The aim of this study was to illuminate the meaning of professional carers’ experiences in caring situations when a conflict of interest arises with the older person receiving care. The findings reveal the complexity of the carers’ ambivalence when facing a conflict of interest, weighing up between the older persons’ right to self-determination and external demands. The carers are alone in their ambivalence, and the conclusion is that they need help and support to be more present in the (...) encounter. The implication for this study is to focus on care as a person-centered practice and to focus on people as interdependent on support carers to maintain older people’s right to self-determination in the relationship. (shrink)

In the surrogate mother procreation can be divorced both from sex as well as any anticipation of child rearing. Often the risks of surrogate motherhood are presented in terms of alternative family structures and economic exploitation of women. Such possibilities must invite critical reflection in order for there to be legal reform. Of paramount importance is the child's best interest and until the full psychological is the child's best interest and until the full psychological ramifications for the child, adoptive parents (...) and natural mother are determined then the law's role must be ambivalent. In this impasse the minority view of the Warnock Report has much to commend itself. (shrink)

The emphasis that the modernity gives to disengagement and beginning leads one to think that the modernity itself is in fact a culture that initiares crisis. Even if there is no initial crisis, it can be created through the ambivalent nature of modernity. Behind the concept of crisis lies the notion that history is a continuous process or movement that opens the door to nihilistic understanding which stems from the idea of contemporary life and thought alienation through the pessimistic meaning (...) of the word. There is a dialectical relationship between the ideas of modernity and progress, and the decadence, and the main theme of Nietzsche's philosophical career. Since the death of Hegel, who made the idea of crisis plausible, everything is nothing but a counter-movement not only in Germany, but also in Europe. The first of these counter-movements is romanticism with its objection to the mind which is liberated from the bonds of tradition. The main thesis of the present article is, between reactiveness of romanticism -on the surface- and the modernity; from one side romanticism's consuming modernity, which is its mirror image, while at the same time feeding from it and modernity's manipulating the ideas developed against it and monopolizing them thanks to its ambivalent nature. For this purpose, following an an anti-enlightenment thinker Nietzsche's, anti-romantic footsteps which at the same time feeds from the romantic heritage, an attempt will be made to analyze the relationship between modernity and romanticism. Another goal of this article is to allow a comparison of how the intellectual development in the West finds its response on the modernization process of our country by probing how the modernization experience of early period Islamist's who experienced this process in a feeling of "backwardness" and with a wounded consciousness and anxiety has led to a shallow romantic worldview. SummaryRomance and romanticism are the main topics of this article. Romanticism is a period, whereas romance is a spiritual attitude not limited to this period, therefore, even today it’s existence is felt. In other words, it is not specific to the Germans. This term is often used to correspond to certain aspects of European intellectual life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance between 1790 and 1850. In its extremely diverse definitions, the most "romantic" definition in our opinion, belongs to Novalis: “I'm romanticizing by giving a high meaning to ordinary things, a mysterious reputation to the ordinary, the honor of the unknown to the known, an infinite look to the finite.” The rejection of existing social reality, the experience of loss, the melancholic longing and the search for loss are the main components of the romantic motive. This study is based on the argument that there is a dialectical relation between romanticism and modernity, which is known as an opposing movement against enlightenment thought. The intellectual feature, which contains the opposite of modernity itself, makes this argument plausible. In addition, the view of modernity as a crisis culture due to the emphasis on disengament and beginnings offers us the possibility to establish a relationship between modernity, which accepts itself as decadence, and romance. Behind the concept of crisis lies the idea that history is a continuous process or movement opening the door to the nihilist understanding in which modern life and thought are alienated in a pessimistic sense. Thus, Allan Megill defines historicism as a prerequisite for nihilism. According to the author, Prophets of Extremity, if the history has no direction to be changed, maintained or lost when wandering in history, it also cannot have a "crisis". The suggestion of "God is dead" is the most concise expression of this crisis. In this crisis state of nihilism, it is a completely forlorn condition of living in the present. Today, which is in the absolute forlorn state; the savior declares his belief that he is devoid of all sorts of features, things that let us reconcile with the current situation of things. In the face of this situation, when people see that the present becomes completely forlorn, they move in two opposite directions with a desire to regenerate culturally: They either have to go back to the past or head for the future. However, every attempt to determine what the future or the past posess will require them to be real, belonging to the present. This will return us to the forlorn state. Nietzsche embraces both opposing sides, but does not attempts choose between them. This is the place where Nietzsche dictates that today is corrupt taking a radical attitude against romanticism fed by the notion of crisis. The fact that modernity has given up its critique of reason, which is revealed by its dialectic, had a great influence on Nietzsche's putting distance between himself and romantics. That is to say, in response to enlightened thought, although romantics speak of unity, apparently, they could not prevent emergence of emotion against mind, local against the universal, individual against social, in other words, the emergence of the second values, which they believed that these were belittled and despised by Enlightenment. Therefore, romantics seem like they could not save themselves from being caught in the web of dialectics in the account they entered that is based on the subject-object distinction in cartesian thought. It is because modernity acts with the consciousness that the life is established on the occurrence and decadence. Based on this, we can say that decadence is inevitable. This decadence (distortion) from the outside may be through movements developed against it, or experienced within itself (even if no one attempts to destroy it). Modernity, with the awareness that it cannot escape from the decadence, wants to arbitrate itself by turning this decadence in its favor by manipulating it. In other words, the modernity dramatizes the feeling of crisis considering itself decadence and the seemingly contradictory ideas of avant-garde and decadence become almost synonymous. It must be the reason why Nietzsche identifies modernity with decadence Modernity manages to put the decadence in its body at the center of attraction by producing self-opposing movements, monopolizing and manipulating. In short, both romanticism and avant-garde movements are the movements that are emerged not against modernity but from itself. Just like an apple worm, they both consume modernity and feed on it. They act as a mirror. Although they seem to criticize, as movements that have emerged from it, they allow the modernity to complete and correct the deficiencies. As a result of this, we can say that romantic critical movements are developed against the world and are shaped by modernity, beginning with the idea of enlightenment, and moved forward in the track of modernity.While romanticism developed in the West as opposed to modernity, in Ottoman-Turkish thought, it was seen as the rhetoric of retardation and regretting of backwardness from civilization. It is inevitable that the experience of modernization in a sense of backwardness, with a wounded consciousness and urgency, will open up space for romance. In our modernization adventure starting with Tanzimat, it is a fact that there has not been a drastic reckoning due to Enlightenment on an intellectual basis, industrialization on an economic basis, programs of revolutionary and nationalist formations on a political basis. Therefore, in Turkish thought, it is not possible to talk about a critical tradition developed against modern paradigm. The status of being audience to what was being experienced in Europe, resulting from superiority was transformed into grudge due to the defeats in the military field. Due to the decadence experienced in the present, inability to find the solution to the problems of its age, melancholic state of mind because of being stuck in the golden age experienced in the past, in the case of a preference, led to a romantic world view because of the appeal of its simplicity to imitate what was once lived in the past. Thus, it is very natural that the direction of Namık Kemal, the cult personality of Islamist-Turkish thought, is towards the past even when talking about progress and civilization. Seeing the 19th century Europe as a re-implementation of ideas and institutions that are actually Islamic, Namık Kemal, in our opinion, showed us a clear example of a typical Islamist romanticism and an example of occidentalist approach regarding that the West learned the civilization from Muslims. In fact, the exact equivalent of this approach displayed in Turkish cogito without even knowing that it is romantic, emerging in the personality of Namık Kemal and in the feeling of backwardness,with a hectic and injured consciousness, is kitschization. So much so that, the state of being kitsch also explains the current situation of Islamic geography which is far from creating a tradition for at least a century, and it clearly tells the usual romantic end. (shrink)

The author examines the philosophical doctrines of Kant and Hegel, and puts forward a thesis concerning the inner ambivalence of these doctrines. The thesis is supported with concrete examples demonstrating the internal contradictions in the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The more a philosophical doctrine is meaningful and innovative, the more it is contradictory, ambivalent, and aporiastic, in spite of the efforts of its founder and followers to reconcile all of its major claims. This ambivalence, however, turns (...) out to be a positive quality, because it allows philosophers to transcend their philosophical system, and if not directly, then indirectly raises the questions: Should philosophers continue building systems? And do not all self-contained systems fetter philosophical discourse? (shrink)

Freud began university intending to study both medicine and philosophy. But he was ambivalent about philosophy, regarding it as metaphysical, too limited to the conscious mind, and ignorant of empirical knowledge. Yet his private correspondence and his writings on culture and history reveal that he never forsook his original philosophical ambitions. Indeed, while Freud remained firmly committed to positivist ideals, his thought was permeated with other aspects of German philosophy. Placed in dialogue with his intellectual contemporaries, Freud appears as a (...) reluctant philosopher who failed to recognize his own metaphysical commitments, thereby crippling the defense of his theory and misrepresenting his true achievement. Recasting Freud as an inspired humanist and reconceiving psychoanalysis as a form of moral inquiry, Alfred Tauber argues that Freudianism still offers a rich approach to self-inquiry, one that reaffirms the enduring task of philosophy and many of the abiding ethical values of Western civilization. (shrink)

Nietzsche sometimes praises the drive to order—to simplify, organize, and draw clear boundaries—as expressive of a vital "classical" style, or an Apollonian artistic drive to calmly contemplate forms displaying "epic definiteness and clarity." But he also sometimes harshly criticizes order, as in the pathological dialectics or "logical schematism" that he associates paradigmatically with Socrates. I challenge a tradition that interprets Socratism as an especially one-sided expression of, or restricted form of attention to, the Apollonian: they are more radically disparate. Beyond (...) strengthening the case for this basic point, I develop a distinctive account of what, exactly, distinguishes the Apollonian-classical and Socratic forms of order. To this end, I advance interrelated interpretations of Apollonian-classical simplicity and the "cold" calm that it elicits, by contrast to superficially similar Socratic phenomena. This illuminates Nietzsche's broader ambivalence toward science, in part by clarifying the nature and value of an idealized Apollonian science. (shrink)

Издание содержит: плодотворная противоречивость философско-исторических и общественно-политических воззрений; амбивалентность великих философских учений и т.д.

The articles considers philosophy as an educational project. The institutionalization of philosophy is connected with the process of formation and development of the classical university as well as with the transformation of its socio-cultural status. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the essential ambivalence of philosophy and its influence to the basic priorities of philosophical education. It is emphasized that the tasks of reforming and modernizing academic philosophical programs initiate the development of variable models and technologies for (...) teaching philosophy in modern universities. It this regard, of particular interest is the Belarusian experience in reforming philosophical education in its two aspects: general philosophy course and special academic programs. The article analyzes the model of teaching philosophy at various stages and levels of higher education, which has been used at the Belarusian State University over the past 15 years. The author describes both the innovative nature of this model and its connection with the previous organization schemes and teaching priorities. Within the framework of this model, there are three levels of teaching philosophy and its various modifications. At the first level, which is focused on the preparation of bachelors, the basic course “Philosophy” is taught, which suggests an acquaintance with world classical philosophical tradition. At the second level, the course “Philosophy in the Modern World” is offered, which, taking into account the specfics of the academic preparation of graduate students, reproduces the basic ideas and concepts of modern philosophy. At the third level, in the course “Philosophy and Methodology of Science”, the main attention is paid to the issues of logic, methodology, sociology of science and education. The article considers some stages, problems and contradictions of this reform process as well as its consequences in the context of recent events in the socioeconomic and political life of Belarus. The author argues that modern converging technologies of social and humanitarian education, which are based on formal and instrumental-pragmatic criteria, have significantly influenced the processes of reforming the system of teaching the humanities and social sciences in Belarusian universities. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Divided Socrates: Ambiguity or Ambivalence? Socratic Constructions Socratic Voices Thematizations.

Acknowledging the power of the id-drives, Freud held on to the authority of reason as the ego’s best tool to control instinctual desire. He thereby placed analytic reason at the foundation of his own ambivalent social theory, which, on the one hand, held utopian promise based upon psychoanalytic insight, and, on the other hand, despaired of reason’s capacity to control the self-destructive elements of the psyche. Moving beyond the recourse of sublimation, post-Freudians attacked reason’s hegemony in quelling disruptive psycho-dynamics and, (...) focusing upon the social domain, they sought strategies to counter the oppressive (repressive) social restrictions and conformist impositions impeding individual freedom that result from thwarted desire. Postmodern celebration of desire at the expense of reason and sublimation leaves the Enlightenment prospects altogether and moves psychoanalysis into a new terrain, where the very notion of rationality and an autonomous ego upon which much of Freudianism rests has been deconstructed. Thus the debate that begins with Freud’s social theories reflects the deeper divisions, which arose with postmodern ethics and discarded Cartesian–Kantian notions of personal identity. Here we consider the moral framework in which Freudian social theory sits and a contrasting understanding of agency that confronts his modernist conception. In that debate, we discern the larger humanist confrontation with postmodernity. Yet, all who engaged Freud shared some version of his utopian ethos, albeit radically restructuring the theory upon which social reform might occur. (shrink)

Acknowledging the power of the id-drives, Freud held on to the authority of reason as the ego’s best tool to control instinctual desire. He thereby placed analytic reason at the foundation of his own ambivalent social theory, which, on the one hand, held utopian promise based upon psychoanalytic insight, and, on the other hand, despaired of reason’s capacity to control the self-destructive elements of the psyche. Moving beyond the recourse of sublimation, post-Freudians attacked reason’s hegemony in quelling disruptive psycho-dynamics and, (...) focusing upon the social domain, they sought strategies to counter the oppressive (repressive) social restrictions and conformist impositions impeding individual freedom that result from thwarted desire. Postmodern celebration of desire at the expense of reason and sublimation leaves the Enlightenment prospects altogether and moves psychoanalysis into a new terrain, where the very notion of rationality and an autonomous ego upon which much of Freudianism rests has been deconstructed. Thus the debate that begins with Freud’s social theories reflects the deeper divisions, which arose with postmodern ethics and discarded Cartesian–Kantian notions of personal identity. Here we consider the moral framework in which Freudian social theory sits and a contrasting understanding of agency that confronts his modernist conception. In that debate, we discern the larger humanist confrontation with postmodernity. Yet, all who engaged Freud shared some version of his utopian ethos, albeit radically restructuring the theory upon which social reform might occur. (shrink)

Theodor Oizerman’s article “On The Meaning of the Question‘What is Philosophy?’” was first published in the journal “Voprosy filosofii”, 1968, vol. 11. Since that the issue has become a bibliographical rarity and still does not exist in a digital form. Other versions of the article were rewritten in the form of book chapters and transformed in the context of the current situation. This proposed publication bases on one of the older versions, which, is, on the one hand, close to the (...) original author’s intention, and on the other hand, lacks a certain dependence on the ideological context. The text, however, includes some critically important arguments appearing only in later editions. In general, the article is of central significance in terms of its place in the Metaphilosophy concept proposed by Oizerman, which later the following books have manifested: “The Problem Of The History Of Philosophy”(1969, 1983), “The Foundations For The Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (1983, in co-authorship with A.S. Bogomolov), “Philosophy As A History Of Philosophy” (1999), “Ambivalence Of Philosophy” (2011); “Metaphilosophy: Theory Of The Historico-Philosophical Process” (2009). A number of references due to the difficulty of reading the archived article text have been omitted or taken from new editions. The text has been prepared and edited by Ilya T. Kasavin. (shrink)

Economic models of addiction are choice-based. These models push the choice paradigm too far by modeling addiction as rational, normative behavior. Heyman's target article provides a sensible alternative to this economic approach by emphasizing that addiction is characterized by ambivalence and a perceived loss of self control. However, matching may not be a satisfactory platform on which to build this alternative model. Matching experiments do not provide evidence of ambivalence or perceived loss of self control.

This paper critically evaluates Habermas's social-philosophical exploration of the public sphere in the age of mass communication, which addresses a key question: "Is the public possible in the sociohistorical formation of the mass public sphere?" In his genealogical analysis of different public spheres from feudal to modern times, Habermas indicates that the emergence of inter-subjectivity is historically based upon the dichotomy of private / public (subjective/objective). He emphasizes the opposition of the "subjective side" of rationality to its "objective side" while (...) dealing with the public spheres in different historical periods. Habermas points out that the notion of the public can exist only at the face-to-face level communication. It is impossible for the (impersonal) masses to construct any sense of publicness, since there are no historical and social conditions in which the masses of working class can establish an "autonomous private sphere" outside of material production and consumption, as the bourgeoisie did. In this way, Habermas ambivalently argues that the public is not possible in the mass public sphere. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates Habermas's social-philosophical exploration of the public sphere in the age of mass communication, which addresses a key question: "Is the public possible in the sociohistorical formation of the mass public sphere?" In his genealogical analysis of different public spheres from feudal to modern times, Habermas indicates that the emergence of inter-subjectivity is historically based upon the dichotomy of private / public (subjective/objective). He emphasizes the opposition of the "subjective side" of rationality to its "objective side" while (...) dealing with the public spheres in different historical periods. Habermas points out that the notion of the public can exist only at the face-to-face level communication. It is impossible for the (impersonal) masses to construct any sense of publicness, since there are no historical and social conditions in which the masses of working class can establish an "autonomous private sphere" outside of material production and consumption, as the bourgeoisie did. In this way, Habermas ambivalently argues that the public is not possible in the mass public sphere. (shrink)

This article engages with the religious dimension of the politics of anti-slavery/trafficking and presents an analysis of select Christian-identified organisations working in anti-slavery/trafficking in South Africa. Using website content of the select organisations as primary material, the article argues that in similar ways to the paternalistic early Christian missionary approach to indigenous religious practices, the politics of paternalism persist to this day in the realm of Christian organisations working in anti-slavery in South Africa. That is, the ‘White Saviour Industrial Complex’ (...) identified by Teju Cole is pervasive in the rhetoric of these Christian organisations. Consequently, and firstly, the article further bolsters the argument that the African continent has frequently been treated as a key site for formulating and testing a variety of models of humanitarian assistance, aid and economic development dating from the colonial era to the present neocolonial one. However, and secondly, the article also highlights that there is ambivalence in the ways in which the Christian anti-slavery/trafficking organisations in South Africa take up a key feminist concept of empowerment as informing how they understand their work. As such, the article proposes that caution be applied in critically engaging the discourse of these organisations.Contribution: This article engages with the religious dimension of the politics of anti-slavery/trafficking and presents an analysis of select Christian-identified organisations working in anti-slavery/trafficking in South Africa. The article illustrates how the intersection of political studies and religion is part of the journal’s focus on interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary contested discourse. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the historical and philosophical analysis of the work of the Kyrgyz humanist writer of the Soviet period, Chingiz Aitmatov, whose early work is characterised as a fascination with the “Soul of Faust.” (Spirit of Faust) The result of this was the writer's earlier works, where he fervently perceives the ideas of progress, socialism, and enlightenment, in other words, the main ideas of the modern era. Later, under the huge influence of Russian classical literature, as well (...) as active study of traditional Kyrgyz culture, epic “Manas”, he spoke on such fundamental metaphysical topics as people, personality, fate, morality, humanism, etc., thereby trying to get rid of the “Soul of Faust” (Spirit of Faust) with its straightforwardness, its propensity for the infinite settlement of everything. So the writer gradually asserted himself more and more as a traditional humanist. But despite these attempts, the writer still retained some ambivalence: on the one hand, he acted as a staunch critic of modernity, faceless technology and on the other, he perceived the modernization process as an objective development of history that needs to be perceived and comprehended. The results of the writer's later ideas are new concepts such as “Mankurt” and “Ixrod” usually used to describe the consciousness of a person who became possible at the junction of modernity with tradition. To a certain extent, these concepts are identical to the idea of “Das Man” by M. Heidegger. (shrink)

Modern trends in social development are defined not only as an information society, but increasingly as a knowledge society. To understand its content and strategy of implementation, an important aspect is to understand the contradictions that are increasingly manifested and are of a general socioanthropological nature. In particular, this is the problem of the correlation between a knowledge society and objective scientific knowledge; this is the question of the correlation between the available knowledge and experience reflected in the cultural tradition (...) and the rapidly changing information flow; this is the question of the social role of education and the social status of an educated person, as well as the problem of human self-determination in the context of situational relations and a configurative society, etc.The widespread mythologeme of a knowledge society as a society of intellectuals supports a rather one-sided view of it. Therefore, understanding the paradoxical combination of elements of a knowledge society system, their contradictions, and complementarities, makes it possible to understand the risks and develop tools to avoid them. The research methodology. The study is based on an interdisciplinary and comprehensive analysis of contemporary socio-cultural processes in the context of the formation of a knowledge society and information pedagogy. Research results: The interpretation of modern society as a knowledge society raises a number of theoretical questions and discussions concerning the definition of knowledge (scientific/non-scientific, useful/unsuitable, etc.), and the definition of its social and anthropological characteristics and human status (educated person, informed person, professional person, successful person). The challenges of the processes of informatization of society lead to the formation of «e-didactics» and «information pedagogy» of a new educational paradigm, the effectiveness of which should resolve a number of contradictions. These include, in particular, the discrepancy between learning tools (openness and mobility) and reproductive learning models; between distance asynchronous learning and the classical stability of the structure and forms of organization of the educational process, etc. Discussions. The analysis of knowledge as the fundamental basis of the new social reality and changes in its historical status allows us to identify problematic issues of the worldview picture of the world that is formed in the conditions of intensive production of information and a certain devaluation of knowledge, actualization of innovations, and devaluation of cultural tradition. The knowledge society is often characterized as an education society. Although such a generalization is debatable, educational technologies of knowledge production and transmission are an important component of the development of a knowledge society and include the destruction of stereotypes and attitudes of the industrial society’s education paradigm. This explains why interdisciplinary discussions about the content and forms of organization of modern education are becoming increasingly acute. The problem of rethinking the established models of teacherstudent relations and the requirements for the subjects of the educational process is important among the many aspects of changes. A student is transformed from an object of pedagogical influence into a subject of the educational process, where a teacher plays the role of a mentor, a tutor, since knowledge must be «extracted» by a student because of his or her own intellectual efforts and cognitive search.The change in social role also includes a change in worldview, way of thinking, and value priorities. Conclusion. The analysis of the socio-cultural mechanisms and practices of the knowledge society reveals its ambivalence and risks, which are its inherent characteristics. Knowledge as the fundamental basis of the new social reality is defined not only as a tool for understanding the world but also as a factor of civilizational development that produces new forms of activity and relationships, new worldview orientations, and value priorities. The transformation of the phenomenon of knowledge and the rapidity of the information flow raises the question of the relevance of existing knowledge and experience to the needs of a given situation, thus actualizing the demand not for the depth of knowledge and understanding, but for the ability to combine and choose a practical (useful) option, to put together puzzles and mosaics, forming a clip thinking. Challenges of the processes of society informatization lead to the formation of “e-didactics”, information pedagogy as a tool for adaptation and a new educational paradigm, the effectiveness of which should resolve the identified contradictions.However, the transformation of modern educational practices involves not only rethinking their content, technologies, and teaching methods, changing the status relations of the subjects of the educational process, but also a general change in models of thinking and personal behavior, and a change in the human world. The correlation of the modes of human definition: educated, intellectual, erudite, and specialist becomes an important issue of the anthropological dimension of the knowledge society, where the problem of human self-determination is becoming more acute. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory – providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's (...) account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

Beginning from the hypothesis that Slavoj iek's recent 'theological' writing really concerns issues in political theory — historicity, modernity and freedom — 'polemical ambivalence' uses a fundamental structural ambiguity in his recent book, The Puppet and Dwarf, to interpret his larger project as split about the utopian aspect of modernity. The Puppet and the Dwarf is riven by modernity, with the text's central argument demonstrating the importance of the modern perspective but with the framing material demanding that we reverse (...) this appraisal. Modernism elicits both a basic allegiance from iek and a basic opposition. Since for iek it is the only way that political theory can remain true to the utopian demands of freedom, such 'ambivalence' about modernity is the unacknowledged ground of iek's thought, and my paper moves toward a consideration of its value in explaining some of the elusive elements of his work — the role and limits of 'science' in politics, the necessity and impossibility of utopian imagination, the problem of belief and faith in revolutionary movements. (shrink)

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's (...) account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) is the definitive statement of Husserl’s early logic. But what does it say that logic is? I argue that Husserl in the Prolegomena thinks logic is its own discipline, namely the “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre), but has two conflicting ideas of what that is. One idea—expressed by the book’s general argument, and which I call Husserl’s Austrian Semanticism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the positive science explaining what science is (which turns out just to (...) be the study of meaning) plus the dependent art that, applying the science, teaches us how to scientifically know. The other idea—expressed by the book’s opening chapter, and which I call Husserl’s German Idealism about logic—is that the Wissenschaftslehre is the purely reflective self-knowing of science, independent of science’s positive expansion. These two ideas are incompatible. Thus, the Prolegomena is ambivalent on what logic is. But since the ambivalence only deepens the significance of Husserl’s early logic, the ambivalence should be embraced. (shrink)

This paper takes as its starting point a debate between Harry Frankfurt and J. David Velleman. Frankfurt argues that we need to resolve ambivalence since it necessarily threatens autonomy. Velleman challenges this claim, arguing that a desire to resolve ambivalence threatens autonomy when it prompts repression. I argue that the relationship between ambivalence and autonomy is more ambiguous than either theorist tends to acknowledge. In doing so, I recommend three features relevant for assessing whether or not (...) class='Hi'>ambivalence threatens autonomy. (shrink)

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgements. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgements express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same (...) object—can play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgements. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view: deciding how to act under moral ambivalence. (shrink)

Posidonia oceanica is an endemic seagrass from the mediterranean that provides key ecosystem services. A protected species, its presence is regressing due to anthropogenic pressures, some associated to the tourism economy that much of the Mediterranean coast depends on. In 1992, the European Union declared it a priority habitat, and since the early 2000s, it has occupied a central space in marine conservation debates in the Balearic Islands. Popularly known as Posidonia, this seagrass went from being considered dirt that ruined (...) virgin Balearic beaches to become an emblematic species. This article takes this U-turn in policy and public perception as a study case to think of knowledge-making practices and restoration initiatives as a form of environmental care. The relational, situated and affective character of care ethics helps to understand the human and ecological labour embedded in knowledge-making and restoration practices and its inevitable engagement with the Balearic tourism industry. Drawing on those engagements, I reflect on environmental care practices of knowledge-making and restoration, arguing that they emerge ambivalently: they challenge management logics based on economic rationales while forced to develop and coexist inside those same rationales. I conclude by arguing that developing care-centric narratives for environmental conservation and restoration is essential to continue promoting more-than-human aquatic relations in which the needs of others are the ethical basis for action. (shrink)

Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires (...) creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete theory of Humean rationality. (shrink)

J.S. Swindell has argued that Harry Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is ambiguous and that it fails to do justice to the full range of this psychological phenomenon. Building on her criticism of Frankfurt, Swindell offers an analysis of ambivalence which is supposed to clarify ambiguities in Frankfurt's analysis and reveal varieties of ambivalence that Frankfurt's analysis allegedly overlooks. In this brief reply, I argue that Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is neither ambiguous nor objectionably narrow. I conclude (...) with remarks on Swindell's analysis of the relationship between ambivalence and weakness of the will. (shrink)

Ambivalence is often presented through cases of defeated ambivalence and multivalence, in which opposed attitudes suggest mutual isolation and defeat each other. Properly understood, however, ambivalence implies the existence of poles that are conflictually yet rationally interlinked and are open to non-defeated joint conduct. This paper considers cases that range from indecisiveness and easy adoption of conflicting attitudes, to tragically conflicted deliberation and to cases of shifting between self-deceptively serious attitudes. Analyzing such cases as variants of defeated (...) ambivalence, I argue that the phenomena of defeated ambivalence are marginal to ambivalence even though they are by the same token exemplary of it. The poles in such cases are connected as opposing attitudes in such a way that the attitudes and the opposition are both undermined. The article focuses on two forms of vague multivalence, one of which is taken from Heidegger’s analysis of curiosity. (shrink)

Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about (...) the subject's response. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in (...) the analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the meaning of birth in the work of Agamben, Esposito, and Derrida, paying particular attention to how it operates in their analyses of citizenship and national belonging. I show that Agamben views birth as negative, Esposito proposes a positive conception, and Derrida's writings imply an understanding that is ambivalent. Then, by focusing on the phenomenon of multiple citizenship, I argue for the value of the Derridean view.

When we disagree with each other at the beginning of a debate, we are confident that we are right and the other side is just wrong, 2017). But at the end of the debate, we could be persuaded that we are wrong and the other side is right. This happens a lot when we disagree on empirical or factual claims. However, when we disagree with each other on moral issues, it is quite rare that either side is persuaded. We could (...) be frustrated by the other’s stubbornness. But sometimes we come to see that the other side has a point. Their view seems reasonable. We might even feel that we could have taken their moral perspective and values. This phenomenon of moral ambivalence is discussed extensively by David Wong as part of his argument for moral relativism that there is no single true morality. Recently, Agustín Vicente and Agustín Arrieta write to refute Wong’s argument. They argue that moral ambivalence is a phenomenon of moral pluralism, the position that there are different acceptable courses of actions, rather than moral relativism. In this paper, I argue that moral ambivalence does not support the kind of moral pluralism that Vicente and Arrieta argue for. Furthermore, I point out that moral ambivalence does not support Wong’s naturalism, the position that morality has human nature constraints, but it does support the kind of relativism that he endorses. (shrink)

This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets (...) that things can have positive and negative aspects: something can both be dangerous and attractive, for instance. (shrink)

Although counterproductive work behaviors can be extremely damaging to organizations and society as a whole, we do not yet fully understand the link between employees’ organizational attachment and their intention to engage in such behaviors. Based on social identity theory, we predicted a negative relationship between organizational identification and counterproductive work behaviors. We also predicted that this relationship would be moderated by ambivalent identification. We explored counterproductive work behaviors toward the organization and other individuals. Study 1, a survey of 198 (...) employees, revealed that employees who identified strongly with their organization reported lower levels of CWB-O, but as predicted, only when ambivalent identification was low. Study 2 involved a manipulation in the form of a scenario presented to 228 U.S. employees, generally replicated the findings of Study 1: the link between organizational identification and CWB-O was stronger for participants in the low ambivalence condition than for those in the high ambivalence condition. The interaction effect of ambivalent and organizational identification on CWB-I was only marginally significant in the second study. These findings provide new evidence for the positive influence of organizational identification under conditions of low ambivalence on counterproductive behaviors toward an organization. (shrink)

The concept of value is often discredited for its ambivalence: value increases and decreases, and is valid for one person but not necessarily for the next. Philosophies of value are subjectivist or contaminated by economic rationality. I show, from Gilbert Simondon, that value can be conceived of as a variable quantity without falling into levelling or axiological relativism. This implies dismissing the neo-Kantian separation of ontology and axiology, rejecting the conception of culture as a set of values and the (...) bipolarity of value oppositions, and finally thinking of value from a physical-mathematical rather than an economic analogy. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against certain dogmas about ambivalence and alienation. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard demand a unity of persons that excludes ambivalence. Other philosophers such as David Velleman have criticized this demand as overblown, yet these critics, too, demand a personal unity that excludes an extreme form of ambivalence (“radical ambivalence”). I defend radical ambivalence by arguing that, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be radically ambivalent. (...) Certain dogmas about alienation are even more entrenched. Allen Wood’s entry on “alienation” in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy begins as follows: “A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together.” I think that it is not true that self-alienation is necessarily “harmful.” I argue that radical ambivalence is a form of self-alienation. Thus, because faithfulness to oneself sometimes requires radical ambivalence, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be alienated from oneself. (shrink)

Responding to Mark Harris, I reflect on his tantalizing question whether the provision of naturalistic explanations for biblical miracles renders the narratives more, or less, credible. I address his “reversal,” in which professional scientists now feature among defenders of a literalistic reading, while professional biblical scholars are often skeptical. I suggest this underlines the ambivalence of scientific naturalism from the standpoint of Christian theology. Historical examples are adduced to show that, until the mid‐nineteenth century, naturalistic and theistic explanations were (...) commonly regarded as complementary. Accordingly, the primacy often accorded to scientific progress in accounts of secularization is questionable. Two concluding questions are raised. If a methodological naturalism inheres in biblical scholarship, as in the sciences, how do biblical scholars decide whether the historical trajectories they construct for the composition of biblical texts are destructive or affirmative of faith? Second, when the miracle is the Resurrection of the dead Christ, does not the scientific impossibility of this foundational event remain sacrosanct? (shrink)

Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having "inconsistent" attitudes of caring or valuing? In this paper, I argue that, contra suggestions of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is "No." Here I focus on "valuations," which are endorsed desires or attitudes. The proper characterization of what I call "valuational inconsistency" I claim, involves not logical form (valuing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is valued; valuations are inconsistent when there is no possible world in which (...) what is valued can co-exist. Essentially conflicting valuations, I show, are no worse for an agent than contingently conflicting ones, which are common and no threat to rationality or well-being. Partly based on reflections about a conflicted mother, who values staying at home and also having a career, I argue that valuational inconsistency does not render a person unable to act, does not make a person's actions ineffective because of vacillation, does not undermine a person's autonomy, and need not make a person dissatisfied with himself. I defend my characterization of inconsistency as an apt one; I offer some reasons to value inconsistency itself; and I draw out some implications for coherence thinking in moral philosophy. (shrink)

A multitude of scholars have recently argued that inherently ambivalent reactions ought to be accepted, and our drive toward overcoming them resisted, in order to preserve a reflectively accurate account of oneself. By contrast, I argue that a genuine commitment to overcome ambivalence aims less at avoiding than acknowledging and understanding, as well as possibly resolving, whatever conflicts led us to become ambivalent in the first place. On the other hand, certain forms of ‘reflective ambivalence’ are especially vulnerable (...) to the very kind of self‐deception they aim to prevent. (shrink)

We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships. (...) The sources and resolutions of collaborative ambivalence reveal how much of our thinking—and so also of our motivational structure—emerges from the details of our collaborative and dialogical engagements. The imaginative skills and strategies exercised in remaining justifiably of two minds—of preserving appropriate ambivalence—are central to practical reasoning. Because these skills provide models for addressing conflicts in the public sphere, because they prompt shared deliberation, they are among the civic virtues. (shrink)

One of the main characteristics of the contemporary aesthetic debate is the recovery of the concept of mimesis, as a dimension that is originally involved in the foundation of human culture and the processes of cultural learning. This is evident in the aesthetic reflection developed by Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf. For these two authors, mimesis is never a mere reproduction of the given reality, but always implies the production of the New, of the Other, of the different with respect (...) to the empirical world, i.e. to the existing categorical order of the world. In particular, Gebauer and Wulf underline the constitutive ambivalence of the notion of mimesis: on the one hand, it favors the processes of reification fueled by capitalist society and, on the other hand, it contributes to the affirmation of a critical and “utopian” instance that can counter “instrumental reason” and the primacy of identity. (shrink)

This paper explores the ambivalent effects of recognition through a critical examination of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. I argue that his underlying perfectionist account and his focus on the psychic effects of recognition lead him to overlook important connections between recognition and power. These claims are substantiated through Butler’s theory of gender performativity and recognition; and issues connected to the socio-institutional recognition of transgender identities. I conclude by suggesting that certain problems with Butler’s own position can corrected by drawing (...) more from the Foucauldian aspects of her work. I argue that this is the most promising way to conceptualise recognition and its complex, ambivalent effects. (shrink)

Recent philosophical arguments in favor of legal markets in human organs such as kidneys claim that respect for autonomy justifies such markets. I argue that these arguments fail to establish the moral permissibility of commercialized organ sales because they do not show that those most likely to serve as vendors would choose to sell autonomously. Pro-market views utilize hierarchical theories of autonomy to demonstrate that potential organ vendors may autonomously consent to selling their organs even in the absence of any (...) practical alternative to doing so. But central to hierarchical accounts of autonomy is the idea that persons my experience volitional ambivalence, a condition in which the will is irreconcilably conflicted. Because commercialized organ sales would create volitional ambivalence in many of those who opt to sell an organ, the choice to sell an organ would not be an autonomous one. (shrink)

I shall argue, however, that there can be genuine ambivalence between a judgment that A is v and a judgment that A is not v. Such ambivalence may, moreover, be precisely of the kind that appears to be either impossible or destructive for ethics. Objectivist ambivalence, as we shall call it, is neither an accidental nor peripheral feature of our value discourse. At the same time it is not destructive to ethics or to value judgments in general, (...) but only to certain received philosophical conceptions of ethics and value. Once the phenomenon of objectivist ambivalence of value judgment is identified, it can be analyzed, and in conducting that analysis I shall set out three aspects that are involved in it. The analysis of the mental attitude of ambivalence will have consequences for the logic of values. We shall see that this logic allows and invites tensions in a non-mysterious way. (shrink)

This paper analyses the notions of desire and metissage that circulate in The Lover, Marguerite Duras's autobiographical novel about an illicit and scandalous sexual relationship between an adolescent French girl and a wealthy Chinese man set in 1920s French colonial Siagon. Rather than celebrate The Lover as a tale of a young French girl's resistance to colonial sexual mores and regulations, this paper seeks to excavate how that resistance both affirms and challenges the racializing and racist dynamics of colonial society. (...) In particular, I explore the intertwining discourses of colonial sexuality, gender, race, and Orientalism that both produced and constrained the specific forms of desire and subjectivities available to and taken up by European women in French Indochina, and that circumscribe the story that Duras is able to tell about the French girl's love affair in The Lover. I suggest that Duras's portrayal of the French girl as a sexually autonomous female subject – one whose erotic relations are not bound by the dictates of colonial patriarchy – is made possible only by the ambivalent structure of the girl's desire, by her simultaneous attraction to and repulsion of the racialized others of the French colonies. (shrink)

The UK’s Cancer Drugs Fund was introduced in 2010 following the Conservative Party’s promise to address the fact that numerous efficacious cancer drugs were not available because of their cost ineffectiveness, as deduced by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence. While, at face value, this policy appears only to promote the UK’s public welfare, a deeper analysis reveals the ethically unjustifiable inconsistencies that the CDF introduces; where is the analogous fund for other equally severe diseases? Have the patients (...) without cancer been neglected simply due to the fear-inducing advertising and particularly ferocious speech which surrounds cancer? The CDF is unjustifiable when challenged by such questions. However, it is troubling to think that the CDF might be repealed in order to abolish these ethical concerns. Intuitively, one feels uncomfortable stripping the cancer patient of their benefits just so that they might be on an equally pessimistic footing with others. In the present essay, I argue that, although there are no ethically justifiable grounds for the CDF’s introduction, its removal would be inappropriate. Following this realisation, I investigate whether the procedural steps of the CDF itself—theoretically removed from the context of resource distribution for all disease types—represent an ethically justifiable system. I believe that the answer is yes, given the CDF’s conformity to accountability for reasonableness, a robust framework of procedural justice, which continuously improves the ethical and epistemological standards of the policies to which it is applied. (shrink)