In this chapter, we will summarize recent empirical results highlighting how different groups of people solve pure coordination games. Such games are traditionally studied in behavioural economics, where two people need to coordinate without communicating with each other. Our results suggest that coordination choices vary across groups of people, and that people can adapt flexibly to these differences in order to coordinate between groups. We propose that pure coordination games are a useful empirical platform for studying aspects of mindshaping. Drawing (...) on existing psychological literature on alignment during interactions, we suggest that experience of successful interaction leads people to develop aligned intuitions about what is relevant and appropriate that support coordination when interaction and communication is not possible. Consistent with arguments made in the literature on mindshaping we believe that such alignment is more important for coordination than mindreading inferences about mental states, and indeed that mindreading is instead a form of coordination behaviour that is dependent upon intuitive alignment. (shrink)

I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes’ analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.

What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...) construction of a minimal theory of mind. Minimal theory of mind is rich enough to explain systematic success on tasks held to be acid tests for theory of mind cognition including many false belief tasks. Yet minimal theory of mind does not require representing propositional attitudes, or any other kind of representation, as such. Minimal theory of mind may be what enables those with limited cognitive resources or little conceptual sophistication, such as infants, chimpanzees, scrub-jays and human adults under load, to track others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs. (shrink)

Публикация рассчитана как на специалистов, так и на широкий круг читателей.

T︠S︡ivilizat︠s︡ionnai︠a︡ sushchnostʹ sovremennogo obrazovanii︠a︡ -- Sot︠s︡ialʹno-kulʹturnoe vzaimodeĭstvie kak osnova pedagogicheskogo sotvorchestva v situat︠s︡ii t︠s︡ivilizat︠s︡ionnykh preobrazovaniĭ -- Nat︠s︡ionalʹnai︠a︡ sistema obrazovanii︠a︡ Belarusi v ėpokhu tekhnogennoĭ t︠s︡ivilizat︠s︡ii i unifikat︠s︡ii kulʹtur.

Marina Gustavovna Shtorkh is a daughter of Gustav Shpet (1879-1937), one of the most important Russian philosophers of the 20th century. He spent the last two years of his life (1935-1937) in exile in Siberia. M.G. Shtorkh shares her memories in a documentary film about her father and his circle, the intellectual leaders of the Silver Age, philosophers, actors, artists: A. Belyi, V. Kachalov, I. Moskvin, A. Shchusev, B. Pil`niak, etc. This book by Elena Iakovich is a transcript of the (...) film. (shrink)