own intentionality and abandoning the natural standpoint, phenomenological reduction can be achieved and the universal experienced in eidetic abstraction. According to Pettit, the merit of Husserl's method is that it recalls philosophy to the self and to the evidence, i.e., to man as a conscious subject and to the obvious, incontestable data of consciousness. Phenomenology's defect is that, since every experience implicitly contains a description, the supposed eidetic experience is absurd. Philosophy should aim at explanation, i.e., at a non-reductive account of conscious experience, which makes the experience intelligible. Pettit concludes with a phenomenological program, listing the dimensions and types of human behavior and showing how the traditional divisions of philosophy fit into the classification. There is a bibliography but no index.--L. G. (shrink)
These essays concern what one of the writers calls "the philosophical problems raised by the existence of modern science," distinguishing and relating various ways of knowing, especially the scientific and philosophic. For R. J. Henle in the first and eighth essays, science and philosophy are set off from the humanities as alike in seeking pure intelligibility, but different in that science knows indirectly through a constructional concept while philosophy knows directly the ontological concept. J. Maritain discusses the shortcomings of the (...) Vienna school of philosophy of science and the kinds of knowing proper to theology, philosophy, and science. J. Fitzgerald considers Maritain's inclusion of modern science in the Aristotelian-Thomist concept of scientific knowledge. R. Blackwell sketches four approaches to a theory of discovery in science: logical, psychological, historical, and epistemological. G. P. Klubertanz, discussing modern science in the light of Thomist doctrine, finds it like the philosophy of nature in having as its object the sensible material thing but differing in definitions, principles, and modes of proof. J. Ladrière argues the importance of intentionality in one essay, and later that both science and philosophy are authentic knowing, but that science is a description of regional ontologies while philosophy is the foundation of those ontologies. E. McMullin discusses the change from Aristotelianism to modern scientific "qualified" realism. E. Caldin finds that theological and scientific knowledge have the same structure but answer different questions. The last five essays deal with more specialized topics. F. J. Crosson: Can a machine be conscious? R. J. Henle: How does anthropology contribute to an understanding of man? A. Fisher: Freud and Husserl, and the essential intentionality of psychical life. Two surveys of modern analytic philosophy conclude the volume, E. J. McKinnon: Reflections on a methodology for integrating philosophy and science; and G. P. Klubertanz: A proposal for integrating the schools of philosophy of science.--L. G. (shrink)
This is a beginning text, with an ingenious format. Each of the five sections consists of seven or eight articles or excerpts, of varying difficulty. Each opens with two excerpts from classic philosophers, presenting alternative formulations of major problems in an area of philosophy. The other selections are by contemporary writers. Each section closes with a fictional dialogue between the men who set the problems. The author hopes that students will find the easy selections provocative and so be encouraged to (...) attempt the less readily understandable. The sections are designed to lead into one another, from "Political and Social Philosophy," with which most students have some acquaintance, to other areas, each presupposed by those preceding, that is, to "Ethics and the Moral Life," "Philosophy of Religion," "Theory of Knowledge and Experience," and finally to "Metaphysics." The selections are fresh, varied, and well-chosen to stimulate discussion. For example: Plato and Hobbes introduce "Political and Social Philosophy," followed by Stuart Hampshire, Michael Oakeshott, Jean-Paul Sartre, C. I. Lewis, John Rawls, and Edward Kent. Berkeley and James introduce "Theory of Knowledge and Experience." Contemporary selections are by Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber, Georg Simmel.--L. G. (shrink)
This book, the first in the Chicago Series in Biology, is an informal attempt to enrich ecological theory with some useful and general concepts. The author's purpose is to escape the "microscopic" level of analysis, that is, the level of interaction between a predator and its prey and of population response to changes in the environment, and to take a "macroscopic" point of view. He does this by first interpreting ecological relationships in terms of cybernetic theory. For example, he takes (...) "information" to be something brought about within the system by its own operation, which in turn influences its future. "Energy gates" are aspects of the system which involve transfer of information from the less organized sub-system to the more organized. Then he takes a cybernetic look at succession, maturity, and exploitation, illustrating his analysis with examples from his speciality of marine biology. He emphasizes that, since we are dealing with a dynamic system, it is important to work with trends and gradients rather than with point values. Finally, he considers evolution as a process going on in an ecosystem. An intellectual synthesis of the paleontological picture of evolution and the contemporary picture of succession should give us working principles for understanding the history of life. As an illustration, he suggests conditions which might have fostered man and his culture. This is a brilliant little book, simply written and absorbing.--L. G. (shrink)
Paterson sees Bruno as a philosopher of rational thought and the open society, martyred by the forces of social constraint. She outlines his cosmology and shows how his theory of knowledge and his ethics derive from it. For Bruno, the fabric of the universe is a dynamic, spirited, divine power which continually generates the infinite multiplicity of things and draws them back into itself. Man's intellect mirrors the universal motion of creation and corruption, drawing ideas from sensibility as the divine (...) intellect draws the natural species from matter. Since the good and the true coincide in the divine unity, man's good consists in harmonizing them and so mirroring the divine. He whose efforts are directed to this harmony and to expanding constantly his knowledge and achievements is universal man. Paterson argues that a rational ethic is implicit in Bruno's thought. Also implicit is the method of modern science, i.e., a speculative leap, followed by empirical testing. The author points out that much work remains to be done by translators, editors, historians, and philosophers before any stable assessment of Bruno can be made.--L. G. (shrink)
These papers originated as lectures, three each by Stephan Kröner, [[sic]] Martinus Versfeld, A. J. Ayer, Stephen Pepper, and O. K. Bouswma, [[sic]] in a year-long series at the University of Notre Dame. Kröner [[sic]] and Pepper see philosophy in terms of conceptual structures, Kröner [[sic]] as the production of "categorial frameworks" and Pepper as the systematization of an intuition he calls a "root metaphor." Versfeld says philosophy is Socratic dialectic, that is, the light-hearted testing of hypotheses. For Ayer, philosophy (...) is analysis aimed at reconstructing the unsatisfactory presuppositions of common sense. Bouswma [[sic]] offers three demonstrations of how philosophical problems are dissolved by showing them to be instances of the misuse of words. Interested readers may wish to look at papers on this topic by Rorty, MacQuarrie, Harris, and Johann, read at Notre Dame in the spring of 1967 and published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.--L. G. (shrink)