Attempts to apply the mathematical tools of dynamical systems theory to cognition in a systematic way has been well under way since the early 90s and has been recognised as a “third contender” to computationalist and connectionist approaches :441–463, 1996). Nevertheless, it was also realised that such an application will not lead to a solid paradigm as straightforwardly as was initially hoped. In this paper I explicate a method for assessing such proposals by drawing upon Lakatos’s Criticism and the growth (...) of knowledge, Cambridge University Press, London, pp 91–195, 1970) methodology of scientific research programs. MSRP focuses on the heuristics of a particular field and gauges the model/theory building stratagems by reference to theoretical and empirical progress, on the one hand, and the continuity and the autonomy of the way the field’s heuristic generates its series of models/theories, on the other. The requirement of continuity and autonomy afford distinct senses of ad hoc-ness, which serve as an effective tool to detect various subtleties which may otherwise be missed: the present approach identifies shortcomings missed by Chemero’s radical embodied cognitive science and falsifies Chemero’s claim that the methodological powers of his model-based account is on a par with computationalism. In general, I claim that MSRP is relevant to current methodological issues in cognitive science and can supplement debates regarding “local” assessments of methodologies, such as that between mechanical versus covering-law explanations. MSRP must at least be viewed as a necessary constraint for any methodological considerations in cognitive science. (shrink)

We study groups definable in tame expansions of ω-stable theories. Assuming several tameness conditions, we obtain structural theorems for groups definable and interpretable in these expansions. As our main example, by characterizing independence in the pair, where K is an algebraically closed field and G is a multiplicative subgroup of K× with the Mann property, we show that the pair satisfies the assumptions. In particular, this provides a characterization of definable and interpretable groups in in terms of algebraic groups in (...) K and interpretable groups in G. Furthermore, we compute the Morley rank and the U-rank in and both ranks agree. (shrink)

The interactivist model of representation makes foundational criticisms of assumptions concerning representation that have been standard since the pre-Socratics and presents a positive model that differs from others on offer in several ways. The interactivist model of representation (or re- presenting), consequently, does not fit well within standard categories (though it is closest to the general pragmatist framework), and, consequently, is often miscategorized and misunderstood. A recent paper by Gładziejewski (2016) gives us an opportunity to address some of these issues. (...) Gładziejewski presupposes a model of the nature of representation, in a version derived from Ramsey (2007), that is precisely of the sort that the interactivist model argues does not work and is not, in principle, possible. Gładziejewski argues that the interactivist model does not satisfy the desiderata of this kind of model of representation, not taking into account that the interactivist model argues directly against such models and their desiderata. The central (though not the only) point is that Gładziejewski begs the question concerning the interactivist model by assuming precisely what the interactivist model argues is impossible, then charging interactivism with not satisfying these impossible desiderata. By simply accepting the Ramsey framework for understanding and modeling representation, he ignores the arguments against such frameworks, and thereby renders his own arguments circular. (shrink)

This essay addresses the questions of whether and how much responsibility for extreme poverty should be assigned to global and domestic institutional orders. The main focus is on whether the global order brings about the existing levels of extreme poverty or merely allows them. By examining Thomas Pogge's recent contribution on this topic, I argue that although he builds a plausible case for the claim that the global order brings about, and not merely fails to prevent, extreme poverty, the moral (...) and empirical complexity of the situation leaves room for doubting his conclusions. I conclude, however, that it is enough that there be a reasonable chance—though not conclusive evidence—that the global order brings about the existing extreme poverty to reduce considerably the moral weight of its privileged participants' appeal to cost when justifying their not taking steps to alleviate extreme poverty. (shrink)

In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement to disgorge such benefits is generated only if other conditions or factors are present. We identify three such factors and claim that their presence would explain why the normative features of certain types of cases of benefiting from wrongdoing differ from cases of benefiting from simple misfortune or bad (...) luck. (shrink)

This paper takes a closer look at the incompatibility thesis, namely the claim that consequentialism is incompatible with accepting the moral relevance of the doing-allowing distinction. I examine two attempts to reject the incompatibility thesis, the first by Samuel Scheffler and the second by Frances Kamm. I argue that both attempts fail to provide an adequate ground for rejecting the incompatibility thesis. I then put forward an account of what I take to be at stake in accepting or rejecting the (...) incompatibility thesis, namely the underlying conception of responsibility. There are, I contend, two relevant conceptions of responsibility, the globalist and the localist. In order for the compatibilist argument to go through, the globalist conception must be adopted. I aim to provide a formulation and defence of the dependency of the compatibilist view on the globalist conception of responsibility. I will not, however, argue for one conception of responsibility over the other. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the field of algebraic numbers with a set of elements of small height treated as a predicate. We prove that such structures are not simple and have the independence property. A real algebraic integer is called a Salem number if α and are Galois conjugate and all other Galois conjugates of α lie on the unit circle. It is not known whether 1 is a limit point of Salem numbers. We relate the simplicity of a (...) certain pair with Lehmer's conjecture and obtain a model‐theoretic characterization of Lehmer's conjecture for Salem numbers. (shrink)

In this paper, we study an algebraically closed field \ expanded by two unary predicates denoting an algebraically closed proper subfield k and a multiplicative subgroup \. This will be a proper expansion of algebraically closed field with a group satisfying the Mann property, and also pairs of algebraically closed fields. We first characterize the independence in the triple \\). This enables us to characterize the interpretable groups when \ is divisible. Every interpretable group H in \\) is, up to (...) isogeny, an extension of a direct sum of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \ by an interpretable group N, which is the quotient of an algebraic group by a subgroup \, which in turn is isogenous to a cartesian product of k-rational points of an algebraic group defined over k and an interpretable abelian group in \. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical commentary on Kasher and Yadlin's article. I start with a few remarks regarding the authors? claim about the uniqueness of fighting terrorism and their proposed definition of acts of terrorism. The main part of my commentary, however, is devoted to discussing Kasher and Yadlin's Principle of Distinction (Part II of their paper). There, I raise several objections to their proposed ranking of state duties and to the way they use the ranking to justify what they (...) call targeted prevention of terror. Finally, I make a few remarks pertaining more specifically to the Israeli?Palestinian situation. (shrink)

Peter Singer is well known to have argued for our responsibilities to address global poverty based on an analogy with saving a drowning child. Just as the passerby has a duty to save that child, we have a duty to save children ‘drowning’ in poverty. Since its publication, more four decades ago, there have been numerous attempts to grapple with the inescapable moral challenge posed by Singer’s analogy. In this paper, we propose a new approach to the Singerian challenge, through (...) offering a different explanation for why our intuitions about rescuing a threatened person in front of us are more demanding than our intuitions about rescuing those living under equally threatening conditions of poverty. We argue that understanding the underlying motive or mechanism by which people come to endorse intuitions about duties of assistance undermines our confidence in the validity and robustness of some of the highly demanding intuitions that Singer relies on. This, in turn, puts serious limitations on the normative and practical reach of Singer’s analogy. (shrink)

Kur’ân-ı Kerim, Allah’u Teâlâ tarafından Peygamber Efendimiz aracılığı ile insanlığa iletilmiş olan bir hidayet kaynağıdır. Okunmasıyla ibadet edilen Kur’ân-ı Kerim’in insanlar tarafından anlaşılması onun tefsiri ile mümkündür. Bununla birlikte Kırâat İlmi de Kur’ân’ın anlaşılması için bilinmesi gereken ve âyetlerin tefsirinde kullanılması gereken önemli ilimlerden birisidir. Kur’ân-ı Kerim kelimelerindeki telaffuz değişikliklerini konu edinen kırâat ilminin tefsir ilmi ile irtibatlı olduğu aşikârdır. Bundan dolayı Kur’ân-ı Kerim’i açıklayan tefsir kitapları ve tefsir âlimleri, kırâatlerden destek almışlar ve âyetlere mana verirken farklı kırâatleri göz önünde (...) bulundurarak anlam zenginliğini sağlamışlardır. Sahih olan kırâatlerin yanında sahih olmayan kırâatler de âyetlerin anlaşılmasında yardımcı olarak kullanılmıştır. Kur’ân kelimelerinde söz konusu olan bu değişiklikler tefsir eserlerinde farklı şekillerde ele alınmış ve incelenmiştir. Kur’ân’ın anlaşılması için kaleme alınan tefsirlerden birisi olan Celâleyn Tefsiri de; kısa, öz, anlaşılır ve çokça istifade edilen bir eserdir. Celâleyn tefsiri aynı zamanda âyetler anlaşılmaya çalışırken kırâatlerin de incelendiği, farklı şekillerde ele alındığı önemli bir tefsir eseridir. Bu ve benzeri nedenlerden dolayı Celâleyn tefsirinin kırâatler açısından incelenmesi, kırâat ve tefsir ilimleri açısından önem arz etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Celâleyn Tefsirinde kırâatlerin nasıl kullanıldığı, kırâatlere değinilirken onların nasıl zikredildiği, hangi yönler ile kırâatlere yaklaşıldığı gibi konular değerlendirilmeye çalışılacaktır. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenologicalsuccessionof experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny (...) this fact or should embracead hocand metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising. (shrink)

The claim that one is never morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing enjoys a great intuitive appeal. If in addition to this claim, we reject the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction. In this short essay, I propose a different take on the argument in question. Instead of opting to reject its conclusion by defending the moral relevance of the doingallowing distinction, we can no longer rely on the strong intuitive appeal of the claim that one is never (...) morally permitted to engage in non-optimal harm doing. (shrink)

Funniness, a property the nature of which is both seemingly obvious and yet resistant to analysis, has been the object of intermittent attention in philosophy since Plato. Sometimes this attention has taken the form of an investigation into the nature of laughter and the humorous. Sometimes it has taken comic art-forms as its object, though tragedy has received a good deal more attention from philosophers. And sometimes it has focused on jokes and put-downs in their considerable variety, and ethical questions (...) associated with them. All these inquiries are, of course, interlinked. In this paper, we focus on the ethics of jokes, but will then draw connections between that issue and the question of the ethical dimension of humor in put-downs and in art. Our inquiry is thus part of a larger investigation in aesthetics on the relation between artistic and moral value generally. (shrink)

Consequentialists do not deny that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant consideration. For, they do include cost to the agent inthe calculation of the overall good. What they deny, however, isthat cost to the agent is a morally relevant factor independentlyof its impact on the overall good. I argue in this paper that, ifone rejects the claim that cost to the agent is a morallyrelevant factor on its own right, one is then committed toaccepting some `hyper' counter-intuitive moral claims. (...) I callthese claims hyper counter-intuitive because they are at a moreextreme level of counter-intuitiveness than the ones usuallyassociated with consequentialism. (shrink)

We give reasons for our judgements of works of art. (2) Reasons are inherently general, and hence dependent on principles. (3) There are no principles of aesthetic evaluation. Each of these three propositions seems plausible, yet one of them must be false. Illusionism denies (1). Particularism denies (2). Generalism denies (3). We argue that illusionism depends on an unacceptable account of the use of critical language. Particularism cannot account for the connection between reasons and verdicts in criticism. Generalism comes in (...) two forms: reversible generalism is the thesis that there are meaningful generalizations in criticism that admit of exceptions; irreversible generalism is the thesis that such generalizations cannot admit of exceptions. It is argued that Frank Sibley's defence of reversible generalism cannot provide a criterion for distinguishing valenced from non-valenced properties, and thus fails. Irreversible generalism is correct: it is logically cogent and fits our critical practices. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature, Knowledge, and ValueOliver Conolly and Bashshar HaydarMany of the terms we use to assess works of literature are cognitive in nature. We say that a work is profound, insightful, shrewd, well-observed, or perceptive, and conversely that it is shallow, or sentimental, or impercipient. A common thread running throughout this terminology is that works of literature are ascribed cognitive features affecting the value of those works qua literature. Use (...) of this terminology therefore implies adherence to a substantial philosophical theory, cognitivism, the thesis that (1) works of literature have cognitive content, and (2) this content enhances their value as works of literature. Note that cognitivism is not the thesis that literature's value resides in its causing us to acquire knowledge, but rather in its displaying such knowledge. A given work's displaying knowledge does not of course entail that it causes us to acquire it.While cognitivism appears consistent with literary critical practice, it is open to a number of objections. In this paper we aim to defend cognitivism and in the process refine it. Broadly, objections to cognitivism deny either (1) the thesis that works of literature contain any cognitive content, or (2) the thesis that such content can be aesthetically relevant in the sense of being relevant to the evaluation of works of literature qua literature. The principal objection is to (2), for it is difficult to deny that no knowledge whatsoever can be obtained from works of art. For example, the Iliad sheds light on values, habits and customs of ancient Greeks, and nineteenth-century Russian novels may inform us about contemporary debates concerning the emancipation of the serfs. It is the relevance of such knowledge to the artistic value of the literature that is in issue. [End Page 111]IThe main challenge faced by the cognitivist is well put by the anti-cognitivist, Peter Lamarque, thus: the "question artistic cognitivists dread most is what (nontrivial) truths they have learnt from works of art." It is thought a difficult question because in "propositional terms the best they can come up with are usually generalities of numbingly banal kind."1 The objection, in short, is that while it is correct that truths can be gleaned from literature, they are trivial. We call this the triviality objection. Stolnitz for example states that the truth to be learned from Pride and Prejudice is, "Stubborn pride and ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart," which he describes as "pitifully meager."2However, the notion of an insight implies nontriviality: a "trivial insight" is an oxymoron. So if the triviality objection succeeds, it follows that we should either stop calling works of literature insightful and perceptive, or that those terms have a different meaning in the context of literary criticism than they do in everyday parlance.There is nothing which in principle debars a philosophical theory from correcting mistaken practices but the practice in this case is widespread and, on the face of it, unobjectionable. The alternative available open to anti-cognitivism is that literary critical terminology has an altogether different meaning from that in ordinary parlance, so that in a literary context a term such as "insightful" has a formal meaning only. Peter Lamarque for instance asserts that we (rightly) evaluate works of literature in part in terms of their content, but not in terms of the truth of the content: "it is usually a work's treatment of a theme which is judged profound or sentimental."3 Lamarque gives the following examples: "Milton's treatment of the Fall is profound just as is Descartes's appeal to God to refute scepticism, but neither need be interpreted as true." However, it is not as easy to divorce profundity from truth as Lamarque implies. With regard to Milton's treatment of the Fall, it is possible to find it profound without believing in the literal truth of the Fall. One might point to, for example, Milton's treatment of the sexuality of Adam and Eve, and the way in which it is bound up with their awareness of their mortality. When, in Paradise Lost, Adam learns of Eve's disobedience, he declares his wish to fall with her... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Literature, Politics, and CharacterOliver Conolly and Bashshar HaydarWhat is the relationship between literature and politics? We might interpret this question in terms of causality. For example, we might ask whether literature has any effects in the world of politics and if so how. Auden famously proclaimed that poetry makes nothing happen, while it was central to Brecht's dramaturgy that theatre has certain political effects on its audience. Conversely, we (...) might see literature as an effect of political causes and claim that certain political environments give rise to certain types of literature, and that those political backgrounds thereby explain certain aspects of literary phenomena. Both kinds of causal relationship are at the heart of Marxist literary criticism, and of the many schools of academic criticism which share the Marxist assumption that individual consciousness, and its literary manifestations, are subordinate to political environment.These causal questions are important and interesting, particularly if approached with requisite critical tact. However, in this paper we would like to focus on the epistemological and normative questions of whether literature is suited to communicate political knowledge or insights, and whether we value, or rather ought to value, literature for such communication. These two questions are in our view intimately related. While there is no doubt that literary works can be made to communicate virtually all kinds of knowledge, from knowledge about the Big Bang to knowledge how to smuggle illegal immigrants into First World countries, these kinds of knowledge are not what we go to literature for. We go to literature and value it for giving us knowledge which it is peculiarly suited to communicate. It is natural to praise a novel for its insight into, say, character but odd to praise a novel for its [End Page 87] insight into, say, meteorology. This is because literature is suited at communicating insights into character, and is not suited at communicating insights into meteorology.The suitability of literature to explore the inner life derives from the expressive and imaginative possibilities inherent in the very medium of literature. For example, Henry James's Portrait of a Lady reveals the inner logic (or psychologic) that underlies the self-destructive behavior of its heroine, Isabel Archer, her disastrous choice of husband being dictated by a desire to prove a point to herself—that she is indifferent to his poverty relative to that of the other suitors—rather than an informed sense of her true interests.1 This is not to say that literature is the only medium in which insight into character can be communicated, but that this is one of the kinds of insight which literature is suited at communicating.The question of whether literature is suited to impart political insights is thus determinative of the question of whether its doing so counts towards its value as literature.2 This is the question to which we now turn.IThe question of whether literature is suited to impart political insights presupposes an understanding of the scope of the political, and the kinds of phenomena that can properly be called political. The scope of the political can be conceived more or less broadly. The narrow view is that politics is concerned with the nature and legitimacy of the state, government, legal and other coercive institutions. The broad view is that politics is concerned with power relations between social groups that are mediated not through institutions but through attitudes.The distinction can be illustrated with reference to two kinds of feminist argument. Feminist arguments for laws on sex discrimination and equal pay, and their proper implementation, are political in the narrow sense. However, feminists may also argue, irrespective of such institutional changes, that social attitudes towards women—the attitudes of a given society, including those of women—should be changed in certain ways. For example, a generally held view that emphasizes the importance of women's appearance, their role as adjuncts to their husbands—the kinds of views that were prevalent in the 1950's, say—is open to challenge by feminists outside a narrow institutional framework. The reason this [End Page 88] stance is political is that it concerns systemic attitudes which underpin power relations between one group... (shrink)

"Faction" is a hybrid genre, aiming at the factual accuracy of journalism on the one hand and the literary form of the novel on the other. There is a fundamental tension however between those two aims, given the constraints which factual accuracy places on characterization, plot, and thematic exploration characteristic of the novel. Further, faction cannot be defended on the grounds that factual accuracy is a literary value in faction. Finally, some aspects of faction, such as its inability to refer (...) to sources or provide an analytic framework for a narrative, hinder rather than facilitate the communication of facts. (shrink)

Irreversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general and do not admit of exceptions, is defended from the criticisms levelled against it by George Dickie in ‘Reading Sibley’. The authors' view that Frank Sibley adhered to a form of reversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general but can sometimes become reasons to disvalue artworks, according to which there a criterion for distinguishing valenced from neutral aesthetic properties, is (...) also defended. (shrink)

In Responding to Global Poverty, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland argue that, while exploitation is morally problematic, responsibilities not to exploit are characteristically less stringent than responsibilities not to harm. They even suggest that exploiters’ responsibilities to assist the exploited may be weaker than the responsibilities of culpable bystanders who are able to help the poor but fail to do so We think Barry and Øverland underestimate the prospects of the exploitation argument. In our paper, we suggest that exploitation can (...) plausibly be understood as a kind of harm. If exploitation harms, then it requires special justification and can generate stringent responsibilities not to exploit that have a different ground than those generated by morally culpable failures to assist. This suggests an important way to rehabilitate arguments for poverty relief on the basis of a duty not to harm, and that there is more interesting territory to explore than Barry and Øverland’s arguments suggest. (shrink)

Technological advances in the information and knowledge society have influenced and transformed economic, social and educational dynamics. Currently there are many digital gaps related to the access to technology, lack of digital literacy and social use. These gaps vary based on the population ages and become more notorious in elders. This digital illiteracy is making all technological developments of the XXI Century to be underused, not making possible to take advantage of all the possibilities that they offer to our society, (...) in this case, to Colombia. This study aims at analyzing the penetration level and use of handheld digital devices, especially the cellular phone, in adult population, based on the 2016 national survey of life quality in Colombia, elaborated by Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística-DANE, specifically on the module of ownership and use of ICT goods. Results of four age groups are compared: 32 years or under, from 33 to 45, from 46 to 59, and over 60. The total sample is 37047 inhabitants of the Colombian territory, grouped by regions (Antioquia, Bogota, Caribbean, Eastern Central, Orinoquia, Amazonia, Pacific, San Andres, and Valle del Cauca). Data have been analyzed by using descriptive and inferential statistical procedures, contingency tables analysis, and logistic regression, in order to identify and know the effect of age on the level of penetration and use of handheld digital devices when comparing results in young adults and older ones. Findings show that young adults use these technologies in a greater proportion when comparing to older adults, showing a significant correlation between age and the increase of the digital gaps of access and social use of handheld digital devices. Even when characteristics like country regions, level of education, and the urban or rural setting are taking into account, the probability of obtaining penetration and use of handheld digital devices decreases significantly when attaining old age. (shrink)

Книга представляет собой реконструкцию и анализ томистской концепции бессмертия человеческой души в общем контексте философии Фомы Аквинского.

Majalla al-Aḥkam al-‘Adliyyah, which is the first example of codification based on Islamic law, has been the subject of criticism from different angles in terms of its preparation and content. The main reasons for criticism are following the casuistic method, being limited to the Hanafi sect, and therefore, the regulations on some issues not meeting the needs of the period, and the lack and excesses that do not comply with the content of the civil law. The commentator of the Majalla, (...) ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, also criticized Majalla from different angles. In this study, it was aimed to identify, describe, and classify Ali Ḥaydar Efendi's critics of the Majalla, and -with some exceptions- no evaluation was made about the criticism of the commentator. Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, the author of the most comprehensive and famous commentary of the Majalla, Dureru'l-hukkâm, criticized the Majalla both in terms of law technique and content, justified his criticisms, and offered alternative suggestions regarding the issues he criticized. Although Ali Ḥaydar Efendi criticized an item for only one reason, he criticized some items from more than one point of view. In the article, each of the criticisms of Ali Ḥaydar Efendi on the Majalla’s items is discussed under a separate heading, and the items criticized from more than one point of view are discussed under a separate heading and exemplified as much as possible. His criticisms of the Majalla in terms of law technique are as follows: The statements of the items are prone to making wrong judgments, not of a general nature, the concepts are not used appropriately, both the concepts and the items are not compatible with each other and with the fiqh books, having some missing, unnecessary or incorrect statements in the items, and the lack of records in the statements. Among the criticisms made in terms of content, first of all, the fact that the provision contained in the article is contrary to the ruling in the fiqh books or the view of the sect should be mentioned. Some of the criticisms in terms of content are related to the preferences made while preparing the Majalla. In this context, it has been the subject of criticism that some of the preferred views are not suitable for the needs of the period or the preferred view in the madhhab, conflicting between preferences from time to time, and not making a choice in some controversial issues. The existence of provisions that do not comply with the requirements of the time, and the asl-far' incompatibility is another reason for criticism. In such criticisms, the suitability of the content of the law with the madhhab books in various aspects has been tried to be revealed, and inappropriate aspects have been criticized. However, ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also pointed out that the text of the law should be prepared by making use of the provisions of different madhhabs, since it does not meet the needs of the time, although it is in accordance with the provisions of the madhhab. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticized the Majalla in terms of missing some issues or not being regulated sufficiently, and included provisions regarding the qarḍ contract and crimes against animals, which were not dealt with even though they should have been included in the Majalla. However, he never touched upon the subjects of consumption and ribā, which were not dealt with in the Majalla, although they should have been. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi said that there is a deficiency in the items dealing with subjects such as luqata and hacr, since some conditions regarding these issues are not included. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi also criticizes the Majalla in terms of the contradiction between the provisions contained in the items; the lack of unity in language, style and terminology among the items; and unnecessary repetitions both between the items and within the items. ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi, who did not make any criticism about the repetitions due to the fact that the Majalla was prepared with the casuistic method, justified or criticized the other repetitions and offered suggestions to avoid such repetitions. Also, according to him, there are deliberate repetitions in the Majalla. In addition, he also criticized the Majalla from a systematic point of view, such as the incompatibility of the title and content, the arrangement of similar subjects in different chapters/items/paragraphs, or the handling of different subjects in the same chapter/item/paragraph. Another criticism of ‘Ali Ḥaydar Efendi about the Majalla is about definitions. He criticizes the definitions made as not being collectively exhaustive, mutually exclusive and not being in the definition technique such as the tautology, but also on the grounds that it is not comprehensive, contrary to the method followed in other definitions made in the Majalla, and not being included in the fiqh books. (shrink)