The blogosphere is full of personalities with masks, or pseudonyms. Although not a desired state of public communication, one could excuse the use of pseudonyms in blogs and social media, which are generally unregulated or weakly regulated. However, in science publishing, there are increasingly strict rules regarding the use of false identities for authors, the lack of institutional or contact details, and the lack of conflicts of interest, and such instances are generally considered to be misconduct. This is because these (...) violations of publishing protocol decrease trust and confidence in science and bring disrepute to those scientists who conform to the rules set out by journals and publishers and abide by them. Thus, when cases are encountered where trust and protocol in publishing are breached, these deserve to be highlighted. In this letter, I focus on Neuroskeptic, a highly prominent science critic, primarily on the blogosphere and in social media, highlighting the dangers associated with the use of pseudonyms in academic publishing. (shrink)

The blogosphere is full of personalities with masks, or pseudonyms. Although not a desired state of public communication, one could excuse the use of pseudonyms in blogs and social media, which are generally unregulated or weakly regulated. However, in science publishing, there are increasingly strict rules regarding the use of false identities for authors, the lack of institutional or contact details, and the lack of conflicts of interest, and such instances are generally considered to be misconduct. This is because these (...) violations of publishing protocol decrease trust and confidence in science and bring disrepute to those scientists who conform to the rules set out by journals and publishers and abide by them. Thus, when cases are encountered where trust and protocol in publishing are breached, these deserve to be highlighted. In this letter, I focus on Neuroskeptic, a highly prominent science critic, primarily on the blogosphere and in social media, highlighting the dangers associated with the use of pseudonyms in academic publishing. (shrink)

The first topic of concern is anonymity, specifically the anonymity that is available in communications on the Internet. An earlier paper argues that anonymity in electronic communication is problematic because: it makes law enforcement difficult ; it frees individuals to behave in socially undesirable and harmful ways ; it diminishes the integrity of information since one can't be sure who information is coming from, whether it has been altered on the way, etc.; and all three of the above contribute to (...) an environment of diminished trust which is not conducive to certain uses of computer communication. Counterbalancing these problems are some important benefits. Anonymity can facilitate some socially desirable and beneficial behavior. For example, it can eliminate the fear of repercussions for behavior in contexts in which repercussions would diminish the availability or reliability of information, e.g., voting, personal relationships between consenting adults, and the like. Furthermore, anonymity can be used constructively to reduce the effect of prejudices on communications. Negative aspects of anonymity all seem to point to a tension between accountability and anonymity. They suggest that accountability and anonymity are not compatible, and they even seem to suggest that since accountability is a good thing, it would be good to eliminate anonymity. In other words, the problems with anonymity suggest that individuals are more likely to behave in socially desirable ways when they are held accountable for their behavior, and they are more likely to engage in socially undesirable behavior when they are not held accountable. I am not going to take issue with the correlation between accountability and anonymity, but rather with the claim that accountability is good. To examine this problem, let's look at a continuum that stretches from total anonymity at one end, and no anonymity at all at the other end. At the opposite extreme of anonymity is a panopticon society. The panopticon is the prison environment described by Foucault in which prison cells are arranged in a large circle with the side facing the inside of the circle open to view. The guard tower is placed in the middle of the circle so that guards can see everything that goes on in every cell. In a recent article on privacy, Jeffrey Reiman, reflecting on the new intelligent highway systems, suggests that we are moving closer and closer to a panopticon society. When we contemplate all the electronic data that is now gathered about each one of us as we move through our everyday lives- intelligent highway systems, consumer transactions, traffic patterns on the internet, medical records, financial records, and so on- we see the trend that Reiman identifies. Electronic behavior is recorded and the information is retained. While actions/transactions in separate domains are not necessarily combined, it seems obvious that the potential exists for combining data into a complete portfolio of an individual's day to day life. So it would seem that as more and more activities and domains are moved into a IT-based medium, the closer we will come to a panopticon society. A panopticon society gives us the ultimate in accountability. Everything an individual does is observable and therefore available to those to whom we are accountable. Of course, in doing this, it puts us, in effect, in prison. The prison parallel is appropriate here because what anonymity allows us is freedom; prison is the ultimate in lack of freedom. In this way the arguments for a free society become arguments for anonymity. Only when individuals are free will they experiment, try new ideas, take risks, and learn by doing so. Only in an environment that tolerates making mistakes will individuals develop the active habits that are so essential for democracy. In a world without information technology, individuals have levels or degrees and various kinds of anonymity and consequently different levels and kinds of freedom. Degrees and kinds of anonymity vary with the domain: small town social life versus urban social life, voting, commercial exchanges, banking, automobile travel, airplane travel, telephone communication, education, and so on. Drawing from our experience before IT-based institutions, we might believe that what we need is varying levels or degrees and kinds of anonymity. This seems a good starting place because it suggests an attempt to re-create the mixture that we have in the physical, non-IT-based world. Nevertheless, there is a danger. If we think in terms of levels and degrees of anonymity, we may not see the forest from the trees. We may not acknowledge that in an electronic medium, levels and kinds of anonymity mean, in an important sense, no anonymity. If there are domains in which we can be anonymous but those domains are part of a global communication infrastructure in which there is no anonymity at the entry point, then it will always be possible to trace someone's identity. We delude ourselves when we think we have anonymity on-line or off-line. Rather, what we have both places is situations in which it is more and less difficult to identify individuals. We have a continuum of situations in which it is easy and difficult to link behavior to other behavior and histories of behaviors. In the physical world, we can go places and do things where others don't know us by name and have no history with us, though they see our bodies, clothes, and behavior. If we do nothing unusual, we may be forgotten. On the other hand, if we do something illegal, authorities may attempt to track us down and figure out who we are. For example, law enforcement officials, collection agencies, those who want to sue us may take an active interest in removing our anonymity, ex post facto. Think of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols-the men who apparently bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City. Much of what they did, they did anonymously, but then law enforcement officials set out to find out who had done various things, e.g., rented a car, bought explosives, etc. The shrouds of anonymity under which McVeigh and Nichols had acted were slowly removed. Is this any different than behavior on the internet? Is there a significant difference in the kind or degree of anonymity we have in the physical world versus what we have in an IT-based world? The character of the trail we leave is different; in the one case, its an electronic trail; while in the other it involves human memories, photographs, and paper and ink. What law enforcement officials had to do to track down McVeigh is quite different from tracking down an electronic law breaker. Also, the cost of electronic information gathering, both in time and money, can be dramatically lower than the cost of talking to people, gathering physical evidence, and the other minutia required by traditional detective work. We should acknowledge that we do not and are never likely to have anonymity on the Internet. We would do better to think of different levels or kinds of identity. There are important moral and social issues arising as a result of these varying degrees and kinds of identity. Perhaps the most important matter is assuring that individuals are informed about the conditions in which they are interacting. Perhaps, even more important is that individuals have a choice about the conditions under which they are communicating. In the rest of this paper we explore a few examples of levels and kinds of identity that are practical on the Internet. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages that we see for these "styles" of identity for individuals, and we examine the costs and benefits of these styles for society as a whole. (shrink)

Was there such a person as Lewis Carroll? An affirmative answer is suggested by the thought that Lewis Carroll was Charles Dodgson, and since there was certainly such a person as Charles Dodgson, there was such a person as Lewis Carroll. A negative answer is suggested by the thought that in arguing thus, the two names ‘Lewis Carroll’ and ‘Charles Dodgson’ are being inappropriately treated as though they were completely on a par: a pseudonym is, after all, a false (...) or fictitious name. Perhaps we should say instead that there was really no such person as Lewis Carroll, but that when Charles Dodgson published under that name, he was pretending that there was, and further, pretending that the works in question formed part of the literary output of this pretendedly real individual. Whether or not this is correct for the case of ‘Lewis Carroll’, I will be suggesting that an account of this second style–a fictionalist account, for short–is appropriate for at least a good many pseudonyms. We shall get to reasons why it might nonetheless not be especially appropriate in the present case in due course: one advantage of the ‘Lewis Carroll’/‘Charles Dodgson’ example, such qualms notwithstanding, is that everyone is familiar not only with both names but with which of them is the pseudonym. Another is that, as we shall have occasion to observe below, Dodgson himself had some interesting views on this particular case of pseudonymy. (shrink)

The essay emphasizes the unsolvable tension between activity and passivity implied in Kierkegaard’s reduplication as an author of authors. To characterize the different approaches to pseudonymity, I will use the term Halvbefaren [the inexperienced seaman] to refer to a reading that appeals only to Kierkegaard’s or to the pseudonyms’ authority over the authorship, and Helbefaren [the experienced seaman] to refer to another interpretation that recognizes that unsolvable tension between them. Recurring to the sailing metaphor implicit in these terms that appear (...) in Climacus’ Postscript, I defend the thesis that the pseudonyms open the authorship from within, overcoming Kierkegaard as a usual author, as the only captain of the entire authorship. The mutiny performed by the pseudonyms cannot be resolved by simply transferring the authority to the pseudonyms themselves, and it creates a subjective space in the authorship so it becomes a matter of the experience of the reader. (shrink)

Anonymity promotes free speech by protecting the identity of people who might otherwise face negative consequences for expressing their ideas. Wrongdoers, however, often abuse this invisibility cloak. Defenders of anonymity online emphasise its value in advancing public debate and safeguarding political dissension. Critics emphasise the need for identifiability in order to achieve accountability for wrongdoers such as trolls. The problematic tension between anonymity and identifiability online lies in the desirability of having low costs (no repercussions) for desirable speech and high (...) costs (appropriate repercussions) for undesirable speech. If we practice either full anonymity or identifiability, we end up having either low or high costs in all online contexts and for all kinds of speech. I argue that free speech is compatible with instituting costs in the form of repercussions and penalties for controversial and unacceptable speech. Costs can minimise the risks of anonymity by providing a reasonable degree of accountability. Pseudonymity is a tool that can help us regulate those costs while furthering free speech. This article argues that, in order to redesign the Internet to better serve free speech, we should shape much of it to resemble an online masquerade. (shrink)

This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.

In his posthumously published Journals and Papers,, Kierkegaard boldly claimed, "Oh, once I am dead, Fear and Trembling alone will be enough for an imperishable name as an author. Then it will be read, translated into foreign languages as well. The reader will almost shrink from the frightful pathos in the book." Certainly, Fear and Trembling has been translated into foreign languages, and its fame has ensured Kierkegaard's place in the pantheon of Western philosophy. Today, however, most shrink from the (...) book not because of its frightful pathos but because of its fearsome impenetrability. In this first volume of a Reading Kierkegaard miniseries, Martens carefully unfolds the form and content of Kierkegaard's celebrated pseudonymous text, guiding and inviting the reader to embrace the challenge of wrestling with it to the end. Throughout, Martens demonstrates that Fear and Trembling is not merely a book that contains frightful pathos; it is also an entree into Kierkegaard's vibrant and polyphonic corpus that is nearly as restless as the faith it commends. (Publisher). (shrink)

The document before you is by a member of a fanatical sect of heretical Ludwig scholars. Through a twist of fate it has fallen into my hands. I hesitate to make it public, since its circulation may do more harm than good. What speaks against publication is that it has the power to corrupt young minds. I do not take a light view of the dangers it poses in this regard. What speaks in favor of publication is the fact that (...) these people must be stopped. Through their pamphlets and brochures they continue to attract more converts everyday. The importance of this document lies in the fact that it brings to light some of the more esoteric doctrines of the sect, revealing the vulnerable theological underbelly of their creed. It also speaks of quar- relling within the infidel camp. There are even suggestions that the author fears that he himself may be excommunicated by an up-and-coming generation of zealots. He pleads here for a mild interpretation of their creed. (Oblivious to the stench of his own blasphemies, he even imagines entering into dialogue with mainstream Ludwig scholars!) My main aim in making this text generally available is that more learned men than I may make a study of it. A sound theological thrashing of the author’s own (according to him, mild!) version of the creed is devoutly to be wished. But my fondest hope is that, in the hands of one of our finer Ludwig scholars, it might become a weapon that can be turned against the infidel camp. I have a Trojan horse maneuver in mind here. A cunningly crafted pseudonymous publication, addressing some of the niceties of their more peculiar doctrines, under the pretence of attempting to heal the looming schism in their sect, ought to be able to bust it wide open. One particularly confusing feature of the document is that the author occasionally adopts a heavily ironical tone, actually going so far as to refer to himself as an infidel, etc., though without apparently the least appreciation of the fact that the heavier he allows his irony to become, the closer he comes finally to speaking the truth.. (shrink)

This paper explores the factory regime in the ‘Sun'1 food processing factory in Turkey, drawing on participant observation in the factory, informal interviews with women workers and in-depth interviews with the managers of the factory's ‘gherkin department’ in which I worked. This paper argues that the ‘Sun’ bottling and canning factory is best understood through my concept of the ‘familial factory regime’. By ‘familial factory regime’ I mean a factory regime in which the features of the extended patriarchal family are (...) used to manage the labour force by obtaining women workers’ consent. Indeed, the paper suggests that there is a tendency for patriarchy to be reconstituted in the workplace through the presence of a familial factory regime. 1‘Sun’ is a pseudonymous name of the factory, which I gave it because of the heat. (shrink)

Inmunhak iran muŏt in'ga (T'onghap ŭi inmunhak, 2009) -- Tungji ŭi ch'ŏrhak (2010) -- Chonjae wa p'yohyŏn (2010) -- Mallarŭme ka mal hanŭn 'idea' ŭi kaenyŏm (Sorŭbon Taehakkyo paksa nonmun) -- P'ol Palleri e issŏsŏ chisŏng kwa hyŏnsil kwaŭi pyŏnjŭngpŏp ŭrosŏŭi si (Sŏul Taehakkyo sŏksa nonmun).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Reading Kierkegaard I: Fear and Trembling by Paul MartensDerek HostetterReading Kierkegaard I: Fear and Trembling Paul Martens EUGENE, OR: CASCADE BOOKS, 2017. 130 pp. $18.00The very first line of Reading Kierkegaard I: Fear and Trembling warns that "reading Søren Kierkegaard is a task that requires a relatively high level of intellectual investment" (ix). Yet the difficult task Paul Martens sets for himself, in keeping with the goal of (...) the Cascade Companions series, is to provide a short introduction to Kierkegaard's thought for a nonspecialist readership. In this first volume, the primary text in focus is Fear and Trembling (FT), with a second volume to focus on Works of Love. More specifically, the threefold purpose of this volume is "(1) to illuminate the internal logic of the text in a manner that renders the text more accessible; (2) to highlight the links between FT and Kierkegaard's broader context in a way that helps one make sense of some of its more opaque sections; and (3) to attend to the theological themes that permeate and drive the text" (xi). [End Page 205]Martens helpfully follows the structure provided by FT, explicating each "chapter" in turn and highlighting the ways it relates to the others as well as to the argument as a whole. This approach is particularly helpful for the long and difficult Problem III "chapter" in FT, which Martens frames as an attempt by Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio to perform the text's argument by demonstrating "that the whole investigation—any investigation, even an unlimited poetic investigation of characters and concepts—only leads to one conspicuous conclusion: Abraham is unintelligible" (54).Attention to the links between FT and Kierkegaard's broader context is also helpful for unifying the seemingly disparate arguments in FT. In Martens's reading of this context, FT is to be understood against the broad backdrop of Kierkegaard's criticisms of nineteenth-century Danish Christendom and the particular backdrop of the Hegelianism that de Silentio finds within it. The overall task of FT is then "to raise the price of faith" (71).Martens clearly attends to the text's theological themes with his repeated juxtaposition between "faith" as de Silentio sees it in the story of Abraham and "the ethical" as de Silentio sees it in nineteenth-century Denmark. Many theological themes are also highlighted and then brought into the reader's context in the discussion questions that follow each chapter.In addition to the discussion questions, Martens provides an appendix, which includes a timeline of Kierkegaard's first authorship, a glossary of important terms that may be unfamiliar, and a list of suggested readings for further study. The glossary will be a particularly helpful tool for those less familiar with Kierkegaard. However, there are also several terms missing that are both significant enough and unclear enough to warrant inclusion. One thinks here of a figure like Socrates and concepts like the knight of faith and the knight of infinite resignation.Similarly, another feature of the book that is both a strength and a weakness is its commitment to the text of FT rather than the scholarship surrounding the text. This is a strength because it keeps the book short and accessible for nonspecialists. It is also a weakness, however, because the reader interested in further study is not clearly pointed toward competing interpretations, despite the fact that some lines are ripe for a brief footnote providing such a reference—"Not all agree with me on this" (76).Overall, the discussion questions and appendix, its short length and overall readability, and its commitment to the text make Reading Kierkegaard I: Fear and Trembling a significant pedagogical contribution to ethics and Kierkegaard studies as an entry point for nonspecialists. [End Page 206]Derek HostetterUniversity of DaytonCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Ṣūfī people, as well as the ulema (ʿulemā), discussed the issue of how God (Ḥaḳḳ) surrounds the universe (ʿālem) and where the ʿarş (arsh / the ninth heaven) in which God ensconces himself exists. The Ṣūfī people supporting the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) concept claim that God surrounds the universe by his own being and so that the ʿarş (arsh) is all the creation / created beings by God moreover they argued that people who rejected this idea could attribute (...) weakness or impotence to the power of God. On the other hand, commentators and scholastic theologians acknowledge the idea that God surrounds the universe not by his own being as Ṣūfīs claimed but God surrounds the universe by his knowledge (ʿilm) and power (ḳudret). They claimed that there was no physical connection of God with the universe. There-fore, this article discusses a couplet (beyit) written by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from Bayramī-Melāmī group in light of four different tracts (risāle). One of the four tracts was written by the author of the couplet Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī himself. The title of his tract is Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). The other tract was written by Munīrī-yi Belgradī and the title of it is Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān. The other two tracts analyzed in this article were written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. These two tracts try to explain how God surrounds the universe from the unity of existence (Wahdat al-wujud) perspective. Therefore, they may help in understanding the men-tioned couplet written by Lāmekānī. The outline of the article is as follows: the introduction has the text of the ghazal including the mentioned couplet and discusses how the characteris-tics of Bayramī-Melāmī people were reflected in their poems. This part also tries to determine who wrote the mentioned ghazal as there were two different pen manes / pseudonyms (mah-las) for the same ghazal in various resources. To determine the original writer of the ghazal is crucial for proper interpretation of the texts. The next part of the article discusses the accusa-tion that Lāmekānī was an heretic in the Şarḥ-i Qaṣīda-i Suleymān tract by Munīrī-yi Belgradī. This part also tries to outline Munīrī-yi Belgradī’s mode of thought to discuss the background of his criticism about the couplets. According to his way of thinking, though Munīrī had some tolerance to Ṣūfī people believing fenā fillāh, he ironically harshly criticized the Ṣūfī group supporting Wahdat al-wujud entitled as Fuṣūṣī. In the second section, based on his work named Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme), it is aimed to create a general portrait of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. In this context, it discusses how Wahdat al-wujud and Hurufism, which are generally big issues for Bayramī-Melāmī, influenced Lāmekānī. Therefore, the comparison between Oglan Sheikh İsmāʿil-i Maʿşūḳī who was clearly influenced by Wahdat al-mavjud (vaḥdet-i mevcūd) and Hurufism, and Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī is realized in this part. It was figured out that adoration of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem (Fuṣūṣīlik) was more influential in Bayramī-Melāmī Sheikh’s mode of thinking through the analysis of the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem in Wahdat-nameh (Vaḥdet-nāme). It was suggested that the reason behind the allocation of Munīrī-yi Belgradī for Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī was the effect of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikem which was salient for Melāmī Sheikh Lāmekānī. The final part of the article is about two tracts Miftāḥ al-vucūd and Zayl al-kitāb written by Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī. The criticized couplet was read under the light of these tracts. These two tracts are significant as they explain how God surrounds the universe and where the ʿarş (arsh) is located by referring to the verses of Quran al-Fussilet 41/54, al-Nisā 4/126 and el-Tāhā 20/5 mentio-ned in the couplet by Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī proposed a new argument about how God surrounds the universe in Zayl al-kitāb. According to this argument, in Miftāḥ al-vucūd Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī tries to explain God’s surrounding potent through the or-ders/grades of the existence. In Zayl al-kitāb, he claims that there must be a center for God’s surroundings of the universe and this center must be Ḥaḳīḳat al-Muḥammediyye. Ṣalāḥ al-dīn-i ʿUşşāḳī stated that he did not acknowledge this information by himself but he acquired it from Ibn Arabī when he had a dream. Lastly, this part of the article discusses what Rahman settles in ʿarş (arsh) means in terms of circle (devir) theory. It was suggested that according to Ṣūfī people believing Wahdat (vaḥdetçi) God’s ʿarş (arsh) is the human being himself by drawing on the Kasf al-Gıtā (Keşfu’l-Gıtā) qasida written by Sunʿullāh-ı Gaybī who was a successor of Ḥuseyn-i Lāmekānī from the second generation. (shrink)

Ch'ŏrhak iran muŏt in'ga (1976) -- Hyŏnsanghak kwa punsŏk ch'ŏrhak (1977) -- Inyŏm kwa chilli, kŭrigo todŏk.

This chapter investigates the hermeneutics of the signature in Greek and Roman visual culture. Ancient artists, it argues, exploited artistic agency as a meaning-making mechanism. The chapter focusses on the common practice of craftsmen working under the name of a more celebrated artist, taking as a particular case study the Iliac tablets. Created in the first century AD, several associate themselves with the ‘Theodorean techne’. This chapter argues that this is a form of pseudonymity: the creator wished to imbue his (...) work with the authority of an Archaic sculptor. (shrink)

By focusing on the works and intellectual network of the Timurid historian Sharaf al Dīn ʻAlī Yazdī (d.1454), this book presents a holistic view of intellectual life in fifteenth century Iran. İlker Evrim Binbaş argues that the intellectuals in this period formed informal networks which transcended political and linguistic boundaries, and spanned an area from the western fringes of the Ottoman State to bustling late medieval metropolises such as Cairo, Shiraz, and Samarkand. The network included an Ottoman revolutionary, a Mamluk (...) prophet, and a Timurid occultist, as well as physicians, astronomers, devotees of the secret sciences, and those political figures who believed that the network was a force to be taken seriously. Also discussing the formation of an early modern Islamicate republic of letters, this book offers fresh insights on the study of intellectual history beyond the limitations imposed by nationalist methodologies, established genres, and recognized literary traditions. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to analyze the problem of possibility and necessity in the pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard. The basic assumption adopted in the text is that Kierkegaard’s oeuvre should be read holistically. That is why what is initially analyzed separately are the mutually excluding statements of Climacus from the Philosophical Fragments and Anti-Climacus from The Sickness Unto Death. Subsequently, the article demonstrates the way in which their main theses can be linked, in the process of interpretation, to form (...) a philosophically concise approach to the eponymous problem. (shrink)

This book offers a critical survey of the origins of liberalism. It challenges the widely-held belief among philosophers that liberalism developed in opposition to religion. Beginning with the Protestant Reformation, it illustrates how Christian thinkers reinterpreted Christianity and used a set of biblical presuppositions from their reinterpretations to develop the first liberal ideas, starting a process that culminates in the birth of the first systematic liberal political philosophy in the writings of a Christian philosopher, John Locke. -/- Foreworded by Michael (...) A. Gillespie, the author of The Theological Origins of Modernity, this book explains how the Protestant Reformation, covenant theology, anti-trinitarianism, and medieval Christian natural law theories formed the foundations of liberalism. Thus, the main argument of this book is that liberalism is better understood as a socio-political project of theistic rationalism, a radical reinterpretation of Christianity that emerged in the post-Reformation and early modern period. (shrink)

Intended for high school and college students studying ancient Greece and Rome as part of a larger world history curriculum, this book's coverage of key wars and battles; important leaders, armies, organizations, and weapons; and other aspects of conflict will enable readers to better understand the complex role warfare played in ancient Western civilization.

Издание предназначено для философов, культурологов, психологов, а также всех, кто интересуется проблемами творчества.