I argue that consideration of certain cases of severe depression reveals a problem for desire-based theories of welfare. I first show that depression can result in a person losing her desires and then identify a case wherein it seems right to think that, as a result of very severe depression, the individuals described no longer have any desires whatsoever. I argue that the state these people are in is a state of profound ill-being: their lives are going very poorly for (...) them. Yet desire theories get this case wrong. Because no desires are being frustrated, the desire theorist has no grounds for ascribing ill-being; indeed, because the individuals described seem utterly without desire, the desire theorist has no grounds for treating these people as subjects of welfare ascription at all. I argue that these results are unacceptable; therefore, we should reject desire-based theories of well-being and ill-being. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of whether it is ever permissible to grant a request for physician-aid-in-dying (PAD) from an individual suffering from treatment-resistant depression. I assume for the sake of argument that PAD is sometimes permissible. There are three requirements for PAD: suffering, prognosis, and competence. First, an individual must be suffering from an illness or injury which is sufficient to cause serious, ongoing hardship. Second, one must have exhausted effective treatment options, and one’s prospects for recovery (...) must be poor. Third, the individual must be judged competent to request PAD. I argue that many cases of treatment-resistant depression meet the first two requirements. Thus, the key question concerns the third. I consider four features of depression that might compromise a person’s decision-making capacity. Ultimately, I conclude that PAD requests from depressed patients can be permissibly granted in some circumstances. (shrink)

How to draw the line between depression-as-disorder and non-pathological depressive symptoms continues to be a contested issue in psychiatry. Relatively few philosophers have waded into this debate, but the tools of philosophical analysis are quite relevant to it. In this paper, I defend a particular answer to this question, the Contextual approach.On this view, depression is a disorder if and only if it is a disproportionate response to a justifying cause or else is unconnected to any justifying cause. I present (...) four objections to this approach and then defend it from them. Along the way, I explain why it matters whether we get this question right. (shrink)

As a result of the stress of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, nurses, doctors, and other healthcare workers have been expressing a great deal of frustration and anger, sometimes directed at patients who have chosen not to get vaccinated. This paper examines the moral status of such anger in light of philosophical treatments of anger's purpose, benefits, and drawbacks. A theory of appropriate anger is sketched, after which healthcare workers’ anger toward perceived patient wrongdoing is assessed in light of philosophical (...) considerations for and against anger. Ultimately, it is argued that it would be better for nurses and doctors not to experience this kind of anger, and this conclusion is used to motivate a moral case for additional support for overtaxed healthcare workers. (shrink)

Research on mental health and illness presents a variety of unique ethical challenges. This article argues that institutional review boards (IRBs) can improve their reviews of such research by including the perspectives of individuals with the condition under study either as members of the IRB or as consultants thereto. Several reasons for including the perspectives of these individuals are advanced, with the discussion organized around a hypothetical case study involving the assessment of a novel talk-therapy modality. Having made this case, (...) the article goes on to explain how to implement the idea by building on a recent proposal by Rebecca Dresser, who argues in a number of publications for the inclusion of former research participants in the IRB review process. Finally, concerns about protecting reviewer and consultant confidentiality are addressed. (shrink)

Recent changes to the Common Rule have helped reduce regulatory burden on researchers conducting minimal risk research. However, in this paper, I propose a way of minimizing burden further within the existing confines of the current regulations. I focus my discussion on the newly created “benign behavioral interventions” category of exempt research, arguing that this exemption from the federal regulations governing research with human subjects should be more expansively interpreted by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections (SACHRP) than (...) is currently the case. Specifically, I argue against the restriction, advocated by SACHRP, that the exemption exclude “physical (bodily) tasks” unless they are “incidental to the behavioral intervention.” This restriction, I argue, is problematically vague and does no significant moral work. Acceptance of my proposed reinterpretation of “benign behavioral interventions” would, I hope, result in a significant reduction in regulatory burden for minimal risk research. (shrink)