Eliseo Vivas gives forceful expression to this ancient but neglected truth in a recent volume of essays. These papers deal with a wide variety of topics, but they all focus upon the theme of the relation between art and ontology, and they all insist that we can approach an understanding of art only to the extent that we can clarify the nature of the object that art discloses. Because of the separation of present-day intellectual disciplines, the vocabulary in which this (...) discussion is cast is apt to make it miscarry. So it is worth a moment to translate its central thesis into those dialects that are most prevalent in contemporary aesthetic discourse. (shrink)

The range of the present work can be indicated by an abstract of the three parts into which it is somewhat loosely divided. The first is concerned with an analysis of the human situation, and of the central problem that this poses for man. The second describes in detail various tempting but fallacious solutions to this problem, and, more vaguely, the one correct solution. The third presents an account of man's obligation to his fellows, and seeks to develop a moral (...) criterion. (shrink)

There are five principal answers that can be given to this question, each of which proliferates into a good many varieties. We might hold that art discloses an order of being that is uniquely its object, accessible only to it. This was the traditional realistic position, stated most openly by Schopenhauer; and it is still often advanced, though usually under the cloak of mysticism, whether apologetic or arrogant, to cover the appearance of irrationality that modern modes of thought give to (...) it. We might hold that art conveys the impressions and feelings of the artist--that its object is simply the artist's vision of himself: this is the answer of expressionism. We might hold, with the psychologistic schools, that art has no antecedent object, but only the purpose of exciting certain feelings and attitudes in its audience; this is to say that the aesthetic object is a fiction, fabricated only with an eye to the effect it will have. We might hold that the work of art is a construct, a design realized in an ordered medium, having no reference beyond itself; this is the answer of formalism. We might hold that art deals with and discloses one aspect of a single but many-faceted order of reality, other aspects of which are dealt with and conveyed in other ways. (shrink)

This phenomenon of the conceptual elusiveness of art quite certainly has a complex causation. The internal richness and intricacy of any given art-work; the profuse varieties of art-works taken as a collection; the occurrence of different art-forms, such as poetry, music, painting, and so forth; the existence of a plurality of styles within each such form; the complexity of the aesthetic experience that we derive from art; the different and often contradictory insistences of artists regarding the intentions, the methods, and (...) the outcomes that are realized in their creative undertakings and embodied in their works; the manifold human uses to which art is put--all of these contribute to the difficulty of reaching a coherent theoretical explanation of the world and the life of art. (shrink)

I shall argue in this paper that our thinking about the question of war and peace is vitiated at its source by a series of mistaken assumptions and intentions. These misconceptions pass as sound coin because they have the air of truisms: they appear to direct our inquiries along lines that are sure to be successful and are anyway the only ones available. At the same time, these errors are so basic that they distort both theory and practice from the (...) start: they are red herrings, putting us on a false scent from which we never free ourselves because we cannot get close enough to the quarry to recognize our mistake. It is my purpose to expose these errors and point the way to their correction. (shrink)

I. There was once a happy time—and it was not so very long ago—when it was widely assumed that democracy was the inevitable climax of man's political development, the form of government to which every people aspired and which every society would adopt when it reached the requisite stage of cultural maturity. It was thought that all that had to be done to secure this consummation was to “make the world safe for democracy” by extirpating its natural enemies, such as (...) kings, emperors, assorted nobles, and landed aristocracies. Once these social predators were done for, the people would spontaneously assert their sovereignty, and would proceed to establish their societies and organize their governments on the model of Anglo-American democratic institutions. (shrink)

When we do this--when we postpone judgment on the meaningfulness and validity of moral experience until this has had the opportunity to speak its piece--at what sort of conception of man's moral condition do we arrive? This is the sole question that the present study will seek to clarify. I shall not be concerned to scrutinize the credentials of the moral conscience: to judge, as among the phenomena of pleasure-seeking, expediency, preference, obligation, devotion to duty, responsibility, self-sacrifice, freedom and love, (...) that some are legitimate reports of actual motives and sentiments while others are pretentions and rationalizations. To the contrary, I should maintain that this separation of the sheep from the goats is precisely what needs to be reconsidered. Nor shall I be concerned to suggest, except perhaps by indirection, even the general form of ethical theory that is required if these various aspects of morality are to be synthesized and explained. My interest lies exclusively with the phenomena--the facts apparent and the facts presumptive--that moral consciousness exhibits and that moral theory must take account of. Hence, my primary intention is to elicit the full range of the moral life as this reveals itself to a purposeful and theoretically uncommitted examination of the common moral conscience. Secondarily, I shall consider the implications of these moral facts as they bear on the nature of man and man's place in the universe, as well as the difficulties that these facts raise for theory. (shrink)

The problem that has been central for most contemporary inquiry concerning values has been that of the verification of value-judgments. When a sharp disjunction has been drawn between facts and values, and when it has been accepted that facts have a preeminently objective status--that the descriptive sciences are the most secure and exact, then it is inevitable that there should be an attempt to impose upon value-judgments--upon the normative sciences--the same form and conditions that hold for judgments of fact. If (...) this is to be accomplished, it is imperative that values should be measurable. Hence, most modern doctrines have been insistent in defining and treating values in such a way that they could be measured. (shrink)

Those philosophical issues that are of the most vivid contemporary significance usually exhibit two striking characteristics. First, there is a widely-shared conviction as to the proper solution of the problem at issue. But, secondly, this conviction cannot be justified and elaborated. A certain general answer to the difficulty is felt to be correct. But this answer cannot be made logically and empirically reasonable. So inquiry, deprived of any basic doctrine that can give it impetus and direction, dwells morbidly upon the (...) same questions: it digs its foundation deeper and deeper, but it seems never to feel sufficiently secure to start work on a super-structure. The terms in which the problem is conceived are, by continuing analysis, rendered ever more subtle; but the hypotheses that might satisfy the conditions posed by the problem, though everywhere implied and frequently adumbrated, are never systematically developed. (shrink)

This is a challenging book. For if the author’s analyses are sound, we now face a critical situation which demands unpalatable solutions. As Professor Miller sees it, we are about to be awakened from our slumbers in the American Dream; and while our eyes are still blurred with sleep, we are to be told that we must get up and dress hurriedly, leave the past behind us, and venture into a strange and hostile world. The book is, first, an historical (...) account of the social and constitutional development of this country, culminating in a close analysis of the problems we will increasingly face in the future and of the terms that these impose for their solution. It is also hortatory, seeking to persuade us to face our situation squarely and prepare ourselves to deal with it in a way to preserve, in so far as possible, the constitutional freedoms and protections we now enjoy. The argument is firmly structured, and the writing is always clear and often forceful. (shrink)