Results for 'Humean Theory of Motivation'

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  1.  10
    The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
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  2. The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended.Neil Sinhababu - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.
    This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean (...). The essay addresses the classic objection that the Humean theory cannot explain the feeling of obligation, Stephen Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. (shrink)
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  3. The Humean Theory of Motivation.Michael Smith - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  4. The Humean Theory of Motivation Rejected.G. F. Schueler - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):103-122.
    In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only (...)
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  5. How Simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Olof Leffler - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):125-140.
    In recent discussions of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM), several authors – not to mention other philosophers around the proverbial water cooler – have appealed to the simplicity of the theory to defend it. But the argument from simplicity has rarely been explicated or received much critical attention – until now. I begin by reconstructing the argument and then argue that it suffers from a number of problems. Most importantly, first, I argue that HTM is (...)
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  6. Humean Theories of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Volume 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 195-223.
  7. Humean Theories of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
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  8. The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2008 - In A Companion to Hume. Wiley-Blackwell.
  9. Humean Theories of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.
     
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  10. What Kind of Theory is the Humean Theory of Motivation?Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):322-342.
    I consider an underappreciated problem for proponents of the Humean theory of motivation. Namely, it is unclear whether is it to be understood as a largely psychological or largely metaphysical theory. I show that the psychological interpretation of HTM will need to be modified in order to be a tenable view and, as it will turn out, the modifications required render it virtually philosophically empty. I then argue that the largely metaphysical interpretation is the only a (...)
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  11. Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Adam R. Thompson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1345-1364.
    A classic, though basically neglected question about motivation arises when we attempt to account for blame’s nature—namely, does the recognition central to blame need help from an independent desire in order to motivate the blame-characteristic dispositions that arise in the blamer? Those who have attended to the question think the answer is yes. Hence, they adopt what I call a Humean Construal of blame on which blame is (a) a judgment that an individual S is blameworthy and (b) (...)
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    What the Humean Theory of Motivation Gets Wrong.Caroline T. Arruda - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:157-178.
    I show that defenses of the Humean theory of motivation often rely on a mistaken assumption. They assume that desires are necessary conditions for being motivated to act because desires themselves have a special, essential, necessary feature, such as their world-to-mind direction of fit, that enables them to motivate. Call this the Desire-Necessity Claim. Beliefs cannot have this feature, so they cannot motivate. Or so the story goes. I show that: when pressed, a proponent of HTM encounters (...)
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  13. Directions of Fit and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Mary Clayton Coleman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):127 – 139.
    According to the Humean theory of motivation, a person can only be motivated to act by a desire together with a relevantly related belief. More specifically, a person can only be motivated to ϕ by a desire to ψ together with a belief that ϕ-ing is a means to or a way of ψ-ing. In recent writings, Michael Smith gives what has become a very influential argument in favour of the Humean claim that desire is a (...)
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  14. The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.
    This paper offers a simple and novel motivation for the Humean Theory of Reasons. According to the Humean Theory of Reasons, all reasons must be explained by some psychological state of the agent for whom they are reasons, such as a desire. This view is commonly thought¹ to be motivated by a substantive theory about the power of reasons to motivate known as reason internalism, and a substantive theory about the possibility of being (...)
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  15. Non‐Humean Theories of Natural Necessity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (5):1-1.
    Non‐Humean theories of natural necessity invoke modally‐laden primitives to explain why nature exhibits lawlike regularities. However, they vary in the primitives they posit and in their subsequent accounts of laws of nature and related phenomena (including natural properties, natural kinds, causation, counterfactuals, and the like). This article provides a taxonomy of non‐Humean theories, discusses influential arguments for and against them, and describes some ways in which differences in goals and methods can motivate different versions of non‐Humeanism (and, for (...)
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  16. Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new desire that in (...)
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  17.  22
    Ego Depletion and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Patrick Fleming - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):390-396.
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  18. Nietzsche’s Humean (All-Too-Humean) Theory of Motivation.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - In The Nietzchean Mind. Routledge. pp. 161-176.
    Nietzsche and Hume agree that desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This shared view helps them appreciate continuities between human and animal motivation and sets them against a long tradition of rationalist rivals including Kant and Plato. In responding to Kant, Nietzsche further developed the Humean views that Kant himself was responding to. Kantians like Christine Korsgaard argue that reflective endorsement and rejection of options presented by desire demonstrates reason’s ability to independently drive reasoning and action. (...)
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  19. A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.
    According to the quasi-perceptualist account of philosophical intuitions, they are intellectual appearances that are psychologically and epistemically analogous to perceptual appearances. Moral intuitions share the key characteristics of other intuitions, but can also have a distinctive phenomenology and motivational role. This paper develops the Humean claim that the shared and distinctive features of substantive moral intuitions are best explained by their being constituted by moral emotions. This is supported by an independently plausible non-Humean, quasi-perceptualist theory of emotion, (...)
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  20.  62
    Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Christos Douskos - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (2):199-233.
    A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligible (M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell 1994). I start by developing a linguistic argument against this claim. The semantics of certain ‘learning to’ and ‘knowing to’ ascriptions points to a dispositional state (...)
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  21. The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (6):1-13.
    Christine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational to (...)
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  22.  7
    Reid's Non-Humean Theory of Moral Motives.Esther Engels Kroeker - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):205-224.
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  23. Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation.Jonathan Dancy - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):1-18.
    To the extent, then, that we set our face against admitting the truth of Humeanism in the theory of motivation, to that extent we are probably going to feel that there is no such thing as the theory of motivation, so conceived, at all. And that will be the position that this paper is trying to defend, though not only for this reason. It might seem miraculous that so much can be extracted from the little distinction (...)
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  24. Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation.Ralph Wedgwood - 1995 - European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):273-288.
    According to the anti-Humean theory of motivation, it is possible to be motivated to act by reason alone. According to the Humean theory of motivation, this is impossible. The debate between these two theories remains as vigorous as ever (see for example Pettit 1987, Lewis 1988, Price 1989 and Smith 1994). In this paper I shall argue that the anti-Humean theory of motivation is incompatible with a number of prominent recent theories (...)
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  25.  11
    Kant's Theory of Motivation and Rational Agency.Paula Satne - 2009 - Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    It is clear that Kant's theory of motivation plays a central role in his ethical theory as a whole. Nevertheless, it has been subjected to many interpretations: (i) the 'orthodox' interpretation, (ii) the 'Aristotelian' or 'Humean' interpretation and (iii) the 'rationalist' interpretation. The first part of the thesis aims to provide an interpretation of Kant's theory of rational agency and motivation. I argue that the 'orthodox' and 'Aristotelian' interpretations should be rejected because they are (...)
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  26. Making Sense of the Sense of Duty: A Humean Theory of Moral Motivation.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    Utilitarian and deontological moral theories are often accused of failing to develop a convincing account of an agent's moral psychology, and so failing to provide an adequate theory of moral motivation that sustains their conception of morality as involving generally overriding moral duties. As a result of this apparent conflict between an agent's psychology and the demands of morality, many suggest making dramatic revisions to our conception of morality. I argue here that a more promising response is to (...)
     
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  27. Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.
    In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to (...)
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  28. The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic.Rachel Singpurwalla - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):880-892.
    Many philosophers today approach important psychological phenomena, such as weakness of the will and moral motivation, using a broadly Humean distinction between beliefs, which aim to represent the world, and desires, which aim to change the world. On this picture, desires provide the ends or goals of action, while beliefs simply tell us how to achieve those ends. In the Republic, Socrates attempts to explain the phenomena using a different distinction: he argues that the human soul or psyche (...)
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  29.  75
    Hume's Theory of Motivation.Daniel Shaw - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):163-183.
    The paper defends a humean account of motivating desires as introspectible causes of actions against objections raised by b stroud and t nagel. Hume's doctrine of the calm passions and the incorrigibility thesis are discussed and defended with reference to conscious desires. The account is then extended to cover unconscious motivation as well.
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  30. Wants and Desires: A Critique of Conativist Theory of Motivation.Chris Meyers - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research:357-370.
    In this paper I will argue against the Humean theory of motivation, or “conativism” which claims that all actions are ultimately generated by desires. Conativism is supported by (1) a behavioral analysis of desire as a disposition to act in certain ways, and (2) the difference between belief and desire in terms of their different “direction of fi t” with the world. I will show that this behavioral account of desire cannot provide an adequate explanation of action. (...)
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  31. Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality.Mark van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (1):37-57.
    Michael Smith's recent defence of the theory shows promise, in that it captures the most common reasons for accepting a Humean view. But, as I will argue, it falls short of vindicating the view. Smith's argument fails, because it ignores the role of rationality conditions on the ascription of motivating reason explanations. Because of these conditions, we must have a theory of rationality before we choose a theory of motivation. Thus, we cannot use Humean (...)
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  32.  99
    Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Mind 96 (384):530-533.
    In 'The Humean Theory of Motivation' Michael Smith attempts two tasks: he offers an account of the debate about motivation between Humeans and anti-Humeans and he provides arguments that are designed to show that the Humeans win. While the paper is of great virtue in clarifying the debate, I believe that it falls short of both its goals. It does not highlight the really central issue between Humeans and anti-Humeans and it does not provide arguments which (...)
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  33. The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.Derek Clayton Baker - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.
    A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, (...)
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  34.  48
    Humean Laws of Nature: The End of the Good Old Days.Craig Callender - unknown
    I show how the two great Humean ways of understanding laws of nature, projectivism and systems theory, have unwittingly reprised developments in metaethics over the past century. This demonstration helps us explain and understand trends in both literatures. It also allows work on laws to “leap- frog” over the birth of many new positions, the nomic counterparts of new theories in metaethics. However, like leap-frogging from agriculture to the internet age, it’s hardly clear that we’ve landed in a (...)
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  35. Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122.
    Hume’s thesis that reason alone does not motivate is taken as the ground for this theory: Reason produces beliefs only, and beliefs are mere representations of fact, which, without passions for the objects the beliefs concern, cannot move anyone at all. Discussions of the Humean theory of motivation usually begin with the motivating passions in place without asking about their genesis. This emphasis, I think, overlooks a good deal of what Hume’s thesis concerning the motivational impotence (...)
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  36. The Possibility of Philosophy of Action.Michael A. Smith - 1998 - In Jan Bransen & Stefaan Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 17--41.
    This article was conceived as a sequel to “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” The paper addresses various challenges to the standard account of the explanation of intentional action in terms of desire and means-end belief, challenges that didn’t occur to me when I wrote “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” I begin by suggesting that the attraction of the standard account lies in the way in which it allows us to unify a vast array of (...)
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  37.  95
    The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.
    Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...)
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  38. Humean Externalism and the Argument From Depression.Steven Swartzer - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-16.
    Several prominent philosophers have argued that the fact that depressed agents sometimes make moral judgments without being appropriately motivated supports Humean externalism – the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are distinct from or “external” to an agent’s motivationally inert moral judgments. This essay argues that such motivational failures do not, in fact, provide evidence for this view. I argue that, if the externalist argument from depression is to undermine a philo-sophically important (...)
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  39.  7
    The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357-376.
    Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...)
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  40.  37
    Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment: A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature. [REVIEW]Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Review of Metaphysics 48 (2):394-395.
    The central, general claim that Brand defends is that an understanding of Hume's view of general rules in book 1 of the Treatise is crucial to a full appreciation of Hume's account of moral judgment in book 3. Although Brand also discusses other respects in which the Treatise is a unified work, both the book's title and subtitle suggest a study more wide-ranging than we actually find. Moreover, discussion of some of the issues important for Brand's interpretation, such as the (...)
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  41.  6
    Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all action and practical reasoning. -/- Desire motivates us to pursue its object. It makes thoughts of its object pleasant. It focuses attention on its object. Its effects are amplified by vivid representations of its object. These aspects of desire explain why motivation usually accompanies moral belief, how intentions shape our plans, how we exercise willpower, what human selves are, how action can express (...)
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  42. Should Motivational Humeans Be Humeans About Rationality?Mark van Roojen - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):209-215.
    Robust moral rationalism has long been regarded as incompatible with the Humean Theory of Motivation which requires desires to ground motives. Recently this orthodoxy has been challenged on the ground that rationality itself might require certain desires. This strategy does not remove the tension between rationalism and the Humean Theory. If rationalism is correct, new normative beliefs should engender new motives - motives not grounded in a means-ends fashion in rationally required existing desires. Thus the (...)
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  43.  47
    How Humeans Can Make Normative Beliefs Motivating.William Ratoff - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.
    Normative realism faces a problem concerning the practicality of normative judgment, the presumptive view that normative judgments are motivational states. Normative judgments, for the normative realist, must be beliefs. This is problematic because it is difficult to see how any belief could have the necessary connection to motivation required to account for the practicality of normative judgment. After all, the Humean theory of motivation has it that motivated action is only brought about by a belief and (...)
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    A Humean Explanation of Acting on Normative Reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.
    This article presents a limited defense of Humeanism about practical reason. Jonathan Dancy and other traditional objective-reasons theorists argue that all practical reasons, what we think about when we deliberate, are facts or states of affairs in the world. On the Humean view, the reasons that motivate us are belief-desire combinations, which are in the mind. Thus, Dancy and others reject Humeanism on the grounds that it cannot allow that anyone acts from a normative reason. I argue, first, that (...)
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  45. The Nature of Motivation (and Why It Matters Less to Ethics Than One Might Think).Robert Noggle - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):87-111.
    What my suggestion rules out – if it is right – is the project of using some thesis about the conative or cognitive nature of motivation to argue for some thesis in meta-ethics. [...] facts about human motivation can be captured equally well with conativist or cognitivist language. And if that is true, then nothing about motivation either implies or rules out internalist moral realism.
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  46.  22
    Humean Moral Motivation.Andres Luco - 2013 - In Bert Musschenga & Anton van Harskamp (eds.), What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Springer. pp. 131-150.
    Moral motivation refers to the psychological causes that motivate or explain moral action. Moral action refers to action that complies with the requirements of morality. In this essay, I lay out alternative views on moral motivation, giving particular attention the way each view conceives of the explanatory link between practical reasoning and moral conduct. In trying to understand this link, philosophers look to moral judgment. The main rival accounts of the relationship between practical reasoning, moral judgment, and moral (...)
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  47. The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2:195-219.
     
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  48.  70
    A Challenge for Humean Externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has (...)
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  49. Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  50. The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii. Clarendon Press.
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