The dissertation's primary task is to discern to what extent the investigations contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics conform to the model of science developed in the Posterior Analytics. It concludes that the Metaphysics substantially follows the model of the Analytics in studying the causes and attributes of a specific nature, although it makes significant departures especially in its conception of the principles of being and substance. ;Two introductory chapters discuss respectively Aristotle's conception of science in the Analytics and the problems one (...) is likely to face in attempting to apply this conception to the Metaphysics . Chapter 3 clarifies the meaning of the phrase "science of being qua being" by reference to the Posterior Analytics, and introduces the concept of pro&d13;v 3&d3;n equivocity. Chapter 4 considers the role of dialectic in metaphysics with particular reference to the principle of noncontradiction. Chapter 5 argues that the second part of Meta. 4.2 introduces a demonstrative science of the per se attributes of being and unity. ;Chapter 6 introduces the investigation into the principles and causes of being and reviews the aporias about the principles . Chapter 7 offers a hypothesis to explain Aristotle's identification of the science of being with first philosophy. The last two chapters argue that Aristotle is pursuing this investigation in the central books of Melaphysics, but his pursuit of the investigation there is incomplete. ;This interpretation provides an alternative to those of T. H. Irwin and Walter Leszl, who argue that metaphysics is a second-order discipline and not a science after the model of the Analytics. It finds explicit support in recent work by Robert Bolton and Alan Code, while widening the range of issues to include the attributes of being and the importance of first philosophy for understanding the nature of being. It supports many of the conclusions of Joseph Owens's, Urbain Dhondt's, and Frede and Patzig's work on the object of metaphysics. There are also substantial discussions of the contributions of G. E. L. Owen, J. G. Stevenson, Theodore Scaltsas, and John Thorp. (shrink)

Analyse van de aan de wetenschap ontleende terminologie die de Amerikaanse dichter (1885-1972) in zijn literair-kritisch werk gebruikte.

Among Aristotle’s writings are two works that have come down to us as the Prior Analytics and Posterior Analytics. Being Aristotle’s major contributions to the study of the syllogism and the theory of science based on it, they occupy important places in the corpus. However, despite the fact that Aristotle himself uses the word “analytics” to refer both to the treatises and to the discipline to which they belong, the question of what Aristotle intends with this terminology has received relatively (...) little attention. Byrne’s aim is to fill this lacuna and in the process shed further light on the nature of Aristotle’s scientific project. (shrink)

This work provides some interesting new results on the notion of the topos and the theory of hypothetical syllogisms in Aristotle based on an incisive interpretation of Aristotle's Topics and certain passages of the Analytics .

The aim of this book is twofold: first, to arrive at a coherent interpretation of Aristotle's account of definition in APo. 2.1-10; and second, to show how what Aristotle says there sheds light on the way in which per se attributes belong to their subjects.